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A Unified Concept of Population Transfer
(Revised*)
CHRISTOPHER M. GOEBEL**
Population transfer is an issue arising often in areas of ethnic ten-
sion, from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Western Sahara,
Tibet, Cyprus, and beyond. There are two forms of human population
transfer: removals and settlements. Generally, commentators in interna-
tional law have yet to discuss the two together as a single category of
population transfer. In discussing the prospects for a unified concept of
population transfer, this article is the first to compare and contrast in-
ternational law's application to removals and settlements.
I. INTRODUCTION
International attention is focusing on uprooted people, especially
where there are tensions between ethnic populations. The Red Cross has
spent a significant proportion of its budget aiding what it called "dis-
placed persons,"" removed en masse from their abodes. Ethnic cleansing,
a term used by the Serbs, was a process of population transfer aimed at
removing the non-Serbian population from large areas of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina.2 The large-scale Jewish settlements into the Israeli-occupied
Arab territories continue to receive publicity. Why not examine these and
other mass removals and settlements of people under a single category,
called population transfer?
Recent discussions at the United Nations and elsewhere, led by
human rights activists, have hinted at such a unified treatment of popula-
tion transfer in an effort to focus attention on "stateless people" faced
* In order to correct errors that were made in editing the version of this Article
formerly published in volume 21, number 1 of the Journal, this revision replaces the
previous version in its entirety.
** Associate, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, on leave as a Fulbright scholar in
France, 1993-94. J.D., 1991, Harvard University. An early draft of this Article was presented
at the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization [hereinafter U.N.P.O.] Conference
on the Human Rights Dimensions of Population Transfer, Tallinn, Estonia, January 11-13,
1992. The author expresses gratitude for comments on drafts by Henry Steiner and Michael
van Walt van Praag. Support also came from Marc Granowitter, Christa Meindersma and
the author's father, Edward W. Goebel, Jr. The foregoing do not necessarily share the views
expressed herein.
1. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 36TH MEETING (SECOND PART), at 20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/
SR.36/Add.1 (1992). These operations were in Africa, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East,
and Europe, which reflects the broad scope of the problem.
2. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., THE ETHNIC
CLEANSING OF BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 5 (Comm. Print 1992).
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with either removal from an area or settlement into one.3 A conference in
1992 deliberated on situations that occurred in what conference partici-
pants called "sovereign states" (e.g. Poland, claiming to have experienced
principally large-scale removals in the form of expulsions by Hitler and
Stalin), as well as areas "occupied" now or at some point in the recent
past (e.g. Western Sahara, the Baltics States, East Timor and Tibet, by
massive settlements and removals), "nations without a state" (e.g. Kurdi-
stan, principally by removals), the lands of "indigenous peoples" (e.g.
Aboriginals of Australia and Chakmas of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, by
settlements and removals), the lands of "ethnic minorities" (e.g. Albani-
ans in Kosova, principally by removals), and others.4 This approach to-
ward removals would take into account situations ranging from the more
traditionally recognized expulsion of a minority from a country to the
forced removal of a significant number of indigenous people for a dam
project. Settlements would include those occurring on a large scale both
across U.N.-recognized borders and internally. In any event, population
transfer, however defined, should be confused neither with refugee move-
ments5 nor with normal migration on an individual basis for economic
3. Just in the last three years, the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities [hereinafter U.N. Sub-Commission] has begun to adopt
resolutions covering both forms of movement under the single category of population trans-
fer. See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF
MINORIrIES ON ITS FORTY-FOURTH SESSION, 70-72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/58 (1992)
[hereinafter U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28]; UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMISSION ON THE
PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES ON ITS FORTY-SECOND SES-
SION, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/59 (1990) [hereinafter U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution
1990/17]; UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF
MINORITIES ON ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/65 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/28].
4. UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLES ORGANIZATION, HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS OF
POPULATION TRANSFER: CONFERENCE HELD IN TALLIN, ESTONIA, JANUARY, 1992, at 6 (David
Goldberg, rapporteur, 1992) [hereinafter U.N.P.O. CONFERENCE REPORT].
5. Although when refugee movements are large, such a distinction becomes difficult.
Refugees, strictly defined, move freely out of their own political motivation. Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force
Apr. 22, 1954); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967); RICHARD PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MI-
GRATION LAW 393 (2d ed. 1988). See also Institute of International Law: Resolutions
Adopted at its Bath Session, art. 1, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 15 (Supp. 1951). In contrast, settlers
and removed people in the context of this Article, rather than being motivated by a per-
sonal, individual desire for political asylum, are treated as group phenomena whereby plan-
ning and implementation of the movement, as well as the ultimate motivation, belong to
governments. It is often difficult to tell whether a refugee moves freely. On a practical level,
then, the categories of population transfer and refugee movements may overlap. One differ-
ence is that refugee movement, strictly defined, occurs across international frontiers,
whereas population transfer can also occur within states. Regarding the Kurdish people, the
period before the Gulf War saw movements that were population transfer, the removal of
Kurdish people caused in part by the Iraqi government's use of poison gas. See MINORITY
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reasons. 6 For years now, some in the policy-making community have min-
gled population transfer's two forms.' Despite such discussions, commen-
tators on international law traditionally have not followed suit.8 Besides a
handful of scholars, including those recognized herein, few have published
lately on either form of population transfer. A unique aspect of the pre-
sent Article is that, while examining a broad concept of population trans-
fer, it compares removals and settlements under applicable international
law. Indeed, to some extent population transfers must be examined on a
case-by-case basis. Rather than do so, however, this Article serves as an
overview of issues relating to population transfer.
In the context of this Article, as a basic rule, transfers of both types
are meant to have in common the element of moving a large number of
people, in relative rather than absolute terms,9 and state involvement or
significant acquiescence in the movement. The specific people involved
can be categorized as removed people, settlers, and, where there are set-
tlers, original inhabitants of the area receiving the settlers. From there,
analysis becomes more difficult. Forced removals, in specific circum-
stances, have been adjudged crimes against humanity. Settlements as well
as removals, under certain restrictions, have violated doctrines of human-
itarian law. Discrepancies exist between the two types of transfer along
RIGHTS GROUP, THE KURDS: MASSACRE BY GAS (1989); MIDDLE EAST WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS
IN IRAQ (1990); Judith Miller, Iraq Accused: A Case of Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1993,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 12, 16. By contrast, flows of Kurdish population in the post-Gulf War
period, more than beforehand, involved refugees. For example, the landmark U.N. Security
Council Resolution 688 addressed Kurdish refugees from Iraq. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N.
SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
6. Regarding migration, see generally PLENDER, supra note 5. See also Myron Weiner,
Security, Stability and International Migration (Dec. 5-6, 1991) (unpublished manuscript
presented at the Conference on the Impact of International Migration on the Security and
Stability of States, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
(differentiating between normal migration, on the one hand, and population movement with
substantial government involvement on the other).
7. See, e.g., Thayer Scudder & Elizabeth Colson, From Welfare to Development: A
Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Dislocated People, in INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION
AND RESETTLEMENT 267 (Art Hansen & Anthony Oliver-Smith eds., 1982).
8. Some analyses, such as Israel Shahak, A History of the Concept of "Transfer" in
Zionism, 18 J. PALESTINE STUD. 22 n.3 (1989) and Alfred M. De Zayas, International Law
and Mass Population Transfers, 16 HARV. INT'L L. J. 207 (1975) [hereinafter De Zayas, Law
and Transfers], treat population transfer as principally the removal of people, whereas
other writings touch on settlements as a phenomenon isolated from removals. See, e.g.,
Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since
1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44 (1990).
9. Cf. U.N.P.O. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7 ("Should numbers be part of
the definition, or should the definition focus on the rationale and intention involved in the
transfer?"). This conference report proposed a unified definition of "population transfer":
"the movement of large numbers of people, either into or away from a certain territory,
with state involvement or acquiescence of government and without the free and informed
consent of the people being moved or the people into whose territory they are being
moved." Id. (emphasis added). This definition turns on the element of consent. Also, it
raises the issue of territorial definition, treated herein.
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such doctrinal lines, and also as to whether the element of consent is a
criterion proper to population transfer. 10 The extent to which those and
other differences resolve themselves, and to which the two types of trans-
fer thus collapse into a unified and coherent category of treatment, will
depend on the future development of international law towards not only
the practices of population transfer but also their effects on removed peo-
ple, settlers, and original inhabitants.
II. PRACTICES OF POPULATION TRANSFER
A. Population Transfer as a Crime Against Humanity and Possible
Extensions
The mass removal of citizens across internationally recognized bor-
ders of a state is called mass deportation or expulsion. Mass deportations,
such as those perpetrated by Nazi Germany, may violate the Nuremberg
principles and, therefore, constitute war crimes or crimes against human-
ity in times of international" and, it has been argued, civil war.12
As a recent example, the expulsion of masses of non-Serbs from east-
ern Croatia across front lines, by bus and other methods, was accom-
plished through coercion, including threats, violence and discrimination.' 3
Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the mass deportation of people to
create ethnically pure areas was a strategy important to Serbia.' These
10. The U.N. Sub-Commission was "[c]oncerned that the movement of people is often
achieved either without free and informed consent of those people being moved or without
the consent of those people into whose territory they are being moved." U.N. Sub-Commis-
sion Resolution 1990/17, supra note 3. See also U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/28,
supra note 3; U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 70-71 (preamble).
11. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, arts. 6(b)-(c), 59 Stat.
1546, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 288; Indictment of the International Military Tribunal, in 1
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG 27, Count 3, §§ B, J, at 51-52, 63-65 (1947). See
also Alfred-Maurice De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. 234,
235-36 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1975) [hereinafter De Zayas, Forced Resettlement]; U.N.
Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/28, supra note 3. Mass deportations should be distin-
guished from deportations on an individual basis. Ruth Lapidoth, Expulsion of Civilians
from Areas under Israeli Control in 1967, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 97, 102-04 (1991) (It is more
inconclusive whether customary international law has prohibited the deportation of individ-
uals, as opposed to en masse). U.N. General Assembly Resolution 95 (1) of December 11,
1946, gave expression to the general applicability of the Nuremberg principles. 2 LASSA OP-
PENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 616-19 (7th ed. 1952). But see JuLIus STONE, No PEACE, No
WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST 17 (1969).
12. De Zayas, Law and Transfers, supra note 8, at 221; UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY
COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF SECURITY COUN-
CIL RESOLUTION 808, at para. 47, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter SECURITY COUNCIL
808 REPORT].
13. HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 75-81 (1992).
14. See id. at 71; John F. Burns, Bosnian Strife Cuts Old Bridges of Trust, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 1992, at AS (noting that although non-Serbs also carried out deportations of Serbs,
the process appeared to have been more systematic in the case of Serbs deporting non-
Serbs).
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expulsions contributed a substantial number of the non-Serbs who exited
Bosnia and Herzegovina." Occurring during international war, these ex-
pulsions surely could face adjudication for crimes against humanity. Had
they occurred earlier, before the international community recognized the
independence of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situations
would have been deemed uniquely civil wars with the front lines inside
national boundaries.16 Nevertheless, the coercive tactics of "ethnic purifi-
cation 1 7 allegedly used by Serbian militia would not have changed with
the varying classification of the war. This case weighs against drawing a
strong distinction between international and civil war in determining
whether population transfers are crimes against humanity.
As seen through the nature of the above examples, the treatment
under international law of removals of people depends on whether the
transfers occur during belligerency. Yet even in peacetime, mass expul-
sions across borders of citizens"' or of aliens who were in the originating
territory lawfully, such as Asians from Uganda, 9 are circumscribed
closely by human rights law.2" This is triggered by the presence of dis-
criminatory or racist characteristics in the expulsions.2 1
Of course, not all governments undertaking removals across interna-
tional borders lack concern for those being removed. The desire as a sov-
ereign to "save" a threatened minority abroad by "inviting" it into the
sovereign territory motivates some of these governments. An example is
where an element of exchange is involved, like the 1922-23 swap of
Greeks and Turks.22 In such cases, despite any state benevolency, jurists
15. HELSINKI WATCH, supra note 13, at 199 (categorizing the war as an international
armed conflict involving two states, Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina).
16. For an analysis of the conflict in former Yugoslavia as a civil war, see generally
Charles Lewis Nier III, Note, The Yugoslavia Civil War: An Analysis of the Applicability
of the Laws of War Governing Non-International Armed Conflict in the Modern World, 10
DICK J. INT'L L. 303 (1992).
17. Burns, supra note 14.
18. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Protocol 4, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept.
3, 1953).
19. See Richard Plender, The Ugandan Crisis and the Right of Expulsion Under In-
ternational Law, 9 INT'L COMM. JURISTS REV. 19, 27-30 (1972).
20. See PLENDER, supra note 5, at 474 n.174, 477; R.C. Chhangani, Notes and Com-
ments, Expulsion of Ugandan Asians and International Law, 12 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 400, 402,
405-07 (1972); De Zayas, Law and Transfers, supra note 8, at 244-45.
21. According to the U.N. Sub-Commission, "the practice of population transfer [refer-
ring to both removals and settlements] is discriminatory in its application and . . . inher-
ently leads to widespread and systematic discrimination." U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution
1991/28, supra note 3. See also U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at
70-71 (preamble).
22. See Alfred M. De Zayas, A Historical Survey of Twentieth Century Expulsions, in
REFUGEES IN THE AGE OF TOTAL WAR 15, 17-20 (Anna C. Bramwell ed., 1988) [hereinafter De
Zayas, Historical Survey]. During the Nuremberg trials, it was recognized that the motive
for transfer could go beyond ill-treatment of those transferred. A government official could
escape liability if military necessity motivated him. De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, supra
1993
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focus on more than just the attitude of the state. The perspective of the
transferees counts, too. For example, the Institut de Droit International,
in its 1952 session, expressed concern for those being removed, especially
as to whether their movement was voluntary.
23
The argument has been advanced that crimes against humanity ap-
ply outside of armed conflict even to the removal of people that starts
and finishes within the territory of a state. The argument zelies on the
analogy to apartheid in South Africa.24 The relocation of millions of
blacks to artificially created homelands in the land-locked interior of that
country, an effort by zonation programs of a development branch of the
government, raised sufficient international condemnation to be consid-
ered censured under customary international law. Integral to the govern-
ment's action of transferring the people were racism and discrimination.
Yet, other massive removals within borders, such as occurred in Guate-
mala,2 East Timor,'2  Australia, 7 Brazil,2 s Egypt, Argentina and Para-
guay, 29 met less international disapproval. At least in the last five in-
stances, which were relatively without belligerency in the sense of armed
conflict, some deference may have been given to governments' motiva-
tions for economic development. 0 Still, as in South Africa, whether the
note 11, at 236.
23. 44 ANNUAIRE INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 138 (1952) (Sienna Session). See
also PLENDER, supra note 5, at 474. Writing about removals, De Zayas comments that "most
transfers of population are not likely to be voluntary." Alfred M. De Zayas, The Legality of
Mass Population Transfers: The German Experience 1945-48, 12 E. EUR. Q. 1, 6 (1978)
[hereinafter De Zayas, German Experience].
24. De Zayas, German Experience, supra note 23, at 253; De Zayas, Forced Resettle-
ment, supra note 11, at 236. But see Lapidoth, supra note 11, at 104 (Drafters of the Nu-
remberg Charter may have meant to cover mass deportations undertaken specifically for
forced labor and extermination).
25. See WEARNE PHILLIP, THE MAYA OF GUATEMALA (Minority Rights Group Report No.
62, 1989); Counterinsurgency and the Development Pole Strategy in Guatemala, CULTURAL
SURVIVAL Q., vol. 12, No. 3, 1988, at 11; CULTURAL SURVIVAL, THE INDIANS OF GUATEMALA:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION (1987); CRAIG W..
NELSON, WITNESS TO GENOCIDE: THE PRESENT SITUATION OF INDIANS IN GUATEMALA (1983);
SURVIVAL INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALAN REFUGEES Now THREATENED BY RELOCATION (1984).
26. See JULIAN BURGER, REPORT FROM THE FRONTIER: THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S IN-
DIGENOUS PEOPLES 142 (1987); FINNGEIR HIORTH, TIMOR PAST AND PRESENT 61 (1985); Steven
Erlanger, East Timor, Reopened by Indonesia, Remains a Sad and Terrifying Place, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1990, at A18.
27. See MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP, REPORT No. 35, ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIANS (1988) (In
Queensland, mining policies, which effectively destroyed some of the economic and social
basis of Aboriginal traditional lifestyle, involved large scale removals).
28. See MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP, REPORT No. 15, WHAT FUTURE FOR THE AMERINDIANS
OF SOUTH AMERICA? (1977). In Brazil, the Sobradinho Dam project resettled about 60,000
urban and rural people. MICHAEL CERNEA, INTERNAL REFUGEES AND DEVELOPMENT-CAUSED
POPULATION DISPLACEMENT (Harvard Institute for International Development, Development
Discussion Paper No. 345, 1990).
29. See CERNEA, supra note 28, at 24-25. In Egypt, dam projects have removed and
resettled at least 100,000 people; in the border between Argentina and Paraguay, submer-
sion projects have removed some 45,000. Id.
30. If there is sufficient public interest for the transfer and proper compensation to-
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effects on those being moved rise to the level of systematic racial discrim-
ination is a factor that should be considered in determining whether any
large scale population transfer violates customary international law. s"
At least one international body has treated removal within borders
with disapproval. The invasion of Cyprus by Turkish troops in 1974 re-
sulted in the widespread eviction and population transfer of over 170,000
Greek Cypriots from their homes in the northern part of Cyprus. In Cy-
prus v. Turkey, the European Commission on Human Rights discussed
population transfer: "The Commission.. . considers that the transporta-
tion of Greek Cypriots to other places, in particular the forcible excur-
sions within the territory controlled by the Turkish army, and the depor-
tation of Greek Cypriots ... constitute an interference with their private
life."'s2 The Commission therefore linked a form of population transfer,
the removal of people, to the right to private life. This right is related to
the right to security of persons. Because the Commission saw forced
transportation as an infringement of the right to private life, the case set
a precedent regarding the use of force to transfer populations. The case
emphasized the voluntariness of the transfer.
Most importantly, in terms of any division between transfers across
borders and those only within, the language in Cyprus v. Turkey distin-
guished between those removals within the boundaries of the territory
controlled by the Turkish army and those across borders. The Commis-
sion condemned both extents of transfer. This condemnation invites
greater scrutiny towards removals occurring under belligerent conditions,
such as military occupation, even though only within state borders.
In brief conclusion about removals, belligerency is present in situa-
tions highly condemned under international law, though the need for bel-
ligerency is reduced by the presence of systematic racial discrimination,
as in Uganda or South Africa. Voluntariness is an important issue for
removals. In order to invoke crimes against humanity, the blatant lack of
voluntariness characterizing the victims of World War II-era transfers is
wards those being moved, these factors should play into the determination of the transfer's
permissibility. Claire Palley, Population Transfer and International Law 3 (Jan. 3, 1992)
(draft paper presented at the U.N.P.O. Conference, on file with author of this Article).
31. "A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, en-
courages or condones (a) genocide ... (f) systematic racial discrimination, . . .or (g) a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS]; accord Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co.,
Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5). See also International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, art. 5(d)(i), (ii), 660
U.N.T.S. 194, 220, 5 I.L.M. 352, 356 [hereinafter Discrimination Convention] (prohibiting
racial discrimination within the borders of a state, occurring in conjunction with limitations
on freedom of movement and residence); Palley, supra note 30, at 4. For further discussion
of freedom of movement, see infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
32. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482, 519-20
(1976) (Commission report) (emphasis added).
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vital. Furthermore, the issue of voluntariness has some importance re-
gardless of state intention. As shown by Cyprus v. Turkey, it also has
some consequence whether or not a transfer crosses international borders.
B. Population Transfer Under Humanitarian Law
The Baltic States, Cyprus, East Timor, the West Bank, Tibet, the
Western Sahara, and Eritrea have been locations of the other form of
population transfer: settlements."8 These movements, unlike some expul-
sions, have never been formally adjudged crimes against humanity. Be-
cause these locales have been sites of military occupations, the settle-
ments of the occupants' people have raised the issue of humanitarian law,
a part of international law that emphasizes the protection of the individ-
ual not only during and following belligerency, but, according to some
scholars, also during peacetime occupations.34
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War presents one of the clearest ex-
amples of positive international law governing population transfer:
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own
civilian population into the territory it occupies .... Individual or
mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons
from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to
that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited regardless
of their motive.35
Furthermore, the Geneva Convention may outlaw population transfers
into occupied lands not only during hostilities, but also afterwards until a
final political settlement has been reached in those lands.8 6 Protocol I to
the Geneva Convention states that the Geneva Convention applies to
"armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the
right of self determination as enshrined by the Charter of the United Na-
tions""3 and contains language similar to article 49.
33. Palley, supra note 30, at 5. For situations not documented elsewhere in the present
article, see MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP, REPORT No. 5, ERITREA AND TIGRAY 4-14 (1983). See
generally U.N.P.O. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 26-33.
34. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
35. Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 318 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention]. Regarding the extent to which the Geneva Convention constitutes customary
international law, see SECURITY COUNCIL 808 REPORT, supra note 12, at para. 37 ("The Ge-
neva Conventions constitute rules of international humanitarian law and provide the core of
the customary law applicable in international armed conflict").
36. See Geneva Convention, supra note 35, at arts. 1, 2, 4, 17, 47, 6 U.S.T. at 3518,
3518, 3520, 3530, 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at 287, 288, 290, 300, 318.
37. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 1, para. 4,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 7, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1397 [hereinafter Protocol I]. Regarding the extent to
which Protocol I constitutes customary international law, see Palley, supra note 30, at 7
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These provisions dictate that, but for certain specific exceptions, set-
tlements in an occupied territory contravene international law. While
forced or forcible movement is illegal under these codes,3 8 an important
issue is that of voluntary movement. On the one hand, the voluntary na-
ture of an act should not be interpreted to legalize what would otherwise
be considered a violation of an international standard.39 This is especially
true if the movement involves the purposes and effects, on both those
transferred and original inhabitants, that the Geneva Convention was
crafted to prevent. 0 On the other hand, there are legal difficulties inher-
ent in defining "voluntary." In this regard, it should be pointed out that
most settlements, if not forced, are facilitated by government actions.
One such tool is incentives, like increased industrialization in the area
targeted for transfer as occurred in Soviet-occupied Estonia and Latvia." '
Even if voluntary settlement on an individual basis is permissible under
article 49, the settlement programs of the 1980s and 1990s, especially the
ambitious programs like those of the Indonesian 2 and Chinese 43 govern-
ments, must be examined on an individual basis to determine whether
(stating that "many states have not ratified [Protocol I], and it remains doubtful to what
extent the Protocol is a reflection of customary law").
38. Cf. De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236. Regarding the other form
of transfer, i.e. removals, the "clear prohibition of forced resettlement in time of war has
been codified." Id.
39. The U.N. Sub-Commission has recognized the link between the right to security of
persons and the issue of population transfer. See U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1990/17,
supra note 3; U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/28, supra note 3; U.N. Sub-Commis-
sion Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 71 (preamble). In other contexts involving that
right, the consent of an individual does not legitimize violations of an international norm.
See Richard B. Lillich, Civil Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND
POLICY ISSUES 115, 120-124 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984) (explaining the right to security of
persons in connection with the right-to-life norm).
40. Roberts, supra note 8, at 84.
41. See Romauld J. Misiunas, The Baltic Republics: Stagnation and Strivings for Sov-
ereignty, in THE NATIONALITIES FACTOR IN SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY 214 (Lubomyr
Hajda & Mark Bessinger eds., 1990); cf. GEOFFREY A. HOSKING, THE FIRST SOCIALIST SOCI-
ETY: A HISTORY FROM WITHIN 399 (1st ed. 1985). See generally Alan Cowell, Pope, in Bal-
tics, Faces Tangle of Ethnic Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1993, at A3.
42. See generally MARIEL OTTEN, TRANSMIGRASI: MYTHS AND REALITIES, INDONESIAN RE-
SETTLEMENT POLICY, 1965-1986 (1986).
43. See HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES & THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET, THE
LONG MARCH: CHINESE SETrLERS AND CHINESE POLICIES IN EASTERN TIBET 5-9 (1991) [here-
inafter EASTERN TIBET]; ASIA WATCH, MERCILESS REPRESSION: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN TI-
BET 15 (1990); Sechin Jagchid, Discrimination Against Minorities in China, in HUMAN
RIGHTS CASE STUDIES 389, 401-02 (Willem A. Veenhoven ed., 1975); 134 CONG. REC. S15,500,
S15,501-02 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1988) (China trip report by Sen. Leahy); Note, Human Rights
in Tibet: An Emerging Foreign Policy Issue, 5 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 193 (1992) (China has
been attempting since 1983 to dilute the Tibetan identity by transferring numerous Han
Chinese into Tibet). While this Note adds that "[w]hether the Chinese are intentionally
transferring Han into Tibet is a matter of complex debate," Human Rights in Tibet: An
Emerging Foreign Policy Issue, supra at 196 n.25, see infra text accompanying notes 115,
117 and 121 for other important issues besides that of the intent of the transferring
government.
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the participants meet the criteria of "voluntary" settlers.
In the case of settlements, these difficulties about voluntariness lead
to the question of whether consent should be relevant at all to a broad
concept of population transfer. Yet, in the instance of removals, volunta-
riness is of paramount concern. The differing weight put on voluntariness
will have to be reconciled for the two categories of transfers to be col-
lapsed satisfactorily into a single category for legal treatment.
Just as national security might motivate governments to remove mi-
norities through expulsion," civilian settlements across the internation-
ally recognized borders of a state are sometimes claimed necessary for the
security of the transferring power and, therefore, essential to preserve
public order and safety."' For example, the Indonesian government in
controlling regions at the borders of lands that it dominated was said to
have an explicit strategic objective that depended on settlements.6
In the Israeli Supreme Court's most important decision on popula-
tion transfer, Beth-El,47 Justice Witkon sustained a prior opinion that the
fact that requisitioned lands were intended for Jewish civilian settle-
ments did not deprive such requisitioning of its security character. 48 In
addition, although no terrorist activity actually took place, Justice
Witkon refused to distinguish Beth-El from a case in which terrorism had
occurred.49 The position of the Israeli court reflected the above-men-
tioned rationale behind Indonesian settlements. Both allowed the move-
ment of civilians to gain control of other civilians. Even if population
transfer is intended for national security purposes, settlements can cause
such conflicts among settlers and original inhabitants- that settlements
may only exacerbate security problems.50 Such cases suggest the illegiti-
44. See De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236.
45. Roberts, supra note 8, at 84.
46. Carmel Budiardjo, The Politics of Transmigration, THE ECOLOGIST, voL. 16, No. 2/3,
1986, at 111 (as related in 1985 by the Indonesian minister for population transfer).
47. H.C. 606/78, Ayub v. Minister of Defense, 33(2) PisKm1 DIN 113, translated and
summarized in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337 (1979) [hereinafter Beth-Ell.
48. Id. at 340.
49. Id. at 339. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A
COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 186 (1957); ci. H.C.
302/72, Sheikh Suleiman Abu Hilu v. Israel, 27(2) PISKEI DIN 169, translated and summa-
rized in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 384 (1975) (court unanimously upholding arguments that
steps taken were necessary due to the terrorist activities and acts of sabotage which in fact
took place in the area).
50. See generally Marcus Colchester, The Social Dimensions of Government Sponsored
Migration and Involuntary Resettlement: Policies and Practice (Jan. 1986) (unpublished
manuscript prepared for the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Is-
sues in Geneva, available through author of this Article). In the context of the occupied
Arab territories, Roberts, Falk, and Weston lend support for two points: first, settlements
are almost never necessary for genuine military or security purposes and do not, in fact,
serve any such purposes; second, even if justified for military needs, transfers still violate
rules of international law. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 84; Richard A. Falk & Burns H.
Weston, The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and
Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 129, 147-48 (1991); cf. U.N.
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macy of the national security rationale.
The issue of control over civilians exercised through population
transfer causes some concern from the viewpoint of original inhabitants.
True, voluntariness or consent, from the perspective of settlers, is a con-
fusing, inconclusive subject. However, regarding original inhabitants, the
subject gains significance, as will be explained below. 1
National security arguments, such as the above, may lead to attempts
to suspend respect for human rights. The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,52 article 4(1), permits states in urgent circumstances
to suspend or breach the right to security of the person, a right which
population transfer may affect. Such derogation, however, has little rele-
vance, if any, where a government undertakes settlements in order to
change the demographic structure or the political, cultural, religious, or
other characteristics of the original inhabitants in the receiving area.53
The permanent nature of such changes means that the population trans-
fer should never be justified on the temporary grounds necessary for
derogation.
This is especially true where transfer occurs during prolonged mili-
tary occupations. Prolonged military occupations have received some at-
tention as a distinct category, having the characteristic of "belligerency
ending. ' '54 The main conventions relating to military occupations, includ-
ing the Geneva Convention and the 1907 Hague Regulations,55 provide no
meaningful variation in their rules because of the length of an occupa-
tion." Indeed, in addition to covering belligerent occupations, these con-
ventions may also address occupations in which the belligerency has sub-
sided.57 The rights of the occupant during peacetime diminish markedly
Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 70-71 (preamble).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 109-116.
52. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter Political Covenant].
53. The U.N. Sub-Commission was "[d]isturbed by reports concerning the implantation
of settlers and settlements in certain countries, including particular occupied territories,
with the aim to changing the demographic structure and the political, cultural, religious,
and other characteristics of the countries concerned." U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution
1990/17, supra note 3. See also U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/28, supra note 3;
U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 71 (preamble). Derogation, gen-
erally, is "extremely troublesome from the human rights viewpoint." Lillich, supra note 39,
at 120.
54. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 51-53; cf. Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 142.
55. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art.
3, 36 Stat. 2277, 2290, 205 CONSOL. T.S. 277, 295-97 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
56. The exception is the "one year after" provision of the Geneva Convention. Geneva
Convention, supra note 35, at art. 6, para. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3522, 75 U.N.T.S. at 292. However,
this provision is of little importance. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 55-56; COMMENTARY ON
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 22 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958); MICHAEL BOTHE
Er AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 57, 59 (1982).
57. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 52; Adam Roberts, What is Military Occupation?,
1984 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 253. But see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL
STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 43 (1987) ("[T]here are, in fact, so many situa-
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relative to its rights during belligerency."8 Where population transfer ex-
tends from belligerent to prolonged occupation and then into peacetime,
the occupant may assert progressively fewer rights. This, again, brings
into doubt the temporariness justification for population transfer men-
tioned above.
Yet Justice Landau, concurring in Beth-El, supported the Israeli set-
tlements against this obvious doubt by saying that the hope that a politi-
cal solution someday will be reached justifies population transfer.59 Re-
garding any particular occupation, Israeli or otherwise, even if one is
satisfied that the Hague Regulations, and not the Geneva Convention, are
in effect,"0 article 43 of the Hague Regulations limits the freedom of the
occupant to undertake population transfer. This is especially true in ex-
tended or peacetime occupation.61 Although many of the above-cited
sources concern the occupied Arab territories, it bears mentioning that
the Chinese and Indonesian governments see Tibet and East Timor, re-
spectively, as important military zones. 2 Even if these are legitimate gov-
ernmental interests related to national security during peacetime, the
governments do not automatically gain free discretion to undertake popu-
lation transfer into those areas.
If conventional law, including the relatively lenient Hague Regula-
tions, applies to a given case of population transfer, governmental discre-
tion to undertake transfer must include reference to the humanitarian
concerns of all individuals affected by the population transfer. s The
needs of both settlers and original inhabitants become particularly rele-
vant as an occupation moves through its stages, from belligerent to pro-
longed and into peacetime.
If prolonged and peacetime, in addition to belligerent, occupations
tions in which the applicability of the Geneva Conventions .. .has been denied that the
common practice has been rejection of the law, rather than its formal recognition and
implementation").
58. C. Lleewellyn Jones, Military Occupation of Alien Territory in Time of Peace, 9
GROTIUS Soc'Y TRANSACTIONS 149, 159-60 (1923). See also Roberts, supra note 57, at 273-79.
Where military necessity exists, an occupying government has "considerable discretion."
Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 138. However, military necessity generally ends when
belligerency stops.
59. Beth-El, supra note 47, at 392.
60. See Yoram Dinstein, The Judgment in the Matter of Pitchat Rafiah, 3 TEL Aviv
UNIV. L. REV. 934 (Hebrew, 1973).
61. See Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 142 (A duty is imposed upon the occupant
vis-a-vis the original inhabitants); cf. H.C. 337/71, Christian Society for the Holy Places v.
Minister of Defense, 26(1) PISKEi DIN 574, translated and summarized in 2 ISR. Y. B. HUM.
RTS. 354, 355 (1972).
62. Regarding East Timor, see BURGER, supra note 26, at 142-43; Budiardjo, supra note
46, at 111. See generally FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF
GENOCIDE: ANALYSES AND CASE STUDIES 378-83 (1990). Concerning Tibet, see EASTERN TIBET,
supra note 43, at 2-4; What McMahon Wrought, THE ECONOMIST, May 23, 1987, at 59.
63. Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human
Rights, 8 ISE. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 104, 111-12 (1978); Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 142.
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are reasons for continuing prohibition of settlements, that signifies that
the positive law prohibiting settlements is moving away from any neces-
sity for belligerency. This may be compared to cases of removals. As men-
tioned above, a presence of racism or discrimination pushes the prohibi-
tion of removals away from a dependence on belligerency.
C. Population Transfer Under Principles Regarding Colonialism
The practice of population transfer is also part and parcel of coloni-
alism. One case of population transfer into territory that was "colonized,"
according to the formal U.N. regime, occurred in the Western Sahara. 4
The Moroccan takeover of this area was marked by the settlement of over
200,000 Moroccans into it, as well as the removal by "brutal tactics" of
some groups of original inhabitants of the area. 5 The Western Sahara
situation went before the International Court of Justice."6 The connection
between population transfer and colonialism was patently clear. Condem-
nations of colonialism came from the ICJs7 and, subsequently, the U.N.
General Assembly s and noted experts.69 In situations of traditional
colonialism earlier than the Western Sahara, a nexus had been estab-
lished between the use of force and its impact on a people's identity. 0
64. See generally VIRGINIA THOMPSON & RICHARD ADLOFF, THE WESTERN SAHARANS:
BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT (1980); DAVID LYNN PRICE, THE WESTERN SAHARA (The Washing-
ton Papers, vol. 7, No. 63, 1979).
65. CLAUDE BONTEMS, LA GUERRE Du SAHARA OCCIDENTAL [THE WAR OF THE WESTERN
SAHARA] 72 (1984). See also JOHN DAMIS, CONFLICT IN NORTHWEST AFRICA: THE WESTERN
SAHARA DISPUTE 61-69 (1983). Although the brutality of Moroccan forces is well known and
documented, it should be noted that not all of the population movement was forced by the
Moroccans. Some of it was encouraged by the Polisario Front, a pro-independence move-
ment, in face of the invasion. Id. at 72.
66. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16). See THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 64,
at 167.
67. The ICJ declined to declare the Western Sahara "terra nullius" but also failed to
declare the territory Moroccan or Mauritaurian. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at para. 162.
While the Western Sahara case does not discuss population transfer directly, the opinion is
important nonetheless for the connection it makes between self-determination and colonial-
ism. Id.; Myron H. Nordquist & Nells P. Nordquist, Self-Determination: The Cases of Fiji,
New Caledonia, and the Western Sahara, in 82 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 429, 439-42
(Michael P. Malloy ed., 1988). From this connection it is arguable that population transfer
affects the right to self-determination. See Nordquist & Nordquist, supra at 443 (discussing
this possible effect). But see DAMIS, supra note 65, at 60 (positing that the ICJ's decision
was essentially political).
68. See DAMIS, supra note 65, at 94.
69. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINOR-
ITIES, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION; IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLU-
TIONS, para. 69 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev. 1, (1980) [hereinafter SELF-
DETERMINATION].
70. The U.N. General Assembly, in the context of colonialism, noted that "the use of
force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable
rights and of the principles of non-intervention." G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Rela-
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The Western Sahara and its aftermath furthered this link.
D. Some Limits on the Prohibition of Population Transfer Practices
The Western Sahara may be contrasted with situations of indigenous
groups, such as the Chakmas of the Chittagong Hill Tracts or the people
of various sparsely inhabited Amazonian provinces of Bolivia, Peru, Ecua-
dor, Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil. These also faced what most consid-
ered to be settlements by ethnically distinct, dominating groups en-
couraged or even forced by U.N.-recognized governments.' The above-
mentioned nexus between force and its effect on a people's identity may
have existed even in these instances of transfer."2 In contrast to the West-
ern Sahara and other examples of traditional colonialism, however, these
settlements occurred within the governments' U.N.-recognized borders.
At issue, then, was the possible constraint of article 2(7) of the U.N.
Charter, which states that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are es-
sentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. 7 As with remov-
als solely within domestic frontiers,7 4 in the case of settlements the con-
current presence of systematic discrimination, genocide, 75 or gross and
persistent violations of human rights76 countenances article 2(7). So does
the moral pressure of publicists like Theodoropoulos who recognize
colonialism outside the traditional U.N. definition. Theodoropoulos as-
serts that South Africa was the chief paradigm of "settler colonialism." '
tions]. The prohibition on the use of force is also now a rule of customary international law.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 1, 14, 98-101 (June 27).
71. See Hurst Hannum, New Developments in Indigenous Rights, 28 VA. J. INT'L L.
649, 668 n.71 (1988) (Approximately 300,000 Bengalis were settled in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts from 1978 to 1988); UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF
MINORITIES, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES; WRITTEN STATEMENT SUBMITTED
BY THE NORDIC SAAMI COUNCIL, INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL WORK GROUP
FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS AND ANTI-SLAVERY INTERNATIONAL, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS IN CONSULTATIVE STATUS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/NGO/3 (1991); Colchester,
supra note 50, at 12 (regarding the other regions, besides the Chittagong Hill Tracts, that
the text accompanying the present note mentions).
72. See Hannum, supra note 71, at 668; U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28,
supra note 3, at 71 (preamble).
73. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. The U.N. Sub-Commission has not limited its concern
to settlements occurring across international frontiers. See U.N. Sub-Commission Resolu-
tion 1990/17, supra note 3; U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/28, supra note 3; U.N.
Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 70-71 (preamble).
74. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 24 (example of South Africa).
75. See discussion infra part III.B.2.
76. See RESTATEMENT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 31, § 702.
77. CHRISTOs THEODOROPOULOS, COLONIALISM AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
CONTEMPORARY THEORY OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 51-52 (1988).
Theodoropoulos writes of "settler colonialism," calling it "colonialism" where restrictions
are "imposed on a colonial people by a colonial power existing geographically not apart from
its colony but instead within the colonial territory." Id. Cf. ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATE-
HOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 182 (1986) (Whether a state enjoys exclusive
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The South African government undertook removals, through zonation, to
clear the way to accomplish the other form of population transfer, settle-
ments."8 Both types of transfer started as well as finished within the
boundaries of that state.
However, for settlements as well as removals occurring within such
territorial limits, prohibition would be more meaningful if it came from
positive law in a rule explicitly about population transfers. Then, such a
ban would be less sensitive to issues defining territory. The following
analysis, though limited in scope, concludes that prohibitions on removals
within international frontiers are closer to benefitting from positive law
such as the Geneva Convention, and from doctrines such as those on
crimes against humanity, than are prohibitions on similarly located
settlements.
The most significant positive law directly prohibiting settlements
comes from the Geneva Convention. Therein, the condition of a given ter-
ritory is crucial. Whether an occupation is belligerent or peaceful, the Ge-
neva Convention requires that the territory be under some form of occu-
pation. 9 It is true that Protocol I, also addressing transfers, generally
applies beyond cases of military occupation,"0 but the language in Proto-
col I prohibiting transfers still refers strictly to transfers into or out of
areas under occupation. These two instruments also refer to removals
that, therefore, are somewhat constrained by the need for occupation."
Yet, removals, unlike settlements, have become the subject of crimes
against humanity. Related commentary shows that, in general, prohibi-
tions on removals may be less constrained by the very idea of territorial
definition. For example, there is the view espoused by some scholars, such
as Palley, that it was just as "unlawful" for the Allies and other countries
after World War II to deport Germans en masse as it was for Germany to
transfer populations during that war.85 One example is the deportation of
Germans from Sudetenland. The governments that transferred the
Germans did not technically "occupy" this area. Furthermore, there is the
power over a territory, such as through annexation thereof, is no longer a precise criterion
for determining what constitutes a colonial territory). Admittedly, international bodies to-
day do not emphasize decolonization. For example, the U.N. did not oppose apartheid in
South Africa under the pretext of decolonization. Therefore, any law that develops on set-
tlements within domestic frontiers will likely develop apart from doctrines on traditional
colonialism.
78. Colchester, supra note 50, at 20.
79. Massive and permanent settlements across borders of states, excluding mass repa-
triation of refugees, are policies implemented uniquely into areas experiencing prolonged
occupations. Settlements, as defined in this Article, almost never occur anymore from one
sovereign state to another. See John Hucker, Migration and Resettlement Under Interna-
tional Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 338-39 (Ronald St.
John Macdonald et al. eds., 1978). In this respect, settlements differ from removals.
80. See supra text accompanying note 37.
81. See Lapidoth, supra note 11, at 98-99.
82. Palley, supra note 30, at 17. See generally De Zayas, Historical Survey, supra note
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argument, buttressed by analogy to events occurring in former Yugosla-
via, that crimes against humanity also apply to removals that, while oc-
curring during civil war, take place in unoccupied land.s"
More authoritative in dealing with the last-mentioned removals than
the opinion of scholars is Protocol II to the Geneva Convention, which
applies to armed conflicts without an international character.8 4 Protocol
II restricts population transfer, through article 17, in the form of remov-
als but does not refer to settlements.8 5 This exclusive reference to remov-
als further supports the above comparison. International deliberations re-
inforce this comparison. Cyprus v. Turkey condemned removals that,
while occurring in an area technically under occupation, started and en-
ded there. 6 By contrast, settlements starting and ending within a terri-
tory under occupation have not fallen subject to comparable concerted
deliberations. Thus, there may be some imbalance in existing interna-
tional legal treatment of the two types of transfers when they occur
within international frontiers. However, future developments in interna-
tional law towards dealing with the effects of population transfer may
overcome any such imbalance.
III. EFFECTS OF POPULATION TRANSFER
An adequate recognition of the effects of population transfer, along
with an accounting of the actual movement of people, is important, even
though these effects may be less detectable than the movement itself8 7 If
the effects of any population transfer escalate to the level of gross and
consistent violations of international human rights, that may give rise to
a violation of customary international law, although the law violated may
not necessarily refer directly to population transfer.
83. De Zayas, Law and Transfers, supra note 8, at 221. See also supra notes 13-17 and
accompanying text.
84. Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol II].
Protocol II supplements the Geneva Convention, article 3, which applies "in the case of
armed conflict not of an international character," by extending article 3 to certain conflicts
where signatories are capable of carrying out "sustained and concerted military operations."
Id. at art. 1. Regarding the extent to which Protocol II constitutes customary international
law, see Palley, supra note 30, at 7 (stating that "many states have not ratified [Protocol II]
and Protocol II is not yet customary law").
85. "The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons re-
lated to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military rea-
sons so demand." Protocol II, supra note 84, at art. 17.
86. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
87. The notion that "[p]eople and socio-cultural systems respond to forced relocation in
predictable ways," Scudder & Colson, supra note 7, at 267, suggests some hope for the es-
tablishment of international norms recognizing any costly and disruptive results from popu-
lation transfer.
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A. Effects on Those Being Moved: Freedom of Movement and Other
Rights
The most significant limitations on a state's right to control the
movement of people are based not on principles of economic interdepen-
dence but rather on rules designed to protect human rights."s The Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, 9 article 13, provides that
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each State.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country.
The right to freedom of movement, an essential part of the right to per-
sonal liberty,90 is most likely part of customary international law.91 An
example of that status is the inclusion of freedom of movement in the
Discrimination Convention. 2 Yet, despite any special status for freedom
of movement, international law has yet to prescribe a satisfactory frame-
work for the movement involved in population transfer.
Just as the issue of the voluntary nature of movement is more com-
plicated in cases of settlements than removals, so also is the matter of
freedom of movement. The Universal Declaration, article 13, refers to
movement both within and across a state's internationally recognized bor-
ders.93 Settlers moving across borders unquestionably have the right to
leave their country. This raises a threshold question: are settlers freely
leaving their country? A government may participate in population trans-
fer to various degrees. It may sponsor settlers, for example financially, or
88. PLENDER, supra note 5, at 62.
89. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
90. Lillich, supra note 39, at 189. Cf. U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1990/17, supra
note 3; U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/28, supra note 3; U.N. Sub-Commission Res-
olution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 71 (preamble) (all documents referring, in conjunction with
population transfer, to freedom of movement and security of persons).
91. UNITED NATIONS, SECRETARIAT, EUROPEAN WORKSHOP ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARA-
TION; PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/89/1, at 101 (1989); Daniel Turack, A
Brief Review of the Provisions in Recent Agreements Concerning Freedom of Movement
Issues in the Modern World, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 95, 95-96 (1979). Cf. Lillich, supra
note 39, at 151 (Rights to transnational movement "seem well-established in conventional
and perhaps even customary international human rights law"). But see id. for the position
that the right to internal movement, distinct from movement across internationally-recog-
nized borders, is not part of customary international law. Lillich's reasoning, however, is
based on the weak evidence that internal exile, such as that practiced by the former Soviet
Union, was not universally condemned.
92. See Turack, supra note 91, at 96.
93. The latter movement refers to the right to leave and to return to a country. The
Universal Declaration grants both citizens and aliens the right to leave any country but
limits the right to return to citizens of that country. See Universal Declaration, supra note
89, at art. 13(2). Article 12(1) and article 12(2) of the Political Covenant also allow both
citizens and aliens the right to leave any country but subject this right to article 12(3)
thereof. See Political Covenant, supra note 52, at art. 12; see also infra note 98 and accom-
panying text.
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encourage their movement, possibly without any monetary support. In ei-
ther case, the degree to which settlers are informed about all aspects of
their transfer, including their destination, affects whether they are con-
senting to their transfer in an informed manner. If uninformed, they are
not voluntarily, or freely, leaving the country.9 The Discrimination Con-
vention prohibits the use of racially discriminatory measures restricting
an individual's right to leave or return to his or her country. After a pop-
ulation transfer has taken place, settlers who move across borders have
the right to return to their home land should they so choose. 95
Population transfer within a state's recognized borders can violate
the right to free internal movement. Under the Universal Declaration, the
right to free internal movement is linked inextricably to the right to
choose one's residence.96 Depending on the specifics involved, a govern-
ment may violate both rights by removing people from their residences
due to, or as part of, transfer across as well as within a country's
borders. 97
Although containing language similar to that of the Universal Decla-
ration, the Political Covenant is qualified by article 12(3), which permits
restrictions on the right to internal movement if such restrictions "are
provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order
(ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of
others .... " Article 12(3) may come into play where governments under-
taking economic development cause massive forced removals.98 Limits on
94. That poses further problems for the transferring government as well as settlers
when the latter, facing rough conditions, choose to return to the country of origin. A govern-
ment might not have an adequate infrastructure to aid them as equally in their return as in
their original movement. For example, settlers from the central islands of Indonesia report-
edly were not adequately informed of conditions in the outer, Indonesian-dominated islands.
See generally Ria Gondowarsito, Transmigrasi Bedol Desa: Inter-Island Village Resettle-
ment from Wonogiri to Bengkulu, 26 BULL. INDONESIAN ECON. STUD. 48 (1990); WORLD
BANK REP. No. 5597-IND, reprinted in INDONESIA REP. - HUM. RTS. Supp. No. 10 (1985).
95. If the motivation of the sponsoring or encouraging government is to create perma-
nent change in an occupied area, this casts doubt on the existence of a meaningful right to
return. See, e.g., Camille Mansour, L'Emigration des Juifs Sovietiques et le Processus de
Paix Israglo-Palestinien [The Immigration of Soviet Jews and the Israeli-Palestinian
Peace Process], LA POLITIQUE ETRANGARE, Summer 1990, at 327, 329 (discussing the effects
of administrative barriers).
96. The same article 13 of the Universal Declaration mentions both rights. Universal
Declaration, supra note 89, at art. 13.
97. Given the absolute character of the right to free movement, people should enjoy
that same right whether or not they are classified as citizens of the state whose government
is undertaking population transfer. A possible objection is that the Discrimination Conven-
tion fails to prohibit general discrimination against aliens by states based on nationality,
citizenship, and exclusions as between citizens and noncitizens. See Discrimination Conven-
tion, supra note 31, at arts. 1-3.
98. Cf. De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236. Without mentioning
whether states may properly derogate from the relevant provision of the Political Covenant,
De Zayas writes that forced resettlement is "incompatible" with the freedom of movement
provisions in both the Universal Declaration and the Political Covenant. Id.
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governmental abuse include article 12(3) provisions that restrictions on
freedom of movement be "necessary" and "consistent with other rights
recognized in the present Covenant." Regarding removals within interna-
tional borders, then, one can make a distinction between transfers such as
those in Egypt, Paraguay, and Argentina, which may have had some de-
velopment rationale, and transfers such as those in East Timor and Gua-
temala, which seem to have featured relatively less.
Other removals within international frontiers are unquestionably
void of a legitimate economic foundation. For instance, population trans-
fer also can occur during international and civil wars in which masses of
dislocated people suffer due to armed conflict. At the time of writing, in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, arrangements involving Serbs and Croats were
reported that were to carve Bosnia and Herzegovina into "communal pro-
tectorates."9 The comparison to zonation in South Africa 0 0 was vivid.
These arrangements threatened thousands of Bosnian Muslims, whose co-
alition had tried to preserve a multi-religious community, with removal
within, as well as across, the Bosnian borders.01 The extent to which
those who caused population transfers within those frontiers violated in-
ternational law depended in part on a balancing of the right to internal
free movement, backed by Protocol II prohibiting dislocation related to
conflict,0 2 with the Political Covenant's derogations and restrictions on
the right to free movement.
Where the occurrence of settlements results in the practice of remov-
als, conflicts may arise between different aspects of the right to freedom
of movement. Although part of customary international law, the rights to
leave and to return to a country are "difficult if not impossible to imple-
ment." 0 For example, in the present context, these rights might conflict
with the right to internal movement. Unless consistent with the Political
Covenant, article 12(3), settlers entering foreign lands cannot force origi-
nal inhabitants to be removed against their will; as a logical extension,
settlers cannot force original inhabitants into exile. °'0 Should original in-
habitants go into exile, they must enjoy the right to return. Furthermore,
original inhabitants have both the right to choose their residence and the
right to security of persons. 05
99. Lean on Croatia, Too, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 14, 1992, at 8.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 77 & 78.
101. See HELSINKI WATCH, supra note 13, at 13; Burns, supra note 14. For treatment of
removals occurring in Bosnia and Herzegovina and resulting in the movement of people
across international frontiers, see supra text accompanying notes 11-17.
102. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
103. Lillich, supra note 39, at 151.
104. The Universal Declaration, article 9, states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." Universal Declaration, supra note 89, at art. 9.
105. The right to security of persons is given more concrete meaning by the guarantees
against arbitrary arrest and detention and against interference with one's privacy, family,
home, or correspondence spelled out in the Universal Declaration, articles 9 and 12, respec-
tively. See Universal Declaration, supra note 89, at arts. 9, 12.
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The problem that settlements across international borders may pose
with the right to free internal movement takes on an added complication
in cases of prolonged military occupation. Humanitarian law might con-
flict with human rights law. The Universal Declaration guarantees origi-
nal inhabitants the right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state, but article 78, paragraph 1 of the Geneva Con-
vention provides that "[i]f the Occupying Power considers it necessary,
for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning
protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence
or internment." ' 6 A case-by-case analysis of population transfer during
prolonged occupation, where an occupant transfers its own people into
the occupied territory and these people in turn obstruct the movement of
original inhabitants, may turn on an assessment of "imperative reasons of
security" upon which the occupant relies.
Where such arguments fail, there is a clear connection between set-
tlements and the violation of human rights, stemming from the right to
free internal movement. Nevertheless, the violation does not occur to set-
tlers' rights, but rather to the rights of original inhabitants. The infringe-
ment is a by-product, though an important one, of population transfer;
whereas in cases of isolated, massive removals any infringement on
human rights may be more part and parcel of the actual population
transfer because those whose rights are violated more likely are the actual
transferees. At least where gross and persistent, violations of this type
support the permeability of internationally recognized frontiers for U.N.
or other attention.
This last comparison supports the above-mentioned conclusion that,
as a general rule, removals, more easily than settlements, may overcome
any limitations of territorial definition.1 0 7 Further developments in
human rights are important if a unified concept of population transfer,
encompassing both types of movement, is to develop in such a direction
that moves further away from the requirement of belligerency that
originated from crimes against humanity and humanitarian law.
B. Effects on Original Inhabitants
1. Effects of Population Transfer on Self-Determination
The voluntariness, or consent, of original inhabitants facing popula-
tion transfer is important to more than just their freedom of movement.
For example, where a government in undertaking population transfer
through settlements is motivated by a desire to have control over original
inhabitants of settled areas, the perspective of these last people becomes
relevant in another respect: did the original inhabitants agree to receive
settlers?
106. Geneva Convention, supra note 35, at art. 78, para. 1.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 79-86.
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Consider original inhabitants to whom self-determination applies '0
and who also face population transfer. One historical example occurred
after World War II. The original inhabitants of Germany received
Germans removed from Poland and Czechoslovakia by these countries'-
governments. De Zayas is of the opinion that these population transfers
violated international law because the legitimate sovereign, the receiving
state of Germany, had not consented to receive them.10 9
By virtue of self-determination's applicability, the original inhabi-
tants on the receiving end of such removals must have unique identifiable
characteristics, including race or ethnicity, language, religion, culture, tra-
dition and history, that set them apart from their neighbors. However,
original inhabitants may not enjoy Germany's status as a well-established
sovereign. Instead, the unit of self-determination of original inhabitants
may be as an ethnic minority, indigenous people, nation without a state,
or people in a territory under occupation. In any such event, it is more
likely that population transfer will endanger the above special character-
istics than in the instance of a sovereign state.'1 0
Any group to which self-determination applies should have the op-
portunity to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development. . . ."I" When their land
108. The right, or even the principle, of self-determination in contemporary interna-
tional law is still to a large extent unclear in its precise scope and content. See generally
Daniel Thurer, Self-determination, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. 470 (Rudolf Bernhardt
ed., 1975); SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 69, at para. 7 (Self-determination pertains "to
all peoples and nations, and [is] .. . a prerequisite of the enjoyment of all the rights and
freedoms of the individual"); HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMI-
NATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 41 (1990) (Most countries either have
not specifically addressed the right to self-determination or have done so in such general
terms that nothing is added to an understanding of its content). The author of this Article
does not intend to express an opinion on such scope and content but, rather, for purpose of
discussion only, assumes that self-determination applies to original inhabitants in question.
109. De Zayas, Historical Survey, supra note 22, at 18.
110. See U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 70-71 (preamble);
Colchester, supra note 50, at 4. Third World countries often "view themselves as unrepre-
sented and disfavored in the development of international law," Mose L. Floyd, Iraq's Inva-
sion of Kuwait Sparks Migration into Jordan: A Third World Nation Copes With the Ad-
ministrative Nightmare of a Refugee Population, 5 GEo. IMMIG. L.J. 57, 65 (1991), and thus
without as much protection from international law. Minorities, indigenous, and other "state-
less" groups have greater reason to view themselves as unrepresented, disfavored, and un-
protected. Cf. P.J.I.M. de Waart, Statehood and International Protection of Peoples in
Armed Conflicts in the "Brave New World": Palestine as a U.N. Source of Concern, 5
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 3, 24 (1992) (expressing concern over the U.N. protecting the right to self-
determination of a stateless group against a state's discrimination based on race, creed, or
color).
111. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. ., at preamble, para. 2, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (1960). See also Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 70, at 121. The
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter Economic
Covenant], imposes the obligation on states to "promote the realization of the right of self-
determination" and to "respect that right." Id. at art. 1. Relevant to self-determination is
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is subject to an occupying or otherwise alien power's population transfer,
original inhabitants may be stripped of the opportunity to determine
their status and to pursue their development and, thus, denied in overt
ways their access to self-determination. In the case of settlements, the
denial might occur when administrators and settlers of an occupying or
dominating power flood into the land of a distinct people, i.e. of original
inhabitants, and appropriate for themselves superior positions in differ-
ent aspects of society.
112
The problem becomes more acute and troublesome if alien superior-
ity results in subjugation, domination and exploitation of the original in-
habitants, effects which have been denounced as contrary to the U.N.
Charter and as constituting denials of fundamental human rights.1' 8 In
his writings about the other form of transfer, removals, at the level of
sovereign or occupied states, De Zayas recognizes the economic risks of
exploitation. He believes that in addition to being willing to receive
masses of expelled people, a state must also have the economic capacity
to do so. 1 ' "In addition, the social and cultural adequacy of the receiving
state ought to be considered,"1 5 he adds, thereby referring to political
domination and social subjugation. But slower to be recognized is that
these same effects may play out in cases of settlements as well as remov-
als. For example, if the sheer scale of a population transfer causes original
inhabitants to become a minority in their own homeland, that dampens
the possibility that they will ever realize self-determination. ' This may
whether people are distinct and have a capacity for self-management and ". . . a common
desire to establish an entity capable of functioning to ensure a common future." SELF-DE-
TERMINATION, supra note 69, at para. 56. For other elements of self-determination, see gener-
ally HANNUM, supra note 108, at 27-49.
112. That reasoning applies in cases of military occupation. See Asbjorn Eide, Human
Rights in a Pluralistic World, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION IN SPACE AND TIME 23, 42
(U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ed., 1990) (Those under military
occupation are entitled to express self-determination). However, such a denial is also possi-
ble in cases of outside domination that do not involve military occupation. Such cases might
jeopardize a people's right to "enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and
resources," provided for in the Economic Covenant, supra note 111, at arts. 1, 25. The Eco-
nomic Covenant also states, in the same article referring to self-determination, that "[in no
case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." Id. at art. 1. Furthermore, a
transferring government might violate original inhabitants' right to an adequate standard of
living, provided in the Economic Covenant, article 11, by restricting their freedom of move-
ment. See U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1990/17, supra note 3; U.N. Sub-Commission
Resolution 1991/28, supra note 3; U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3,
at 71 (preamble) (mentioning all above rights in conjunction with population transfer).
113. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 70.
114. De Zayas, Historical Survey, supra note 22, at 3. He adds: "The arrival of millions
of expellees in a country already incapable to feed itself necessarily leads to chaos, both for
the native population of the receiving state and for the arriving expellees." Id. (emphasis
added).
115. Id. Cf. VERNON VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, ETHNICITY AND DISCRIMINATION 76
(1985) (referring to the effect on political processes of mixing societies deeply divided along
cultural lines).
116. See Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L
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happen even if the unit of self-determination being affected is not that of
an occupied state.
Whether international law takes account of such effects will depend.
on resolution of the dilemma over how to measure respect for a country's
domestic jurisdiction. For the future, the key factor may be whether and
how original inhabitants in areas flooded by settlers, originating and end-
ing within U.N.-recognized borders, are accorded and then able to realize
self-determination. Developments in the rights of indigenous peoples and
related land rights are also relevant, ' but change has come slowly. For
instance, in the revised text of the Draft Universal Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the right to self-determination was in-
cluded in only a compromising manner.""8 Moreover, in an important con-
vention on indigenous rights, there were provisions dealing only with re-
movals, and these provisions were "weak." 1 9
Self-determination does not always imply total independence from
outside groups, but it does give those to whom it applies some control
over their own destiny.12 0 Logically, settlements, whether across or within
international frontiers, may prevent a distinct group from determining its
& COMP. L.Q. 105, 109 (1976) (referring to the effects resulting from diluting and dispersing
a minority).
117. For example, as land rights relate to self-determination. For a discussion of the
relationship between self-determination, land and indigenous rights, see generally Hannum,
supra note 71, at 670-77. De Zayas makes the connection between land rights, respect there-
for, and humane approaches to the problem of population transfer. However, his examples,
which are removals and not settlements, occur across international frontiers. Nevertheless,
he points out the gradual public sensitization to the "right of peoples to their native soil,"
and opines that "the best and most humane solution [to problems caused by population
transfer] would be the increased permeability of national frontiers." De Zayas, Historical
Survey, supra note 22, at 33-34. See also id. at 23; De Zayas, German Experience, supra
note 23, at 5-6 ("The broad authority of sovereign states to pursue legitimate ends [through
population transfer] should not be exercised to the detriment of a people's right to inhabit
their native soil").
118. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES,
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES; REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INDIGE-
NOUS POPULATIONS ON ITS EIGHTH SESSION, at Annex II, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42
(1990). Only minor changes were introduced for the 1991 session.
119. Hannum, supra note 71, at 668 n.72 (citing the International Labor Organization
Convention No. 107, art. 12).
120. VAN DYKE, supra note 115, at 221 ("[A]n exercise of self-determination does not
necessarily mean that the choice will be for independence. One of the potential choices is for
autonomy within the framework of the state and given reasonableness on both sides this is
the choice, or compromise that will be made"); Peter Malanczuk, The Kurdish Crisis and
Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 114, 124
(1991) (referring to self-determination as a "sufficient degree of autonomy within the ex-
isting state structure"); UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS SEMINAR ON THE EFFECTS OF RACIAL DIS-
CRIMINATION ON THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND
STATES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/22 (1989) (Self-determination may only imply "self-
development").
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own status and development particularly when the group's members do
not want to receive the influx. Therefore, self-determination, should it
apply to original inhabitants faced with population transfer, brings into
play the element of consent. Self-determination thereby plugs a gap that
otherwise exists between removals and settlements on the issue of con-
sent. In this Article's discussion of this issue, before this section on self-
determination, the conclusion has been that consent pertains more to re-
movals than settlements. Self-determination, however, with its focus on
the original inhabitants affected by settlements, brings out the impor-
tance of voluntariness to the process of settlements. It is, therefore, an
important factor to a unified approach to population transfer.
The foregoing analysis advocates a shift in international attention
away from governmental motives for undertaking settlements and to-
wards the point of view of those directly affected by settlements. This
shift parallels existing international treatment of removals. The Institut
de Droit International recognized that, in addition to the importance of
examining governmental motives for causing removals, the perspectives of
removed people are also a significant factor in determining the permissi-
bility of transfers. Yet governmental motives retain importance. The gov-
ernmental practices of racism and discrimination lead to condemnation of
removals. Where governments act on similar motives in undertaking set-
tlements, this overlap also supports a unified concept of population
transfer.
2. Effect of Population Transfer on Rights Regarding Genocide
There has been concern that people subjected to massive population
transfer, either by facing settlers or by themselves being removed, have
been threatened with genocide.12 1 For instance, in Indonesian-ruled East
Timor population transfer occurred in both forms. Concurrently, due to
the inhumane conditions imposed there, some commentators believe that
genocide happened. 2' The U.N. has adopted the following definition of
genocide through the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide: "Genocide means . . . acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group,
121. See U.N. Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/28, supra note 3, at 71 (preamble);
DeZayas, Forced Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236 (expressing concern over genocide for
removals but not for settlements). As an instance of concern expressed over genocide for
settlements as well as removals, which the author of this Article cannot confirm as actual
genocide, see CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS COMMISSION, LIFE is NoT OURS: LAND AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS, BANGLADESH (1991); The Chittagong Hill Tracts,
INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS NEWSLETTER, July/Aug. 1991; IN-
TERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, Doc. No. 5, THEY ARE Now BURNING
VILLAGE AFTER VILLAGE: GENOCIDE IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS (1984).
122. See CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 62, at 379; Erlanger, supra note 26 (100,000
to 200,000 East Timorese died from 1974 to 1980); Budiardjo, supra note 46 (200,000 died);
HIORTH, supra note 26, at 61 (In 1975, an estimated 650,000 East Timorese lived on the
island).
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as such."' 23
According to Dinstein, "[tihe right of peoples to physical existence
corresponds to the prohibition of genocide.'' 1 In focusing, therefore, on
the effects of population transfer on the right to existence, at least two
issues arise. One is the distinction between genocide and ethnocide. The
latter is a sub-category of the former. Yet, "[tihe suppression of a culture,
a language, a religion, and so on is a phenomenon that is analytically dif-
ferent from the physical extermination of a group.' 25 Concern over geno-
cide in the sense of mass death applies to relatively few cases of popula-
tion transfer. The meaning of ethnocide, which might also coincide with
-the denial of self-determination, pertains to relatively more instances of
population transfer.12
A second issue important to the relationship between population
transfer and the right to existence is intent: "the essence of genocide is
not the actual destruction of a group - in our case, a people - but the
intent to destroy it as such (in whole or in part). 1117 This implies that if a
group, for example a "people," however defined, is destroyed, but no in-
tent to destroy exists, then no genocide occurs. Conversely, one individual
murder fits this essence of genocide if the act of murder is designed to
further the extinction of a people.
The situation of the Kurds after the Gulf War involved less the re-
moval of people than did the Kurdish plight before that war.' 28 Nonethe-
less, Payam Akhavan believes that after the war the requisite intent for
genocide existed. He states that "it was not in question that the deliber-
ate policy of the Iraqi authorities had resulted in conditions which were
so extreme as to cause the mass exodus of Kurds to neighboring
States."' 29 Given that the receiving area consisted of "inhospitable re-
gions where their survival may [have been] threatened," Akhavan recom-
123. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened
for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 28 I.L.M. 763 [hereinafter Genocide Conven-
tion]. Specific acts include "(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing mea-
sures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group." Id. Cf. RESTATEMENT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 31, § 702.
124. Dinstein, supra note 116, at 105.
125. CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 62, at 23.
126. Distinctions between ethnocide and genocide are de-emphasized by focusing on
existence rather than extermination. This is a constructive, preventative approach to such
comparison. Some causes are common to both ethnocide and genocide, one of which causes
is discrimination. For example, prevention of discrimination would remove religious intoler-
ance. One commentator refers to intolerance as "one of the decisive causes of genocide."
WARWICK McKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (1983).
127. Dinstein, supra note 116, at 105 (citing NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CON-
VENTION: A COMMENTARY 58 (1960)).
128. See supra note 5.
129. Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention Through the Advisory
Opinion Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 297 (1991).
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mends that the International Court of Justice give an advisory opinion on
whether the Iraqi policy constituted "'deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its destruction in whole or in
part' within the meaning of the Genocide Convention. 1 3 0 A positive re-
sponse, meaning genocide occurred, would carry significance despite arti-
cle 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.131
Depending upon circumstances, the governmental intent required to
raise an act to genocidal level may vary. For example, a high degree of
centralized authority and quasi-bureaucratic organization in the govern-
ment, like that of Iraq, is not always required. According to Chalk and
Jonassohn, an exception has been "when the victim group is numerically
small." They give as an example the phenomenon of population transfer,
"such as the indigenous tribes wiped out by colonizing settlers."132 De-
spite their loose use of the term "colonizing," under their analysis settle-
ments may cause of genocide. An analysis such as theirs should be ex-
amined for its validity in the case of the Indonesian presence in East
Timor.
In summary regarding genocide, governmental participation in popu-
lation transfer might take the form of force, as in the case of some remov-
als. Or it might take the form of encouragement or sponsorship, as in the
example of some settlements. Although containing less obvious intent, the
latter involvement needs to be examined further, through concerted case
study, for the possibility that such settlements may result in the genocide
of original inhabitants. Like the arguments in regard to voluntariness and
freedom of movement, legal reasoning regarding genocide is more obvious
to cases of removals but may apply also to settlements. As the concept of
genocide is relatively blind to issues of the permeability of international
frontiers and as it applies even outside of belligerency, it is crucial to any
broad concept of population transfer.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law on genocide, like that on self-determination, refers to groups
rather than individuals. Development of the consciousness of interna-
tional law towards collectivities is important to a holistic legal approach
towards uprooted people. However, given the differences between remov-
als and settlements mentioned herein, international law is distant from
treating removals and settlements as one category per se. A broad treat-
ment should be pursued, especially where the motivations for and the ef-
fects of both types are egregious. Some variances or differences between
the two types may be just noise. The law on population transfer is unde-
130. Id. at 297-98.
131. Akhavan states that "given its status as a 'crime against humanity,' an inference
that genocide exists would definitely put into question the proposition that the matter is
one 'essentially within the jurisdiction' of Iraq." Id. at 298. See also Leslie Gelb, The
Strange Story of Mr. Bush Dealing With Saddam, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 5, 1992, at 4.
132. CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 62, at 28.
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veloped and, thus, somewhat confusing. The coherent legal study of pop-
ulation transfer will gain speed as the realization grows that it is "inaccu-
rate to use the passive voice to describe much of the world's population
flows." 133
133. Weiner, supra note 6, at 7.
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Discriminating Genocide From War Crimes:
Vietnam and Afghanistan Reexamined
HELEN FEIN*
Raphael Lemkin introduced the concept of genocide in 1942 as a way
to understand the objective of Germany's policies toward the population
of the occupied states.1 Historically, this term has been used "to signify a
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essen-
tial foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilat-
ing the groups themselves."2 Since 1944, the concept has frequently been
misused rhetorically and metaphorically for political ends. For instance,
segregation and integration, drug addiction and methadone-maintenance,
free choice of abortion and enforced birth control, AIDS, and condom use
each have been labelled as "genocide." ' Despite the prevalence of geno-
cide4 -and the importance of the concept as an international norm, no sat-
isfactory method exists to distinguish putative cases from rhetorical mis-
uses and specious claims.
This article proposes criteria and conditions to be examined in evalu-
ating charges of genocide and to differentiate such charges from war
crimes and other mass killings.
It also illustrates these criteria by applying them to the accusations
of genocide made against the superpowers arising from their interventions
in the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan . 5 Before evaluating these cases,
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GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS (1944).
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however, it is necessary to review how the concept of genocide emerged,
how genocide is legally defined, and the problematic situations in which
war and genocide may emerge simultaneously.
I. ORIGINS OF THE LABEL, GENOCIDE
The impetus to recognize genocide as a distinct crime emerged as a
reaction to the systematic mass murder of Jews and Gypsies, and the se-
lective decimation of Poles and Slavic civilians in Nazi-controlled Europe
during World War II. The mass murders of Jews and Gypsies were acts
against intentionally discriminated and aggregated victims - acts not re-
lated to the goals of war as legitimated in international law and already
criminalized by the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. The perpetrators
of these acts were indicted for genocide at Nuremberg, Germany in 1945
and later tried for their crimes against humanity. The foundation for
these indictments was the Hague Convention's prohibition of the murder,
deportation, and enslavement of civilians during war.
6
A subsequent definition of genocide appeared in the United Nations
Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide,
which became effective international law in 1951.' The Genocide Conven-
tion made genocide a crime for which individuals might be indicted,
whether occurring in times of peace or war, and regardless of whether the
victims were nationals of other states or of the perpetrators' own state.
According to Article II of the Genocide Convention,
genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group as such: a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) deliberately in-
flicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures in-
tended to prevent births within the group; e) forcibly transferring
AND AMERICANS IN VIETNAM 502 (1973); JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, ON GENOCIDE (1968); MICHAEL
MACOBY & RICHARD FALK, WAR CRIMES AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE 80-81 (1970). But see
DANIEL ELLSBERG, Contra This, in WAR CRIMES AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE 82-83 (1970).
See also W.V. O'BRIEN, THE NUREMBERG PRINCIPLES 3; THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 198-199 (Richard Falk ed., 1972); HUGO ADAM BEDAU, Genocide in Vietnam?, in
PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Virginia Held et al. eds., 1974).
For Afghanistan: See JAN GOODWIN, The Media Ignores Genocide in Afghanistan, 2
INST. FOR THE STUDY OF GENOCIDE NEWSL. 1 (1988); Report of the Independent Counsel on
International Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan, 42 U.N.
GAOR C.3 (Agenda Item 12) U.N. Doc. A/C.3/42/8 (1987), edited and reprinted in W.M.
REISMAN AND C.H. NORCHI, Genocide and the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, 4 INST.
FOR THE STUDY OF GENOCIDE NEWSL. 1 (1988). But see BARNETT R. RUBIN, Afghanistan: Over
a Million Dead, 7 INST. FOR THE STUDY OF GENOCIDE NEWSL. 1 (1988).
6. SEE BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE DOCUMENTARY REC-
ORD 1944-45 (1982).
7. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 1951 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
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children of the group to another group 8
The General Assembly first passed a resolution condemning genocide
as a crime on 11 December 1948, stating that "[g]enocide is a denial of
the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of
the right to live of individual human beings."9 Kuper notes that "the
crime of genocide in this resolution is wholly independent of crimes
against peace or of war crimes."1 0
Discriminating among mass and arbitrary killings that are genocides
under the Genocide Convention definition, killings that can be considered
war crimes, and unintended killings that are ascribable to the effects of
war itself may present problems. In order to distinguish genocide from
civilian deaths resulting from warfare or war crimes, I suggest a paradigm
to clarify the pattern, authorization, context, and intent of such acts. This
paradigm will then be employed to evaluate the substantive case for
charges of genocide against the United States in Vietnam (1963-1973) and
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (1979-1988).
Since the claims of genocide in Vietnam and Afghanistan arose in the
context of wars, certain definitional issues need to be clarified. "War is a
'legal condition which equally permits two or more groups to carry on a
conflict by armed force.' , Thus, war is ideally conceived of as a sym-
metrical conflict between two forces. By contrast, genocide is usually con-
ceived of as the asymmetrical slaughter of an unorganized group by an
organized force.
Although the Genocide Convention's definition of genocide 2 is the
international norm, scholars of genocide have offered more encompassing
definitions that include all groups, based on the concept of the defense-
less victim. "Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to
physically destroy a group directly or indirectly, through interdiction of
the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained re-
gardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim."" "Ge-
nocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other au-
thority intends to destroy a group."4 Marginal cases involving genocide
include the Warsaw ghetto uprising and the 1915 Armenian defense of
Van, memorialized in "The Forty Days of Musa Dagh.' 5 In these cases,
the victims knew they would be killed if they did not resist, so despite
8. Id.
9. LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 23 (1981).
10. Id. at 23.
11. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MODEL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 41 (1977), quoting QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 8 (1942).
12. See Genocide Convention, supra note 7.
13. Helen Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective, 24 CURRENT SOC. 38 (1990); see
also HELEN FEIN, GENOCIDE: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1993).
14. FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 23
(1990).
15. FRANZ WERFEL, THE FORTY DAYS OF MUSA DAGH (Geoffrey Dunlop Trans., 1934).
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being poorly armed or unarmed, they fought in order to live or die
fighting.
In wars fought according to international law, combatants are limited
by what Walzer calls the "war convention."16 Although the "war conven-
tion" was codified by both the Hague and Geneva Conventions in the late
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it cross-cuts many cultures and his-
torical periods.17 Similarly, Singh and McWhinney relate the sources of
the "war convention" to the major world religions: Christianity, Hindu-
ism, and Islam. 8 This is not to say that the "war convention" has been
observed throughout this period but that the ideal transcends particular
cultures and time.
The functions of the "war convention" are twofold: justifying war as
a human institution by establishing criteria for evaluation of specific
wars, and limiting the effects of war. These functions enable people to
both make and conclude wars. International humanitarian law, which em-
bodies the "war convention," prohibits the following: 9
1) killing or wounding captured or surrendered prisoners;
2) not distinguishing non-combatants from combatants in waging in-
discriminate attacks leading to the killing, wounding, or violating the
rights of civilians intentionally;
3) inflicting foreseeable injury to civilians "out of proportion to the
military advantage reasonably expected to be gained"; 0 and,
4) certain means of warfare, such as poison gas and chemical
weapons."
These criteria can lead to justifications for killing civilians. Both
"military necessity" and "proportionality" are flexible notions. The "prin-
ciple of double effect," initially "worked out by Catholic casuists in the
Middle Ages," is a sophisticated justification for foreseeable, but un-
wanted, civilian deaths that arise from pursuit of necessary military
objectives.2"
Walzer illustrates three types of situations involving pre-modern and
modern warfare that have resulted in mass death of civilians. These situa-
tions, which have been labeled genocidal by some, undermine the view
that war and genocide are always discrete phenomena. The first situation
16. WALZER, supra note 11, at 44.
17. Walzer discussed this in a lecture on "Minimalism in Ethics" at the John F. Ken-
nedy School of Government of Harvard University, February 25, 1991.
18. J. NAGENDRA SINGH & EDWARD McWHINNEY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15 (2d ed., 1989).
19. See generally HILAIRE McCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (1990);
WALZER, supra note 11.
20. WALDEMAR A. SOLF & W. GEORGE GRANDISON, International Humanitarian Law
Applied in Armed Conflict, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 583 (1979)(adding the proportionality
element). See also DAVID WEISSBRODT & BETH ANDRUS, The Right to Life During Armed
Conflict: Disabled Peoples' International v. United States, 29 HARV INT'L L. J. 71 (1988).
21. MCCOUBREY, supra note 19.
22. WALZER, supra note 11, at 152-153.
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involves war or phases of wars in which one side relies on a strategy of
attrition, such as tactical sieges and blockades.
2
The second situation involves guerilla wars in which a rebel force
tries to undermine state power, and the state undertakes the elimination
of the guerilla force.24 In so doing, the state indiscriminately kills large
numbers of the ethnic or regional group from which the guerrillas are
drawn, since the guerrillas are not readily distinguishable from innocent
civilians. Is this situation an inevitable result of the ambiguity, or are
these indeed genocidal massacres? Kuper, Fein, and other scholars em-
ploy the term "genocidal massacre" to define massacres that are not part
of a continuous genocide but are committed by an authority or other or-
ganized group against a particular ethnic or other distinguishable group.2 5
These "genocidal massacres" are organized to destroy victims selected on
the basis of their identity alone and have been labeled pogroms, race ri-
ots, and communal violence.
The third situation involves total war, distinguished from a guerilla
action by the use of weapons of mass devastation such as aerial bombard-
ment with conventional or nuclear weapons. Some charge that targeting
civilian populations with nuclear or other weapons, resulting in the killing
of great numbers indiscriminately, is intrinsically an act of genocide.2
The types of situations in which genocide arises are not original to
modern times. The first situation, encompassing blockades and encircled
sites, has reoccurred throughout history. Typically, a city was seized or
blockaded until its inhabitants surrendered. According to Walzer, neither
siege nor blockades of civilian populations is prohibited by the rules of
war when soldiers are fighting from within villages and cities inhabited or
surrounded by civilians. In ancient and modern times, the number of ci-
vilians killed in such cases has been enormous. The Geneva Protocols of
1977, however, outlawed the starvation of civilians in the time of war.
Deliberate famines were imposed as a means of genocide in the So-
viet Ukraine in 1932-33, the Warsaw Ghetto in 1941-42, and in other Jew-
ish concentrated areas during the Holocaust.2 7 These cases can be distin-
23. Id. at 160-74. Since the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention, which must have
occurred subsequent to the printing of Walzer, all "methods of warfare designed to take
effect through starvation of the civilian population are prohibited," according to Mc-
COUBREY, supra note 19, at 117. See also INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF THE RED CROSS,*
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 12 AUGUST 1949 653-54, 943, 1330, 1457 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ADDI-
TIONAL PROTOCOLS].
24. Id. at 176-96.
25. KUPER, supra note 9, at 9; HELEN FEIN, Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide
and Critical Responses, in TOWARD THE UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE: 2
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE 31
(Israel W. Charney ed., 1984).
26. KUPER, supra note 9, at 14, 17, 34-35, 45-46, 50, 55, 91-92, 102, 139, 174; ISRAEL
CHARNY, GENOCIDE: A CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW 7-8 (Israel Charny ed., 1988).
27. Commission on the Ukraine Famine, Report to Congress (1988); HELEN FEIN, Ac-
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guished from other historical governmentally imposed famines since the
military objectives were not designed to compel one side to surrender.
Reprisals are also permissible actions that may lead to the deaths of
many civilians. Belligerent forces may conduct reprisals against civilians
to punish and deter crimes of the opposing force, including violations of
the "war convention." Walzer explains that
[n]o part of the war convention is so open to abuse, is so openly
abused, as the doctrine of reprisals .... It legitimizes actions other-
wise criminal, if these actions are undertaken in response to crimes
previously committed by the enemy ... Reprisals of this sort have as
their purpose the enforcement of the war convention .... Under the
special conditions of combat, at least, utilitarian calculations have in-
deed required the 'punishing' of innocent people.2 8
Reprisals are also subject to the criteria of proportionality. This led to the
severe condemnation, and subsequent indictment, of Nazi officers for the
killings of hostages in occupied countries during World War 11.29
Guerilla warfare presents another complicated series of challenges to
the "war convention." How can both sides fight effectively with disparate
means and at the same time respect the distinction between combatants
and noncombatants? How do observers assess the responsibility of the
guerrillas and the defenders of the state to protect the uninvolved citizens
from reprisals? For
the guerrillas don't subvert the war convention by themselves attack-
ing civilians; at least, it is not a necessary feature of their struggle that
they do that. Instead, they invite their enemies to do it .... [T]hey
seek to place the onus of indiscriminate warfare on the opposing
army. The guerrillas themselves have to discriminate, if only to prove
that they really are soldiers (and not enemies) of the people.3 0
The killing of non-combatants often occurs in contexts where it is
not readily possible for soldiers to distinguish between partisans and ci-
vilians, such as instances when non-uniformed partisans fight from the
midst of civilian villages. In some cases, such killing is a result of confu-
sion; in other cases, the arbitrary killings are simply rationalized by gov-
ernment forces because of their inability to identify partisans. Some gue-
rilla forces use calculated killings of class enemies or indiscriminate
killing as a means of creating terror, thus gaining power over the
civilians."1
COUNTING FOR GENOCIDE: NATIONAL RESPONSES AND JEWISH VICTIMIZATION DURING THE HOLO-
CAUST 210 (1979).
28. WALZER, supra note 11, at 207-210.
29. Id. at 211; GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 294 (1980).
30. WALZER, supra note 11, at 180.
31. HELEN FEIN, LIvEs AT RISK 25-27 (Institute for the Study of Genocide, 1990). For
examples see the Shining Path guerrillas in Peru, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Renamo in
Mozambique, and Sikh terrorists in India.
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Another issue is whether the use of fire power to respond to partisan
attacks and to spare the state forces or intervenors casualties by exploit-
ing their superior weaponry produces indiscriminate killing. If the sides
are divided by ethnicity or nationality, as is often the case in guerilla and
civil wars, a pattern of indiscriminate killing could constitute an attempt
by one party to eliminate the other. Such a pattern of indiscriminate kill-
ing could constitute a disguised attempt to dry up the "sea" of supporters
in which the guerrillas "swim," to use a metaphor by Mao. These charges
have been raised both in civil wars and in interventions. We shall return
to these scenarios when evaluating the charges against the United States
and the Soviet Union.
The possibility that the use of nuclear weapons against civilians con-
stitutes genocide needs to be examined. Most international lawyers who
have considered this issue agree that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal
under the law of war because of the extent of indiscriminate killing- 2 An-
other ground for finding the use of nuclear weapons illegal is the resulting
radiation poisoning of the atmosphere of neutral states.33
Dissenters to this argument include McDougal, Schlei and Stone.34
Further, governments that possess nuclear arms do not agree that use of
those weapons is illegal. Opinions on the legality of tactical nuclear weap-
ons are mixed.3 5 However, some agreement exists on possible legal uses of
nuclear weapons, including nuclear reprisals, destruction of incoming hos-
tile aircraft carrying nuclear missiles, and the possession and stockpiling
of nuclear arms.
Nuclear deterrence, a balance of terror designed to avoid "mutually
assured destruction," raises an issue of the use of immoral threats. Some
scholars who discuss genocide have said or implied that the use or threat
of nuclear weapons leading to mass killing of another national group is
genocidal.3 " Other genocide scholars, including Barbara Harff, Frank
Chalk, Kurt Jonassohn, and myself disagree.3 7 Singh and McWhinney
consider nuclear war a violation of the Genocide Convention because of
its effects, although it was not the intent of the Convention to prohibit
32. See SINGH AND MCWHINNEY, supra note 18, at 313-19. Only two of fourteen mem-
bers of the Special Commission of the Institut de Droit International in 1967 considered
the use of weapons of mass destruction permissible. Id. Similarly, the Geneva Conference
Report of experts convened by the Carnegie Endowment in 1969 concluded that atomic,
biological, and chemical weapons were prohibited. Id. at 318.
33. Id. at 80-81, 157-63, 188-89.
34. Id. at 188-89, 301-12, 319.
35. Id. at 146, 171-74, 191-92, 195-99.
36. KUPER, supra note 9, at 17; IAN CLARK, WAGING WAR: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUC-
TION 100 (1988), quoting Fred Charles Ikle; CHARNY, supra note 26, at 7-8.
37. CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 14, at 23-25; see also papers by Frank Chalk, Israel
Charny, Helen Fein, and Leo Kuper presented at conference at Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center
for International Human Rights, Yale Law School, February 16, 1991 (forthcoming in GENO-
CIDE: THE CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORIcAL DIMENSIONS (George Andreopolus, ed., 1994)).
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nuclear war."
Analysis of this controversy requires consideration of three questions
regarding the use of nuclear weapons. First, was the use of atomic weap-
ons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 an act of genocide? Second, does
the threat of a nuclear response, building weapons, and calculating nu-
clear strategies (whether mutually assured destruction or counter-force)
violate the prohibition against genocide? Does this question depend on
the intention behind the use of the threat; for example, could a threat
intended to deter war and its resultant casualties be genocidal? Third,
would the use of any nuclear weapons, including tactical weapons, in a
future war, whether in aggression or in self-defense, constitute genocide?
This article cannot fully address these questions, but it can suggest
an approach to answering them. Regarding the question of genocide in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the available evidence suggests that the answer
is no. No one has suggested any evidence to show intent by the Allies to
eliminate the Japanese as a people. Indeed, all allied acts of war ceased
when Japan surrendered. Acts of genocide, by contrast, typically include
the slaughter of people in captivity, people who have surrendered, or peo-
ple without a state or political organization that can offer a credible
threat to the perpetrator. The judgment whether such aerial bombings
were wrong, unnecessary, or violations of the war convention is not the
same as whether they were genocidal. The atom-bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki could be considered a crime of war or a crime against hu-
manity, even though both cities were military centers."' But the evidence
does not support an allegation of genocide.
Regarding the question of nuclear build-ups, the concept of "omni-
cide" appears more appropriate than that of genocide. 0 If a threat made
with the intention to deter actually were to precipitate a nuclear war,
there would be bilateral mass killings, without regard to racial, religious,
national or ethnic identity of the victims and including citizens of each
side in residence on the other side. Such an unprecedented situation can-
not be described by the paradigm of genocide, which presumes a powerful
perpetrator and a relatively powerless victim. Omnicide implies two per-
petrator-victims, reciprocally engaged in mutually assured suicide.
The consideration of hypothetical events and rhetorical claims of ge-
nocide often blurs the perception of present events. It should not be for-
gotten that genocide has reoccurred several times since World War II." If
genocide is not understood and detered or stopped through intervention,
it will certainly occur again. In order to detect emerging genocide, an ex-
amination of past acts of genocide is helpful. The following paradigm
enumerates some general criteria that past acts of genocide had in
38. SINGH AND MCWHINNEY, supra note 18, at 119.
39. Id. at 150-52.
40. CHARNEY, supra note 26, at 7-8.
41. See generally KUPER, supra note 9.
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II. THE GENOCIDE PARADIGM
A. A Paradigm for Detecting and Tracing Genocide
I have culled the elements of a paradigm to detect genocide and to
document its course from studies conducted by myself and by others. The
result is a set of propositions that examine the parameters identifying
how genocide occurred and additional questions that further examine
reinforcing conditions. The following propositions constitute a set of nec-
essary and sufficient conditions to impute genocide. How each proposition
"fits" the facts of a particular case is assessed by answers to the questions
that follow the propositions.
Proposition 1: There is a sustained attack, or continuity of attacks,
by the perpetrator to physically destroy group members, a) Did a series
of actions or a single action of the perpetrator lead to the death of mem-
bers of group X? b) What tactics were used to maximize the number of
victims? Such tactics may include, among other things, preceding regis-
tration, orders to report and round-ups, and the isolation and concentra-
tion of victims. c) What means, besides direct killing, were used to de-
stroy the victims or to interdict the biological and social reproduction of
the group? Actions may include poisoning air or water, imposed starva-
tion, introduction of disease entities, forcible prevention of birth, and in-
voluntary transfer of children. d) What was the duration, the sequence of
actions, and the number of victims? Trace the time span, repetition of
similar or related actions, and the number of victims.
Proposition 2: The perpetrator is a collective or organized actor or a
commander of organized actors. Genocide is distinguished from homicide
empirically by the fact that it is never an act of a single individual. It is
necessary to determine the following: a) Were the perpetrators joined as
an armed force, paramilitary force, or informal band? b) Was there a con-
tinuity of leadership or membership of perpetrators or similar bases of
recruitment for such forces? c) Were these forces authorized or organized
by the state? d) To whom were those forces responsible - an agency of
the state, army, or party? e) Were they organized and garbed to display
or to deny government responsibility?
Proposition 3: The victims are selected because they are members of
a group. a) Were the victims selected irrespective of any charge against
them individually? b) Were they chosen on the basis of a state adminis-
trative designation or their group identity? Criteria for identity include
membership in a religious body, physical differences, linguistic ability, or
other sign of identity. c) Were they chosen on the basis of status within
the group, such as religious leaders or the educated class? d) Was the
basis of the group religion, race, ethnicity, tribal or linguistic status? e)
42. FEIN, supra note 13, at 25-28.
1993
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Were they pre-selected or discriminated from other citizens before the
killings? Evidence of pre-selection includes prior legal definition, denial
of equal rights and entitlement under the law, stripping of citizenship,
civil rights, state posts, licenses, benefits and legal group recognition, seg-
regation and marking, rounding-up and ghettoization or concentration.
Proposition 4: The victims are defenseless or are killed regardless of
whether they surrendered or resisted, a) Was the victims' group armed
and organized to physically resist the perpetrators' group? b) Was their
level of armament sufficient to wage war against the perpetrators? Were
the armaments being used to defend themselves from being seized? c)
Was there evidence, if the victims were armed, that they were killed after
their surrender and that unarmed members of the group were systemati-
cally killed?
Proposition 5: The destruction of group members is undertaken with
intent to kill and the murder is sanctioned by the perpetrators. a) Could
the deaths of group members be explained as accidental outcomes? b)
Was there evidence of repetition of destruction either in design or as a
foreseeable outcome? c) Was there direct evidence of orders or authoriza-
tion for the destruction of the victims? d) At what level did the authori-
zation occur? e) Was there prima facie evidence showing that the authori-
ties had to plan or deliberately choose to overlook a pattern of
destruction? f) Was there any evidence of sanctions against agents re-
sponsible for such acts?
The following two questions examine reinforcing conditions:
Question 1: Consistency of sanctions for killing group members: a)
Were there any rules promulgated by the perpetrator to punish or to ex-
onerate individual murder, torture, and rape of members of the victim
group? b) Were there institutional mechanisms to implement such rules?
c) Were there examples of sanctions enforced for either the murder of
members of the victim's group or the failure to protect victims from at-
tacks by the perpetrators? Were there sanctions for refusing to partici-
pate in killing the victims or for reporting the commission of such
killings?
Question 2: Ideologies and beliefs legitimating genocide: a) Was
there evidence of an ideological, mythical, or articulable social goal justi-
fying destruction of the victim? Can one observe religious traditions of
contempt and collective defamation, stereotypes, and derogatory meta-
phors indicating that the victims were inferior or sub-human? Were the
victims depicted in myth, ideology, or folklore as super-human, Satanic
and/or omnipotent? Were there other signs that the victims were pre-
defined as alien, outside the universe of obligation of the perpetrator,
sub-human or dehumanized, or the enemy, such as rhetoric justifying the
elimination of the victim group in order that the perpetrator may live? b)
If destructive acts were acknowledged by the perpetrator, how were they
labeled and justified? c) Did the acknowledgement, labeling, and justifica-
tion change before different audiences?
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B. Two Putative Like Cases: Analogy Can Mislead
The United States intervention in Vietnam (1963-73) and the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan (1979-88) have both evoked charges of geno-
cide. While the charges against the United States were widely broadcast,
the charges against the Soviet Union garnered little public attention for
two reasons. First, no internal or international campaign to stop the So-
viet Union existed. Second, many in the West professed that Afghanistan
was "the Soviets' Vietnam"; thus, further judgment seemed superfluous.
Even critics of the Soviet Union's invasion generally attributed the prob-
lematic questions of how the war was conducted to the nature of the anti-
guerilla war and the tenacity of the Afghan's resistance.
There is no necessary or logical reason, however, to come to a similar
judgment in both cases because the interventions may not have been sim-
ilarly motivated. In both cases, the intervenor's motives are in dispute.
Did the United States intervene in Vietnam to stop communism under
fear of the "domino" theory, to provide a further application of the use of
low-level warfare by guerilla movements elsewhere, to deter aggression, or
to prevent an ally from falling? Did the Soviet Union intervene in Af-
ghanistan to expand its sphere of influence by aggression, to dominate
Southwest Asia, or to prevent a communist state and ally from falling in
accordance with the Brezhnev doctrine?
I shall not review the evidence here because the underlying rationale
of the intervenors is beyond the scope of this article. Further, the judg-
ment whether either action became genocide does not depend on the
goals of either the United States or the Soviet Union, but it does depend
on the intent and pattern of their uses of force.
I will not address the issue of whether these were just wars, jus ad
bellum, but will instead focus on the questions raised about the conduct
of the war, jus in bello. This does not imply that I condone either inter-
vention - I do not. Rather, it simply recognizes that the assessment of
war crimes and genocide is logically a separate issue from the justness of
the ends of war. Confirmed pacifists who take the position that "there are
no war crimes: war is the crime," as a poster of the War Resistance
League attests, may regard this separation as pointless. On the contrary,
if the war alone is the crime, there is no added onus, nor any restraint, on
any warring party for the murder, rape, torture, or deportations that its
troops inflict, or even for eliminating entire groups at will. Such a posi-
tion does not serve to inhibit war, war crimes, or genocide.
III. THE GENOCIDE PARADIGM APPLIED
The following tables list the specific genocide charges that have been
made against the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Af-
ghanistan. These charges will be individually evaluated using the previ-
ously laid out paradigm.
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TABLE h CHARGES OF GENOCIDE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN
VIETNAM (1968)
AND THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN (1988)
UNGC Clause Violated * Charges made in Charges made in
Acts prohibited in the Vietnam * Afghanistan **
UNGC
1. a) Killing members in massive bombing, free-fire massive bombing,
whole or in part zones unrestricted
"indiscriminate shooting, repeated massacres in
murder, rape, and looting" villages, roads, refugee
caravans; reprisals and
summary executions
b) Causing serious bodily anti-personnel weapons, attacks on religion, mines
or mental harm napalm, fragmentation disguised as toys
bombs
c) Deliberately inflicting defoliation, shooting destruction of food
conditions of life livestock, transferring supplies, irrigation canals
calculated to bring about populations to refugee and wells, depopulation
its physical destruction in camps and hamlets
whole or in part "strategic attacks on
society"
d) Imposing measures to putting South Vietnamese
prevent births within the in refugee camps
group
e) Forcibly transferring forced transfers back to
children of the group to the USSR
another group
2) Was the "intent to YES - Sartre YES - Reisman & Norchi
destroy in whole or in NO - Lewy YES - Goodwin
part, a national . . . group NOT PROVEN - Bedau NO - Rubin
as such" present? OTHER INTENT - Miller
* From the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.
•* For charges made by various authors see:
Vietnam: BEDAU, supra note 5; LEwY, infra note 43; MILLER, infra note 70; SARTRE,
supra note 5.
Afghanistan: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, infra note 120; GOODWIN, supra note 5; HELSINKI
WATCH 1984, infra note 116; HELSINKI WATCH 1985, infra note 116; LABER & RUBIN, infra
note 116; REISMAN & NORCHI, infra note 5; RUBIN, supra note 5; SLIWINSKU, infra note 136.
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Estimates of Effects Vietnam Afghanistan
% civilians killed 1.7% **
% of total national group 3.6% * 9% *
killed
% refugees in other 33%
countries I
*** LEWY, infra note 43, at 301; percentages based on the 1965 population figures from
The UNITED NATIONS DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK (1974), cited by LEWY, supra at 301.
**** Sliwinski, a demographer, makes estimates based on a "representative sampling of
Afghan families inhabiting Pakistan's 318 refugee camps in August 1987 and based on the
prewar Afghan population. The USCR estimates that 40% of Afghans were refugees and
15% were internally displaced in 1988 (United States Committee for Refugees, World Refu-
gee Survey: 1988 in Review (Washington, D.C.: USCR, 1989).
Note: The reader may observe that the estimate of losses in Afghanistan is based on an
actual survey of Afghans while that in Vietnam is based on American estimates of war dead.
In order to compare the depopulation of Vietnam that might be attributed to the war with
that of Afghanistan, I calculated the difference between the expected population in 1973
(based on the annual rate of increase in 1957) and the actual population, expecting that the
deficit could be attributed to war deaths. However, the 1973 population was 2,365,144
greater than that expected from the rate of natural increase in 1957, indicating either that
the war had no effect on population or had a paradoxical effect. One must note, however,
that the sources indicate the estimates by the governments of Vietnam are either unreliable
or of unknown completeness.
A. Paradigm Applied: Vietnam
Determining the intent to commit genocide is often problematic in
the absence of written authorization. The unstated objectives of actors, in
this case the United States and the Government of South Vietnam
(GVN), are difficult if not impossible to determine. As a result, before
addressing the criteria of intent, one might ask whether a prima facie case
for genocide can be made on evidentiary grounds alone - that is,
whether intent can be inferred from the pattern of killings.
Much of the data used comes from Guenter Lewy's citation of
sources in his defense of the United States' role in Vietnam."3 Lewy's
work, though explicit in its aims, has been noted for its exceptional schol-
arship by critics who have nevertheless disagreed with his assumptions
and conclusions due to its lack of censorship of sources that allows read-
ers to arrive at their own conclusions from the data presented."
The first charge brought is the killing of group members in whole or
in part. This corresponds to propositions one and two of the paradigm.
43. GUENTER LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM (1978).
44. M.W. Browne, Book Review, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1978, at 9; Michael Walzer, Book
Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 11, 1978, at 9; William F. Buckley, Jr., N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS,
Dec. 7, 1978, at 19 (Buckley wrote that "[t]he unfortunate Lewy, trying so hard to defend
our war as lawful, has unwittingly written one of the most damning indictments yet of
American intervention in Vietnam.").
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No one questions that there was a sustained attack by the United States
and the GVN that killed hundreds of thousands of people. Nor is there
any question that these attacks were authorized by the military and polit-
ical hierarchy of the United States.
However, Sartre and most other critics failed to note that both sides
were responsible for civilian casualties due in part to their targeted kill-
ings of non-combatants."5 These targeted killings included an estimated
36,725 persons in South Vietnam assassinated by the Vietcong and North
Vietnamese Army between 1957-1972."' Pike argued that the killing of
local officials, the "natural leaders" of Vietnamese society, "by any defini-
tion ... amounts to genocide. '47
This is but one of the many accusations of genocide in that war. For
instance, Operation Phoenix, a Central Intelligence Agency program con-
ducted by the GVN and up to 650 U.S. military and civilian advisors to
"neutralize" the Vietcong infrastructure, killed an estimated 20,587 South
Vietnamese without trial between 1968-1971." 8 During the same period,
Pike estimated that the Vietcong and the Army of North Vietnam assas-
sinated about 21,115 Vietnamese.49
Lewy purports to demonstrate that Operation Phoenix was not an
assassination program because suspects were killed in the course of re-
sisting arrest or during military operations. He argues that the operation
was instead a counter-insurgency program designed to capture and inter-
rogate suspected Vietcong." The confusion in the press partly emanated
from the use by United States intelligence staff of the word "neutralize"
to include both suspects captured, interrogated, and later released as well
as suspects who were killed. The fact that up to thirty-nine percent of
those suspects were killed belies Lewy's defense. 1 Conceding that be-
tween "January 1970 and March 1971 less than 6 percent of those killed
(2 percent of all those neutralized) were killed as a result of special
targeting" means that 623 persons were targeted and assassinated, and an
additional 9,758 persons who should have been released were caught dur-
ing military operations and experienced extrajudicial executions.2 "Con-
cern over the increase in the number killed" - from sixteen percent of
reported cases in 1968 to thirty nine percent of reported cases in 1971 -
led the United States Military Assistance Command to issue new instruc-
tions to United States advisors in 1969 and 1970 about the constraints of
law; these instructions forbade assassinations.5 "
45. SARTRE, supra note 5.
46. DOUGLAS PIKE, THE VIETCONG STRATEGY OF TERROR 82 (1970).
47. Id. at 248.
48. LEWY, supra note 43, at 281.
49. PIKE, supra note 46, at 454.
50. Id. at 279-285.
51. LEwv, supra note 43, at 281.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 282-283, 496 n.38.
VOL. 22:1
GENOCIDE
According to estimates by the United States of "civilian casualties
resulting from enemy-initiated incidents - assassinations, the mining of
roads, the shelling of hamlets or refugee camps, etc.. ." - the number of
deaths represents thirty-one percent of the 53,730 civilians estimated to
have been "killed outright" during 1969 and 1970.1" All such estimates
arouse suspicion because of their false precision and the possible bias ac-
tivating the source, whether estimating casualties inflicted by their own
forces or by their enemies. While the magnitude of casualties inflicted by
North Vietnam and the Vietcong is significant, the preponderance of ci-
vilian casualties were inflicted by the United States Army or United
States trained forces.
Propositions three and four ask whether the Vietnamese were se-
lected as indiscriminate or categorical victims regardless of what they did.
Sartre's charge that United States troops were engaged in "indiscriminate
shooting, murder, rape, and looting" implies that there was a lack of se-
lection of victims between North and South Vietnamese and therefore an
explicit or implicit authorization for slaughter." Two types of charges ex-
ist in South Vietnam: 1) acts by individual soldiers of murder, rape, etc.;
and 2) the conduct of the war itself - massive bombardment, the use of
anti-personnel weapons, and deportations to strategic hamlets and refu-
gee camps, which Sartre termed "concentration. camps."56
Before examining the inference of intent, the following questions
must be answered: What evidence was there of authorization for any
crimes committed by individual servicemen? Conversely, what evidence
was there that such crimes elicited punishment?
Regarding acts by individual soldiers and units, there is insufficient
evidence available from the scattered testimonies compiled by the Inter-
national War Crimes Tribunal convened by Bertrand Russell in 1967 to
make a case.5 7 The selective concern of that tribunal, however, was
faulted by some antiwar activists, including Staughton Lynd who did not
join the Tribunal because it would not investigate the war crimes of both
sides. Finally, in 1969 Bertrand Russell "completely broke with
Schoenman [the principal investigator of the tribunal] having
concluded that the latter had an 'utter incapacity of imparting
reliable information' and was suffering from megalomania." 8 Telford
Taylor, a severe critic of the United States' policy, noted that the United
States massacre at Son My, better known as the My Lai massacre, "pales
into numerical insignificance beside the massacre of thousands in Hue
during the Tet offensive, when the Vietcong also overran Quang Ngai and
54. Id. at 448-449.
55. SARTRE SUPRA note 5, at 73.
56. Id.
57. AGAINST THE CRIME OF SILENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNAL (John Duffet ed., 1970). The Tribunal accepted the Sartre essay as its judgment
on genocide. See SARTRE, supra note 5.
58. LEwy, supra note 43, at 313.
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raced through the hospital shooting doctors, nurses, and bed-ridden pa-
tients."" This does not bear on the evidence for charges against the
United States, but it does bear on imputations that the United States is
alone responsible for the totality of killings of unarmed Vietnamese.
Question one of the paradigm examines whether the United States
had in place sanctions for or against murder, other violations of life-integ-
rity, war crimes, and genocide. Evidence indicating that there were sanc-
tions and enforcement mechanisms to protect the lives and human rights
of Vietnamese from violations by United States servicemen include two
actions undertaken by the United States. First, American officers and ser-
vicemen were prosecuted for their roles in the massacre at Son My, which
was exposed by a member of the United States armed forces. Second, 288
soldiers and marines were tried and court-martialed for personal crimes
against Vietnamese, including murder, rape, mutilation of corpses, and
negligent homicide.6 0 Therefore murder, including mass murder, was still
recognized as murder during the war in Vietnam.
However, questions remain whether such 'crimes were reported and
whether enforcement mechanisms were consistently employed. For in-
stance, company commanders were involved in some cases with abetting,
failing to report, or concealing war crimes. The rules for reporting, refor-
mulated after the Calley trial, probably encouraged cover-ups since
soldiers were supposed to report war crimes to their commanding officer.
Lewy concludes that "[w]hatever the reasons, it is apparent that the rules
for reporting war crimes were often violated."'" The issue is whether vio-
lations of the rules were deviations or the norm. Judgment on this issue
depends on whether the very conduct of the war -such as the designa-
tion of "free-fire zones" for bombing, which accounted for the greatest
number of casualties - constituted a war crime or lead to a general atti-
tude among American servicemen of diminished value for Vietnamese
lives.
Proposition five explores the issue whether there was premeditated
intent and sanctions for genocide implicit in the conduct of the war itself.
What evidence is there of sanctions for attack on Vietnamese civilians?
The United States Rules of Engagement (ROE) proscribed firing on
populated areas except when there was organized resistance from the
Vietcong, not just sniper fire. "In an instruction program established in
1965, newly arrived soldiers were taught that respect for civilian life was
not only a matter of basic decency and legality but was also essential for
winning the hearts and minds of the people."6 2
Both American commanders and members of the United States
59. TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 171 (1971).
60. SEYMOUR M. HERSH, My LAI 4: A REPORT ON THE MASSACRE AND ITS AFTERMATH
(1971).
61. LEWY, supra note 43, at 347.
62. Id. at 302.
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armed forces grumbled and resented General William Westmoreland's ex-
plication of the ROE in 1965-66. They resented the limitations on bomb-
ing, which might have prevented casualties among United States soldiers,
and the clearance procedures necessary before artillery fire and air strikes
could be authorized. The ROE were denounced in the Congressional Rec-
ord by Senator Barry Goldwater in June 1975.63 Civilians were supposed
to be warned of impending air raids by leafletting and loudspeakers. But
these orders were not widely known among field commanders and were
interpreted inconsistently. Further, American combat troops were not ad-
equately trained concerning the Geneva Conventions protecting
civilians."
Jonathan Schell concluded that the ROE were utterly ineffective in
protecting the civilian population. 5 Lewy notes that "Prof. Telford Tay-
lor, formerly chief counsel for the prosecution at the Nuremberg war
crimes trials and a critic of many facets of the United States' Vietnam
policy, has called the rules of engagement 'virtually impeccable.' "66 But
Lewy omits what Taylor went on to say:
But of course the question remains whether the picture painted by
these directives bears any resemblance to the face of war in Vietnam.
... Of what use is an hour or two of lectures on the Geneva Conven-
tions if the soldier sent into combat sees them flouted on every side?
How does the admonition to the Air Force square with the observa-
tions of Jonathan Schell on the way in which tactical air power is ac-
tually used, or with the Marine 'ultimatum' that he quotes? How 'real'
do the instructions to the ground troops appear in the light of the
lieutenants' testimony at the Duffy trial, of the 'mere gook' rule de-
scribed by the Army lawyers, or of the Army Major's remarks after
the destruction of Ben Tre, with heavy loss of civilian life: 'It was
necessary to destroy the town to save it?'67
The "mere gook" rule refers to the belief by many soldiers "that the
lives of Vietnamese were cheap and not protected by the laws of war."6"
"Free fire zones" or "specified strike zones" (SSZ) where the civilian pop-
ulation was supposed to have been warned to move and/or transferred
could be bombed with fewer inhibitions than other areas in which the
Vietcong were believed to be operating. But the targets were supposed to
conform to the laws of war in the SSZs also, with specific targets being
chosen by Forward Air Controllers (FACs) who were in a better position
to see the targets than were the bombers."
All these assumptions were often negated in fact. For instance, civil-
63. Id. at 303.
64. Id. at 235-239.
65. JONATHAN SCHELL, THE OTHER HALF 151 (1968).
66. LEwY, supra note 43, at 233.
67. TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 168-169.
68. LEWY, supra note 43, at 241.
69. Id.
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ians often moved back to their homes rather than remaining in the SSZs.
In addition, Richard Miller charged that the FAC's sometimes called
strikes against the wrong targets, prompted in one case by paid
Vietnamese informers who targeted a Jesuit mission that refused to put
up the NLF flag.70
This pattern of anticipatable deaths that were not prevented because
of the strategy and tactics chosen, the inadequate specification, communi-
cations, and lack of consistent enforcement of norms against war crimes
certainly could, and did, elicit charges of war crimes and immoral conduct
of the war."' However, to make a prima facie case for genocide, we have to
return to the question of selection of victims before exploring the ques-
tion of American intent.
Propositions three and four ask whether the Vietnamese victims were
selected because they were Vietnamese and whether they were in fact de-
fenseless victims. Most South Vietnamese civilian victims were not se-
lected. Rather they were killed as a result of the following United States
strategies: high firepower; reprisals for suspected VC-NVA fire in order to
defeat the Vietcong and to protect American soldiers; officially dividing
the population into "loyal" and "disloyal" camps; and instigating the vil-
lagers to deny aid to the Vietcong and expel them out of fear of repri-
sals. 72 The South Vietnamese villagers were vulnerable in most cases be-
cause of where they were, not who they were. They were also vulnerable
because Vietcong strategy made their villages into "defended places" and
because the Vietcong used villagers to launch attacks, leading to the le-
gally-rationalized erosion of protective norms by the United States in the
face of military frustration.
According to Lewy's estimate of how civilian deaths were related to
military deaths in the Vietnam conflict, between 365,000 and 587,000
North and South Vietnamese civilians were killed by all forces. These
dead constitute either twenty-eight or forty-five percent of all deaths, de-
pending on the assumptions one makes about the ratio of combatants to
noncombatants among the United States' reported war deaths.7 3 Other
figures compiled by AID, Lewy, and Senator Kennedy's Senate Subcom-
mittee on Refugees state the highest estimate of civilian deaths attributa-
ble to all forces as 430,000.4 This constitutes 1.7 percent of the popula-
tion of both Vietnams in 1960, about the same percentage of civilians
70. RICHARD MILLER, THE LAW OF WAR 192 (1975).
71. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 59.
72. LEWY, supra note 43, at 95-107, 271-374; WALZER, supra note 11, at 188-189. If the
number of Vietnamese who were murdered by US serviceman who were subsequently in-
dicted were added to the number of Vietnamese killed in Operation Phoenix, the ration of
the total number of Vietnamese killed to the number murdered and subject to extrajudicial
execution by GVN forces is 11.45:1. Estimates used to arrive at this figure include 542 mur-
dered Vietnamese where an indictment resulted out of 430,000 total number of Vietnamese
killed. This figure comes from the Kennedy Committee's estimate.
73. LEWy, supra note 43, at 452-453.
74. Id.
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killed in the two world wars in this century and in the Korean conflict.
The estimate of civilian deaths is not inconsistent with the vague es-
timate supplied by the Permanent Mission of Vietnam to the United
States that "several hundred thousand" were killed in "Southern Viet-
nam"; no estimate was made for "Northern Vietnam." ' Paradoxically, we
find unexpected population growth during this period (see Table 1), indi-
cating perhaps that the original population may have been higher than
estimated and the percent killed less than estimated. The number of
Vietnamese wounded is not known. However, the Kennedy Committee
estimated that 1,005,000 Vietnamese civilians were wounded, and the offi-
cial Vietnamese source reports there are 302,000 war invalids in "south-
ern Vietnam," presumably including civilians and combatants.7 6
Estimates of internal refugees, officially recorded and temporarily
displaced or unrecorded, range from 4.5 million South Vietnamese to ten
million in "Southern Vietnam."' 7 This raises the question whether the
South Vietnamese who were defenseless victims had any choices when
they were unable or unwilling to fight for either side and were unable to
expel either the Vietcong or the United States. Was there an alternative
that would allow them to evade being killed? Sartre charges that the al-
ternatives presented to the South Vietnamese constituted "conditional
genocide," for there were no alternatives other than to "U]oin the armed
forces of Saigon or be enclosed in . . .concentration camps. '7 8 Such op-
tions, he asserts, were an example of "deliberately inflicting conditions of
life calculated to bring about [the] physical destruction [of the
Vietnamese] in whole or in part. 7 9
Question two in the paradigm examines whether the United States
deliberately inflicted conditions of life calculated to bring about the phys-
ical destruction of the South Vietnamese. The refugee camps did not lead
to the physical destruction of the internees but preserved them from
physical destruction. However, Sartre makes a case by dwelling on the
demoralization and impairment of the social structure as a result of dis-
placement and destruction of the traditional Vietnamese way of life. He
also charges that the refugee camps prevented births through the separa-
tion of families, shown as charge 1(d) in Table 1. Sartre characterizes the
camps by their lack of basic hygiene, malnutrition, separation of families,
the lack of any activities for the refugees, and destruction of family and
social structures."
Many concur with his judgment of poor conditions in the camps.
Lewy cites reports supporting most of Sartre's charges but asserts that
the conditions, although "generally dismal," were "not out of line with
75. SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 101-103 (1990) [hereinafter VIETNAMI.
76. LEwy, supra note 43, at 445-449.
77. Id. at 108; VIETNAM, supra note 75, at 101.
78. SARTRE, supra note 5, at 72-73.
79. Id. at 74.
80. Id. at 73-75.
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the local standard of living and with what one could expect in a wartime
situation.""1 Taylor ascribes the failure of the United States to insure
that the camps met with basic standards to a more general cause, "un-
dermaintenance." The commitment by the United States to social ser-
vices was never commensurate with the need in Vietnam and was only a
small proportion of the total spent on the war." However, Sartre's model
of the Nazi concentration camp, an institution designed for calculated de-
struction, simply does not fit. In contrast to concentration camps in which
people disappear and are systematically tortured and worked to death,
the South Vietnamese camps were shelters for refugees displaced from
their homes but not denied legal existence. These refugees were not sub-
jected to military discipline, forced labor, or torture.
The Russell Tribunal also charged that the camps were purposely
placed in dangerous zones but gave no evidence of how sites were se-
lected."3 This charge, however, underlines the danger that justified the
existence of the camps and of strategic hamlets, a danger which arose
from the strategy employed by both sides. The camps were justified by
the United States intervenors because they were required by their obliga-
tion to protect the civilian population from physical destruction. Thus, it
is difficult to infer from the deficiencies of the camps that they consti-
tuted deliberate infliction on the group of "conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part," as defined by Article 2(c) of the Genocide Convention.
Further, some unplanned consequences of camp life, such as depen-
dency, demoralization, and changes in family structure, occur in many
refugee camps and administered communities and cannot be plausibly in-
terpreted as physical destruction. Neither Sartre nor anyone else has
shown how the camps and strategic hamlets led to physical destruction or
a diminishing birth rate. In fact, as Table 1 points out, the population of
Vietnam actually increased during the war years.
There are questions about any population transfers by an occupier or
an intervenor under international law, but the removal of the civilian
population is not prohibited by the Geneva Convention if undertaken for
the security of the occupied population. Article 49 of the Geneva Conven-
tion states that
[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of pro-
tected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupy-
ing Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohib-
ited, regardless of their motive. Nevertheless, the Occupying Power
may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the secur-
ity of the population or imperative military reasons so demand...
Charge 1(b) in Table 1 explores whether the United States deliber-
81. LEWY, supra note 43, at 228.
82. TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 196-202.
83. SARTRE, supra note 5, at 48-50.
VOL. 22:1
GENOCIDE
ately caused "serious bodily and mental harm" to destroy the Vietnamese
as a group. This charge, brought by the Russell Tribunal, alleged as evi-
dence the effects of the use of fragmentation bombs - showing the "in-
tention of accomplishing a greater massacre," which is a war crime84
and incendiary weapons, such as napalm and white phosphorous.
However, there is an alternative explanation to the use of such weap-
ons. Lewy explains that incendiary weapons, including napalm, do not
violate the Hague Convention because the Convention has been inter-
preted to weigh civilian suffering relative to military effectiveness, and
interpretation which only negates the use of weapons that cause suffering
but are militarily ineffective.8 5 Lewy observes that napalm was used in
World War II and Korea, but this argument is partially outdated by re-
strictions on incendiary weapons in Protocol I of 1977. The tactical justi-
fication of incendiary weapons used by both sides is their usefulness in
killing enemy forces in underground bunkers. Although the use of napalm
is not outlawed in attacks on combatants, international norms may be
changing. A 1974 United Nations General Assembly Resolution con-
demned the use of napalm without any dissenting votes and declared that
incendiary weapons, like bacteriological, chemical, and nuclear weapons,
should be outlawed.8
6
Lewy further concludes that cluster or fragmentation bombs (CBUs)
have legitimate military functions. Lewy observes that "CBUs proved
particularly useful in flak suppression over North Vietnam where they
could either knock out the anti-aircraft weapons or prevent them from
firing by forcing their crews underground."8 Taylor also argues that anti-
personnel bombs might have had legitimate uses in North Vietnam.8
However, there are serious questions about the proportionality of civilian
casualties such weapons inflict. Krepon criticizes the lack of military con-
sideration of the high civilian casualties caused by the CBUs and advo-
cates new protocols to the Geneva Convention banning their use, despite
their effectiveness at suppressing flak.
A Japanese team of experts traveling in North Vietnam and observing
the effects has estimated that a single CBU dropped in a linear pat-
tern and detonated at an altitude of 600 feet was able to disperse its
fragments so as to kill or wound people at an effective range of 300
meters by 1,000 meters. A report by the International Committee of
the Red Cross places the correct figure at 300 by 900 meters. These
figures are generally halved by American experts (noting the possible
bias of the sources) .... CBUs, by literally pockmarking an entire
area, could either knock out the anti-aircraft weapon or prevent it
from firing, thus providing the maximum amount of cover for U.S.
84. Id. at 20-22.
85. LEWy, supra note 43, at 242-43.
86. Id. at 247-48.
87. Id. at 267.
88. TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 141-142.
1993
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
aircraft, surpassing even napalm in effectiveness. 9
Article 35 of Protocol I in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Ge-
neva Convention prohibits "the use of any weapon the primary effect of
which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detec-
tion by X-Rays."90 Although the use of napalm and fragmentation bombs
was not unlawful at the time, it seems likely that many of their uses
would now be regarded as war crimes.
The destruction of crops and other methods of defoliation may be
construed as the deliberate infliction of "conditions of life calculated to
bring about [the] physical destruction [of the Vietnamese] in whole or in
part," conditions which could lead to charges of genocide.91 Crop destruc-
tion, applied to 3.2% of South Vietnam's cultivated land between 1965
and 1971, was said to affect less than one percent of the population in
areas where food was destroyed, according to Lewy.92 However, a policy
that indirectly curtailed food to the civilian population in those areas
might violate the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention outlawing
starvation of the civilian population. 3
Defoliation was intended to clear jungle and forest terrain so troops
could operate more effectively. Neither objective is outlawed by the laws
of war nor were these tactics calculated to bring about the physical de-
struction of the Vietnamese. However, the program undermined the exis-
tence of the estimated 325,000 villagers involved by 1967, then 1.9% of
the estimated population of South Vietnam. Cutting the local food supply
led to widespread hatred of the United States and the GVN among the
villagers, and a Rand Corporation study in 1967 recommended that the
program be discontinued as it was counterproductive. 4 It continued for
four more years, due to resistance on the part of the American military
command, which commissioned its own reviews.5 The chemical agents
employed to defoliate the jungle were intended to protect the soldiers of
the United States. At the time, the long term effects of the agents were
not known. When the research on the long-range, harmful effects of
Agent Orange on people was established, its use was suspended. 6 Chemi-
cal despoliation of the environment has since been prohibited by Protocol
I of 1977 Geneva Convention. 7
Charge 2 in the table accuses the United States of intending to de-
89. MICHAEL KREPON, Weapons Potentially Inhumane: The Case of Cluster Bombs, in
4 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONCLUDING PHASE 269 (Richard A. Falk
ed., 1976).
90. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 23, at 405, 409.
91. SARTRE, supra note 5, at 74.
92. LEWY, supra note 43, at 258.
93. See supra note 23.
94. LEwY, supra note 43, at 259-260.
95. Id. at 260-262.
96. Id. at 263.
97. MCCOUBREY, supra note 19, at 117-118.
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stroy the Vietnamese people. As already established, there was a sus-
tained attack by United States and GVN forces that led to widespread
displacement of and the death of a segment of the Vietnamese people -
perhaps less than two percent - and the wounding of perhaps three
times that number. 8 The victims most often became vulnerable as a re-
sult of a military strategy that increasingly led to patterned deviations
from the Rules of Engagement, which were designed to protect
Vietnamese civilians. Yet the United States tried and punished perpetra-
tors of individual murders and of the Son My massacre of Vietnamese
civilians. No evidence of other wanton massacres was confirmed, despite
claims by some soldiers that war crimes and torture were commonplace in
Vietnam." Further, no evidence was presented that the South
Vietnamese regarded the United States intervention as a threat to their
right to life, as opposed to their self-determination or their political au-
tonomy. The major refugee flows from Vietnam were instigated by the
postwar governments: first, in 1975 by the military victory of North Viet-
nam; and second, in 1978-80 by the policy of the new government of
pressing ethnic Chinese Vietnamese to flee in boats under conditions that
threatened their survival.100
The effects of the war on the Vietnamese are scarcely summed up in
the second portion of the table. It omits the wounded, the destruction of
traditional ways of life, the ecological damage, and the post-war refugee
flows. In addition, there was probably widespread social disorganization
and adaptation to ways of life scorned by the Vietnamese, including pros-
titution and mixed marriages. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam lists
"several hundred thousand prostitutes and drug addicts" as war damage
in Southern Vietnam and 800,000 orphans or children abandoned by de-
parting American soldiers.10 1
Although no prima facie case can be made for genocide under the
Genocide Convention, thereby rendering the question of genocidal intent
moot, there still remains the question of intent for the indiscriminate kill-
ing that did occur. No one has presented evidence of a United States ide-
ology justifying destruction of the Vietnamese qua Vietnamese. On the
contrary, official explanations endorsed the United States obligations to
guarantee the rights of the South Vietnamese. One approach in showing
intent is to infer motives from the attitude of United States servicemen in
South Vietnam towards the Vietnamese. Widespread racism, depersonal-
ization, hostility, and cultural misunderstanding were reported. The
Vietnamese were demeaned, dehumanized, and excluded from the Ameri-
can universe of obligation by labeling them "gooks," as the Koreans were
98. See supra notes 72-74.
99. LEwy, supra note 43, at 313-319.
100. HELEN FEIN, CONGREGATIONAL SPONSORS OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES IN THE U.S.,
1979-1981 44-47 (1987); BARRY WAIN, THE REFUSED: THE AGONY OF THE INDOCHINESE REFU-
GEES (1981).
101. VIETNAM, supra note 75, at 101.
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labeled in the Korean War. But the attitudes of American soldiers were a
product of the specific situation. No evidence was presented that such
attitudes precipitated American involvement or determined the conduct
of the war. To blame the enlistees and draftees, who did not choose either
to fight the war or the strategy that led them to construe all Vietnamese
as possible enemies, would diminish the responsibility of the architects of
American policy.
Another approach to explain the mass civilian deaths is to analyze
the political and military decisions that led to the destruction. Bedau ex-
amines Sartre's case for genocide and the possible methods of establish-
ing intent and exposes Sartre's contradictory statements." 2 "Sartre some-
what grudgingly admits that there is no evidence of a self-conscious
United States policy in Vietnam to kill Vietnamese 'merely because they
are Vietnamese.' "103 But, Sartre argues that "genocidal intent is implicit
in the facts." He asserted that the United States would have to extermi-
nate part of the Vietnamese in order to show "all of the Third World...
that guerrilla war does not pay."10 However, both Thompson and Lans-
dale, counter-insurgency experts who worked in Malaya and the Philip-
pines where their strategies succeeded, testified that anti-guerrilla war-
fare does not require mass killing, but it does require patience, respect for
the rural population, and discrimination of guerrillas from the peasantry
or villagers.10 5 Both Thompson and Lansdale advised the United States
on strategy in Vietnam in the early 1960's.
Bedau maintains that
the war the United States actually fought in South Vietnam beginning
in 1965 was, by and large, not conducted on any recognizable theory
of counter-insurgency at all. The war, insofar as we are concerned
with those events ... with possibly genocidal significance, was actually
fought as a function of responses to considerations progressively in-
compatible with the patience and persistence required by anti-guer-
rilla warfare."'0 6
In other words, the United States relied on air power because of the need
to keep American casualties low for domestic political reasons. This strat-
egy led to a war of attrition, designed to destroy Vietcong support by
stripping away their protective layer of villagers and driving the villagers
into refugee camps to escape bombardment. But after 1968, when the
United States realized it could only win by devastating South Vietnam, it
began to scale the war down.1"' Bedau concludes that genocidal intent by
102. See BEDAU, supra note 5.
103. Id. at 32.
104. Id. at 19.
105. See generally ROBERT THOMPSON, DEFEATING COMMUNIST INSURGENcY: THE LES-
SONS OF MALAYA AND VIETNAM (1966); EDWARD GEARY LANSDALE, IN THE MIDST OF WARS: AN
AMERICAN'S MISSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (1972).
106. BEDAU, supra note 5, at 36.
107. Id. at 37-42.
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the U.S. was not proven, but he implies that war crimes and crimes
against humanity may have been perpetrated by the United States in
Vietnam. 10
8
Walzer reaches a similar conclusion, observing that an appropriate
anti-guerrilla strategy, which requires a very high ratio of soldiers to guer-
rillas, does not lead to indiscriminate killing of civilians. However, this
sort of anti-guerrilla strategy was not used in Vietnam.' Walzer declares
that "the American war in Vietnam was, first of all, an unjustified inter-
vention, and it was, secondly, carried on in so brutal a manner that even
had it initially been defensible, it would have to be condemned."" Tay-
lor, a partisan of the intervention until 1965 by his own account, con-
demns the choice of a strategy that could not work and that produced
mass deaths for expedient reasons, as well as the lack of adequate funding
for restitution and social and medical services in Vietnam."' He con-
cludes that General Westmoreland and his staff were guilty of war crimes
in Vietnam, citing Nuremburg precedents." 2
Miller concludes further that South Vietnamese civilians were denied
the protection of international law by all parties - the United States, the
GVN, the Vietcong and the army of North Vietnam - and that the
bombing of the North was a war crime but not genocide." 3 Taylor dis-
agreed, on the other hand, concluding that there was ". . . no sufficient
basis for war crimes charges based on the bombing of North Vietnam."
He believed that General Westmoreland and the United States Army
command were indictable for war crimes, but he was not sure who in
Washington was indictable for their actions regarding South Vietnam." 4
Lewy, who generally defends the conduct of the Vietnam war against crit-
ics, also concludes that General Westmoreland could be indicted for fail-
ure to prevent war crimes because of his failure to enforce the Rules of
Engagement, "a dereliction which in turn led to war crimes."".5
B. Paradigm Applied: Afghanistan
Again, application of the paradigm begins by examining the evidence
of possible genocidal acts in Afghanistan to determine whether a prima
facie case exists, as alleged in charges 1(a) and 1(b). Propositions one and
two examine the killing of members of groups in whole or in part, the
causing of serious bodily or mental harm, and the existence of a sustained
attack by an organized political actor.
All sources agree that the destruction of crops, orchards, irrigation,
108. Id. at 43, 46.
109. WALZER, supra note 11, at 193-94.
110. Id. at 299.
111. TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 172-207.
112. Id. at 179-82.
113. Id. at 157-200, 306.
114. Id. at 192-94.
115. LEWY, supra note 43, at 241-42.
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and terracing systems without limits demonstrates a sustained and mas-
sive bombing against Afghan villages and agriculture.11 6 This could be at-
tributed to a Soviet strategy intended to destroy the subsistence of the
mujahadeen, a legitimate military objective. However, since the anticipat-
able result is the starvation of the civilian rural cultivators, the attack
may be considered a war crime under the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva
Convention.117 Rubin observes that there is "evidence that the destruc-
tion of agriculture has created pre-famine conditions in certain regions of
the country . .. [and] infant mortality, always high, has skyrocketed to
300 to 400 per thousand." 1 8 If this destruction was aimed at military
objectives, then the bombing might be considered a war crime, but it is
insufficient evidence to make a prima facie case for genocide.
Proposition three examines whether the victims were selected by
their membership in a group. Soviet soldiers perpetrated repeated indis-
criminate massacres of Afghans. Two dozen incidents of corroborated re-
ports are cited by Laber and Rubin as representative of a pattern of mas-
sacres." 9 In these incidents, the soldiers entered villages without
opposition and slaughtered people by many means, including lobbing gre-
nades into houses; tying, dousing with gasoline, and setting victims afire;
setting fire to irrigation tunnels; and bayonetting and machine gunning
victims.2 0 Victims were apparently picked solely because they were Af-
ghans, demonstrated by the lack of evidence of any interrogation or
search process.
Rubin observes that "the Soviets have a clear and consistent policy
of taking reprisals against civilians for military actions by the Resis-
tance."'' Bodansky, relying on the history of Soviet military doctrine,
strategy, and the reports of defectors, asserts that the attacks on villagers
were purposeful and represented "simply a pragmatic and highly effective
tactic" both to punish resistance and "to create collateral terror to pro-
duce a massive flight of refugees."' 22 Other acts described below also indi-
cate that the Soviet intent was to murder and maim.
Proposition five examines whether the Soviets had a premeditated
116. HELSINKI WATCH, To DIE IN AFGHANISTAN (1985)[hereinafter HELSINKI WATCH
1985]; HELSINKI WATCH, "TEARS, BLOOD AND CRIES:" HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE
THE INVASION 1979-1984 (1984)[hereinafter HELSINKI WATCH 1984]; JERI LASER & BARNETT
R. RUBIN, "A NATION Is DYING;" AFGHANISTAN UNDER THE SOVIETS 1979-1987 (1988); see also
PORTER, supra note 3.
117. See supra note 23.
118. BARNETT R. RUBIN, Human Rights in Afghanistan, in AFGHANISTAN: THE GREAT
GAME REVISITED 351 (Rosanne Klass ed., 1990) [hereinafter AFGHANISTAN: THE GREAT GAME
REVISITED.]
119. LABER & RUBIN, supra note 116, at 351.
120. See also HELSINKI WATCH 1984, supra note 116, at 34-40; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
AFGHANISTAN: UNLAWFUL KILLING AND TORTURE 5-6 (1988); GOODWIN, supra note 5, at 2.
121. RUBIN, supra note 118, at 340-341.
122. YOSSEF BODANSKY, Soviet Military Operations in Afghanistan, in AFGHANISTAN:
THE GREAT GAME REVISITED, supra note 118, at 258.
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intent to murder and to inflict serious bodily harm without alternative
explanations. The bombardments that occurred appear to have been pur-
posefully aimed at crowds and aggregates of people unlikely to attack
soldiers, such as refugee caravans, weddings, funerals, religious gather-
ings, and civilian buses. Many reports show that victims and their fami-
lies tell of mines disguised as toys that they and their children picked
up.123 This tactic obviously serves to maim and disable people, but no one
has alleged that such mines have any military purpose' whatsoever in
fighting a guerrilla war since the design indicates that they target
children.
Charge 1(c) addresses the infliction of serious mental harm resulting
from sustained attacks. There are discrepancies in the reports of attacks
on the Afghans as a religious collectivity. Because many Afghans con-
ceived of the war as an Islamic war against communism, the mujahadeen
were literally warriors in a religious war. Reisman and Norchi observe
that Islam is of extraordinary importance to the identity of Afghans, and
this religious belief was a target of systematic attack during torture. They
believe that "[g]iven the Afghan value system, such acts could constitute
genocide [under] Article II (b), in that they are acts committed with the
intent to destroy a religious group by causing serious mental and physical
harm to members of the group." They note that "[tihere is also evidence
of the targeting of mosques and religious schools and, in one case, the
intentional desecration of a mosque."14
Laber and Rubin assert that "there have been no open
attacks on Islam." Instead, they claim that leaders of the Democratic Re-
public of Afghanistan ("DRA") tried to "woo religious Afghans to their
side" through public lip-service to Islam and manipulation of religious
schools by the secret police. Observance of Islam, they reported, under-
mined Afghans' chances of succeeding in school and gaining government
employment.1 25 At worst, however, giving preference to Afghans not prac-
ticing Islam and creating a system of positive incentives to ideological
conformity constituted a policy of discrimination rather than an attempt
to physically eliminate or injure religious practitioners. The Genocide
Convention's definition of harm would be stretched beyond usefulness if
it included all discrimination and ideological attacks as causes of "mental
harm." In addition, Reisman and Norchi's charge that mosques have been
purposefully targeted seems hard to prove given the evidence of indis-
criminate bombardment and the general targeting of crowds.
Charge 1(e) forbids the forcible transfer of children of the victimized
group to another group. Reisman and Norchi report that
[e]vidence indicates a co-ordinated policy of forcibly transferring chil-
dren from Afghanistan to the USSR. The objective of this policy ap-
123. See supra note 116; RUBIN, supra note 118, at 341, 355.
124. REISMAN & NoRCdI, supra note 5, at 5.
125. LABER'& RUBIN, supra note 116, at 121-22.
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pears to be a deliberate attempt to deculturate the transferred chil-
dren from the values of their parents and the group and to forcibly
inculcate them in the values of the Soviet Union. According to wit-
nesses, the procedure is as follows: without warning, officials enter a
classroom, and with no explanation, choose a certain number of chil-
dren who must leave with the officials . . . . Several days later, the
parents are told that their children have been sent to the Soviet
Union.' 11
2 6
Helsinki Watch first reported this practice in 1984 and stressed its
systematic character in 1985.127 Government officials drew some students
from the Fatherland Training Centers, which were designed for the re-
education of orphans. Others were transferred without parental permis-
sion from youth organizations. Some parents were induced to give permis-
sion by force, deceit, and social pressure. 128 In some cases, children were
transferred for short term visits (up to six months). But in 1984, "Babrak
Karmal announced a new program under which thousands of children
would be sent to the Soviet Union for ten years of education. ' ' 29 Mem-
bers of the Communist Party, Khad (the DRA security service), and com-
munist youth organizations were induced to go, and children of the poor
and the fatherless were snatched. A defector from the Kabul government
asserted that there was an agreement signed between the Soviet Union
and the Afghan trade union organization to send at least 2,000 Afghan
children a year to the Soviet Union for ten years.'
Question one examines whether sanctions for murder, crime, and ge-
nocide were in place. As has been noted, the massacres "are invariably
the work of Soviet soldiers, sometimes accompanied by a few Afghan
party members who serve as guides."'' 1 In several instances, Soviet
soldiers are reported to have said that "[w]e don't need the people, we
need the land!' 32 Not only were there no sanctions against the mass kill-
ing of Afghans, individual homicides, rape, or looting, Soviet defectors
have said that there were sanctions against not killing civilians. For ex-
ample, Private Oleg Khlan told the Christian Science Monitor on 10 Au-
gust 1984 that "[w]e were ordered by our officers that when we attack a
village, not one person must be left alive to tell the tale. If we refuse to
carry out these orders, we get it in the neck ourselves."' s
In a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Inde-
pendent Council on International Human Rights reported on the human
rights situation in Afghanistan. The Independent Council observed that
126. REISMAN & NORCHI, supra note 5, at 5-6.
127. HELSINKI WATCH 1985, supra note 116.
128. Id. at 71-78.
129. Id. at 76.
130. Id. at 78.
131. LABER & RUBIN, supra note 116, at 22.
132. Id. at 10.
133. Id. at 35.
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"the unremitting pattern of violations of the laws of war by Soviet forces
bespeaks [of] a complete lack of awareness of these basic international
norms, which the Soviet Union has bound itself by treaty to observe.1 ' 3 4
Bodansky relates the indiscriminate killing of civilians to a long-term So-
viet doctrine and strategy previously practiced in Asia.1' This compari-
son helps to explain the gap between international norms and the behav-
ior of the Soviet forces.
The effect of these policies has been severe. A Gallup Pakistan sur-
vey, designed and analyzed by a Swiss demographer, Marek Sliwinski,
showed that nine percent of Afghanistan's pre-war population was killed
between 1978 and 1987, another thirty-three percent have become refu-
gees, and eleven percent are internally displaced."3 6 The percentage
killed, Sliwinski notes, is among the highest in recent history.
Although comparing percentages killed cannot prove culpability, it
does suggest how the effects in Afghanistan compare to other instances of
genocide aimed at eliminating a people over time. For example, the per-
centage killed in Afghanistan, a figure that includes an unknown number
of combatants, is not far below the percentage of Poles killed by German
forces in Poland between 1939 and 1945, where ten percent of the Polish
population, excluding the Jews and combat deaths, was killed. Lemkin
identified Poles as the victims of Nazi genocide in his seminal work on
genocide."3 7 The Poles were directly killed in collective reprisals, mas-
sacres, and extra-judicial executions on streets and in villages, and indi-
rectly in concentration camps through starvation and medical experimen-
tation.' In Afghanistan, forty-six per cent of the Afghans killed were
victims of aerial bombardments, and Sliwinski estimates that "non-bel-
ligerents constituted approximately [eighty] percent of the victims of ae-
rial bombardment.' 39 This is an indirect testimony to either the target-
ing of civilians or indiscriminate targeting.
Human rights organizations have noted that there were violations of
the laws of war on both sides. The Afghan government and the parties of
the resistance killed prisoners of war, and they committed extra-judicial
executions and torture both preceding the Soviet invasion and during the
war. '4 However, the violations committed by the resistance organizations
were generally directed against the DRA, Soviet soldiers, and rival resis-
tance groups, and not against unarmed Soviet citizens.
134. REISMAN & NORCHI, supra note 5.
135. BODANSKY, supra note 122, at 234, 246-256.
136. MAREK SLIWINSKI, The Decimation of a People, 33 ORaIs 39 (1989).
137. See BOHDAN WYTWYCKY, THE OTHER HOLOCAUST: MANY CIRCLES OF HELL 39-52, 91
(1980)(discussing the similarity between the pattern of collective punishments in Afghani-
stan in which Soviet soldiers killed hundreds in reprisal for a single illegal act in the vicinity
and German collective punishment in Poland between 1939 and 1945).
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There is no evidence of any generalized sanctions among resistance
groups towards the murder of civilians, with the exception of the killing
of Afghan government officials believed to be collaborating with the oc-
cupiers. However, the practices of the various resistance groups differ
substantially. Most of the charges made by Helsinki Watch have been
leveled against the Islamic fundamentalist Hezb-e Islami Party.
Propositions four and five and Charge 2 explore whether the Soviet
Union intended to destroy the Afghans as a people. There is scarcely any
dispute about the facts except those concerning the Soviet attacks against
Islam. Reisman and Norchi conclude that both the acts and intent of the
Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were "to de-
stroy, in whole or in part, a national ... group, as such," and thus those
actions violate the Genocide Convention. The object of the mass bom-
bardments, massacres, and destruction of the countryside was the depop-
ulation of Afghanistan. The refugee flight figures show that this
succeeded.
Where actions with predictable results are taken over an extended pe-
riod of time, and the consequences of these actions regularly confirm
their outcome, one can reasonably infer that those responsible for
such actions are committing them with specific intent. [In legal terms
this proposition is res ipsa loquitur, or, the thing speaks for itself]....
There is considerable evidence that genocide was committed against
the Afghan people by the combined forces of the Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The repetition and pattern indi-
cates that many of the acts described above were part of a plan."'
Sliwinski shows that the ethnic composition of Afghanistan changed
significantly between 1978 and 1987. In 1978, Pathans were the largest
ethnic group, comprising thirty-nine percent of all Afghans. Yet, they
made up only twenty-two percent of the population in Afghanistan in
1987. Tajiks made up twenty-six percent of the population in 1978, but
grew to thirty-four percent of the population in 1987. Sliwinski observed
that
[tihe new dominance of Tajiks and other northern ethnic groups is of
more than mere ethnographic interest.... The proximity of the So-
viet Muslim republics populated by Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens
provides the Soviet authorities with the linguistic and cultural means
to influence the now-dominant Afghan ethnic populations. At some
point, the strong linguistic and ethnic affinities across the Soviet-Af-
ghan border may even furnish a pretext for the annexation of these
provinces." 2
Sliwinski also notes that the depopulation of these provinces "resulted
from a conscious, ordered, and planned Soviet policy. . . These steps
could not be achieved without expelling or exterminating the indigenous
141. REISMAN & NORCHI, supra note 5, at 6.
142. SLIWINSKI, supra note 136, at 46-47.
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population."14 3
Similarly, the decline in the number of agriculturalists from eighty-
five percent in 1977/78 to twenty-six percent in 1986/87, coupled with the
fact that ninty-seven percent of the refugees were of rural origin
is probably not coincidental. The disintegration of agricultural com-
munities, traditionally hostile toward communism, constituted the
sine qua non for the stability of the communist regime. But, as offi-
cials in Kabul have been quoted as saying, 'if only 1 million people
were left in the country, they would be more than enough to start a
new society." '44
Thus, "depopulation" is not a voluntaristic or neutral process; rather,
it is a strategy for state security that utilizes genocide. An alternative in-
terpretation by Rubin argues that Soviet destruction was an outcome of
another goal.
The Soviet intention in invading Afghanistan and trying to subdue
the resistance was not to destroy any group, in whole or in part. Their
goal, rather, was to subdue armed opposition to a regime they had
imposed on the country. When it became clear, however, that the re-
sistance movement drew sustenance and strength from the support it
received from the population, the Soviet military did not shrink from
massive reprisals against civilians; this had the foreseeable effect of
destroying certain groups and depopulating certain areas. 14"
Rubin's explanation implies that the Soviet reprisals were a consequence
of mujahadeen resistance and a means to deter attacks by the resistance.
Rubin, however, observed that the Soviet reprisals were purposefully
targeted at civilians and not restricted to reprisals against the attackers
by targeting the villages in which attackers hid that could be considered
defended places."" This targeting could be considered a crime of war in
itself.
Afghans became victims regardless of whether they fled or surren-
dered. This is particularly reflected in the indiscriminate Soviet bombing
of refugee caravans and villages. Similarly, the victims of massacres were
not protected by their surrender to Soviet troops. Thus, the destruction
of Afghans was not incidental to military objectives but was a strategic
objective in and of itself. This objective fulfills what Bodansky sees as the
Soviet military doctrine and strategy of isolating and destroying segments
of a society in Muslim areas before attempting to pacify the remainder. 147
Rubin's denial that the Soviet/DRA destruction of a significant part
of the Afghan people is genocide appears to stem from a confusion be-
tween intent and motive. He defines intent as a long-range goal rather
143. Id. at 49-50.
144. Id. at 50-51.
145. RUBIN, supra note 5, at 7.
146. See supra note 119.
147. BODANSKY, supra note 122, at 234-37.
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than the expected end of purposeful action.1 4 8 However, motive and in-
tent are different. Motive describes why an action was taken; intent de-
scribes the anticipated goal or purpose of an action. Identical intents,
therefore, may be inspired by different motives. The intent to destroy the
Afghan people, without distinction between combatants and non-combat-
ants, was demonstrated by the persistent pattern of mass killing and
maiming of people in Afghanistan and the destruction of the environment
and food producing areas by the Soviet Union and the DRA. This pattern
is not attributable to the pursuit of any legitimate military objective and
is therefore a violation of sections a, b, and c of Article II of the Genocide
Convention. Furthermore, the forcible transfer of children is a clear viola-
tion of section e of Article II.
Although conclusions may be drawn about Soviet patterns of behav-
ior in Afghanistan, different interpretations of their motives cannot be
confirmed. The pattern discerned may be attributed to a motive to terror-
ize, to devastate, or to depopulate the nation. The specification of motive
lends plausibility to a finding of intent to commit genocide, assuming that
the facts fit the criteria of genocide. In that case, as Reisman and Norchi
argued, a plausible prima facie case of genocide can be made against the
Soviet Union and the DRA in Afghanistan for its action from 1979-1988.
VI. CONCLUSION
Genocide, some have said, is a "fuzzy concept. 1 4 9 Similarly, the laws
of war, "although a long-established reality with a substantial core of rec-
ognized practice, are very fuzzy around the edges. '150 The paradigm pro-
posed earlier provides the criteria necessary to make genocide easier to
detect and could be used as a model to devise criteria to probe the exis-
tence of war crimes. Such a paradigm might enable us to explore whether
lawful ends may lead to the killing of civilians and to clarify the inten-
tions of the perpetrators and the obligations of superior officers.
Sanctions for or against the murder of members of the occupied na-
tion by the intervenor provide clues both to the nature of the obligations
of occupiers and to the expectations officers have for actions of their
troops. If men are expected to kill members of a group categorically, it is
plausible to assume that their superiors would have to both exonerate the
perpetrator from punishment for the killing of the victims and to obligate
or compel them to kill. The existence of sanctions against murder, if they
are enforced, is inconsistent with the execution of genocide. The fact that
American soldiers were prosecuted for individual murders in Vietnam, as
well as for group massacres, whereas Soviet soldiers were threatened for
not participating in massacres in Afghanistan is a vital clue to the differ-
148. RUBIN, supra note 118, at 352, 335.
149. Quoting Professor Morton Winston at the Genocide Watch Conference of the In-
stitute for the Study of Genocide in New York City, May 22, 1989.
150. TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 32.
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ence between the aims and strategies of the United States and the Soviet
Union. These differences, both in the scale and toleration of massacres
between Vietnam and Afghanistan, lead to the differential impact on
population noted in Table 1.
In Vietnam, there were repeated and substantive charges of war
crimes that appear well-founded. Charges of genocide, which gained some
currency at the time, simply are not supported by the acts cited. In Af-
ghanistan, there were repeated and substantive
charges of "depopulation," massacre, deliberate injury, forced transfer of
the children of Aghanis, and occasional charges of genocide, all of which
were usually ignored. The evidence of Soviet actions in Afghanistan sus-
tains a prima facie charge of genocide as well as charges of war crimes.
Mixed anti-guerrilla war and wars of intervention may provide prov-
ocations and justifications masking genocide for several reasons, but they
do not produce genocide without authorization for targeted mass killing
at some level. These reasons may include 1) labeling one camp or a whole
people as an enemy; 2) the inability of intervenors and state defenders to
reliably discriminate between guerrillas and others of the population they
come from; 3) the pre-existing racial/ethnic division between the inter-
venors and the population; 4) the greater force available to the interven-
ors; and 5) military strategies and ideologies that counter guerrilla strate-
gies of discrete and tactical terror by mass terror and intimidation.
There are, however, warning signs that genocide may be occurring.
Careful examination should be made of actions taken by the intervenors.
Is a group being labeled collectively? Do the doctrines of the intervenor
support the elimination of the group? Even if such clues are not present
at the beginning, the situation could change since military problems en-
countered by the intervenor may evoke the temptation to win by terror
and by depopulation of the countryside. Genocide is thus a temptation to
intervenors faced with guerrillas drawn from a majority population
among whom they can not readily discriminate, control, or segregate. It is
not, however, an inevitability.
Both to explain the different outcomes in Vietnam and Afghanistan
and to anticipate the possibilities of genocide elsewhere in the future, the
international community must look not only at the vulnerability of the
victims but at the vulnerability of the perpetrators as well. Some factors
to consider are the greater readiness of totalitarian states to use violence
and terror as opposed to democratic states, the integration or separation
of civilian and military power, and the distance between the society of the
victim from that of the perpetrator. Research on genocide since 1945 con-
firms that perpetrators are much more likely to be revolutionary and au-
thoritarian states than democratic states. 15 ' Democratic checks, including
151. BARBARA HABF, State Perpetrators of Mass Political Murder Since 1945,
presented to the Conference on State-Organized Terror at Michigan State University, No-
vember 2-5, 1988; see also Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide after 1945: Theories and
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the power of public opinion, the division of powers, and a free press, were
among the factors that inhibited American escalation of the war in Viet-
nam. Conversely, the absence of democratic checks in the Soviet Union
was one of the factors that allowed that war, denounced in 1989 by many
in Moscow, to escalate to genocide.
Some Findings, 1 INT'L J. GRouP RIGHTS 79 (1993).
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Bringing Polluters Before Transnational
Courts: Why Industry Should Demand Strict
and Unlimited Liability for the
Transnational Movements of Hazardous
and Radioactive Wastes
ELLI LOUKA*
C'est parce qu'on ne le tient jamais jusqu'au bout que rien n'est
obtenu. Mais il suffit peut-tre de rester logique jusqu'd la fin
-Albert Camus
This article prescribes an international private liability regime for
the transnational movements of hazardous and radioactive wastes. Pre-
scription of such a regime is particularly relevant because the Basel Con-
vention for the transfrontier movements of hazardous wastes' has entered
* Ford Foundation Fellow, New York University School of Law. This article was first
presented at a dinner meeting organized by Professor Thomas Franck, Director of the
Center for International Studies at New York University School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Thomas Franck for organizing this meeting for me from which this article
has immensely benefitted. I am grateful to Professor Richard Stewart for his insightful com-
ments on the preliminary drafts of the manuscript, Professor Michael Reisman for valuable
suggestions and unremitting support, and Professor Chet Mirsky for his encouragement.
Professor Ginther Handl and Ms. Christianne Bourloyannis, legal officer at the United Na-
tions, have been most helpful in providing the most recent bibliography. Ms. Senita Birbal,
inter-library loan co-ordinator at the N.Y.U. Law Library has been of tremendous assistance
in helping accumulate the necessary bibliography.
1. The Basel Convention on the Control on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989) [hereinafter
Basel Convention]. The Basel Convention is the first Convention that deals with the prob-
lem of transnational movements of hazardous wastes. The Convention establishes prior noti-
fication and informed consent as an indispensable prerequisite of international waste trans-
ports. The Basel Convention was the international community's response to an
accumulation of international incidents in the late 1980's involving waste transfers to devel-
oping countries. For example, in June of 1988, drums of mislabeled construction material
were dumped in the Nigeria port of Koko. The Nigerian authorities seized the ship and
arrested those responsible. In addition, Guinea Bissau was offered three times its GNP in
order to accept wastes from the United States and Europe. In Congo the minister for the
environment and other top-ranking officials were arrested in two toxic waste dumping deals.
See generally ELLI LOUKA, THE TRANSNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS AND RADIOAC-
TIVE WASTES 3-6 (Yale Law School, Schell Center Series ed., 1992).
Transfrontier waste movements continue unabated until today. See infra notes 280-82.
African countries felt that the prior informed consent prescribed by the Basel Convention
could not prevent waste exports into Africa and adopted the Bamako Convention that bans
waste imports into the African region. See Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import of
All Forms of Hazardous Waste Into Africa, Jan 29, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 773 (1991)
[hereinafter Bamako Convention]. For Annexes, see 31 I.L.M. 163 (1992). See generally
LOUKA, supra at 9-11.
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into force, 2 and a protocol that will deal with liability and compensation
issues is under negotiation.3
As evidenced by the-oil and nuclear liability regimes, strict and lim-
ited liability has been the prevailing form of liability in international law.
This prevalence is due to the belief that a form of unlimited liability will
hamper insurance availability. The purpose of this article is to defeat the
myth that strict and unlimited liability is responsible for the lack of in-
surance for environmental harms. This study demonstrates that strict
and unlimited liability cannot be blamed solely for the failure of tradi-
tional insurance markets and that the emergence of alternative insurance
worldwide will provide waste management and chemical industries with
adequate insurance coverage.
The fact that strict and unlimited liability does not hamper insur-
ance is not the only reason why it should be prescribed as the appropriate
liability regime for transnational waste movements. Contribution to pre-
vention of accidents caused by waste mismanagement, initiation of direct
democratic controls into the international system, and appeasement of so-
cial conflicts are additional reasons why the establishment of strict and
unlimited liability is imperative.
But strict and unlimited liability, while necessary, is not adequate.
When industries are unable to compensate pollution victims, a social in-
surance mechanism in the form of a fund that would provide immediate
relief and residual or full compensation is necessary. Such a fund could be
financed by states, industries, or a combination of both. Because of the
lack of data of the contribution of each industrial sector to accidents
caused by wastes, it would desirable if the fund develops in two stages as
analyzed in Section III of this article.
I. INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY REGIMES
A. The Oil Pollution Regime
The oil pollution regime is the only comprehensive private liability
regime in international law. The oil pollution regime vividly illustrates
the preoccupation of the oil industry with limited liability as the type of
2. United Nations Officials See Basel Treaty as Limping into Effect with Limited
Support, INT'L ENVTL. DAILY (BNA), May 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File. The Convention needed twenty ratifications in order to enter into force. At pre-
sent, the following twenty-two countries have ratified the Convention: Argentina, Australia,
China, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Finland, France, Hungary, Jordan, Latvia, Liechten-
stein, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Syria, and Uruguay. It is interesting to note that the United States and the member
states of the European Community (EC), except for France, have not ratified the Conven-
tion. The United States and the European Community countries are the major exporters of
hazardous wastes.
3. The current negotiations also involve the creation of an emergency fund. See Deci-
sions 1/5 and 1/14 of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, UNEP/CHW.1/
24, Annex II (Dec. 1992).
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liability that will not jeopardize insurance availability. It is essential to
mention that the first conventions dealing with oil pollution were conven-
tions on limitations of liability, and that the idea of limiting liability for
oil pollution damage preceded the idea of creating a comprehensive re-
gime for oil pollution.
4
The current international regime of oil pollution is comprised of the
1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage' and the
1971 Fund Convention.6 These Conventions were amended by the 1984
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage' and the 1984
Fund Convention.' To be party to a Fund Convention, states must be
parties to the respective Liability Convention. The initial Conventions
and their amendments co-exist, and states can be parties to one or both
of them at the same time.9
The oil and tanker industry is anxious to avoid liability under inter-
national conventions and has accordingly devised voluntary compensation
schemes. One such scheme, the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement
Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP), provides for strict
and limited liability of shipowners just as the Conventions on Civil Lia-
bility do. Another scheme, the Contract Regarding an Interim Supple-
ment to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL), provides for a
fund similar to those prescribed by the Fund Conventions.'" By adopting
4. See, e.g., International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea Going Vessels, Aug. 25, 1924, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONVENTIONS 1383 (Ignacio Arroyo ed., 1991); International Con-
vention Relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea-going Ships, Oct. 10, 1957,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONVENTIONS 1389 (Ignacio Arroyo ed., 1991).
5. Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S.
3, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970) [hereinafter 1969 Convention]. See also Protocol to the
1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 19, 1976,
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 617 (1977) (the purpose of this Protocol was to amend the-"Unit of
Account" in which limits of liability are expressed. The initial unit was the gold franc; the
Protocol replaced it with "Special Drawing Rights" (SDRs)).
6. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Com-
pensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CONVEN-
TIONS ON MARITIME LAW 236 (Comit6 Maritime International ed., 1987)[hereinafter 1971
Fund Convention]. See also Protocol to International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, Nov. 19, 1976,
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 621 (1977).
7. Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, May 25, 1984, reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVI-
RONMENT 1 (Bernd Rister & Bruno Simma eds., 1990) [hereinafter Protocol of 1984 to
Amend 1969 Convention].
8. Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, May 25, 1984, reprinted
in 2 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 21 (Bernd Ruster and Bruno Simma
eds., 1990)[hereinafter 1984 Fund Convention].
9. DAVID W. ABECASSIS & RICHARD L. JARASHOW, OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPS: INTERNA-
TIONAL, UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES, LAW AND PRACTICE 246-47 (1985).
10. Id. at 303.
[T]he two schemes operate together as an integrated whole, but they do not
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voluntary compensation schemes, the oil industry has hoped to demon-
strate to governments that international treaties are unnecessary or at
least to influence the emerging international norms for oil pollution."
The industry has failed in both endeavors. The 1969 Convention and the
1971 Fund Convention have entered into force, and the 1984 regime is far
more progressive than the one advocated by industry.1"
The 1969 Convention imposes on shipowners strict and limited liabil-
ity for oil pollution damage' s and joint and several liability when two or
more ships are involved and the pollution damage is not reasonably sepa-
rable. 14 Shipowners can limit their liability to a specific amount by creat-
ing a limitation fund.15 However, they are not entitled to limited liability
if the incident that caused pollution is the result of their "fault or priv-
ity.""6 The concept of "fault or privity" is not further explained in the
1969 Convention. The 1984 Convention clarified it by providing that ship-
owners are not entitled to limit their liability if it is proved that the pol-
lution damage was the outcome of an intentional act or omission, or from
reckless behavior and with knowledge that such damage would probably
result.' 7 Reckless behavior, however, is a flexible concept providing courts
with significant latitude to impose unlimited liability.
The limitation fund established by the owner is distributed among
the claimants in proportion to the amount of their claims. The distribu-
tion of claims is a smooth procedure when the total amount claimed does
not exceed the limitation fund established by the owner, otherwise it may
be delayed."B
apply to cases actually covered by their respective international legal counter-
parts: a claimant cannot recover under both the Fund Convention and CRIS-
TAL, for instance, but he can recover under the Liability Convention and
CRISTAL if the Fund Convention does not apply to the case.
Id. See generally CHRISTOPHER HILL, MARITIME LAW 311-16 (1989).
11. ABECASSlS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 304.
12. Id.
13. 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. 111(2). According to article 111(2), shipowners
are exempt from liability in cases of force majeure, or when pollution damage is wholly
caused by a third party with the intent to cause such damage, or by negligence or a wrongful
act of a government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other
navigational aids. The term "navigational aids" is too vague. In an incident involving the oil
pollution of Swedish territorial waters by a Soviet tanker, the Soviet tanker was able to
prove that the pollution was due to a failure to mark a rock on the navigation chart. See
HILL, supra note 10, at 291.
14. 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. IV.
15. According to article V(1) as amended in 1976, shipowners can limit their liability to
an amount of 133 SDRs for each ton of the ship's weight. This amount shall not exceed
fourteen million SDRs. See supra note 5.
16. 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2).
17. Protocol of 1984 to Amend 1969 Convention, supra note 7, art. 6(2).
18. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 217. The fund has been involved in sixty
cases. In one case, it had not been possible to fully compensate the damage. Another case
where claims may exceed the limit is still pending. See GUnther Doeker & Thomas Gehring,
RESEARCH PAPER No. 32, in LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 30 (United Nations Con-
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Under the Convention, the plaintiff can bring an action for compen-
sation only in the courts of the contracting state where the damage oc-
curred.' 9 Nonetheless, according to conflicts of law rules, a plaintiff can
bring an action in the courts of a non-contracting state if the person re-
sponsible for the pollution damage is domiciled within that state.
20
The Convention also provides for compulsory insurance of shipown-
ers registered in a contracting state and carrying more than two thousand
tons of oil in bulk.21 One of the advantages of compulsory insurance is
that it drives out of the market those shipowners who do not have ade-
quate assets to cover possible pollution damage. This effect is tempered,
however, by the fact that only those shipowners carrying two thousand
tons of oil are required to maintain insurance.2' National governments
must enforce the compulsory insurance provision by ensuring that the
ships they register maintain insurance and carry an insurance certificate
on board. 2  Ships registered in contracting states with no insurance certif-
icate are not allowed to engage in the business of carrying oil.24 Ships
registered in non-contracting states are also required to hold such a cer-
tificate whenever they enter or leave ports or off-shore terminals of con-
tracting states.2" This prevents those shipowners from acquiring a com-
petitive advantage over ships of contracting states.26  The 1984
Convention further clarifies that contracting states should mutually rec-
ognize the certificates they issue and that a ship registered in a non-con-
tracting state can obtain such a certificate from the authorities of any
contracting state.27
ference on the Environment and Development ed., 1992) [hereinafter UNCED].
19. 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. IX. Article VIII also provides that the plaintiff
has no right to compensation if she brings an action after three years from the date the
damage occurred. No action can be brought after six years from the date of the incident
that caused the damage.
20. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 220-21.
[T]his has been dramatically illustrated in the Amoco Cadiz case off France (a
contracting state) in 1978, where French plaintiffs, including the French gov-
ernment, instituted actions in the United States (which was not a contracting
state) where the managers of the ship were domiciled. The other defendants
included the owner, registered in Liberia (a contracting state) and the ship
builder, registered in Spain (also a contracting state). The United States Court
of Appeals rejected the plea of forum non conveniens made by the ship
builder, and the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois proceeded
to enter judgment against the owners, the managers, and their parent com-
pany.(citations omitted).
Id. See also Tullio Scovazzi, Industrial Accidents and the Veil of Transnational Corpora-
tions, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 395, 413-21 (Francesco
Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 1991) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL HARM].
21. 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. VII(1).
22. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 224.
23. 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. VII(2), (4).
24. Id. art. VII (10).
25. Id. art. VII(11).
26. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 225.
27. Protocol of 1984 to Amend 1969 Convention, supra note 7, art. 7.
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The 1969 Convention applies exclusively to pollution damage caused
within the territory or the territorial sea of contracting states.2 8 Pollution
damage is defined as loss or damage caused from the escape or discharge
of oil from a ship carrying oil."' The loss or damage also includes "the
costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by pre-
ventive measures."30 Preventive measures, in turn, are defined as reasona-
ble measures taken after the oil spill has occurred for the prevention or
minimization of pollution damage. 31 The definition of oil pollution dam-
age has been criticized as vague because only personal injuries are cov-
ered under the Convention, while there is no specification for the type
and scope of other damages.3 2
To some extent the 1984 Convention has remedied the shortcomings
of the 1969 Convention's definition of oil pollution damage. The 1984
Convention establishes that compensation should cover not only personal
injuries, but also include property damages and loss of profit.3 Claims for
compensation for impairment of the environment are limited to the cost
of reasonable measures actually undertaken or measures to be undertaken
for reinstatement of the environment.34 The Convention does not provide
details on causation, which damages are considered remote, or informa-
tion on how to quantify damages such as loss of future earnings.3 5 In-
stead, the Convention leaves this task to national courts. Yet, lack of de-
tails on causation and quantification should not be conceived as a
shortcoming of the Convention. 6 Until sufficient national legislation is
passed, case-by-case adjudication can address these details better than
general treaty provisions. International conventions have to maintain a
certain level of flexibility in order to accommodate future developments.
Another innovation of the 1984 Convention is that it establishes lia-
bility not only for occurrences resulting in pollution damage but also oc-
currences creating "a grave and imminent threat of causing such dam-
age." Plaintiffs can now be compensated not only for preventive
measures after pollution has occurred but also for measures taken to
avert threats of pollution.
The geographical scope of the 1984 Convention includes the exclusive
economic zone as well as the territory and the territorial sea of the con-
28. 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. 2.
29. Id. art. 1(6).
30. Id.
31. Id. art. 1(7).
32. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 209.
33. Protocol of 1984 to Amend 1969 Convention, supra note 7, art. 2(3). See also ABE-
CASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 237-38.
34. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 237-38.
35. Id.
36. But see id. at 209, 239.
37. Compare 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(8) with Protocol of 1984 to Amend
1969 Convention, supra note 7, art. 2(4).
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tracting states.38 Liability is channelled to the owner, but other people
that perform services for the ship such as the manager, charterer, or oper-
ator of the ship 9 can be held liable if the damage resulted from a reckless
or intentional act or omission and with knowledge that such damage
would probably result. As mentioned above, the term "recklessly" pro-
vides courts with ample discretion to hold these persons liable. The Con-
vention does not provide for liability of the builder or the repairer of the
ship, but the builder or repairer may be held liable under domestic law.4 0
One of the priorities of 1984 Convention was to raise the liability
limits of the 1969 Convention. The liability ceilings adopted were consid-
ered too high by some states and therefore the final draft of the Conven-
tion was adopted with many abstentions.4 ' The procedure for revising the
liability ceilings adopted in the 1984 Convention does not-require a Con-
ference, as did the 1969 Convention.42 The 1984 Convention merely re-
quires an amendment adopted by the Legal Committee of the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO). The amendment is considered
accepted within eighteen months after notification to all state parties, un-
less a quarter of the state parties object.4 Industry's preoccupation with
the repercussions of liability on insurance is evident: state parties will
consider the potential increase in insurance costs when contemplating any
revision of the liability ceiling.4
The 1971 Fund Convention supplements the 1969 Liability Conven-
tion and provides for compensation of victims of pollution "5 and for in-
demnification of the owner held liable under the Liability Convention.46
Indemnification of the shipowner was excessively debated during the
drafting of the Convention because of the conflict of interests between
states with shipping industry and oil receiving states that finance the
Fund.47 Finally, the indemnification provision was abolished in the 1984
38. Compare 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. II with Protocol of 1984 to Amend
1969 Convention, supra note 7, art. 3.
39. According to article 4(2) of the Protocol of 1984 to Amend 1969 Convention, supra
note 7, these people include the following: the servants or agents of the owner or the mem-
bers of the crew; the pilot or any other person who, without being a member of the crew,
performs services for the ship; any person performing salvage operations with the consent of
the owner or on the instructions of a competent public authority; any person taking preven-
tive measures; and all servants or agents of persons mentioned above.
40. A3ECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 233.
41. Id. at 240. According to article 4 of the Protocol of 1984 to Amend 1969 Convention,
supra note 7, shipowners can limit their liability to the three million SDRs for a ship that
does not exceed five thousand units of tonnage; for a ship with additional tonnage, an addi-
tional 420 million SDRs are required. In any case the amount can not exceed 59.7 million
SDRs.
42. Protocol of 1984 to Amend 1969 Convention, supra note 7, art. 15.
43. Id. art. 15(7).
44. Id. art. 15(5).
45. 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(6). The amount of compensation can in
no case exceed 900 million francs or be lower than 450 million francs.
46. Id. art. 5(1).
47. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 261.
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Fund Convention.48
Compensation is provided for pollution damage49 only if the claimant
is unable to obtain full and adequate compensation under the Liability
Convention."0 The claimant can also recover preventive costs as defined
by the Liability Convention." Preventive costs are those costs incurred
from measures undertaken after the oil spill occurred. The 1984 Fund
Convention further improved this definition by providing that the claim-
ant is entitled to compensation for preventive measures taken before the
occurrence of the oil spill.
52
Under the 1971 Fund Convention, the amount of damages to which
the victims are entitled is unrelated to the amount of indemnification
paid to the owner. The provision relating to distribution of Fund re-
sources among claimants is ambiguous.53 The 1984 Fund Convention "
clarified this provision by providing that claims against the Fund should
be treated as a separate group and distributed pro rata disregarding the
extent to which they have been satisfied by the limitation fund of the
Liability Convention. 5 According to Fund practice, the claims covered
under its provisions are restoration of the environment, loss of livelihood,
loss of income, and environmental damage." But claims to recover costs
for environmental damage can be raised only if economic interests are
affected.5 7
48. 1984 Fund Convention, supra note 8, art. 7.
49. Both the 1969 Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention define pollution
damage in the same terms. See 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(2).
50. The claimant is unable to obtain full and adequate compensation when no liability
for damage arises under the Liability Convention, or when the owner liable under the Lia-
bility Convention is financially incapable of meeting her obligations, or when the damage
exceeds the owner's limitation fund. 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(1).
51. See 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(9).
52. 1984 Fund Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(3). The 1984 Fund Convention defines
preventive measures as the 1984 Liability Convention does. See id. art. 2(2).
53. 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(5):
Where the amount of established claims against the Fund exceeds the aggre-
gate amount of compensation payable under paragraph 4, the amount available
shall be distributed in such manner that the proportion between any estab-
lished claim and the amount of compensation actually recovered by the claim-
ant under the Liability Convention shall be the same for all claimants.
See also ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 270.
54. The 1984 Fund Convention has also raised the liability limits to 135 million SDRs.
See also 1984 Fund Convention, supra note 8, art. 6(4)(c), which calls for liability limits to
be raised to 200 million SDRs in case state parties to the Convention receive oil equal to 600
million tons. This is because oil-receiving states contribute to the Fund. See infra at 71.
Thus, in practice the limit will be raised only if the United States together with Japan, or
with Italy and France, or with Italy and the Netherlands, participate in the Fund. See UN-
CED, supra note 18, at 34.
55. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 269-70, 295.
56. See generally id. at 274-77.
57. It is difficult to quantify harm to the environment when tangible economic loss or
personal injury is not involved. See Note by the Director General on Claims Relating to
Damage to the Marine Environment, IOPC Fund, Exec. Comm., 30th Sess., Agenda Item 3,
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The Fund's settlement procedure is quite remarkable. The Fund has
developed a Claims Manual that provides a simple procedure for claim
settlement." The Fund has a good working relationship with the Protec-
tion and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs) of shipowners, and claimants can
bring their claims just once to either of these two bodies in order to ob-
tain compensation.59 Subsequently, the Club and the Fund divide the
amount paid to the claimant.60 P&I Clubs are composed of shipowners
who organize to mutually indemnify each other against lawsuits in case of
damage to cargo or injuries to third parties. The Clubs started to operate
in the nineteenth century when underwriters at Lloyd's of London would
cover only three quarters of hull damage."1 Today P&I Clubs cover ninety
percent of the world shipping industry. They provide unlimited coverage
in most cases, except for oil pollution and nuclear incidents.62 P&I Clubs,
while considered a traditional form of insurance, are one of the oldest
forms of alternative insurance.6"
The Fund also provides for prepayment of damages after verifying
that the shipowner is entitled to liability limits under the Liability Con-
vention. To receive prepayment, one must also demonstrate undue finan-
cial hardship on the part of the shipowner."' The Fund additionally pro-
vides for credit facilities to contracting states "in imminent danger of
substantial pollution damage."6 " The 1984 Fund Convention enhanced
these provisions by providing for compensation even if the shipowner has
not yet established a limitation fund. 6
The Fund is financed by entities of states that have received in the
relevant calendar year more than 150,000 metric tons of oil.8 7 Therefore,
states with modest oil imports can become parties to the Fund Conven-
tion, enjoying its full protection, without imposing on the industry to con-
tribute to the Fund.68 Enforcement is left to states, which should make
sure that industry's financial obligation to the Fund are fulfilled and
which should impose sanctions when necessary. 9 The 1984 Fund Conven-
tion additionally provides that states can be held liable if their failure to
police the contributors results in financial loss to the Fund.7 0
FUND/EXC.30/2 (Nov. 29, 1991); see also IOCP Fund Resolution No. 3-Pollution Dam-
age, Annex, FUND/EXC.30/2 (Oct. 1980).
58. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 272.
59. Id. at 272-73 (mentioning the Fund's internal regulations).
60. Id. at 273.
61. BRUCE FARTHING, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING 49 (1987).
62. Id.
63. J. Brady Young, High Stakes in the Alternative Market: Non-Traditional Risk-
Financing Techniques, BEST'S REV., Jan. 1992, at 47.
64. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 273.
65. Id.
66. 1984 Fund Convention, supra note 8, art. 6(5).
67. 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 6, art. 10(1).
68. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 278.
69. 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 6, art. 13(2).
70. 1984 Fund Convention, supra note 8, art. 16(2).
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In general, the oil pollution regime is very comprehensive, but it has
one important shortcoming: the prescription of limited liability. The in-
adequacy of liability limits is evidenced by their repeated increases after
environmental disasters.' After the Amoco Cadiz disaster, France, a state
party to the 1974 Convention, refused to collect the money deposited in
the limitation fund because of limited liability restraints. Instead, France
brought an action in the United States, the domicile of the ship's builder
and operator."'
Except for the prescription of limited liability, the oil pollution re-
gime provides a model private liability system for environmental acci-
dents with international implications.7 The 1984 Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions clarified many of the provisions of the Conventions they
have amended. They provide explicitly for compensation for economic
loss, and for recovery of expenditures for restoration of the environment.
They also provide for compensation even when the shipowner has not es-
tablished a limitation fund. Because of these progressive provisions, the
Conventions have yet to enter into force. The United States Congress re-
fused to ratify the Conventions, and therefore the prospects of the Con-
ventions ever entering into force are slim."' For this reason the IMO de-
cided to amend the Conventions in order to ease their ratification."
After the Exxon Valdez disaster, the United States enacted legisla-
tion" that not only increased the liability limits for oil pollution77 but
also provided for unlimited liability in many more instances than do the
1971 and 1984 Conventions on Civil Liability. Even before the Oil Pol-
lution Act, United States courts interpreted the Limitation Liability Act
of 18517" broadly. According to the Act, shipowners are not entitled to
limit their liability if the damage occurred due to their privity or knowl-
71. UNCED, supra note 18, at 37-38 (For example, liability limits were increased by
fifty percent after the Amoco Cadiz incident).
72. See In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978,
954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992).
73. The success of the Conventions is evidenced by the fact that many countries have
ratified them. For example, since their entry into force, 71 countries have ratified the 1971
Civil Liability Convention, and 47 countries have ratified the 1971 Fund Convention.
74. See supra note 54.
75. Consideration of Draft Protocols with Amendments to the Intergovernmental Oil
Pollution Liability and Compensation System Based on the 1969 Civil Liability Convention
and the 1971 Fund Convention and Related Issues, IMO Leg. Comm., 66th Sess., Agenda
Item 9, at 21-24, IMO Doc. LEG 66/9 (Mar. 26, 1992).
76. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1990).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a).
78. Compare 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2) and Protocol of 1984 to Amend
1969 Convention, supra note 7, art 6(2) with 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c), which provides that pol-
luters are not entitled to limited liability in case of gross negligence, willful misconduct or
"violation of an applicable Federal safety, construction, or operating regulation" (empha-
sis added). In addition, according to the Oil Pollution Act, polluters are not accorded as
many defenses as under the Civil Liability Convention. Compare 1969 Convention, supra
note 5, art. I(2) with 33 U.S.C. § 2703.
79. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1982).
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edge.80 Courts initially supported Congress' purpose for the Act - to en-
hance the competitiveness of the United States shipping industry, which
was at that time comprised of small shipowners. But during the 1950's
and 1960's, the courts refused to provide the same protection to multina-
tional oil corporations. The courts instead interpreted the statute in favor
of pollution victims. More specifically, the courts started imposing unlim-
ited liability not only when shipowners had actual knowledge of an immi-
nent threat of an accident but also when they should have had knowledge
of such a threat, such as knowledge of the lack of seaworthiness or faulty
condition of the ship. 1 Perhaps the different national courts that will in-
terpret the Liability Convention will follow the same path. As empha-
sized, the explicit provision for unlimited liability when shipowners reck-
lessly cause damage opens the door for such an interpretation.
In practice, the 1971 regime has functioned smoothly with an amica-
ble resolution of most disputes. This is largely due to the fact that oil
spills do not directly affect population centers by causing injuries and
deaths. Oil spills have a more subtle effect on the surrounding marine
environment. A liability regime for transnational waste movements can
build upon many of the provisions of the oil pollution regime.
B. International Liability of the Carriers of Dangerous Goods
The Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Car-
riage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels
(CRTD)8 2 was prepared by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (ECE), but it is opened for signature to other countries.83 The
Convention places strict and limited liability on operators of railway lines
and persons in control of vehicles carrying dangerous goods. 4
In order to facilitate the identification of the liable person, it is pre-
sumed that the person in whose name the vehicle is registered is liable.
When such registration does not exist, the owner will be held liable, un-
less the owner can prove that another person was in control of the vehicle
80. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a).
81. Linda Rosenthal & Carol Raper, Amoco Cadiz and Limitation of Liability for Oil
Spill Pollution: Domestic and International Solutions, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 259,
270-72 (1985).
82. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE (ECE), CONVENTION ON CIVIL
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED DURING CARRIAGE OF DANGEROUS GOODS BY ROAD, RAIL OR
INLAND NAVIGATION VESSELS (CRTD), U.N. Doc. ECE/TRANS/84, U.N. Sales No.
E.90.II.E.39 (1990) (including Explanatory Report) [hereinafter CRTD Convention]. The
Convention has not yet come into force.
83. Id. art. 22.
84. Id. art. 1(8). When the vehicle on which the dangerous goods are transported is
carried on another vehicle the operator of that other vehicle will be considered the carrier.
See art. 1(8)(a). When damage has resulted from an incident involving two or more vehicles,
and the damage is inseparable, both carriers will be held jointly and severally liable. See art.
8.
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with or without the owner's consent. 85
The primary concern of the drafters of the treaty was to protect po-
tential victims, while simultaneously minimizing insurance costs. There-
fore, the different solutions proposed by the drafters contemplated both
of those considerations. 6 The possibility of channeling liability to the
owner of goods was excluded because ownership may change many times
during transport, making identification of the owner burdensome.8 7 Chan-
neling responsibility to the producer of goods was also excluded because
the producer has no control over the carriage. Moreover, the carriage may
take place many years after production and, consequently, it would be
unfair to require the producer to keep insurance just in case of an acci-
dent during transportation. Many times dangerous goods are transported
together, and it is difficult to distinguish which producer's goods have
caused the damage.8 Imposing liability on the shipper was additionally
viewed as impractical. The shipper would have to take out insurance for
each and every consignment, and it would be difficult at the time of an
accident to decipher which shipper's substance caused the damage.89
Placing liability on the carrier seemed the most reasonable solution
to most governments since the carrier is in control of the movement of
goods, can be easily identified by the victims, and can purchase insurance
on an annual basis. Carriers fiercely opposed this proposition. They
claimed that accidents occur due to the inherent danger of the goods car-
ried and that imposing liability on the carrier will only increase the cost
of insurance, distort competition, and drive many carriers out of business.
The carriers proposed joint responsibility of carriers and shippers. How-
ever, joint responsibility was rejected because it was considered impracti-
cal to place responsibility on the shipper, and because most governments
considered joint and several liability too complex. Yet recognizing the in-
equities of placing responsibility on the carrier when other persons are
also responsible, the Convention renders the consignor or consignee liable
for accidents caused during loading or unloading without the participa-
tion of the carrier. Joint liability is additionally established when both
the carrier and another person are involved in loading and unloading.90
Except for the reasons mentioned above, persons other than the carrier
are not required to take out insurance. 1
The issue of whether liability should be limited or unlimited was a
source of contention during the drafting of the treaty. It is interesting to
note that a large number of governments favored unlimited liability, ar-
guing that the adoption of unlimited liability in domestic systems has not
85. Id. art. 1(8).
86. Id. at 6, Explanatory Report.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. art. 6.
91. Id. art. 6(2)(a).
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prevented the operation of compulsory insurance.2 As a compromise, lim-
ited liability was adopted,9 3 while it was made clear that governments
may adopt higher limits or unlimited liability.94 The Convention also pro-
vides that when carriers are entitled to limit their liability, they must
establish a limitation fund with the court where an action is brought.95
Carriers are not entitled to limit their liability when the damage is caused
by their intentional or reckless act or omission or by an intentional or
reckless act of their servants and agents. 6
The defenses provided in this Convention are broader than those of
the Oil Pollution Convention. 7 Except for force majeure, carriers cannot
be held liable if they can prove that consignors or other persons did not
fulfill their obligation to inform them about the dangerous nature of
goods. The carriers must also prove that they did not know, or were not
required to know, that the goods carried were dangerous. 8 The carrier is
also exonerated from liability if the damage resulted from an intentional
or negligent act or omission of the victim.9 In case the carrier is not lia-
ble, other persons may be held liable, but many important provisions of
the Convention will not apply to them.'0 0
Following the 1969 Oil Pollution Convention, the CRTD Convention
provides for compulsory insurance.'0 ' The insurance covers not only the
carrier mentioned in the insurance policy, but it also covers any other
person in control of the vehicle at the time of an accident.' 2 The partici-
pants felt that insurance companies would be able to insure carriers, and
92. Id. at 9, Explanatory Report.
93. For the limits of liability, see id. art. 9:
The liability of the road carrier and of the rail carrier under this Convention
for claims arising from any one incident shall be limited as follows: (a) with
respect to claims for loss of life or personal injury: eighteen million units of
account (b) with respect to any other claim: twelve million units of account.
The liability of the carrier by inland navigation vessel under this Convention
for claims arising from any one incident shall be limited as follows: (a) with
respect to claims for loss of life or personal injury: eight million units of ac-
count (b) with respect to any other claim: seven million units of account. See
also id. art. 37, Explanatory Report. The reason for imposing lower liability
limit for inland navigation carriers was the absence of insurance markets for
such carriers, and concerns that small such carriers will not be able to insure
up to the amounts provided for rail and road carriers.
94. Id. art. 24.
95. Id. art. 11.
96. Id. art. 10.
97. Compare 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. 111(2) with CRTD Convention, supra
note 82, art. 5(4).
98. See also Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by
Road (CMA), May 19, 1956, art. 22, reprinted in 399 U.N.T.S. 189. Servants and agents of a
carrier are exonerated from liability as well unless they acted with intent or with knowledge
that such damage would probably result. See CRTD Convention, supra note 82, art. 5(7).
99. CRTD Convention, supra note 82, art. 5(5).
100. Id. art. 7.
101. Id. art. 13.
102. Id. art. 13(2).
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they believed that, because of the limited amounts of liability, even small
carriers would be able to insure. The insurance companies were in favor
of such a regime. While they claimed that strict liability may initially lead
to an increase in premiums, they maintained that such an increase would
be reassessed by taking into account the number and severity of claims.'0 3
The monitoring of insurance provisions is left to state parties. Each state
party must designate competent authorities that will issue or approve cer-
tificates verifying that the carriers have obtained insurance.10' In order to
speed the settlement of disputes, claims for compensation may be
brought directly against the insurer. No action against the carrier or its
insurer may be brought three years after the victim knew or should have
known of the damage and the identity of the carrier, or ten years after
the incident.105 Actions may be brought in the courts of the state party
where damage occurred, where the incident took place, or where preven-
tive measures were taken. In addition, and contrary to the oil pollution
and nuclear liability regimes, an action may be brought where carriers
have their habitual residence - the state of registration when the ship
entangled in the accident is subject to such registration. 06 Some govern-
ments also proposed the establishment of a fund for use when compensa-
tion exceeds the liability limits, but the proposal did not gain the support
of the majority of governments. It was recognized that the oil importers
sponsoring the oil pollution fund were more readily identifiable than in-
dustries involved with dangerous goods.10 '
The definition of dangerous goods provided by the Convention is
very comprehensive.' 08 The Convention refers to the European Agree-
ment Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road
(ADR),' 09 which contains extensive lists of dangerous substances subject
to frequent updates. This puts carriers on notice about which substances
may entail liability under the Convention. The definition of dangerous
goods is broad enough to include hazardous wastes as long as there is no
specific liability regime for the transfers of hazardous wastes."0
The damages covered under the Convention involve loss of life or
personal injury and loss of or damage to property."" Recovery for pure
economic loss is not explicitly covered by the Convention. It should be
103. Id. at 9, Explanatory Report.
104. Id. art. 14.
105. Id. art. 18.
106. Id. art. 19.
107. Id. at 10, Explanatory Report.
108. Id. art. 1(9).
109. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, EUROPEAN AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE INTER-
NATIONAL CARRIAGE OF DANGEROUS GOODS BY ROAD, U.N. Doc. ECE/TRANS/80, U.N. Sales
No. E.89.VII.2 (including amendments up to January 1990).
110. Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 12, provides that state parties must adopt a
liability protocol concerning the transfrontier movements of hazardous wastes. See also
supra note 3.
111. CRTD Convention, supra note 82, art. 1(9).
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mentioned, however, that during the drafting, many states resisted ex-
plicit exclusion of pure economic loss and maintained that because na-
tional laws were still evolving such issues must be covered by domestic
legislation. 12 Loss or damage from polluting the environment may also be
recovered provided that compensation for impairment of the environ-
ment, other than loss of profit, is restricted "to costs of reasonable mea-
sures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken." ''1 The
costs of preventive measures and loss or damage caused by preventive
measures must also be covered. " ' Preventive measures, however, are de-
fined as measures taken after an incident has occurred.'1
An advantage of the Convention is that, by subjecting reckless carri-
ers to unlimited liability, it leaves open the possibility for application of
unlimited liability. In addition, the Convention justifiably renders con-
signors liable if they fail to inform carriers about the nature of dangerous
goods. But unfortunately, the Convention does not go far enough. Estab-
lishing limited liability that could be superseded by expansive judicial in-
terpretations or by national laws imposing increased liability limits or un-
limited liability fails to bind states to a uniform liability regime. A fund
sponsored by consignors or consignees seems also necessary since the ag-
gravation of many accidents is due to improper packing or the inherent
nature of dangerous goods. A fund could provide the mechanism through
which persons profiting from the trade in dangerous goods will internalize
the costs resulting from the transportation of such goods.
Yet attempts to impose liability on the shippers of dangerous sub-
stances within the framework of the Draft Convention Concerning the
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea"" have been met
with strong resistance from the chemical industry. The chemical industry
claims that liability should lie with the shipowner according to the tradi-
tional rules of maritime law. Another problem is that because many di-
verse industries are involved in the transportation of dangerous goods, it
is difficult to create an effective international body capable of collecting
contributions.
Recent proposals involve the establishment of an "International Dan-
gerous Goods Scheme." Under the initial formulation of the Scheme, each
shipper and shipowner had to purchase a dangerous goods certificate stat-
ing the amount and nature of the cargo, and in which trip it would be
112. Id. at 17-18, Explanatory Report.
113. Id. art.l(9)(c).
114. Id. art. l(9)(d).
115. Id. art. 1(11).
116. 1991 Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with the
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, Jan. 25, 1991, IMO Doc. LEG. 64/4
[hereinafter HNS Convention]. The Convention has been recently amended. See 1992 Draft
International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, Jan. 5, 1993, IMO Doc. LEG 684
[hereinafter HNS Revision].
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transported."' Later in the negotiations, it was decided that only ship-
pers should sponsor the Scheme"' because that was more in line with the
established law and practice initiated by the oil pollution regime. 1 9 The
certificates purchased by shippers will be issued by "issuing agents" -
governments 20 - on behalf of the Scheme.' 2 ' Many problems, however,
emerged in trying to identify the contributions of each industrial sec-
tor. 22 These problems would be difficult to resolve because of the lack of
statistics identifying the rate of involvement of each industrial sector in
accidents. 2 3 The chemical industry has proposed that only shipowners
should participate in the Scheme. According to the chemical industry,
shipowners must incorporate the cost of contributing to the Scheme into
the freight price, and contribute the charge so collected to the Scheme. If
they fail to contribute, they should be refused registration until they
pay. 2 " The proposal of the chemistry industry has been rejected.'2 5
C. The Nuclear Liability Regime
The nuclear liability regime is comprised of three conventions: the
Paris Convention 28 adopted by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the
117. HNS Convention, supra note 116, art. 17.
118. It has been proposed that the term "scheme" should be replaced by the term
"fund." Consideration of a Draft International Convention on Liability and Compensation
for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea,
IMO Leg. Comm. 66th Sess., Agenda Item 9, at 9, IMO Doc. LEG. 66/9 (Mar. 26, 1992)
[hereinafter 66th Session Report].
119. HNS Revision, supra note 116, art. 17.
120. Norway has proposed that in addition to issuing agents, voluntary "industry as-
sociations" should be able to issue HNS certificates. According to Norway's proposal, an
industry association may include a trade sector, or part of a trade sector, world-wide or
regional. The members of such associations will have to purchase HNS certificates, but the
associations will have to contribute to the Scheme based on transport statistics. Shippers
will have to reimburse their industry association according to their membership terms. See
Consideration of a Draft International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Dam-
age in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, IMO
Leg. Comm. 67th Sess., Agenda Item 9, Annex 2, at 6, IMO Doc. LEG 67/9 (Oct.13, 1992)
[hereinafter 67th Session Report].
121. HNS Revision, supra note 116, art. 12, 14.
122. 66th Session, supra note 118, Annex 2.
123. 67th Session Report, supra note 120, at 5, 11.
124. Consideration of a Draft International Convention of Liability and Compensation
for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea, Submitted by the
European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC), IMO Legal Comm., 65th Sess., Agenda Item
3, at 2, IMO Doc. LEG. 65/3/8 (Sept. 10, 1991). CEFIC reiterated its position in the 67th
Session Report, supra note 120, at 7.
125. Report of the Group of Technical Experts on the Consideration of a Draft Interna-
tional Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Car-
riage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, IMO Leg. Comm. 67th Sess., Agenda
Item 3, at 8, IMO Doc. LEG 67/WP.7 (Oct. 1, 1992).
126. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960,
1041 U.N.T.S. 358 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),'2 7
the Vienna Convention 2 adopted by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)," 9 and the Brussels Convention, which supplements the
Paris Convention.'"0 State parties to the Paris Convention are not parties
to the Vienna Convention. For this reason, the Joint Protocol Relating to
the Application of the Vienna and Paris Conventions"3 ' provides that a
state party to the Vienna or Paris Conventions and the Protocol can re-
cover damages from the operator of a nuclear facility installed in a state
that is party to either Convention. 2
Both the Paris and the Vienna Conventions impose strict'3 3 and lim-
ited liability on the operator of a nuclear installation 3 4 and joint and sev-
eral liability when more than one operator is liable and the damage is not
reasonably separable. 3 5 Limited liability was considered preferable be-
cause it was protective of the relatively new nuclear energy industry. 36
Channelling liability exclusively to the operator avoided the excessive ad-
ministrative and insurance costs related with inquiries into the liability of
the other actors such as suppliers and transporters."7 The Conventions
127. Seventeen OECD countries have signed the Convention: Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and
United Kingdom.
128. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063
U.N.T.S. 265 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
129. The state parties to the Vienna Convention are as follows: Argentina, Bolivia,
Cameroon, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, Hungary, Mexico, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Trini-
dad & Tobago and Yugoslavia. Only Argentina and Yugoslavia are, however, nuclear power
states.
130. Convention Supplementary to the 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the
Field of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 956 U.N.T.S. 264 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
131. Joint Protocol Relating to The Application of the Vienna Convention and the
Paris Convention, Sept. 21, 1988, reprinted in 42 NUCLEAR LAW 56 (NEA ed., 1988).
132. All these Conventions are concerned with liability issues regarding peaceful uses of
nuclear power. The only Convention that touches on the military uses of nuclear power has
never entered into force because of the sensitivity of national security issues. See Conven-
tion on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962, reprinted in INTERNA-
TIONAL CONVENTIONS ON MARITIME LAW, supra note 6, at 138. The Convention provides for
strict and limited liability of the operators of nuclear ships (art. 2-3). No other person ex-
cept for the operator can be held liable (art. 2). Operators of warships are also held liable
(art. 1(11)).
133. According to Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 9 and Vienna Convention,
supra note 128, art. IV(3), operators are not held liable in cases of force majeure.
134. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 3, 6; Vienna Convention, supra note 128,
art. IV(1), 11(5).
135. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 5(b); Vienna Convention, supra note 128,
art. 11(3).
136. Norbert Pelzer, Concepts of Nuclear Liability Revisited: A Post-Chernobyl As-
sessment of the Paris and the Vienna Conventions, in NUCLEAR ENERGY LAW AFTER
CHERNOBYL 97, 99 (Peter Cameron et al. eds., 1988).
137. Id. at 102. As far as the carriage of nuclear material is concerned both Conventions
impose liability on the operator who sends and the operator who receives the material. See
Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 4; Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art. II. See
also Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear
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also impose compulsory insurance on the operators of nuclear facilities.
The specification of the amount, type, and terms of such insurance is left
to each state party. 138
-The Conventions apply in cases that involve, inter alia, transporta-
tion and disposal of radioactive wastes.' 9 Nuclear damage under the Con-
ventions comprises loss of life, personal injury, and damage to property.140
It does not include economic loss and loss of future earnings unless the
courts of the competent state so provide.' 4' The Brussels Convention
prescribes a compensation scheme for damages caused by an incident at a
nuclear installation whose operator is liable under the Paris Convention:
a portion is provided by the operator's insurance, another by the installa-
tion state, and the balance by contracting states, according to a special
formula based upon the GNP and the nuclear power of the installation
state.'42 Victims can bring claims under the Conventions only in the
courts of a state where the incident that caused nuclear damage oc-
curred.'4 3 However, under the general rules of private international law,
any state that suffers damage because of a nuclear incident has jurisdic-
tion over such claims, and plaintiffs can engage in forum shopping."
The nuclear liability regime does not address nuclear accidents as
comprehensively as the oil pollution regime does with oil spills. The lia-
bility prescribed is limited, and the liability ceilings are ridiculously
low' 4 5 in light of a disaster such as Chernobyl. In addition, the Conven-
Material, Dec. 17, 1971, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON MARITIME LAW, supra
note 6, at 230. The purpose of the Maritime Carriage Convention is to ensure that operators
of nuclear installations are exclusively liable for damages caused by a nuclear incident dur-
ing the transport of nuclear material. More specifically, article 2 of the Convention provides
that any person who could be held liable, according to international or national law applica-
ble in maritime transportation, is exonerated from such liability if an operator of a nuclear
installation is liable under the Paris or Vienna Convention or national law.
138. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 10; Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art.
VII.
139. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. l(a)(ii), (iv), (v), and art. 8. See also Vienna
Convention, supra note 128, art. I(g), (h), (j), and art. VI(2).
140. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 3.
141. Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art. I(k). See also id. art. VIII; Paris Conven-
tion, supra note 126, art 11.
142. Brussels Convention, supra note 130, art. 3.
143. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 13; Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art.
XI.
144. Pelzer, supra note 136, at 103-04.
145. Under article 7 of the Paris Convention, supra note 126, the liability ceiling is
fifteen million European Monetary Agreement Units of Account. National laws can set lower
liability ceilings after examining the opportunities that operators have to obtain insurance,
but in no case can liability limits be less than five million European Monetary Agreement
Units of Account. Under article III of the Brussels Convention, supra note 130, the liability
ceiling was increased to 120 million European Monetary Agreement Units of Account. The
1982 protocols to the Paris and Brussels Conventions that entered into force in 1988 have
replaced the unit of account with SDRs. The Vienna Convention, supra note 128, does not
set upper liability limits. Under article V(1), it just sets a minimum liability ceiling of five
million dollars.
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tions do not provide mechanisms to update liability limits and to com-
pensate for preventive measures and economic loss as does the 1984 Lia-
bility Convention for Oil Pollution. Moreover, the ten year time frame
within which the plaintiff can bring an action does not take into account
that the effects of exposure to radiation may not appear for decades. Also
there is no international fund to provide for immediate or residual relief
after a nuclear disaster."4 6 In other words, the particular nature of nuclear
accidents makes the nuclear liability regime appear disconnected from re-
ality. Only lately have there been efforts to update the conventions and
specify their liability limits. The revision process requires close coopera-
tion between OECD and IAEA."47
II. DOMESTIC SYSTEMS OF LIABILITY: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. CERCLA and the Price-Anderson Act: Evidence of Linkage Between
Liability and Insurance?
This section analyzes United States legislation concerning the liabil-
ity of generators, transporters and disposers of hazardous wastes, and op-
erators of nuclear plants. The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 4 s governs the liability of
hazardous waste generators, transporters, and disposers concerning the
clean-up of hazardous waste sites. Yet the statute does not deal with per-
sonal injuries caused by hazardous waste sites. CERCLA represents a
vivid illustration of the tensions surrounding the subject of liability and
insurance. The same tensions are apparent in the Price-Anderson Act,149
the statute governing nuclear liability.
1. CERCLA
While the Resource, Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)' 50 sets
the standards for waste disposal, CERCLA prescribes strict, unlimited,
and retroactive'"' liability for actors involved in waste management.
CERCLA also creates an 8.5 billion dollar fund, the Hazardous Substance
146. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 8; Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art.
VI(1).
147. UNCED, supra note 18, at 17.
148. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
was amended by the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act in 1986 (SARA). Both
these Acts are referred to as CERCLA or as CERCLA as amended by SARA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1986).
149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210-2214 (1988 & Supp. 1 1990).
150. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991(k)
(1982 & Supp. I 1984).
151. Retroactive liability extends liability to past mismanagement of hazardous wastes
when no regulations regarding sound disposal were existing. See, e.g., United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Inc. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
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Superfund, to clean up hazardous waste disposal sites.5 2 The Superfund
is financed by taxes on chemical and oil importing companies and by
taxes on general revenues. It is frequently replenished because each time
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cleans a hazardous waste
site it recovers its expenditures from private responsible parties. " Many
times, however, the discovery and apportionment of liability among re-
sponsible parties entail time-consuming and very expensive settlement 1 "
and litigation procedures with hundreds of parties involved. 55
Under CERCLA, four categories of persons are strictly liable for re-
leases or threatened releases of hazardous waste from a disposal facility:
the current owner of a disposal facility, the owner or operator of a facility
at the time of disposal, 56 the generators of hazardous wastes disposed of
at a facility, and the transporters of hazardous wastes.5 7 Their liability
includes all costs of removal or remedial action at hazardous waste sites "5 8
incurred by the federal or state government and all other necessary costs
of response assumed by any other person. The costs of removal and reme-
dial action must be consistent with the National Contingency Plan
(NCP)."5 9 Liability also includes all damages resulting from the destruc-
152. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (this section specifies that the government can enter into a Con-
sent Decree according to which Potential Responsible Parties (PRPs) have to reimburse it
for response costs incurred or under which the PRPs agree to undertake response measures
themselves. In extraordinary circumstances, these settlement agreements may include a cov-
enant not to sue the PRPs).
155. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (OTA), COMING CLEAN: SUPERFUND PROBLEMS
CAN BE SOLVED 28-29 (1989).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). The term "owner or operator" according to the act
does not include "a person, who, without participating in the management of a ... facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the facility." Despite
this provision, courts have held lenders liable under the act. In United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.Supp. 573. (D. Md. 1986), the court found a foreclosing lender
liable under the act. But see United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985), holding lenders that foreclosed not liable because they did
not participate in the operation of the facility but only in the financial decisions. But see
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F. 2d 1550, 1557-8 (11th Cir. 1990), holding:
JI]t is not necessary for the secured creditor actually to involve itself in the
day-to-day operations of the facility in order to be liable ... [n]or is it neces-
sary for the secured creditor to participate in management decisions relating to
hazardous waste. Rather, a secured creditor will be liable if its involvement
with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the infer-
ence that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose.
See also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F. 2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985), holding a stock-
holder and corporate officer individually liable for the continuing release of hazardous
wastes. The security interest exemption was not applicable because the stockholder as a
corporate officer had participated in the management of the facility.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
158. Removal costs cover the short-term responses in cases of emergency at a disposal
site. Remedial costs are the long-term clean-up costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(D)(23), (24).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 9605. The NCP establishes procedures and standards for responding
to releases of hazardous substances. The EPA is required to employ a hazard ranking sys-
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tion or injury of national resources.' 60 Consequently, liability under CER-
CLA covers damage to property and to the environment but not personal
injuries.'"" Liability under CERCLA can be characterized as absolute due
to the fact that the defenses provided are very limited.' 6 Furthermore,
the courts take an expansive approach interpreting those defenses. Ac-
cording to the interpretation of the courts, the government's burden of
proof entails the following: the existence of a "facility;" a release of haz-
ardous wastes from the facility; and a defendant that can be one of the
persons - generator, transporter, owner, or disposer - that can be held
liable under CERCLA.6 3 The courts also have imposed joint and several
liability on defendants when the harm caused is indivisible.164 This is the
case in most hazardous waste disposal sites where, because drums are
crowded together, it is virtually impossible to identify the extent to which
a particular defendant has contributed to the contamination of the sur-
rounding environment and groundwater.
The RCRA provides for compulsory insurance of owners and opera-
tors of hazardous waste facilities'66 during the time of operation and
thirty years subsequent to the facility closure. The insurance must cover
all property damage and personal injury claims resulting from sudden ac-
cidental occurrences and non-sudden accidental occurrences.'66 In case in-
surance is not available, letters of credit, surety bonds, trust funds, corpo-
rate guarantees, or self-insurance can be used to demonstrate financial
accountability.' 7
ten in determining the facilities to be added to the National Priority List.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
161. Despite the fact that the statute does not cover personal injuries, certain courts
have allowed medical monitoring damages to be recovered as response costs. See, e.g.,
Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). See also Keister v. Vertac Chemical
Corp., 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,677 (E.D. Ark. 1990).
162. In order not to be held liable, the defendant should establish by preponderance of
evidence that the release or threat of release was a result of an act of God, an act of war, or
an act or omission of a party with which the defendant had a contractual relationship other
than an employee or agent of the defendant. In the latter case, the defendant has to prove
that she exercised due care, and that she took precautions against foreseeable acts or omis-
sions of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such
acts or omissions. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
163. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 616
(1990).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985).
165. RCRA § 3004(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6924. The RCRA concerns active waste facilities and
not abandoned waste sites. However, the RCRA provides for corrective action for releases of
hazardous waste constituents from disposal facilities independent of the time wastes were
placed at the facility. See RCRA § 3004(u), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u). Also, the EPA is author-
ized under the RCRA to issue an order or bring an action against past and present waste
generators, transporters, and disposers involved in facilities that may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health and the environment. See RCRA § 7003(a), 42
U.S.C. § 6973(a).
166. 40 C.F.R. § 264.147(a)-(b).
167. Id. § 264.147(a)-(b), (f), (g).
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2. The Causes and Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis
By the mid to late 1980's, the imposition of strict and retroactive
liability, and joint and several liability, in combination with an excessive
number of environmental claims led many insurance companies to with-
draw comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies, covering both acci-
dental and gradual environmental harm.16 8 Instead, the insurance compa-
nies started providing insurance only for one year, and only for sudden
pollution arising out of an incident during that year. 169 In this manner,
the insurance companies hoped to evade liability for the past mishaps of
their policy holders. In most cases, however, courts interpreted the letter
of insurance contracts broadly and held insurers liable for all types of
pollution, sudden as well as gradual, as long as the harm was not inten-
tional.'7 0 The uncertainty created by the broad judicial interpretation of
insurance contracts rendered insurance virtually unavailable.' 7 ' However,
it was not only insurance availability for hazardous waste that declined.
Simultaneously, insurance premiums for medical malpractice and prod-
ucts liability soared.'72 As a result, corporations were forced to self-insure
through "industry wide mutuals"' " or "go bare," that is, operate without
any insurance."7 4
The insurance crisis has provoked severe criticism of the tort system,
but critics do not attribute the insurance crisis to the doctrine of strict
and unlimited liability. Instead, they maintain that the insurance crisis is
rooted in the uncertainty created by the broad interpretation of insurance
policies by courts. ' 5 Critics claim that courts have failed to distinguish
between liability levels that deter irresponsible corporate behavior by
forcing industry to engage in prevention and high liability levels that do
168. ANDERSON, supra note 163, at 610.
169. Id. at 611.
170. Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 963-73 (1988).
171. See id. at 944. See also UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS
WASTES: THE COST AND AVAILABILITY OF POLLUTION INSURANCE 4 (GAO/PEMD-89-6 1988).
172. Some commentators have attributed the insurance crisis to the alteration of hard
and soft markets that are characteristic of the insurance industry. According to this view,
limiting liability or caps on awards will not alter insurance availability. See, e.g., Linda Lip-
sen, The Evolution of Products Liability as a Federal Policy Issue, in TORT LAW AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 247 (Peter Schuck ed., 1991) [hereinafter PUBLIC INTEREST].
173. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L. J. 1521, 1570, 1577 (1987) (Priest calls the mutuals created because of unavailability
of insurance, for example, in the area of hazardous waste and railroad transportation as
high-risk mutuals. On the contrary, "low-risk mutuals are formed because their members
find being pooled with the high-risk more costly than its worth.").
174. Frank Sommerfield, Going Bare, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 1990, at 99.
Uninsured companies are coping with the situation simply by trying to make
their internal environmental controls failsafe. Although some say they are self-
insuring, they usually mean that they feel their cash flow is strong enough to
charge damages to profits, not that they are reserving against potential losses.
175. See, e.g., KIP VIscusI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 28, 50 (1991).
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not deter,170 render insurance unavailable, drive useful companies out of
the market, hamper innovation 1 77 and international competitiveness,1 7 8
and possibly spur illegal practices.' 79 In other words, critics do not blame
the insurance crisis on the doctrine of unlimitied liability per se. Rather,
they blame the interpretation by U.S. courts that awarded large amounts
of compensatory and punitive damages, increasing uncertainty in the in-
surance market.
According to the critics of the tort system, because strict and unlim-
ited liability is not at the source of the insurance crisis, its abolition can-
not be the remedy. Therefore, state statutes that attempt to set limits on
liability, or reinstate the fault principle are bound to fail to relieve the
uncertainty of the insurance market. 80 In addition, liability limits for
each type of injury would be extremely inflexible and would make it diffi-
cult to consider the particularities of individual cases. Even the most ve-
hement critics of the tort system consider liability ceilings "desperate re-
sponses impelled by juridical inflation that has exceeded all bounds that
private insurance can accommodate.' ' 81
In fact, state efforts to stimulate the insurance market in response to
the insurance crisis by establishing caps on liability awards have not sig-
nificantly affected the availability of insurance. For example, empirical
studies have demonstrated that measures to limit liability, such as caps
on awards or granting immunities to defendants, have reduced insurance
costs in medical malpractice cases. 1' But in the case of general liability,
176. See Priest, supra note 173, at 1538.
[T]he economic effects of steadily increasing provider liability thus are quite
simple in structure. A liability rule can compel providers of products and ser-
vices to make investments that reduce the accident rate up to the level of opti-
mal (cost-effective) investments. After providers have invested optimally in
prevention, however, any further assignment of liability affects only the provi-
sion of insurance.
177. Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, Overview, in LIABILITY MAZE 16 (Peter W.
Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991)[hereinafter LIABILITY MAZE]:
[statistical analysis has] found that for industries with relatively low liability
costs the liability system appeared, if anything, to enhance innovation. But iri
industries such as general aviation, in which liability costs rose sharply during
the early 1980s and became a significant share of total costs, liability does seem
to have dampened innovation.
178. Douglas Besharov, Forum Shopping and Forum Skipping, and the Problem of
International Competitiveness, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 139 (Walter K. Olson
ed., 1988).
179. PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 165
(1988)("[P]roviders who are illegal, anonymous, or too small to bother with also gain a com-
petitive edge over established and reputable providers every time the liability vise is
tightened.").
180. Priest, supra note 173, at 1532-4. See also Abraham, supra note 170, at 976.
181. HUBER, supra note 179, at 202.
182. Glenn Blackmonn & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legislation: Assess-
ing Our Control of Risks, in PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 172, at 272, 279; Michael J. Tre-
bilcock et. al., Malpractice Liability: A Crosscultural Perspective, in PUBLIC INTEREST,
supra note 172, at 207, 217 (caps on awards reduced claims severity by about twenty-three
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it is not caps, but restrictions on noneconomic and punitive damages and
modifications of the joint and several liability doctrine that have reduced
insurance costs. 8 3 The fact that limits on liability have affected malprac-
tice insurance, but not general insurance, has been attributed to the fact
that malpractice insurance crisis was a crisis of price, while the general
liability insurance crisis was a crisis of availability. 84
Moreover, in the empirical studies mentioned above, for both medical
malpractice and general liability, reduction of insurance costs does not
always result in an actual decrease of insurance premiums. Rather, it re-
sults in less dramatic increases of insurance premiums in states where
tort reform has been enacted.18 The inability of statutory tort reform to
induce an actual decrease of insurance premiums has been attributed to
the insurers' conviction that the success of statutory reforms depends on
judicial interpretation.8 '
Additionally, predictions that the tort system would harm innovation
and the competitiveness of American industry in international markets
have not proven true. The performance of the United States chemical
industry in international markets has not been affected by the allegedly
excessive liability costs. 8 7 On the contrary, the American chemical indus-
try is much more innovative8 8 than Japanese and Western European
chemical industries.8 ' Products liability does not appear to preoccupy
American corporate executives as much as do the general economic envi-
ronment, taxation, the stigmatizing effects of punitive damages, and haz-
percent).
183. Blackmonn & Zeckhauser, supra note 182, at 277 (the authors do not make clear
what kinds of insurance are included in the broad category "general liability insurance."
The study makes it difficult to identify what exact type of reform caused what reduction of
insurance costs. This is because it frequently includes similar, but not identical tort reforms
under one general category).
184. Patricia Danzon, Malpractice Liability: Is the Grass on the Other Side Greener,
in PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 172, at 176, 180.
185. Blackmonn & Zeckhauser, supra note 182, at 287.
186. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance
Crisis, in PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 172, at 151, 158.
187. Rollin B. Johnson, The Impact of Liability on Innovation in the Chemical Indus-
try, in LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 177, at 428, 431-34:
[Alccording to a recent report, "while the U.S. has posted massive overall trade
deficits for many years, this country's chemical trade surplus reflects the tech-
nology, research and marketing expertise that give the industry competitive
advantage in many high valued products." The report goes on to say that
American chemical companies are very attractive to foreign investment ... and
that foreign chemical companies view the American market as the biggest and
most promising for chemical products.
188. In other industries like pharmaceuticals and industries that produce small air-
crafts, liability has dampened innovation. See, e.g., Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of
Product Liabiiity on New Drug Development, in LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 177, at 334;
Robert Martin, General Aviation Manufacturing: An Industry Under Siege, in LIABILITY
MAZE, supra note 177, at 478.
189. See Johnson, supra note 187, at 433.
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ardous waste regulations. '10 However, even in the area of hazardous
wastes, the chemical industry has started to realize that the regulatory
and liability rules of hazardous waste management will provide it with a
competitive advantage over other industries that have little experience
with handling chemical substances.' Fluor, for instance, a uranium min-
ing company, uses a modification of its computer program for mining to
determine how to excavate underground contaminants, while removing as
little soil as possible, and how to extract and treat contaminated ground-
water. 92 Betcht is another company that once constructed oil refineries
but now assists in cleaning them up. Betcht was hired by Saudi Arabia to
clean up the Gulf spill.
1 93
It has been determined that the existence of liability or of a particu-
lar standard of liability - strict liability or negligence - does not by
itself influence deterrence. Concerns about reputation and a mix of liabil-
ity and regulatory rules often have more effective deterrent effects.'"
Many times strict liability and regulations have forced industry to invest
in products that are environmentally benign and have fostered industrial
safety and innovation. The efforts of the industry to develop alternatives
to chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are well known. After the Bhopal disaster,
certain chemical companies reduced the amount of hazardous chemicals
they store on site or the amounts they use.1 95 Other times, stringent legis-
lation has driven polluting industries out of the market and has spurred
the development of new industries willing to produce safer products or
services."9 "
Despite the chemical industry's increased investment in safety, it has
been estimated that the existing liability system grossly underdeters cor-
porations. For immediately manifested injuries due to chemical exposure,
the overall liability costs of the chemical industry represent no more than
seventy percent of the corresponding social costs.19 For chronic diseases
due to chemical exposure, liability costs represent no more than five per-
cent and often less than one tenth of a percent of the corresponding social
costs."9 The causes of this excessive underdeterrence are, inter alia, the
190. Id. at 435.
191. Id. at 444.
192. Sonni Efron & James M. Gomez, Cleaning-Up on Clean-Ups, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1991, at D1.
193. Id.
194. LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 177, at 12. See also Johnson, supra note 187, at 449.
However, while concerns about reputation can influence transnational corporations and
small reputable firms, they cannot influence speculative small enterprises. See BREmN Fiss.
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 242 (1983).
195. Nicholas Ashford & Robert F. Stone, The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and
Innovation, in LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 177, at 367, 400 (the authors mention numerous
examples where industries changed practices because of public outcry after disasters or
more stringent legislation). See also Johnson, supra note 187, at 444.
196. Ashford & Stone, supra note 195, at 417-18.
197. Id. at 417.
198. Id.
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difficulties of identifying chemical exposure and the difficulties of verify-
ing, by preponderance of evidence,' 9 the causal linkage between exposure
and disease when there is a long latency period between exposure and
manifestation of the disease. °0 Even in circumstances where courts have
relaxed the causation standard,2 ' the amount of compensation awarded
is very small.2 °2 What actually preoccupies courts is that relaxing the cau-
sation standard when reliable epidemiological studies do not exist would
over-compensate plaintiffs at the expense of the defendants."2 On the
other hand, denying damages because of lack of epidemiological studies
may undercompensate accident victims given the current absence of sci-
entific knowledge on many hazardous substances and their effects on
humans. Because of the reluctance of courts to relax the causation stan-
dard, and the ensuing blatant underdeterrence of the chemical industry,
it has been claimed that caps on awards will eventually discourage the
creation of safer products and services, 0 " and that tort reform should be
199. In the notorious Agent Orange litigation, the court ruled that the linkage between
exposure and disease must be proven by a probability of greater than fifty percent. See In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), afl'd, 818 F.2d 145
(2nd Cir. 1987). See also Parker v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 440
S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969). Courts also have refused to grant awards where other synergistic
factors could have contributed to the disease. Gardner v. Hecla Mining Corp., 431 P.2d 794
(Utah 1967). In addition, courts have been reluctant to award damages for increased risk of
future injury because of exposure to harmful substances at waste sites. This is because sci-
ence is not advanced enough to quantify the degree of susceptibility to a future illness due
to chemical exposure. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir.
1988); Wilson v. Johns-Mansville, 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Anderson v. W.R. Grace &
Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D.Mass. 1986).
200. Ashford & Stone, supra note 195, at 414.
201. For example, courts have been willing to award damages for fear of future illness
("cancerphobia") due to present injury from chemical exposure. See Payton v. Abbott Labs,
437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982). Certain courts have even relaxed the standard of "present
injury" and simply demand "present impact" or "reasonable fear" of developing a disease,
Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, 660 F. Supp. 1516 (W.D. Mich. 1987), or serious emo-
tional distress that is both "severe and debilitating," Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio
1983). Courts also are increasingly willing to grant damages for costs of medical monitoring
when there is a relative increase in the chance that the disease will occur and early diagnosis
will mitigate its effects. See Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987). See also
In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829 (3rd Cir. 1990). In awarding dam-
ages courts have relied on medical expert testimony, Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736
F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and epidemiological studies, but, for example, courts have re-
jected medical testimony and epidemiological evidence based on animal studies. See In re
"Agent Orange", supra note 199. See also Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d
823 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
202. Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988). The district
court granted damages ranging from $50,000 to $250,000. The court of appeals reduced a
$250,000 award to $18,000 and the highest award granted was $72,000.
203. Even commentators supporting probabilistic causation -that courts should rely
on statistical analysis based on the facts of the particular and previous similar exposures -
concede that such an approach may over-compensate or under-compensate pollution vic-
tims. See Glen Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risks, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 786 (1985).
204. Ashford & Stone, supra note 195, at 398.
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oriented more towards expanding rather than limiting liability.1s0*
As demonstrated, the insurance crisis has been attributed to the un-
certainty created by court decisions that have made damage awards un-
predictable rather than to the absence of liability ceilings. Moreover, em-
pirical studies have demonstrated no direct linkage between caps on
liability and insurance availability. Furthermore, the claim that the tort
system grossly underdeters the chemical industry compels reconsideration
of the position that limited liability will boost insurance markets. Today,
after the insurance crisis, while traditional insurance for environmental
damage is still unavailable, industries have started to participate in alter-
native forms of insurance. In fact, alternative insurance is on the rise
worldwide, and it is believed that it will eventually replace traditional
insurance.0 6
The lack of causal linkage between unlimited liability and insurance
availability illustrated by the experience of the U.S. should dissipate con-
cern about establishing an unlimited liability regime at the international
level. This is especially true because of the development of alternative
forms of insurance that may be better suited to cover environmental
harm.
3. The Price-Anderson Act
The experience of the nuclear industry underscores the view that lia-
bility ceilings cannot guarantee insurance availability and financial viabil-
205. Id. at 419.
[T]he recent demands for widespread tort reform ... tend to miss their mark
since significant underdeterrence in the system already exists. Thus proposals
that damage awards be capped, that limitations be placed on pain and suffer-
ing and punitive damages, and that stricter evidence be required for recovery
should be rejected. On the contrary, the revisions of the tort system should
include relaxing the evidentiary requirements for recovery, shifting the basis of
recovery to subclinical effects of chemicals, and establishing clear causes of ac-
tion where evidence of exposure exists in the absence of manifest disease.
Other tort claims may also be entertained, but they must increase the amount
of deterrence in the system, not further weaken the signals sent to the firm.
206. See Alternative Insurance, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 1992, at 94. Lack of traditional
insurance has created booming international markets for alternative insurance. Companies
increasingly discover that because they know their risks better than insurers, they can bet-
ter insure for risks giving rise to big claims. Rather than paying premiums to traditional
insurance companies, they hire consultants to advise them on how to manage their risks.
Many alternatives to traditional insurance are currently available. One is to pay claims as
they arise. Another is to create reserves by establishing subsidiary companies, the so-called
captives, into which premiums are paid. A third alternative used mostly by small enterprises
is to form mutual insurance companies. Commentators believe that by the year 2000, self-
insurance in the form of captives or mutuals will be the prevailing form of insurance world-
wide. It is estimated that captives all over the world have assets worth twenty-three to
twenty-four billion dollars. Premiums paid to mutuals were estimated to be $270 million by
the end of 1988 and double that amount by the end of 1991. See also Richard M. Page, The
Business of Insurance; Someone Has To Pay; Special Global Report, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES
INSTITUTE, Jan. 1991.
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ity for corporations. The Price-Anderson Act as amended in 198807 pro-
vides for limited liability of operators of commercial nuclear power plants
and completely shields Department of Energy contractors from any form
of liability in the event of a "nuclear incident."20 8 When first enacted, the
act contained a liability ceiling of five hundred million dollars, sixty mil-
lion dollars contributed by private insurance companies and the remain-
ing by public funds.200 This unique arrangement was undoubtedly due to
the United States' eagerness to explore the peaceful and military uses of
nuclear power combined with the reluctance of private insurance compa-
nies to undertake the full costs of compensation in the event of a nuclear
disaster.2 0 The 1988 Amendment of the Act did not eliminate the liabil-
ity limit. Despite the significant setbacks of the nuclear industry and the
termination of the cold war, the liability ceiling remains, although it has
been increased significantly to seven billion dollars.2 11
In spite of the liability ceilings prescribed by the Price-Anderson Act,
insurance for nuclear power plants in traditional insurance markets re-
mains unavailable. Limited liability has been unable to prevent the de-
cline of the nuclear industry.2 12 In the United States, the nuclear industry
is in retreat.21  The fierce public opposition against the construction of
nuclear power plants has annulled any possible incentive provided by
limited liability. Additionally, insurance industries have suggested that
nuclear liability limits discourage demand for liability coverage and that
as long as utilities are protected by liability limits, they do not have in-
centives to purchase more coverage. 21 ' Despite the absence of traditional
207. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210-2214 (1988). The United States Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of limits on the liability of nuclear power plants. According to the Court,
liability limits
accompanied by an express statutory commitment to 'take whatever action is
deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences
of' a nuclear accident [are] fair and reasonable substitute for the uncertain
recovery of damages of this magnitude from a utility or component manufac-
turer, whose resources might well be exhausted at an early stage.
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
208. Nuclear incident is defined as an occurrence including an extraordinary nuclear
occurrence taking place within the United States and causing bodily injury, sickness, dis-
ease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property within or outside
the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e).
210. Dan Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation? The Sixty-
Three Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 1, 6 (1989).
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e); 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b). See also Marcie Rosenthal, Note,
How the Price Anderson Act Failed the Nuclear Industry, 15 COLUM. J. ENVr'L L. 121, 123
(1990).
212. Nuclear's Fall from Favour, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1992, at 18.
213. See, e.g., DANIEL BORSON ET AL., A DECADE OF DECLINE (Public Citizen ed. 1989).
See also Nuclear Power: Losing its Charm, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1992, at 21 ("In the United
States, where a quarter of the world's nuclear plants operate, no new plant has been ordered
without subsequently being canceled, since 1974.").
214. Dan R. Anderson, The Dangers of Nuclear Liability Limits, BEST'S REVIEW 12
(Property-Casualty Insurance ed., Mar. 18, 1987).
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insurance for nuclear power plants, the nuclear industry has been able to
secure coverage through alternative forms of insurance, such as insurance
pools and mutuals.1 5 Today nuclear plant operators are able to obtain
over two billion dollars per reactor in coverage.2 1
6
B. The Draft Waste Liability Directive and the European Insurance
Market
The Commission of the European Community, following in the steps
of the United States, has proposed strict and unlimited liability for actors
involved in hazardous waste activities21 7 According to the Commission,
strict liability for environmental harm is becoming increasingly prevalent
in both international2 8 and domestic law.21 9 The purpose of the Directive
is to establish a uniform liability system within the European Community
in order to ensure that a product's price reflects the full costs of its pro-
duction, including the costs of environmental damage.2 The proposed
Directive, however, differs from CERCLA in that it does not explicitly
address the problem of abandoned waste sites and covers personal injury
cases. In contrast to CERCLA, it explicitly incorporates a cost-benefit
analysis for estimating which damages should be recovered for cleaning
up the environment.
The Directive imposes strict, unlimited,22" ' and joint and several lia-
bility222 on the "producer of wastes." '223 For the purposes of the Directive,
215. Three insurance pools provide insurance for the nuclear industry: American Nu-
clear Insurers (ANI) (pool of 90 member insurance companies, insuring one-half of 110 nu-
clear plants), Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters (MAELU), and MAELRP Re-
insurance Association which reinsures 100% of the MAELU policies. Utility companies have
also formed mutuals: Nuclear Mutual Ltd. and Nuclear Electric Insurance Ltd. See Christo-
pher Dauer, AN! Unveils New Nuclear Power Covers, THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER COM-
PANY, May 13, 1991, at 23. See also Mercedes M. Perez, Nuclear Energy Touted as Long-
Term Option, BEST'S REV. 112 (Property-Casualty Insurance ed., May 1989); NUCLEONICS
WEEK, April 6, 1990, at 12.
216. This is a significant increase in comparison with $300 million insurance coverage
used to be provided in 1979 when the Three Mile accident occurred.
217. Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste,
COM(89)282 final [hereinafter Proposal]. It was further amended by COM(91)219 final
[hereinafter Amendment].
218. See Proposal, supra note 217, at 2 (the Commission refers to the products liability
Directive, the international conventions on nuclear energy and oil pollution, and the draft
convention on compensation for damage caused by the carriage of dangerous goods by rail,
road or inland waterway).
219. Id.
[Tihe same trend is becoming increasingly established in national legislation.
Germany and Belgium have already introduced the principle of no-fault liabil-
ity. In France, it is well established by case law. Case law in the Netherlands is
moving in the same direction, and the law is being drafted to introduce the
principle in the new Civil Code. In Spain, strict liability has been introduced in
the waste management sector.
220. See Proposal, supra note 217, at 1.
221. Amendment, supra note 217, art. 8.
222. Id. art. 5.
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producers of wastes are considered those persons who import wastes into
the European Community from non-Community countries,"' waste dis-
posers, 2 5 and persons in control of wastes when they cannot identify the
producer.2 " In the latter case, producers are held liable only for a limited
amount if the incident that caused the damage falls within the scope of
the liability Convention concerning the carriage of dangerous goods.22'
The Directive does not specify whether generators that transport their
wastes to a permitted disposal facility are still be held liable.
Damages under the Directive include harm resulting from death or
physical injury, and damage to property.22 8 Plaintiffs can bring an action
against -polluters under national law. National law also determines
whether lost profits may be recovered and who may bring an action in the
event of impairment of the environment.229 In the latter case, plaintiffs
can claim compensation for costs to prevent impairment to the environ-
ment, for costs to restore the environment, and for damage caused by
preventive measures. The entitlement to compensation, however, is sub-
ject to a cost-benefit analysis: there is no entitlement to compensation
when the costs of restoration substantially exceed the benefits or if sub-
stantially cheaper restoration measures are available.22 Impairment to
the environment is defined as significant physical, chemical, or biological
deterioration of the environment.
23
'
Despite the claims of the Commission that the purpose of the Direc-
tive is to establish a uniform liability system, the precise remedy28 2 and
the standard of proof22 3 are left to national legislation. The Directive also
223. A producer of wastes is anyone who in the course of commercial or industrial ac-
tivity produces wastes and anyone who engages in processing, mixing, or other operations
resulting in a change of the nature or composition of waste. Id. art. 2(1)(a).
224. Importers are not held liable when wastes were previously exported from the Com-
munity and their nature or composition were not substantially changed prior to reimporta-
tion. Id. art. 2(2)(a).
225. Id. art. 2(2)(c).
226. Id. art. 2(2)(b).
227. Id. art. 3(1). See also supra Section I(B).
228. Id. art. 2(1)(c).
229. Id. art. 4(1)(a).
230. Id. art. 4(2).
231. Id. art. 2(1)(d).
232. Id. art. 4(1)(b).
The national laws of the Member States shall determine ... the remedies
available to [plaintiffs] which shall include: (i) an injunction prohibiting the
act or correcting the omission that has caused or may cause the damage and/or
compensation for the damage suffered; (ii) an injunction prohibiting the act or
correcting the omission that has caused or may cause impairment of the envi-
ronment; (iii) an injunction ordering the reinstatement of the environment
and/or ordering the execution of preventive measures and the reimbursement
of costs lawfully incurred in reinstating the environment and in taking preven-
tive measures (including costs of damage caused by preventive measures).
233. See Id. art. 4(1)(c). But see Proposal, supra note 217, art. 4(6). It was provided
that a plaintiff should show "overwhelming probability of the causal relationship between
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provides that, in addition to pollution victims and public authorities,
non-governmental organizations can bring action against polluters under
conditions specified by domestic legislation.""
Polluters are exempt from liability only when they can prove that the
damage or injury to the environment was the result of force majeure2 3 5 or
the result of an intentional act or omission of a third party. 6 Their lia-
bility can also be reduced or totally abolished when the damage is caused
in part by the injured party. 3 7 Finally, waste disposers are exempt from
liability if they can prove that they were not negligent and that the pro-
ducer failed to fully disclose information regarding the nature of the
wastes.238
The scope of the Directive includes hazardous and non-hazardous
wastes2"' but not nuclear wastes.14 0 The Directive does not distinguish be-
tween recyclable and non-recyclable wastes. The Economic and Social
Committee has praised the Commission for including recyclable wastes in
the definition of wastes.24 1 The Economic and Social Committee has also
recommended that carriers should be able to use a distinctive sign to in-
the producer's wastes and the damage ... or the injury to the environment suffered."
234. Amendment, supra note 217, art. 4(3). The 1989 version of the proposed directive
provided that public-interest groups could bring an action only if national law so provided.
See also Proposal, supra note 217, art. 4(4).
235. Amendment, supra note 217, art. 6(1)(b).
236. Id. art. 6(1)(a).
237. Id. art. 7(2).
238. Id. art. 7(1).
239. Id. art. 2(1)(b).
240. The justification is that there already exist international conventions prescribing
liability for activities involving nuclear wastes. Proposal, supra note 217, at 2. Most Euro-
pean countries have signed the Paris Convention. However, international regulation of other
issues has not prevented the Commission from proposing appropriate legislation. In addi-
tion, the Paris Convention has many inadequacies that could be addressed by European
Community legislation.
The reluctance of the Commission to regulate radioactive wastes stems from the Euro-
pean Community's support for nuclear energy. This position is reflected in the Euratom
Treaty, which is more preoccupied with facilitating the development of nuclear industry
than with establishing safeguards for the operation of nuclear power plants or for the dispo-
sal of radioactive wastes. As a result, the Commission has adopted a position of non-inter-
vention in domestic nuclear energy programs. See, e.g., Leigh Hancher, 1992 and Accounta-
bility Gaps: The Transnuklear Scandal: A Case Study in European Regulation, 53 MOD. L.
REV. 669 (1990). The lack of genuine supervision and the absence of safeguards for the mili-
tary uses of nuclear power has left radioactive waste management unregulated and has cor-
rupted the nuclear energy industry. The nuclear industry has been frequently involved in
illegal transfers of radioactive materials and wastes. After the Transnuklear scandal that
involved illegal waste exports to Belgium, Transnuklear, the private company entangled in
the scandal was dissolved. It was replaced by a government company that soon started to
engage in illegal waste transfers as well. Nuclear Energy: West Germany Confirms Irregular-
ities in Transport of Nuclear Material, European Report, No. 1555, Jan. 15, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
241. Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage
Caused by Waste, CES(90)215.
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dicate whether the wastes they carry are for recycling or final disposal.24 2
Finally, the Committee has suggested that waste carriers should be held
primarily liable because of the difficulty victims will encounter in identi-
fying the producer before the expiration of the statute of limitations.2 43
The Commission has yet to include this recommendation in the amended
Directive.24
4
The Directive provides for compulsory insurance of waste generators
and disposers2 45 and also provides that the Commission will study the
feasibility of establishing a "European Fund for Compensation for Dam-
age and Impairment of the Environment Caused by Waste."2 The impo-
sition of compulsory insurance has intensified the insurance industry's
opposition to the Directive.2 47 The insurance industry fears that the
vague language of the Directive could be interpreted broadly to include
liability for past misdeeds and compulsory insurance for both accidental
and gradual pollution.24 In other words, it fears the creation of a type of
liability scheme believed to be responsible for the litigation and insurance
crises in the United States. Nevertheless, the fear that the United States
precedent will be repeated in the European Community is unfounded.
This is due to the differences between the legal systems of European
Community countries and the United States. The rules of civil procedure
of many European countries often compel the losing party to pay the le-
gal costs of the winning party. Most European systems also do not pro-
vide for jury trials, broad discovery, and noneconomic and punitive dam-
ages. Thus, even if the final formulation of the waste Directive contains
language similar to that of the United States tort doctrine, it does not
follow that its implementation will spur litigation or that it will affect the
availability of insurance. 2 9 In fact, it has been suggested that precisely
because of the legal-systems of the Community and aversion to confronta-
tion, Europeans will not resort to litigation to resolve their disputes.2 50
242. Id.
243. Id. A plaintiff can bring an action within three years from the date the damage or
injury to the environment occurred. See Amendment, supra note 217, art. 9. The right to
compensation expires after thirty years. See Amendment, supra note 217, art. 10.
244. See Amendment, supra note 217.
245. Amendment, supra note 217, art. 11(1).
246. Id. art. 11(2).
247. Gavin Souter, E.C. Insurers to Scramble to Avoid Clean-Up Liability, BUSINESS
INSURANCE, Oct. 21, 1991, at 30.
248. Id. See also Roger Scotton, European Marketplace Faces Crisis: Insurer, Busi-
NESS INSURANCE, June 10, 1991, at 44.
249. Gary T. Schwartz, Product Liability and Medical Malpractice in Comparative
Context, in LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 177, at 28 (the author emphasizes that differences in
doctrine cannot explain why significantly more suits are brought in the United States than
in Europe, Japan or Canada because these countries have doctrines similar to the United
States liability doctrines. He demonstrates that jury trials, liberal rules of discovery, contin-
gency fees, and punitive damages make the United States tort system more unpredictable
and costly).
250. R. Patrick Thomas, "New" Europe is Years Away; Cultural Traditions, Not E.C.
Directives, Shape Risk Functions, BUSINESS INSURANCE, May 27, 1991, at 27.
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An additional indication that the European Community is unlikely to
experience an insurance crisis is that in Europe insurance contracts pro-
viding for sudden and accidental pollution have been interpreted nar-
rowly and have not been the subject of extensive litigation.2 51 Despite the
narrow interpretation of insurance contracts, British insurers have been
reluctant to provide pollution coverage. However, insurance is readily
available from Swiss and American insurers who claim to make significant
profits from environmental premiums.2 52 In other parts of Europe strict
liability and environmental regulations have intensified the trend toward
alternative types of insurance through captives or mutuals.25 3
III. THE LIABILITY REGIME FOR THE TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF
HAZARDOUS AND RADIOACTIVE WASTES
Before prescribing the elements of a private liability system for
transnational waste movements, it is necessary to examine the potential
functions of such a system and whether it can be successfully replaced by
more efficient and fairer systems. Such systems could include an interna-
tional social insurance system that would be in the form of a government-
sponsored international fund.
A. The Theoretical Debate
In the 1920's and 1930's, workers' compensation statutes gradually
replaced the tort system of the United States and Europe.2 ' At that time,
there was significant debate in academic circles as to whether enterprise
liability should replace the fault principle in torts.2 55 This debate was re-
flected in court decisions that began shifting the burden of proof from
plaintiffs to defendants. Under the fault principle, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant caused the harm, thus the costs of accidents are
more likely to be borne by the plaintiff. Under an enterprise liability sys-
tem, the defendant carries the burden of proof, and the costs of accidents
are more likely to be imposed on the defendant. The movement favoring
251. Id.
252. Green Insurance: Missing Market, ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1992, at 94.
253. See, e.g., Wilhelm Zeller, European Solutions to EIL Coverage; Environmental
Impairment Liability Insurance, A.M. BEST COMPANY INC. 14 (Property-Casualty Insurance
Edition, March 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; but see also Carolyn
Aldred, Pollution Crackdown in Europe; EIL Insurance Increasingly Scare, BUSINESS IN-
SURANCE, Oct. 8, 1990, at 35, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (mentioning a
French insurance pool that provides insurance for both accidental and gradual pollution
damage, German general insurance liability policies that provide coverage for bodily injury
resulting from both sudden and accidental as well as gradual pollution, and a Swedish insur-
ance consortium that has created a fund to indemnify third parties for pollution caused by
insolvent or unknown polluters).
254. See generally Lawrence Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law
of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967).
255. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 3, 4 (1970) (citing extensive related
literature in the United States and Europe).
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enterprise liability, as its name indicates, was inspired by indignation
against corporate power and advocated placing liability, irrespective of
fault, on those with "deep-pockets. 2 56 Contemporary proponents of en-
terprise liability urge adoption of strict liability and view the tort system
as a social security mechanism whose primary function is to adequately
compensate accident victims.25 '
The theory of enterprise liability has been enriched by what is called
the "economic theory" of tort law. The economic theory concludes that
"deep-pockets" should bear the cost of accidents, but it bases this conclu-
sion on a different rationale. The primary goal of tort law is not to com-
pensate accident victims but to reduce accident costs. Accident costs can
be reduced by deterring tortfeasors from engaging in accident-prone ac-
tivities. 5 8 However, harmful activities are only deterred if the costs of
accidents exceed the costs of preventing them.2 59 This determination is
left to the cheapest cost-avoider who is the person in the best position to
assess more cheaply the dangers of certain activities.260 Frequently, the
cheapest cost-avoiders are corporate entities or insurance companies that
have or can obtain first-hand information on the safety of products and
services. The public, on the other hand, cannot be the cheapest cost-
avoider because it can easily underestimate the dangers involved.2 6 1 For
this reason, advocates of the economic analysis argue that the costs of
accidents should not be externalized in the form of general taxes because
this would compromise the primary goal of deterrence. 2 2 Accident costs
should be incorporated in the price-system, informing the public on the
safety of products and services.6 8
The two goals of tort law as designated by both enterprise liability
and economic theories - victim compensation and corporate deterrence
- have been criticized as conflicting. Lavish compensation awards may
over-deter corporations, deprive society of valuable services, and impede
innovation.2 " These predictions, however, have not proven true. As ana-
256. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
257. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 5 (1987).
258. CALABRESI, supra note 255, at 16. But see also E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive
Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1053 (1989).
259. CALABRESI, supra note 255, at 17.
260. Id. at 164-65.
261. Id. at 55
[F]irst, individuals choosing between insurance and taking their chances often
do not have the data necessary to determine how great the risk is .... Second,
even if individuals had adequate data for evaluating the risk, they would be
psychologically unable to do so . . .people cannot estimate rationally their
chances of suffering death or catastrophic injury.
262. Id. at 143.
263. Id. at 134. However, Calabresi concedes that in real life many decisions are made
politically or collectively without the intervention of the market. This is particularly true
when a decision made through the market would be considered unfair. See id. at 24.
264. For example, in the case of pharmaceuticals and industries that produce small air-
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lyzed above, despite the imposition of enterprise liability, chemical indus-
tries are still underdeterred because it is difficult to establish the causal
link between exposure and disease. 6
Opponents of the tort system also contend that the tort system can-
not deter environmental accidents because such accidents are unforesee-
able events, even for the corporations involved.26 6 They are "normal acci-
dents," or unpredictable outcomes of interactions of complex systems.267
The critics claim that adding safety devices to complex systems will not
necessarily reduce the likelihood of accidents. On the contrary, in many
circumstances, safety devices may stimulate the interactive complexity of
a system, ultimately resulting in more accidents.26 8 This is particularly
evident in nuclear energy production where the potential for unexpected
interactions of trivial failures substantially increases the likelihood of ac-
cidents. 26 9 It is also evident in maritime transportation where naviga-
tional aids have contributed to an increase rather than a reduction of ac-
cidents. Due to high-tech navigational devices, captains feel more in
control of their ships and take greater risks than they normally would if
the technology had not been available.27 The nature of certain accidents
makes the primary goal of corporate deterrence look futile.27' The tort
system as a compensation mechanism has also been criticized for being
too expensive and too ineffective when the advantages of a social security
system are considered.2 72 The advantages of a social security system in-
volve, inter alia, speedy and less costly dispute resolution.27
crafts. See supra note 188; see also HUBER, supra note 179, at 12-15.
265. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
266. See generally RICHARD H. GASKINs, ENVIRONMENTAL ACCIDENTS: PERSONAL INJURY
AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 59-62 (1989).
267. CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES
(1984).
268. Id. at 23.
269. Id. at 60-61.
270. RICHARD PETROW, IN THE WAKE OF TORRY CANYON 206 (1968).
271. GASKINS, supra note 266, at 94.
272. The advantages of the social security system are as follows: "expert" administra-
tive tribunals that deal with similar cases so they can dispose of them relatively quickly; the
lack of adversariness that saves time and money during discovery; and the possibilities of
making provisional assessments of the injury and review them when there is future aggrava-
tion. One of the disadvantages of the social security system is that it is vulnerable to fraudu-
lent claims. See generally PATRICK S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 401-
07, 509-11 (1980); see also Peter Kerr, Vast Amount of Fraud Discovered in Workers' Com-
pensation System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1991, at 1. Even advocates of the economic theory
of law have suggested that the tort system is incapable of dealing with cases of catastrophic
accidents or excessive pollution and that it should be replaced by a social insurance system.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 390 (1991) (Posner suggests that
in cases of catastrophic accidents that cannot be attributed to the negligence of another, a
social insurance system might be preferable).
273. ATIYAH, supra note 272.
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B. An Evaluation of the Debate
1. Liability and Minimum Standards as an Accident Prevention
Mechanism
The first argument of the opponents of the tort system is that envi-
ronmental accidents are inherent in the systems that generate them, and
consequently no one can legitimately be held responsible for the occur-
rence of an accident. Accidents are bound to happen and will happen, as
statistical charts indicate. However, upon closer scrutiny, the picture is
not as bleak as the opponents of the tort system indicate. The systems
that generate accidents are generally capable of improvement. Even the
"normal accident theory" suggests that prevention of accidents depends
on factors such as political will, collective action," 4 and a change in cor-
porate attitude.2" Often a simple change in a decision making procedure
can minimize the frequency and seriousness of accidents. For example, in
the area of marine transportation, replacing the captain with a team of
officers that can check each other's decisions can reduce the likelihood of
accidents.2" Environmental accidents, therefore, are often preventable
and, as demonstrated by the domestic systems analyzed above, strict and
unlimited liability in combination with appropriate international stan-
dards will deter corporate polluters, especially large corporations con-
cerned with their reputation. These standards for the purpose of waste
movements should include standards for land disposal.
277
However, it is highly unlikely that strict and unlimited liability and
land disposal standards will deter smaller hauling companies penetrated
by organized crime 7 . from engaging in illegal waste trafficking.2 9 These
companies are often involved in international illegal waste shipments
such as the illegal waste transfers across the United States-Mexican bor-
der. 28 0 In Europe, organized crime has penetrated waste exports to
274. PERROW, supra note 267, at 172. Perrow attributes the lack of effort to prevent
marine accidents to the fact that victims are unidentifiable, "low status, unorganized or
poorly organized seamen." The same is true for the victims of toxic spills and pollution.
275. In marine transportation corporate pressure to keep to schedules despite the ship's
condition or the weather forecasts is at the source of most accidents. See id. at 118. Such
pressure could certainly be lessened.
276. Id. at 230.
277. It is better to allow waste exports for disposal than prohibit them, and conse-
quently entice industries to engage in illegal dumping. In contrast to oil and other danger-
ous goods, wastes are considered materials without further use, thus industry is always
tempted to illegally dump them. See LOUKA, supra note 1, at 20.
278. For the involvement of organized crime in the United States transportation indus-
try, see MAURICE D. HINCHEY, REPORT TO THE NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY ENVIRONMENTAL
PRESERVATION COMMITTEE, ORGANIZED CRIME'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE WASTE TRANSPORTATION
INDUSTRY (1984). See also MAURICE HINCHEY, REPORT TO THE NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, ILLEGAL DISPOSAL OF WASTES IN THE HUDSON
VALLEY (1991).
279. See FISsE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 194.
280. See Californian Pleads Guilty to Transporting Hazardous Waste to Mexico Ille-
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France 28  and Somalia.282
Even if strict and unlimited liability does not affect the behavior of
companies penetrated by organized crime, it is likely that, in combination
with clear and specific land disposal standards, it will limit the clientele
of those companies. 83 Clear and specific international standards will be
instrumental in avoiding the confusion and uncertainty of industry about
expected behavior concerning waste management and transfers. Develop-
ing clear and specific international standards and legal assurances that
severe penalties will be imposed if violated will encourage industry's com-
pliance and make waste generators less willing to entrust waste shipments
to enterprises infiltrated by organized crime. Levying severe penalties
when a violation occurs is particularly crucial due to the difficulties in
detecting illegal waste traffickers. Violators must know that once discov-
ered they will endure severe punishment.
2. Liability as a Catharsis and Instrument of Democratic Control
The second argument made by the opponents of the tort system is
more compelling. Opponents argue that a social security system would be
less time-consuming and less costly. However, the tort system presents an
undoubtable advantage: in the domestic arena, suing polluters potentially
not only prevents accidents and provides victims with compensation, it
also empowers the individual284 to force industry to change its negligent
practices. The tort system enables individuals to send a signal to govern-
gaily, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), May 28, 1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Current File. See also Michael S. Barr et al., The Labor and Environmental Rights
in the Proposed Mexico-United States Free Trade Agreement, 14 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1
(1991).
281. The German Environment Minister, after the scandal of illegal waste transfers to
France, warned against the dangers of an international network of illegal waste traffickers
similar to the one involved in illegal arms and drug deals. See Criminals "Trading in Toxic
Waste," THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File;
Alarming Spread of Illegal Waste Dumping, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Aug. 19, 1992, availa-
ble in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Tony Catterall, Crime in Germany Spreads to
Trash, Aug. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
282. The Executive Director of UNEP claimed also that organized crime was involved
in the waste transfers from Italy and Switzerland to Somalia. The interim government of
Somalia participated in the deal hoping to make profits that would be used to buy more
weapons. When the deal was uncovered, the directors of the company involved had already
disappeared. See Contract to Dump Toxic Waste in Somalia Linked to Firm in Small Vil-
lage Outside Geneva, INT'L ENVTL. DAILY (BNA), Oct. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File; Somalia, European Firms Dumping Wastes, UNEP To Probe, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Aidan Hart-
ley, Contract Shows Plan to Dump Toxic Waste in Somalia, THE REUTER LIBRARY REPORT,
Sept. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
283. For more details on the international system that must govern transnational waste
movements, see ELLI LOUKA, OVERCOMING NATIONAL BARRIERS IN INTERNATIONAL WASTE
TRADE (forthcoming).
284. See ATIYAH, supra note 272, at 554.
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ments that legislative action is imperative. 8 5 Certainly, in a democracy,
interest groups can always lobby and participate in public hearings. The
advantage that the tort system offers, as opposed to a social security sys-
tem, is that each individual citizen can initiate action and voice concerns
in an adversarial setting. This advantage is very critical because only by
personally initiating action before an impartial judge can accident victims
be persuaded that justice is served. The catharsis of a public trial is espe-
cially important in cases of catastrophic accidents when victims demand
some sort of vindication."' Thus, the tort system serves a dual function.
It acts as a tension release mechanism of social passions. It also in-
troduces an element of direct democracy in corporate boardrooms and
within government bodies where the decisions that affect people are
made. In other words, the tort system instills democratic controls in a
society where democracy is limited to periodic elections."' In this respect,
the tort system is undoubtedly superior to any social insurance system.
The advantages of a tort system over a social insurance system are
also evident in international law. The international community, despite
patterns of cooperation, is still deeply divided between the privileged and
underprivileged, and this division is often the cause of dissention and
conflict. A private liability system can assuage confrontations by empow-
ering the citizens of developing countries to sue multinational corpora-
tions in national courts. This is especially pertinent when social dichoto-
mies are inflamed by catastrophic accidents of international dimensions,
such as the Bhopal incident, that entail not only economic suffering and
property damage but physical injuries and death. In such cases, the pub-
lic often considers a settlement between the state and the corporate en-
tity as unsatisfactory.288 Only the entitlement to compensation through
settlement with the threat of litigation, or through adjudication, can con-
vince victims that justice has been served. It is only through this method
that individuals can be relieved from the helplessness they experience
when confronted with the unexpected consequences of an environmental
accident.
285. See LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 177, at 16 (liability may play a role in "helping
regulators identify potentially unsafe products and encouraging them to take action.").
286. See, e.g., ATIYAH, supra note 272, at 553 (the author emphasizes that the tort sys-
tem is instrumental in appeasing social divisions after catastrophic accidents, as, for exam-
ple, in the case of an accident that involved the collapse of coal tip onto a school that caused
the deaths of 116 children and 28 adults).
287. See JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981).
288. India Seeks to Reopen Bhopal Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1990, at D8. Indian
Government Ends Speculation, Announces Support for Bhopal Challenge, 13 INT'L ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 551 (1990). See also Wil Lepkowski, Union Carbide-Bhopal Saga Continues as
Criminal Proceedings Begin in India, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS 7, May 16, 1992 (the
$470 million settlement between India and Union Carbide mediated in 1989 by the Indian
Supreme Court encompassed both civil and criminal charges. "But public outcry was so
strong that the court agreed to review its decision. It completed its review last December,
upholding the settlement but restoring the criminal charges it had thrown out as part of the
1989 ruling.").
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The notion that private liability can work as a tension release mecha-
nism in international fora stems from the domain of human rights. For
example, after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,2 8 9 citizens of developing countries
started bringing suits against human rights violators in the courts of the
United States. The purpose of the suits is vindication as opposed to
compensation. 9 '
Citizen participation in the international arena achieves something
more fundamental. In pursuit of justice in transnational fora, citizens es-
sentially join in the formation and strengthening of international rules.
Their cases establish precedents that define acceptable corporate or state
behavior. The importance of. citizen participation is that it is not effectu-
ated through state representation but through direct citizen involvement
in affairs of international dimension. In this fashion, international law is
infused by elements of direct democracy and is transformed from an in-
strument at the disposal of governments to an instrument in the hands of
those truly affected by it.
Viewing the tort system as an instrument capable of introducing di-
rect democracy in the international system could be criticized as unrealis-
tic given the fact that citizens in many countries are not that litigious.
However, this reality is changing at a rapid pace. Environmental groups
in developing countries have started bringing suits against corporate and
government polluters. For example, in Korea, the contamination of
groundwater supplies resulted in criminal charges brought against top
corporate officials.291 In Malaysia, an environmental group brought an ac-
tion against a corporation for the alleged harm to pregnant women and
children caused by radioactive waste dumping.2 92 There also have been
suits on behalf of future generations and suits for failing to comply with
environmental impact assessments. 93
289. 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980) (the case involved a suit of two Paraguayan citizens
against Pena, another Paraguayan citizen and former Inspector General of the Police in
Paraguay. According to the plaintiffs, Pena had tortured to death their son and brother.
The court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction based on the Alien Tort Statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1350, which provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction on any
civil action by an alien for tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States.").
290. See Larry Rohter, Ex-Ruler of Haiti Faces Human Rights Suit in the US, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1991, at B10 (the objectives of these lawsuits are political and psychological.
As a lawyer for six Haitians formulated it: "There is a message here to other military thugs
and human rights violators, which is that you're not going to get away with it."). Relying on
the Alien Tort Claims Act, human rights groups have filed claims against the Serbian leader
in Bosnia, Radovan Karadzic, on behalf of the women raped during the civil war in the
former Yugoslavia. Because of the lawsuit, Karadzic asked the United States administration
to grant him immunity in order to participate in the peace talks held at the United Nations
headquarters in New York. Paul Lewis, Immunity Sought for Bosnian Serb: Atrocities Suit
in a U.S. Court Cited as Barrier to Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1993, at A8.
291. Michele Corash & Robert Falk, Through a Cleaner Looking Glass, LEGAL TIMES,
May 11, 1992, at 16, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
292. Id.
293. Id.
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The growth of national litigation renders an international tort system
for environmental harms extremely relevant. Building such a system
would not necessarily be a panacea for all the procedural hurdles of pri-
vate international law.9 4 It could, however, lay the foundation for a more
coherent action when the circumstances arise. These circumstances are
very likely to develop, given the lack of success of the current interna-
tional system in controlling the international transfers of hazardous and
radioactive wastes. For example, the ban of waste imports into the Afri-
can region 95 has not stopped illegal waste transfers to that area. In fact,
waste exports to impoverished African countries such as Somalia are on
the increase.29 Waste exports to Latin America and Eastern Europe are
also on the rise.2
97
C. A Proposal for a Liability Regime
1. The Liability Component
Strict liability has been established, nationally and internationally, as
the appropriate type of liability for environmental harms-ultra-hazard-
294. See Hans Ulrich Jessurum d'Oliveira, The Sandoz Blaze: The Damage and the
Public and Private Liabilities in Environmental Harm, in ENVIRONMENTAL HARM, supra
note 20, at 429, 442. See Scovazzi, supra note 20, at 395-96. These procedural hurdles stem
from the fact that different countries adopt different conflict of law rules. For example, in
the Sandoz disaster many problems emerged because the countries affected by the disaster
- France, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland -have different rules of private inter-
national law. In addition, corporate subsidiaries not having many assets are often involved
in severe accidents. In these cases, plaintiffs have tried to pierce the corporate veil and sue
the parent company in the courts of the state where it is located. An example is the Bhopal
case. The success of these lawsuits has been mixed and the law on this subject needs further
clarification.
In response to the above concerns, certain countries have signed agreements that pro-
vide equal access to national remedies. The principle of equal access agreements is that
plaintiffs suffering damages in a country other than the country where the environmental
accident originated enjoy in the country where the accident originated the same legal treat-
ment as the citizens of that country. However, these agreements are very few and do not
solve the problem that the laws of the country of origin of environmental accident may be
inadequate to deal with such accidents. See Alan E. Boyle, Making the Polluter Pay? Alter-
natives to State Responsibility in Allocation of Transboundary Environmental Costs, in
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM, supra note 20, at 363, 370-73.
295. See supra note 1.
296. See supra note 281-2.
297. For example, banned German pesticides that were labeled as humanitarian aid
were shipped to Romania and Albania without the consent of the governments of these
countries. See Federal, State Environmental Ministers Approve Steps to Curb Illegal
Waste Trade, INT'L ENVTL. DAILY (BNA), Sept. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Omni File; Greenpeace Finds Loopholes in EC Waste Trade Laws, INTER PRESS SER-
VICE, Oct. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; see also David Clark
Scott, Central American Presidents Seek Regional Solution to Toxic Wastes, THE CHRIS-
TIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 10, 1992, at 5, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File;
Colombia: Government Bans Ship Loaded with Toxic Waste, INTER PRESS SERVICE, July 30,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
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ous activities posing non-reciprocal risks to others. The generation, trans-
portation, and disposal of hazardous wastes are such activities. Unlimited
liability, although not yet established in international law, has many pro-
cedural advantages over limited liability. Unlimited liability makes un-
necessary periodic revisions of liability ceilings in order to take into ac-
count cost of living adjustments or in case of unexpected environmental
disasters. In addition, the lack of adverse effects of this type of liability
on insurance, in combination with its function as a tension release mecha-
nism, an instrument of democratic control, and an accident prevention
mechanism, renders its adoption imperative. Pollution victims should be
able to negotiate a settlement or bring an action free of prearranged limi-
tations on the amount of liability they may demand.
Imposing liability on generators for accidents occurring during trans-
portation and disposal is supported by both domestic and regional legisla-
tion as a method that would induce generators to internalize the costs of
producing wastes. Disposers must also be held liable for accidents occur-
ring during disposal. Waste disposers must have the facilities and equip-
ment to verify the quantities and categories of wastes they receive in or-
der to ensure that they are suitable for the type of services they provide.
Disposers must also be held liable for accidents taking place during trans-
port, except in cases where they can prove that they did not have any
control over the transporter or did not participate in her selection.
Imposing liability on transporters is not a common practice. The
Conventions on nuclear liability avoid placing liability on transporters of
nuclear materials - including wastes. The Draft European Community
Directive specifies that waste transporters are liable only for a limited
amount and not liable when they can identify the waste producer. Only
the Convention on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods holds carriers exclu-
sively liable, but only for a limited amount. Exonerating transporters
from liability for accidents during transportation and disposal has yet to
be adequately explained. Waste transporters must examine and verify the
identity and package of wastes. They should refuse delivery if the wastes
are improperly identified in the consignment note or if the package ap-
pears faulty. It is important to establish such a duty because otherwise
transporters would have an incentive to engage in high-risk transfers. At
the same time, waste transporters should be allowed defenses if they can
identify the generator and demonstrate that, under the circumstances,
further examination of wastes was infeasible or that the generator did not
disclose the nature of wastes. However, the negligence of the waste trans-
porter should not be a defense. Other defenses for waste transporters may
be appropriate. This is because generators will often force transporters to
expedite waste shipments and because there is significant room for fraud
when wastes are already packaged and ready for transportation.
In addition, generators, transporters, and disposers must not be held
liable when they have complied with the clear and specific national and
international standards, or when the damage is the result of force
majeure, intentional acts, or omissions of a third party or the victim.- Lia-
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bility must be joint and several when more than one person is liable.29
All actors involved in waste management must have a right of recourse or
subrogation against each other. Such a right will be particularly useful
when waste disposal facilities are situated in developing countries and op-
erated by small or state companies, and the deep-pocket generators are
multinational corporations from a developed country with stricter envi-
ronmental legislation. Such rules would provide generators with incen-
tives to select responsible transporters, for transporters to verify the
types of wastes they transport, and for disposers to make sure that the
wastes they dispose of are actually the wastes mentioned in the manifest.
Liability should cover personal injuries, property, loss of profits, costs of
preventing environmental harm, and the costs to clean the environment.
The costs to be recovered for preventing environmental harm and for
cleaning the environment may be subject to a cost-benefit analysis after
considering the circumstances of each case. Compulsory insurance must
also be imposed, including traditional as well as alternative types of in-
surance. Moreover, given the particular nature of waste management, the
statute of limitations should be extended to twenty or thirty years after
the incident occurs. Finally, the geographical scope of an international
liability regime must include the territory, the territorial sea, and the ex-
clusive economic zone.299
Securing such provisions in an international convention should not
be difficult since most national and international tort law contains similar
provisions for environmental accidents."' It will be difficult, however, to
establish an international standard of proof because national legislation is
still evolving. This standard, because of the long latency periods between
exposure and disease, should allow for reliable epidemiological studies to
be considered. On the other hand, the standard should be flexible enough
to allow courts to adjudicate cases according to the particularities of each
individual case. Claims for emotional distress or for fear of cancer must
also be given careful consideration. Finally, plaintiffs must be able to
choose between the forum where the damage occurred, the forum where
the environmental accident originated, or the place of business of the
generators, transporters, and disposers. Existing conventions that limit
the fora to the place where the incident or damage occurred only en-
courage defections from the established liability regimes when accidents
actually happen and the forum designated does not serve the plaintiffs'
298. Joint and several liability has been adopted by the Draft Convention on Liability
from Activities Dangerous to the Environment. See The Council of Europe, Draft Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting form Activities Dangerous to the Environment,
July 31, 1992, DIR/JUR (92) 3, art. 6(2)-(3). After closure of the site it is provided that the
last operator shall be liable and then the operator can have recourse against any third party.
See id. art. 7.
299. The application of strict and unlimited liability cannot be extended to actions that
take place in the high seas since there is no national or international jurisdiction over the
high seas.
300. See supra sections I & II.
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interests.
It will be difficult to include in a single international instrument
those issues already covered by other international conventions and
under the jurisdiction of different international organizations. As empha-
sized, there exist international conventions that deal with the transporta-
tion of toxic and radioactive wastes along with the transportation of dan-
gerous and nuclear material.3 0' There is also a fragmentation of
international institutions that deal with the transportation of hazardous
and radioactive wastes. In the case of maritime transportation of wastes,
waste shippers may resist the imposition of liability by invoking the
traditional rules of maritime law that place liability on shipowners.
3 0 2
Consequently, given the existing international legislation and different
modes of waste transportation, it will be useful if the protocol to the Ba-
sel Convention is drafted with the cooperation of IMO, IAEA, and
NEA. 0 3 Such cooperation would elucidate many issues.
2. The Social Insurance Component
Additional funding mechanisms should be provided in cases where
businesses are not able to shoulder the full amount of compensation, can-
not be held liable, do not exist anymore, or the settlement or adjudication
procedures take too long because of the nature of the dispute or the over-
loading of national courts. These concerns can best be addressed by a
mixed system comprised of private liability and social insurance compo-
nents. The social insurance component of such a regime may take the
form of a fund. The fund could be modeled after the 1971 and 1984 Fund
Conventions and provide for residual compensation and immediate relief.
It may also provide full compensation in cases where industries are not
liable or do not exist anymore or in cases where national courts rejected
compensation claims because there was no apparent linkage between ex-
posure and disease. In the latter case, plaintiffs may be allowed to file
claims against the fund at least two times after the initial claim if they
can demonstrate with stronger evidence the linkage between exposure
and disease. The fund could additionally provide immediate assistance
during catastrophic accidents and sponsor international relief efforts in
case of environmental disasters in the high-seas.
The Fund could be financed by waste exporting and importing states
301. In addition, during the discussion of the HNS Revision, there was agreement that
the Convention should cover "damage occurring during the carriage of hazardous and nox-
ious substances to the dumping site." See 66th Session Report, supra note 118, at 13. How-
ever, the state parties to the London Dumping Convention have emphasized that the HNS
Convention should apply only to "accidental spillages and loss of waste cargo" and not to
"deliberate disposal at sea of wastes." The latter should be covered by a liability protocol to
the London Dumping Convention. See 67th Session Report, supra note 120, at 17.
302. See supra notes 4-8.
303. It appears that such cooperation already exists. See Discussion of the Protocol to
the Basel Convention, 67th Session Report, supra note 120, at 25.
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in proportion to their wealth and the volumes of wastes they import or
export.3 °4 States can, in turn, tax waste generators, transporters, or dis-
posers. Direct industry financing under the supervision of states should
not be excluded, but it will be more difficult to establish because indus-
tries that generate wastes, unlike industries involved in the oil business,
are very diverse. An alternative approach would be to establish a prelimi-
nary fund involving mandatory contributions of states and voluntary con-
tributions of industry. After the termination of the preliminary period,
the performance of the fund will be evaluated and states will be required
to submit proposals concerning industry's direct contributions to the
fund. For this purpose, during the first stage of the fund, states will have
to accumulate data and sponsor statistical analysis concerning waste pro-
duction, waste exports, and accidents due to waste mismanagement and
transportation for each industrial sector. The advantage of the two-stage
approach is that it would entice industry to contribute to the fund under
the threat that if voluntary contributions are inadequate, they will be-
come mandatory. As evidenced by CRISTAL and TOVALOP, industry is
more willing to contribute to voluntary schemes than to obligatory ones.
The fund could be administered temporarily by an existing international
organization such as the United Nations Environment Programme, the
IAEA, the World Bank, or preferably by an international agency special-
izing in waste management.30 5
CONCLUSION
It is the conclusion of this article that both justice and efficiency
propagate the establishment of an international liability regime for acci-
dents due to waste mismanagement. A strict and unlimited liability sys-
tem will prevent accidents and simultaneously democratize the interna-
tional system without causing any adverse effects on insurance.
304. LOUKA, supra note 1, at 26.
305. Id. at 22-23.
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Public Participation in Economic and
Environmental Planning: A Case Study of
the Philippines
EDWARD E. YATES*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Phillipines, Aboriginal, Malay, Chinese and mixed-blood peo-
ples live among unique and productive biological ecosystems. However,
environmental degradation threatens socio-economic development in this
resource rich but environmentally fragile country. Destruction of forest
and marine ecosystems severely affects local economies dependent on
traditional fishing and agriculture. The quality of urban air and water is
degradated daily, causing major health problems. The increased pollution
and natural resource degradation are clearly related to the country's drop
in food production and its difficulties raising the national standard of liv-
ing.' Indigenous peoples and rural poor often bear the brunt of this re-
source degradation. The increased pollution and natural resource erosion
are clearly related to the country's drop in food production and its diffi-
culties in developing an economy capable of raising the national standard
of living.'
The traditional western response to difficulties in economic develop-
ment has been to throw both money and concrete at the problem. Yet the
large industrial and infrastructure projects in the Philippines, as in other
countries, cause tremendous environmental repercussions.2 While the
pursuit of socioeconomic development does not necessarily conflict with a
strong environmental policy,3 rapid industrial based development with
little public scrutiny or involvement has clearly increased damage to the
environment and human suffering in the Phillipines.
Non-governmental organizations and some political leaders recognize
the problems caused by this resource degradation and have stressed the
* Board Member, Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide - Philippines; currently
with the Pacific Energy and Resources Center, Sausalito, CA.
1. See generally THE WORLD BANK, FORESTRY, FISHERIES, AND AGRICULTURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES (Sept., 1989); U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT, SUSTAINABLE NATURAL RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PHILIPPINES (Dames and Moore Int'l,
et. al., 1989); GARETH PORTER & DELFIN GANAPIN, WORLD RESOURCES, INSTITUTE, RESOURCES,
POPULATION AND THE PHILIPPINES FUTURE (1989).
2. See SIERRA CLUB, BANKROLLING DISASTERS (1987); ROBIN BROAD & JOHN CAVANAUGH,
PLUNDERING PARADISE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE PHILLIPINES (1993).
3. Studies of economic growth in Europe and the United States clearly show that envi-
ronmental protection does not slow down or interfere with economic growth. See THE COUN-
CIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, WASHINGTON D.C., 21st ANNUAL REPORT, MAKING THE ENVI-
RONMENT COUNT (1990).
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urgency of the problem.4 As these leaders and groups point out, little has
been done to address the problem because the wealthy classes in the Phil-
ippines benefit from rapid resource exploitation, and the political power
of this economic elite has effectively eliminated any serious political re-
structuring, such as land reform.5 Further, the inability of the Philippine
government to effectively fund and carry out environmental protection
has thwarted genuine efforts to regulate and manage resources. To sus-
tain its resources the Philippines must confront and overcome both the
political power of those exploiting resources and the scarcity of adminis-
trative funding and capacity.
To address unjust and inadequate economic and environmental poli-
cies, citizens and governments in many countries have attempted to open
up information control and development planning, through the environ-
mental impact assessment (EIA) process.6 EIA, along with open meetings
and freedom of information acts, opens proposed programs and projects
to external review and criticism.7 In the 1970s, the Philippines, along with
other countries, established EIA in order to provide an objective, analyti-
cal approach to project planning. Although many countries established
EIA, only those nations that incorporated extensive external review, coor-
dination, and public involvement - the United States, Canada and the
Netherlands' - succeeded in using EIA to avoid and reduce the environ-
mental and socio-economic impacts caused by large scale development.9
4. See Our Threatened Heritage (Proceedings from the Solidarity Seminar on the En-
vironment), 124 SOLIDARITY (Oct.-Dec. 1989)[hereinafter SOLIDARITY].
5. PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, SAVING THE EARTH: THE PHILIP-
PINE EXPERIENCE (1991).
6. Most environmental statutory mechanisms need a substantial regulatory framework
and are often applied after the pollutant or development has altered the environment. EIA
is a study process used to predict and prevent the environmental and socio-economic conse-
quences of development programs and projects and avoid costly regulation and enforcement.
Projects can include establishing a forest management plan or building a hydraulic dam.
Programs such as water use management plans can also utilize the EIA process. EIA con-
centrates on natural resource constraints that can effect the success of a program or project.
It also sets out how projects might cause harm to people, their homeland or their liveli-
hoods, or to other nearby development projects. EIA then identifies ways to minimize the
problems and outlines ways to improve the project so that it better meets its proposed goals.
The people who participate in the process include other government agency officials, techni-
cal specialists, local leaders and perhaps most importantly, the local citizens of the area for
which the program or project is planned. United Nations Environment Program, ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: BASIC PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROGRAM, at 2, 3 (1988).
7. MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS (1991).
8. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347, (1988); Government Or-
ganization Act, 1979, P.C. 1984-2132, CAN. GAZ., 118(14) SOR/84/467 (Nov. 7, 1984); Envi-
ronmental Protection Act, Act of April 23, 1986 (General Provisions), Bulletin of Acts, Or-
ders and Decrees 211 (The Netherlands).
9. W. Kennedy, Environmental Impact Assessment in North America and Western
Europe: What has Worked Where, How, and Why, Int'l Env. Rep. (BNA) 257-262 (Apr. 13,
1988); U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, WASHINGTON D.C., 20TH ANNUAL REPORT
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT; A MODEL FOR
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Those EIA systems, including Asian systems, that did not establish coor-
dination or oversight mechanisms, have had serious implementation
problems.1 l
The Philippine EIA system incorporated many elements of various
other EIA systems and established some indigenous, innovative concepts.
The Philippines implemented their EIA system, however, in an uneven
manner, emphasizing technical and regulatory aspects and largely ignor-
ing the more important external review aspects such as inter-governmen-
tal coordination and public participation." Since establishment of the
EIA system fifteen years ago, the government has eliminated its inter-
agency coordination, granted hundreds of exemptions and, in some cases,
simply failed to carry out the planning required by the EIA system. Pub-
lic scrutiny and oversight could have prevented much of this abuse. Fur-
ther, the EIA system never adequately utilized a very valuable resource:
the input and knowledge of local citizens and organizations.
This paper will briefly set out the more serious problems in the Phil-
ippine EIA system, problems which are representative of the economic
and environmental planning problems faced in many developing coun-
tries.1" Next, it will show how citizen participation and external review of
government planning could produce an effective development planning
process that would avoid projects that damage the environment. The last
section will suggest a minor revision of The Phillipine EIA process by
which public involvement is established as an integral part of develop-
ment project planning in the Philippines and in other developing
countries' s
II. NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC POWER IN THE PHILIPPINES
The commerce and culture of the Philippines has traditionally been
OTHER COUNTRIES 42-51 NOTE (1990).
10. N. Htun, The EIA Process in Asia and the Pacific Region; I. Moreira, EIA in Latin
America in Environmental Impact Assessment: Theory and Practice (P. Wathern, ed.,
1988).
11. The period of dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos seriously affected all Philippine
citizen and non-governmental efforts to participate in the economic development process.
EIA was viewed as a technical tool under Marcos and that view has not changed in the
seven years since his overthrow. For a general history of recent Philippine politics see CLARK
NEHER, SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ERA 55-85 (1991).
12. For a review of EIA in developing countries, see Symposium: EIA for Developing
Countries: Progress and Prospects, 5 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 3 (Sept. 1985).
13. This paper will not attempt to analyze the analytical or quantitative processes uti-
lized in the Philippine EIA system; e.g. mitigation, alternatives, monitoring, cumulative im-
pact assessment, etc. This paper attempts to assess why the current system is not effective.
For another view of the Philippine EIA system see Abracosa & Ortolano, Environmental
Impact Assessment in the Philippines: 1977-1885, 7 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 293-
310 (1987) [hereinafter Abracosa]; PHD. DISSERTATION, DEP'T OF CIVIL ENGINEERING, STAN-
FORD UNIVERSITY, THE PHILIPPINE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SYSTEM: AN INSTITU-
TIONAL ANALYSIS OF IMPLEMENTATION, (1987)(Available at Stanford Engineering Dept. and
the University of the Philippines, Manila School of Urban and Regional Planning).
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closely tied to the land and the sea. In recent years the Philippines has
put great demands on these natural resources in order to support its rap-
idly growing population and its need for economic development. Yet
these resources, agricultural land, forests and marine ecosystems, are de-
teriorating rapidly. For instance, forest cover has declined in the Philip-
pines from 75 percent in 1950 to only 25 percent in 1988, and only
980,000 acres of virgin forest remain." The once productive fisheries of
the Philippines are being decimated by the destruction of the coral reefs
and the pollution of coastal waters by industrial and human wastes."
Given that fish and other seafood provide 54 percent of the protein for
the average Filipino household, the destruction of marine resources could
result in economic disaster and possible famine.
Destruction of the natural resource base results in the breakdown of
the socioeconomic and cultural foundation of Filipino rural society. The
loss of that base causes the mass migration of rural peoples to the vastly
overcrowded, polluted cities of the Philippines. In urban areas, buses and
factories emit huge clouds of black smoke into small, highly populated
areas where health care for the poor often does not exist. Open sewers
and lack of zoning regulations allow processing of toxic substances and
hazardous waste in thickly populated, lower-income areas.
For years, government agencies or rapid growth oriented political ap-
pointees have dominated the agencies charged with managing the nation's
natural resources. The Aquino administration initially attempted to
change this dynamic by establishing the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and appointing more enlightened administra-
tors. Unfortunately, the laws intended to control air and water pollution
and wanton destruction of the country's natural resources remain only
rarely enforced. The belief prevails in much of industry that the Philip-
pines must follow a "pollute and grow" approach.
Access to natural resources and economic benefits from the extrac-
tion of resources creates political and economic power. The traditional
land-holding elite and foreign multinationals, who have little interest in
the type of planning that encourages sustainable development of re-
sources, hold most of this power. 6 Citizens and local communities in the
14. PHILIPPINE MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON FOR-
EST PRODUCTS UTILIZATION 1 (1987); DANTE B. GATMAYTAN, LEGAL RIGHTS AND NATURAL RE-
SOURCES CENTER, MANILA, IT'S Too EARLY FOR CONSERVATION: TOKENISM IN THE ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM OF THE PHILLIPINES (1993).
15. Delfin J. Ganapin & Gareth Porter, Philippine Fisheries: Who Benefits? in RE-
SOURCES, POPULATION AND THE PHILIPPINES FUTURE (1988). See also The Philippines Marine
Wealth: Who Owns It?, in SARILAKAS, Sept, 1987 (The authors describe how fishery re-
sources that are supposedly open access are often destroyed by large scale fish and shrimp
farming enterprises aimed at export).
16. See generally Delfin J. Ganapin, TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE REGULATION: A CASE
STUDY OF THE PHILIPPINES (Presented to the Conference on Environmental Management in
Developing Countries, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris,
France, Oct. 2-5, 1990) [hereinafter GANAPIN]; PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOUR-
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Philippines have few tools with which to manage or protect natural
resources.
A panel of natural resource policy experts, including Sen. Orlando
Mercado and noted Filipino economist Sixto Roxas, declared that "deci-
sion making and responsibility over the natural ecosystem should belong
to local communities whose livelihoods are most directly affected by its
protection."" Given the Philippine government's record managing re-
sources and regulating polluters, this policy recommendation may provide
the only alternative for long term resolution of the environmental crisis in
the Philippines. The panelists also acknowledged the need for govern-
ment-community partnerships where large scale projects receive public
support. Regional and national infrastructure projects such as highways,
ports, and energy facilities could provide excellent vehicles for develop-
ment of such partnerships through both regional planning and EIA
processes. Yet EIA, and most development planning in the Philippines,
failed during the first fifteen years.
III. EIA IN THE PHILIPPINES: A BRIEF HISTORY
A. Intergovernmental Coordination Aspects
The regulatory system' s set up to implement the EIA system in the
Philippines stressed two elements: (1) the technical and procedural re-
view required prior to the granting of permits; and (2) the interdiscipli-
nary approach and coordination needed for development planning. All
project proponents (other federal agencies or local governments) were re-
quired to carry out this process and obtain "Environmental Compliance
NALISM, SAVING THE EARTH: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE (1991).
17. Many large scale policy changes are currently being advocated by Philippine leaders
and activists to address environmental protection and economic development. Most, how-
ever, require either huge policy changes by governments or costly and ambitious (but neces-
sary) regulatory apparatus. In the Philippines the most far reaching yet basic reforms would
be to change the land tenure system and to allow its citizens democratic access to natural
resources. See SOLIDARITY, supra note 4. Many of these reforms can only be implemented
after extensive changes in property and even Constitutional law. This paper does not ad-
dress those reforms but instead will identify immediate steps to improve the present plan-
ning processes which could build toward and complement more far reaching reforms when
they are in place.
18. Presidential Decree No. 1151 set out the general administrative framework for envi-
ronmental protection in the Philippines. Presidential Decree No. 1586 (June 11, 1978) set
out the statutory framework for the environmental impact statement system including the
establishment of the Environmental Critical Projects and Areas concept. The National En-
vironmental Protection Council issued specific Rules and Regulations to implement Presi-
dential Decrees No. 1151 and No. 1586 on July 22, 1983. Presidential Proclamation No. 2146
(Dec. 14, 1981) identified the environmentally critical areas and projects called for in Presi-
dential Decree No. 1586. In 1983 the NEPC issued guidance regarding Presidential Procla-
mation No. 2146. Office Circular 3, Technical Definitions and Scope of the Environmen-
tally Critical Projects and Areas Enumerated in Proclamation 2146 (1990); see also Legal
Assistance Center for Indigenous Filipinos, Commission on Ancestral Domain: The Legisla-
tive Agenda, PANLIPI HORIZONS, Jan. 1989, vol. 1, no. 2.
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Certificates" (ECC).' 9 The ECC system established a list of environmen-
tally critical projects or areas that trigger the requirement to draft an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).2 ° This list system usually pro-
vides for an assured minimal level of planning for those projects and ar-
eas listed.2 ' As in many EIA systems around the world, the Philippine
system emphasizes the technical, quantitative methodologies of EIA. The
Philippines and India, where well developed higher education systems ex-
isted, assumed that technical analysis could provide the objective scrutiny
that would reform narrowly focused, inefficient, or corrupt government
programs.
The designers of this EIA system correctly predicted that the line
agencies approving the projects were narrow, mission oriented entities not
interested in broad based planning. Therefore, the designers attempted to
create an environmental awareness and expertise in government minis-
tries. They required the establishment of environmental units within all
government agencies involved in planning development projects. This
system proposed to develop environmental expertise and awareness in the
very officials who design and oversee projects. The National Environmen-
tal Protection Council's (NEPC) original task was simply to give advice,
oversee the EIA system, and review the EISs for adequacy.22 However,
neither the NEPC nor the public had the power to enforce the EIA
system.2 3
When the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) took over the functions of the NEPC in 1986,24 the line agencies
had stopped complying with the intended system, and DENR's Environ-
ment and Management Bureau (EMB) was charged with drafting all the
EISs for the entire country! As in many other environment ministries
worldwide, 25 other government departments who want little scrutiny of
their projects often block officials at DENR.2 6 These departments do not
19. Presidential Proclamation No. 2146 (1981).
20. Id.; Letter of Instructions No. 1179 (1981); NEPC Council Special Order No. 1
(1982).
21. JOHN HORBERRY, WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, STATUS AND APPLICATION OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 68, (1984).
22. These two processes are performed by two different government agencies in the
U.S.; under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1988), the Council on
Environmental Quality is charged with oversight of the EIA process, while section 309 of the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7609 (1988), charges the Environmental Protection Agency with
the duty to review EISs for substantive and technical adequacy.
23. Abracosa, supra note 13, at 293.
24. President Aquino issued Presidential Order No. 192, which mandated a reorganiza-
tion of government agencies dealing with environmental and natural resources issues. Over-
sight of the EIA process was transferred from the now defunct National Environmental
Protection Council (NEPC) to the Environmental Management Bureau of the newly formed
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
25. See generally Jaro Mayda, Environmental Legislation in Developing Countries:
Some Parameters and Constraints, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 997 (1985).
26. In the last two years DENR has addressed some of these coordination issues by
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report their projects to DENR until the funds have been appropriated or
the project has already started in order to avoid intervention.
For example, in order to exploit the "ecotourism" boom, the Philip-
pine government has made extensive investment inroads on the thickly
forested, sparsely inhabited island of Palawan. An EIS is being drafted
for one such road from the airport in Puerto Princesa to Sabong on the
beautiful and little visited west coast. This road passes through the wa-
tershed that feeds the unusual underground river at St. Paul National
Park, a park that the Philippine government has recently spent millions
of Pesos to protect. Road construction, however, has already started and
has brought settlers practicing "kaingin," or slash and burn agriculture,
to the watershed and to the ancestral domain of the traditional Batak
and Tagbanue peoples. By not adequately complying with the coordina-
tion process, the municipality building the road ignored the knowledge of
the national government entity that manages the park.2" The rush to ig-
nore planning and coordination will not only stunt economic development
but will also threaten the survival of two indigenous cultures.
B. External Oversight
Public scrutiny makes government agencies uncomfortable. Yet, as
the noted international environmental legal scholar Nicholas Robinson
points out, public involvement and oversight of project planning have
helped eliminate or reassess poorly planned projects. From the citizen
suits by inner city workers in New York to outreach in rural Russia, EIA
allows people to participate in and improve planning.
28
Unfortunately, the Philippines' attempt to ensure some oversight
lacked force and application. Review panels made up of governmental
and academic technical specialists convened to examine the adequacy of
the environmental analysis. 29 This process unfortunately became a some-
what closed, technical, and eventually meaningless exercise. Further, the
establishing agreements with other government agencies, such as the National Economic
Development Agency, that attempt to reestablish coordination between line agencies and
DENR. DENR has also issued Administrative Order No. 38-A (September 12, 1990) and
Special Order No. 589 (June 27, 1991), which set out internal procedures for EMB in imple-
menting the EIA system. None of these above measures are legally binding but instead set
up an institutional framework.
27. The Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau of the DENR. Exec. Order 192 (1987).
Admin. Code of 1987, Tit. XIV, Ch. 2, § 19.
28. Nicholas Robinson, The National Environmental Policy Act: Today's Law for the
Future, address at the Council on Environmental Quality sponsored Conference (September
22, 1989) (transcript available in Pace University School of Law Center for Environmental
Legal Studies); see GATMAYTAN, supra note 14, at 9-14.
29. Section 5 of the Regulations for implementing Presidential Decree No. 1586 estab-
lishes the mandate for the EIS Review Committee. Yet these panels are rarely convened and
are generally made up of technically oriented government and ex-government officials.
Broader systemic and socio-economic issues are not addressed and the panels are not viewed
as independent.
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implementing regulations permitted the government to grant exemptions
for certain projects or areas, with little or no basis. Even more disap-
pointing, a large quantity of projects were never reviewed because the line
agencies failed to inform EMB that these projects existed. Dr. Ramon
Abracosa, a Philippine EIA expert, notes that the regulations provide for
too much discretion for government decision makers and do not clarify
the enforcement process.3"
Even worse, powerful political patrons have cut short EIA
processes.3 " For example, little documentation preceded the massive Jap-
anese funded Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation
project in Leyte. Similarly, the Ortigas-EDSA Overpass, a critical urban
transportation link in Manila, was never the subject of EIA documenta-
tion. This overpass cannot accommodate public transit, leaving the over-
pass an expenditure of public funds that will only benefit the auto owning
upper classes.
Inconsistent implementation of the EIA system in the Philippines
has resulted in a dearth of environmental or socio-economic safeguards
for a large majority of the major development programs and projects in
the Philippines. Agency statistics show that between 1983 and 1990
DENR denied only five Environmental Compliance Certificates out of the
hundreds of projects subject to the EIA system.2 Hundreds of large scale
projects escaped needed scrutiny.
Even more troublesome, project proponents fail to bring countless
projects to the attention of DENR, and other projects receive exemptions,
legally or illegally, from high level politicians.3 For example, senior offi-
cials at DENR and the Department of Public Works cut off environmen-
tal analysis of the Manila Light Rail Transit (LRT) project. The results
of that illegal interference could prove catastrophic to the Filipino tax-
payer. The LRT is now sinking in unstable ground. A thorough hydrogeo-
logical investigation of an EIS could have helped predict and avoid a fi-
asco that may waste millions of Philippine Pesos.
No process exists to halt the undue influence by industry and politi-
cians that derails the EIA system. Public hearings and public oversight
that could have provided the scrutiny necessary to enforce an effective
EIA system were never implemented. The system has generally excluded
30. Interview with Ramon Abracosa, Engineer with the Philippine Department of Agri-
culture (August 15, 1991).
31. This includes attempts by the Congress to delegate additional political powers to
local governments set out in the Local Government Act, Rep. Act No. 7160 (1991). This law
includes, among other decentralizing mandates, the requirement that all national agencies
"conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental
and people's organizations" before projects are implemented. Tit. I, Ch. 3, § 2. This notice
requirement has not been effective, however, as it does not require any involvement or con-
sultation with the public.
32. Statistical Summary of EIA Projects: 1983-1991, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Environmental Management Bureau (1991).
33. GANAPIN, supra note 16, at 3.
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local citizens and officials, thereby omitting the participation of those who
have the most relevant experience and knowledge concerning projects.
Only EIAs on selected, highly controversial projects give citizens an op-
portunity to express their views. Yet these hearings occur late in the pro-
cess, if they occur at all.
For example, a huge EIS was drafted for the internationally debated
Mount Apo geothermal development project. Phillipine National Oil
Company officials knew that substantial opposition existed to destruction
of a bioregion that contains the Philippines' most important national
park, the only habitat for the highly endangered Philippine Eagle and an
area sacred to many indigenous tribes.
Local citizens were allowed to comment on the eleven volume EIS
only after the sponsor, the Philippine National Oil Company, had in-
vested millions of pesos and after approval and completion of virtually all
the feasibility studies. For all practical purposes the decision had already
been made based on incomplete information."' Requirements for early
and effective public participation would have uncovered the inappropri-
ateness of such a project and avoided the national and international con-
troversy and embarrassment suffered by the Philippines.3 5
IV. OVERCOMING RESTRAINTS: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND OVERSIGHT
CAN WORK
EIA systems do not generally work as their designers plan. Often the
problems result from a theoretically faulty legislative framework or inade-
quate regulatory measures.3 6 For example, other national EIA systems
currently in use have been criticized for lack of regional planning tools
such as carrying capacity.3 7 But more often than not, the basic legislative/
regulatory system suffers from functional inadequacy rather than theoret-
ical inadequacy. The system is quite simply not implemented. In the
Philippines, documents are drafted late in the planning process, the gov-
34. For an extensive discussion of the socio-economic impacts and the EIA process re-
garding Mt. Apo National Park, see C. Fay, A. Royo & Dante B. Gatmaytan, The Destruc-
tion of Mt. Apo: In Defense of Bagobo Ancestral Domain, 2 PHILIPPINE NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW JOURNAL 18-25 (May 1990).
35. The most recent revision of the Phillipine EIA process came in the form of an ad-
ministrative order pushed through by DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran before a change
in administration. DENR Administrative Order 21, § 1992 generally streamlines and decen-
tralizes the Rules and Regulations of Presidential Decree 1586. DENR regional offices now
have greater flexibility in regard to requiring ECCS and issuing exemptions. Art. 2, § 5. In
regard to public involvement, little has changed except that the requirements have been
lessened. Public hearings are not required except for projects that are "environmentally crit-
ical" and where there is "mounting public opposition." Art. IV, § 4.2.4. For a more in-depth
review of this administrative order, see GATMAYTAN, supra note 14, at 18-25.
36. See generally R. COENEN & J. JORISSEN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 39 (1989).
37. See William Rees, A Role for Environmental Assessment in Achieving Sustainable
Development, 8 ENvTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 273 (1988).
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eminent environment agency does not have the capabilities to carry out
its responsibilities, and many projects never face review due to political
pressure or political debts known as "utang na loob."
How can these restraints be overcome? One approach is to adjust or
"tinker" with the analytical process (e.g. improve mitigation analysis) or
reorganize the government administrative functions. These types of ad-
justments, however, do not address the basic lack of implementation. The
Philippine government is not able to carry out and enforce an EIA system
on its own. 8 For that matter, no government is capable of such a task
without both public participation and external oversight.
A. Public Participation
The necessity of a local knowledge base to the completion of success-
ful project planning has become clear to many countries."' The European
experience is instructive. As W.R. Sheate stated, regarding EIA in the
United Kingdom, "[i]f sufficient public involvement occurs in the early
stages it may be possible to identify the priority issues and thereby ex-
plore ways of addressing and hopefully removing or mitigating their worst
effects.1 4
o
Economic and environmental planning requires the mobilization of
those people most familiar with the environmental and socio-economic
factors in question. Environmental planning and management demands a
broader base of support and knowledge from universities, economic enter-
prises, and those most familiar with local resource constraints, the local
communities. 41 Filipino citizens, including civic leaders and local busi-
nessmen, all have knowledge of the potential and limits of local resources,
normally not ascertainable from scientific or economic studies. 2
The public participation processes utilized in EIA can be imple-
mented without extensive training or restructuring of local government
laws. Two methods of public participation are "scoping" and public com-
ment and access to documents.
Under scoping, those parties with special or particular knowledge
concerning a project or its site are given the opportunity to comment
38. Dames and Moore, supra note 1, at vi.
39. HORBERRY, supra note 21, at 67-70; THE WORLD BANK, MAKING BETTER DECISIONS:
INFORMATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND PARTICIPATION 83-97 (1992).
40. W.R. Sheate, Public Participation: The Key to Effective Environmental Assess-
ment, 21 ENVTL. POL'Y & LAW 3, 4 (1991); CELIA MOHN, BARRY BREEN & WILLIAM FUTRELL,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FROM SOURCE TO RECOVERY 88 (1993).
41. HORBERRY, supra note 21, at 69.
42. Article four of the Regulations promulgated under P.D. 1151 provided a framework
for the invocation of public hearings. P.D 1151 §4 (1977). These regulations, however, do not
specifically require that public hearings or other public participation mechanisms be incor-
porated into the EIA process. Hearings are often held only where great public controversy
has arisen over the project, and they are generally held late in the planning stage solely in
order to allow the irate public to blow off steam.
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early in the planning process. This method encourages participants to in-
dicate major issues and discard unimportant issues making future efforts
more focused and efficient. Public access to and comment on project doc-
uments opens up the decision making process to necessary public light
and scrutiny."'
By allowing public comment and access to documents, agencies can
benefit from the additional expertise that only the public can provide. 4'
Public comment overcomes the inherent bias by government agencies in
favor of the projects and industries that they regulate. Where the govern-
ment agency holds all the information secretly, the opposition cannot ver-
ify the EIS's underlying base analysis.
Public comment on documents in the Philippines is not required nor
used efficiently. The Philippines could adapt or expand both processes,
scoping and public comment, to meet their specific needs. For example,
the Philippine National Irrigation Administration has successfully incor-
porated public participation in many of its projects.' The Philippines
cannot afford to waste local knowledge.
B. External Review/Enforcement
Just as environmental planning needs the expertise and participation
of the affected local communities, the government agencies that imple-
ment the projects need oversight. The unwillingness of Philippine govern-
ment line agencies to establish environmental units, the narrow mindset
of mission-oriented agencies, and the politicians' continued support of
special interests clearly demonstrate the barriers to the EIA system's
ability to enforce itself. Indeed, the problem of enforcement of the EIA
process is not unique to the Philippines.
Numerous works have detailed the problems in implementation and
enforcement of the various governmental and institutional EIA processes
worldwide. 6 Lack of external review makes correcting these deficiencies
difficult. Those systems established without adequate provisions for envi-
ronmental review have faltered.' Much of the success of the EIA systems
43. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL COUNSELS,
NEPA LIAISONS, AND PARTICIPANTS IN SCOPING (1981).
44. Several military base closure programs in the U.S. use an even more proactive
model of public participation. Advisory panels made up of community representatives and
local government officials work closely with base commanders on issues of cleanup and reuse
of the bases. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Interim Report of the Federal
Facilities Environmental Restoration Dialogue Committee (1993).
45. F. KORTEN AND R. SIY, TRANSFORMING A BUREAUCRACY: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE
PHILIPPINES NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (1989).
46. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Peter Wathern, ed.,
1988); JOHN HORBERRY, STATUS AND APPLICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR
DEVELOPMENT, CONSERVATION FOR DEVELOPMENT CENTRE, GLAND (1984); Mayda, supra note
25; COENEN, supra note 36.
47. UNITED STATES COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 42-51 notes (1990).
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in the U.S. and the Netherlands flows from independent review commis-
sions or direct citizen suits that shed light on government processes and
ensure their implementation.48 Even Canada, which developed an efficient
review panel system, has recognized the need for expansion of public par-
ticipation and oversight.49
C. International Movement on EIA and Public Involvement
For several years international institutions, such as the United Na-
tions and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,5" have recognized
the problems caused by poorly planned, large scale development projects
with little outside scrutiny. These institutions have called for the revamp-
ing and/or establishment of EIA in member countries. However, the un-
willingness of international banks to require environmental feasibility
studies, alongside economic and engineering studies, has provided little
incentive for governments to revise their planning systems. In recent
years, non-governmental organizations have been pressuring the interna-
tional financial institutions to adopt more stringent environmental review
requirements for large scale development projects. International NGOs
succeeded in pushing the Pelosi Amendment, a bank reform bill,5 '
through the U.S. Congress. This law requires the U.S. Executive Directors
at the four multilateral development banks to vote against any project
that significantly affects the environment that has not been the subject of
an EIS.52
Banks, while scrambling to revise their own project cycle,53 have not
aggressively or effectively communicated their mandate to assist borrower
countries in developing and/or revising such procedures. Even more im-
portant, the banks have refused to require their borrower countries to
48. See THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 42-46
note (1989); S. TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK (1984). Taylor's study found that
judicial enforcement of EIA norms is the only effective way to insure their implementation.
Taylor does note that many government officials feel that EIA would be more effective as a
standard, non-regulatory planning tool. Interview with Dr. Ramon Abracosa, Philippine De-
partment of Agriculture (Aug. 15, 1991) (Dr. Abracosa cites cost-benefit analysis as a suc-
cessful example of non-regulatory planning).
49. See CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL ADVISORY PANEL, REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION ACT (1987).
50. Goals and Principles for Environmental Impact Assessment, United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme, UNEP/GC14/17, Nairobi, 1987, Principle #7; Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Article
14(1) (1985).
51. 13 International Financial Institutions Act § 1307(a); Pub. L. No. 101-240; 22
U.S.C. § 262(m) (1990).
52. The four multilateral banks clearly covered by this law are the World Bank, the
Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the African Develop-
ment Bank. It is not clear whether the Pelosi Amendment applies to the newly formed
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
53. THE WORLD BANK, OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 4.00 (1989); THE INTERAMERICAN DEVEL-
OPMENT BANK; PROCEDURES FOR CLASSIFYING AND EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF
BANK OPERATIONS (1990).
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carry out the public participation process. For example, the Asian Devel-
opment Bank (ADB) has developed a complex and extensive set of envi-
ronmental planning guidelines that do not strictly follow the EIA pro-
cess. 4 ADB's environment chief, Bindu Lohani, notes that ADB's
requirements go beyond EIA by requiring resource assessment and re-
gional planning. Yet the ADB does not require public participation. In-
stead, it uses mathematical formulas to determine social impacts." The
technical prowess of environmental planners will not, as has been shown
in the Philippines, prevent funding of unsound projects.
V. AN EXTERNAL/INTERNAL APPROACH
In many countries, citizens have the legal standing to challenge an
agency action that abuses administrative discretion"e or violates a Consti-
tutional right to a clean environment. Other countries reject the use of
litigation to settle social disputes or challenge government action. While
small environmental disputes do sometimes go to trial in the Philippines,
the conservative courts discourage the use of litigation to achieve social
change. 57 Effectuating social change in the Philippines through statutory
reform proves even more difficult. The Philippine Congress spends its
time on fractious. politics and has passed fewer than ten major laws in the
last ten years. Many political activists have more faith in administrative
reform than in congressional or court mandated social change.58
Oversight of governmental processes by quasi-governmental commis-
sions could provide an alternative. This approach may provide a more
theoretically preferable or culturally acceptable method of dispute resolu-
54. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES FOR SELECTED INFRASTRUC-
TURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (1986, revised 1988); ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL GUIDELINES FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIAL AND POWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (1987, revised
1988); ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES FOR SELECTED AGRICULTURAL
AND NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (1987)(the above documents are available
through the Asian Development Bank in Manila).
55. The Asian Development Bank has developed a "Mathematical Formulation of the
Human Development Index," yet does not require community involvement as an aspect of
their social analysis. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, GUIDELINES FOR SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF DEVEL-
OPMENT PROJECTS (June 1991).
56. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); U.S. Students Challenging Regulatory
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). Many U.S. environmental statutes also include
"citizen suit" provisions which grant citizens a right of action against a government agency
for enforcement of the statute. For example, The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C §7604 (1990); The
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §1540(g) (1973); The Emergency Planning and Commu-
nity Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §11046 (1986).
57. In a case brought on behalf of children and future generations against the DENR
for granting timber concessions, the Judge dismissed the case stating that "the Court firmly
believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a mat-
ter of public policy," violates the Separation of Powers clause of the Philippine Constitu-
tion. Tony Oposa, et. al v. Fulgencio Factoran, The Department of the Environment and
Natural Resources, et. al, Civil Case 90-777, July 18, 1991.
58. Interview with Marvic Leonen and Tony LaVina, Philippine Legal Rights and Nat-
ural Resources Center, Inc., in Manila (Aug. 1991).
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tion than litigation. The Philippine EIA law holds the basic framework
for both the coordination and external review needed for a workable de-
velopment planning process. The system, however, lacks much needed
public oversight and enforcement. As in the Canadian system, this public
oversight role could be taken on by the Review Commission.
The Philippines have not successfully implemented such a method of
external review. An Executive Order based on the current EIA law could
allow the DENR to seat representatives from NGOs on the Review Com-
missions, require the Commission to hold public hearings, and grant citi-
zen groups the right to administratively appeal Commission decisions.
Such an approach avoids expensive confrontation through the courts and
yet allows for extensive public involvement.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rapid destruction of soils, watersheds, marine life, and forests in
the Philippines threatens its ability to achieve just and sustainable devel-
opment. The lack of funds to regulate and monitor environmental degra-
dation and pollution strongly suggests the need for strengthened environ-
mental planning. Yet the government clearly lacks the resources to do so.
The lack of reliable information and the failure to enforce environmental
laws in the Philippines demonstrate the strong need for a planning sys-
tem that includes both public participation and external review.
For many years, NGOs have recognized the problems inherent in
programs and projects planned without public involvement and external
review. Government and industry have recently begun to recognize the
need for sustainable economic development and the further democratiza-
tion of government decision making. Asia Week reports that, regarding
pollution, Asian governments are "indeed beginning to take notice - and
take action."59 Now is an opportune time to reassess the making of devel-
opment decisions and how to increase citizen involvement in natural re-
source planning.
59. The Green Crusaders, ASIA WEEK, June 21, 1991, at 58; see also National Power
Corporation v. Vera, G.R. No. 83558, 170 CSCRA 721 (1989), in which the Phillipine Su-
preme Court interpreted Presidential Decree 1818 (1974) to continue to prohibit courts from
issuing injunctions on infrastructure or natural resources development projects.
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Securities Regulation in Japan: An Update
SHEN-SHIN Lu*
§ 1. INTRODUCTION
The Japanese overhauled their Securities and Exchange Law (S.E.L.)
in 1988' in order to accomplish the following goals: (1) liberalize and in-
ternationalize their securities market; (2) regulate the securities futures,
index, and option trade; (3) develop a healthier securities issue market;
(4) change disclosure regulations; (5) encourage investor trust in the fair-
ness of the Japanese securities market; and (6) reinforce the prevention of
"insider trading."' In 1992, Japan further amended the S.E.L. to extend
the restrictions on insider trading to the over the counter market as well
as listed securities.3 The 1992 amendments also created a Securities and
Exchange Surveillance Commission with authority to investigate securi-
ties law violations, but, unfortunately, its powers are limited to reporting
its findings to the Ministry of Finance." This article focuses on the re-
vised disclosure regulation and the effort to prevent insider trading ad-
dressed in the 1988 and 1992 amendments.
In 1988, the Japanese created an entirely new system of disclosure
regulations. The major changes were as follows: (1) three types of regis-
tration procedures, including a shortened form of the registration proce-
dure, whereas previously there was only one; (2) a new shelf registration
* Candidate for S.J.D., Harvard Law School; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1991; LL.M.
Hitotsubashi University (Tokyo), 1989. This article is printed with the consent of Clark
Boardman Callaghan and will also appear in INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURI-
TIES REGULATION.
1. Securities and Exchange Law No. 25 of 1948, amended by Law No. 75 of 1988.
2. WATARU HORIGUCHI, KAISEIHO No ZENPANTEKI KOSATSU [A General Study of the
Amendment], 806 KINYU SHOJI HANREI [FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL CASES] 7 (1988).
3. Securities and Exchange Law No. 25 of 1948, amended by Law No. 73 of 1992 [here-
inafter S.E.L.].
4. See infra § 4.02.
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system;5 (3) a shorter waiting period; (4) reinstatement of disclosure re-
quirements for secured bonds; (5) an increased offering amount exempt
from registration; (6) an extended requirement for filing current reports;
and (7) a required disclosure of segmental and geographic financial infor-
mation. In 1992, the Ministry of Finance (M.O.F.) also amended the Dis-
closure Rule (D.R.).8 These changes in the disclosure system are explored
below.
§ 2. NEW DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS
§ 2.01 Three Kinds of Registration
The Japanese disclosure system is similar in many respects to that
under the Securities Acts in the United States. An issuer must register
securities with the M.O.F. and prepare a prospectus for the investors if
the issuer wants to publicly offer securities.7 The issuer, underwriter, or
securities firm offering the securities must deliver a prospectus to the
purchasers of securities in a public offering." A public company must file
periodic reports (annual, semi-annual and current) with the M.O.F. as
well. 9 The registration statements relating to a securities offering and the
periodic reports constituting the continuous disclosure system require
some of the same information. Under the new system, companies that
have filed periodic reports for three years may file a simplified registra-
tion statement incorporating periodic reports.
Under the current law, there are three types of registration disclos-
ure: complete disclosure (kanzen kaizi), combined disclosure (kumikomu),
and reference disclosure (sansho), which is the simplest.
[1] Complete Disclosure
An issuer must file a registration statement with the M.O.F. before
publicly offering or selling securities if the amount offered exceeds 500
million yen (4.2 million U.S. dollars).10 Offerings of less than 500 million
yen are exempt from registration.11 Some securities are exempted - for
example, government and municipal bonds.12 The issuer must complete
and file Form 2 (Japanese companies) or Form 7 (foreign companies).13
Complete disclosure is the most burdensome type of registration.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1992) (Rule 415 of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933). See gener-
ally Cox, HILLMAN & LANGERVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 269
(1991); Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 135 (1988).
6. Ministry of Finance Order No. 53 (1992) [hereinafter M.O.F.].
7. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 13.
8. Id. art. 15.
9. Id. arts. 24, 24-5.
10. Id. art. 4 (based on an exchange rate of one U.S. dollar to 120 yen, which will fluctu-
ate with the market).
11. See infra § 2.05 for the procedures relating to offerings of less than 500 million yen.
12. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 3.
13. Kaijirei [Disclosure Rule], art. 8 (1992) [hereinafter D.R.].
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[2] Combined Disclosure
A company that has been filing periodic reports for the previous
three years can use combined disclosure if the company wants to issue or
sell securities through a public offering.' " The issuer completes the regis-
tration form to include all events that have taken place since the filing of
the last periodic report. The issuer submits the registration form to the
M.O.F. with copies of the most recent annual, semi-annual, and current
reports. Combined disclosure enables the issuer to avoid duplicating in-
formation previously filed. The issuer must use either registration state-
ment Form 2-2 (Japanese companies) or Form 7-2 (foreign companies). 15
[3] Reference Disclosure
An issuer qualified for reference disclosure need only submit a list of
the previously filed reports and the location of the reports before issuing
or selling securities.' 6 This is the simplest registration format. The eligi-
bility criteria for reference disclosure are the same as those for shelf regis-
tration described below.' 7 The issuer must use either registration Form 2-
3 (Japanese companies) or Form 7-3 (foreign companies).' 8
§ 2.01 Shelf Registration System (Hako Toroku)
The two types of disclosure requirements that existed before the
1988 amendment - public offering registration disclosure and continuous
disclosure - remain. The new shelf registration system integrates these
two requirements, reduces the cost of issuing securities to large listed
companies, and enables companies to issue securities within certain time
periods, giving them the chance to select the most opportune time.
[1] Issuer's Qualification
In order to qualify to file a shelf registration, an issuer must satisfy
the following conditions: 9
1) the issuer must be a listed company and have filed disclosure re-
ports for the three previous years; and
2) the issuer's average stock trading amounts on exchanges in the last
three fiscal years must exceed 100 billion yen (830 million U.S. dollars),2 0
AND the average market value of its listed stock in the last three years
must exceed 100 billion yen; OR the average market value of its listed
14. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 5; D.R., supra note 13, art. 9-2.
15. D.R., supra note 13, art. 9-2.
16. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 5; D.R., supra note 13, art. 9-3.
17. See infra § 2.02[1].
18. D.R., supra note 13, art. 9-3.
19. S.E.L., supra note 3, arts. 5, 23-3; D.R., supra note 13, art. 9.
20. If the issuer's securities have been traded on an exchange for less than three years,
the average trading amount or market value of the longer period (one or two years) should
be used. M.O.F., supra note 6.
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stock in the last three years must exceed 500 billion yen (4.2 billion U.S.
dollars); OR the issuer must have issued bonds that constitute a secured
privilege payment under law;2 ' OR the issuer must have issued bonds that
are rated at least single A by one rating institution.2 2
[2] Filing the Shelf Registration
An issuer proposing to offer securities on a delayed basis can file a
shelf registration statement with the Ministry of Finance (M.O.F.). The
registration statement must state the planned issuing or selling period,
kind and price of the securities, and name of the major underwriter or
securities firm selling the securities.2 3 The registration must be on Form
11 (Japanese companies), or Form 14 (foreign companies), and include
the same information required by the reference registration.2 4
The registration becomes effective fifteen days after it is filed.2 5 The
M.O.F. can shorten the waiting period to seven days at the issuer's re-
quest.2" The planned offering or selling period must not exceed two years
after the effective date.2 ' The issuer may choose a one or two year pe-
riod. 28 If the issuer has issued or sold the planned amount before the ef-
fective period expires, the issuer must file a statement terminating the
shelf registration.2 9 The issuer may cancel the shelf registration anytime
by filing a cancellation statement.30 If the issuer is no longer listed on the
exchange, it is not eligible for the shelf registration and must file a cancel-
lation statement with the M.O.F.3 The shelf registration then loses effect
immediately.2 The issuer must also send copies of the cancellation state-
ment to the exchanges with which the issuer was listed.3
21. For example, both the Public Electricity Law and the Nippon Telephone & Tele-
gram Corporate Law authorize the power and telephone companies to issue bonds with se-
cured privilege payment. "Bonds with secured privilege payment" are bonds guaranteed by
the government.
22. In 1992, the M.O.F. adopted a rating system and designated Standard and Poor's,
Moody's, the Japan Investment Service, Japanese Bond Research Institution, and two other
organizations as acceptable rating organizations for this purpose. M.O.F. Bulletin, No. 131
(1992).
23. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 23-3.
24. D.R., supra note 13, art. 14-2. See infra § 2.01[3] for a discussion of reference
registration.
25. S.E.L., supra note 3, arts. 8, 23-5.
26. Toriatsukai Tsudatsu [Administrative Guidance], arts. 8-1, 23-5-1 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter A.G.].
27. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 23-6.
28. D.R., supra note 13, art. 14-5.
29. S.E.L., srupra note 3, art. 23-7.
30. A.G., supra note 26, art. 23-7-2.
31. Id. art. 23-7-3.
32. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 23-7.
33. A.G., supra note 26, art. 23-7-4.
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[3] Amendments
After filing the shelf registration, the issuer must file an amended
registration statement with the M.O.F. under the following conditions:3 4
(1) the entire planned amount of securities cannot be issued in the
planned offering period;3 5
(2) the issuer selects a different underwriter or securities firm to sell
the securities; 6 or
(3) the issuer delays the effective date.3"
In addition, when the issuer deems any other change significant, an
amended registration should be filed. However, the issuer may not
amend the registration statement to increase the amount offered, change
the planned issuing period, or change the kind of securities.39 The M.O.F.
may suspend the shelf registration for up to fifteen days after the issuer
files an amendment if such action is necessary in order to protect public
investors.4
0
[4] Ordered Amendment
The M.O.F. may order the issuer to file a supplemental shelf registra-
tion statement, suspending the offering until the filing occurs.41 The filing
should be made on supplemental shelf registration Form 12 (Japanese
companies) or Form 15 (foreign companies).42
The M.O.F. can order the issuer to file additional documents if it
finds the issuer's statements are defective, misleading, or inconsistent
with the disclosures required by the appropriate forms.43 The M.O.F. may
also suspend the shelf registration or delay the effective date at any
time.4
4
§ 2.03 Shorter Waiting Period
Under the new law the waiting period has been shortened from thirty
days to fifteen days." This was possible because of the development of
34. S.E.L., supra note 3, arts. 23-4, 197, 200.
35. A.G., supra note 26, art. 23-4-2.
36. Id. art. 23-4-3.
37. D.R., supra note 13, art. 14-4. Since the registration becomes effective 15 days after
filing, the issuer may want to file a delaying amendment to postpone the effective date.
38. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 23-4.
39. D.R., supra note 13, art. 14-4.
40. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 23-5.
41. Id. art. 23-8.
42. A.G., supra note 26, art. 14-7.
43. S.E.L., supra note 3, arts. 23-9, 23-10. For example, additional documents would be
ordered if an issuer failed to include the name of the firm acting as underwriter or to submit
a list of the locations at which its disclosure reports are available. See supra § 2.01[3].
44. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 23-11.
45. Id. art. 8.
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computer and communication technology, which has accelerated informa-
tion analysis. The M.O.F. can further shorten the period if the issuer's
information is readily available to the general public." Registration for an
issuer eligible to use reference disclosure can become effective seven days
after the filing."'
§ 2.04 Reinstatement of Disclosure Requirements for Secured Bonds
The registration requirements for issuing secured, legally guaranteed,
and preferred bonds were temporarily waived in 1953,48 but they exist
again under the new law. The reasons for the temporary waiver of the
registration requirement were as follows:4" (1) most of the secured bonds
were acquired by financial institutions; as a result, there was no need to
protect public investors; (2) these bonds were secured, or legally guaran-
teed, and were thus safer than other securities; and (3) the issuers of
these bonds continued to file periodic reports. It was unnecessarily bur-
densome for the issuers to file registration every time they wanted to is-
sue such bonds.
The reasons for reinstating registration requirements for such bonds
include the following: (1) the general public now purchases more than
half of these bonds; (2) deregulation under the Commercial Code now
means these bonds are no safer than unsecured bonds; and (3) the dis-
closure procedure has been simplified by the new law. As a consequence,
registration of secured bonds is required under the current law for the
protection of public investors with minimal burden on issuers.
§ 2.05 A Higher Issuing Amount for Registration Exemption
Under the old regime, an issuer had to file a registration statement if
the issuing amount exceeded 100 million yen (830 thousand U.S. dollars).
This had been the standard since the 1971 S.E.L. amendment.
As a result of inflation and currently large issuing amounts, 100 mil-
lion yen is no longer an appropriate threshold for imposing the burden
and cost of registration on issuers. Accordingly, the amount has been
raised to 500 million yen (4.2 million U.S. dollars).50 However, the issuer
still has to file a notification with the M.O.F. if the issuing amount ex-
ceeds 1 million yen (8.3 thousand U.S. dollars).5 1 If the issuing amount
exceeds 500 million yen, the issuer must file a registration statement. If
the amount is between 1 million and 500 million yen, the issuer has to file
a notification with the M.O.F. If the offering is for less than one million
46. Id.
47. A.G., supra note 26, art. 8-1.
48. Securities and Exchange Law No. 25 of 1948, amended by Law No. 142 of 1953,
supp. provision item 7 (Kaiseiho Fusoku 7).
49. Kakuro Kanzaki, "Kigyo Naiyo Kaiji Seido No Kaisei" ["Enterprise Disclosure
Amendments"], 806 KINYU SHOJI HANREI [FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL CASES] 24 (1988).
50. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 4; D.R., supra note 13, art. 2.
51. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 4; D.R., supra note 13, art. 4.
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yen, the exemption is self-executing.
§ 2.06 Expanded Requirements for Filing Current Reports
Under the old regime, an issuer who had a duty to file periodic re-
ports was required to file a current report under the following
circumstances.2
(1) There was a change of the issuer's parent or an important
subsidiary.
(2) There was a change of the major shareholder.
(3) An issuer met with a disaster.
(4) The issuer was issuing or selling securities other than bonds
abroad in amounts exceeding 100 million yen (830 thousand U.S. dollars).
Under the new amendment the amount has been increased to 500 million
yen (4.2 million U.S. dollars).
(5) A decision was made by a shareholders' meeting or by the board
of directors for private sale of securities, other than bonds, in amounts
exceeding 100 million yen. Under the new amendment the amount has
been increased to 500 million yen.
Under the new amendment, these requirements still exist," and
there are six additional circumstances under which an issuer must now
file a current report.
(1) A law suit has been filed against the issuer, and the alleged dam-
ages exceeds five percent of total assets, or the issuer has paid damages
equal to more than one percent of total assets as a result of a law suit.
(2) The board of directors signs a merger or a consolidation contract
that will increase or decrease the issuer's sales or total assets by more
than ten percent, or dissolve the issuer.
(3) The board of directors signs a contract for the purchase or sale of
the business or assets that will increase or decrease the issuer's sales or
total assets by more than ten percent.
(4) A change of the representative director occurs.
(5) The issuer's debtor or the guarantor of the debt defaults on a
debt instrument to any party (emphasis added), OR the debtor or guar-
antor is undergoing reorganization. Such default or reorganization, how-
ever, need be reported only if it might result in a default or delay in pay-
ing a debt to the issuer in an amount that is more than ten percent of the
issuer's total assets.
(6) Any event occurs that has a substantial effect on the issuer's fi-
nancial situation or business.
The new disclosure requirements benefit the public, which now has
52. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 24-5.
53. Id.
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access to more accurate and up-to-date information about the issuer.
§ 2.07 Disclosure of Segmental Information
Full disclosure of business operations is required in both the initial
registration and periodic reports. The issuer must disclose total sales of
each product and quantities sold within the last two fiscal years. An is-
suer that exports most of its products overseas must disclose the import-
ing countries or areas and, for each product, the percentage of sales in the
respective country or area.
In addition to these requirements, under the new amendment, the
issuer must disclose (1) sales and profit or loss of each business, (2) sales
and profit or loss in different business locations, and (3) overseas sales."
Public investors thus have more information about the issuer's financial
performance.
§ 2.08 Penalties and Remedies
There is a three year imprisonment or fine of three million yen"5 (25
thousand U.S. dollars), or both, for filing an untruthful registration state-
ment.50 If the issuer continues to offer securities without filing a supple-
mental registration when ordered to do so, a one year prison term, a fine
of up to 1 million yen (8300 U.S. dollars), or both may be imposed.57 Any
issuer that fails to file a supplemental shelf registration when ordered to
do so and continues to offer or sell securities is liable to the person who
acquired the securities and sustained damage as a result. 8 If the M.O.F.
issues an order suspending the registration and the issuer does not obey
the order, the issuer faces a penalty of up to six months imprisonment or
a fine no greater than 500 thousand yen (4.2 thousand U.S. dollars), or
both.59
§ 2.09 Disclosure Summary
The new disclosure system integrates registration disclosure and con-
tinuous disclosure. It gives reporting companies that meet the criteria for
shelf registration flexibility to choose the best time to issue securities and
simplifies filing requirements for such companies. It also gives public in-
vestors more pertinent information relating to a company's finance and
business operations. The requirements for segmental and geographic re-
porting of specified financial information will also facilitate the efforts by
54. D.R., supra note 13, arts. 10, 14, 17.
55. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 197.
56. Id. arts. 197, 202. S.E.L. Article 202 states: "A prison term and a fine may be im-
posed in parallel with one another on any person who commits any crime referred to in the
preceding five articles depending on the circumstances relating to such crime." Capital Mar-
ket Research Institute, S.E.L., 135 (1989).
57. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 198.
58. Id. arts. 16, 23-12.
59. Id. art. 200.
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Japanese issuers to gain access to foreign capital markets, including the
United States. It should be noted, however, that the segmental and geo-
graphic reporting requirements in Japan are not as detailed as the re-
quirements of Regulation S-K in the United States.
§ 3. INSIDER TRADING
The 1988 and 1992 amendments included a well publicized effort to
prevent insider trading. The discussion below argues that this new devel-
opment is illustrative of the Japanese genius for maintaining the status
quo despite outward manifestations of reform - in fact, the law on the
books may never be realized in practice.
§ 3.01 Reasons for Reinforcing Insider Trading Regulations
There were three reasons for reinforcing the insider trading provi-
sions. First, because the Tokyo Stock Exchange is among the biggest
listed markets in the world in terms of market capitalization, the Japa-
nese want to build a fair trading market image. Since the creation of the
Securities and Exchange Law in 1948, almost no insider trading cases
have been exposed. The foreign media accuse Japan of being an "insider's
haven.""0 The Japanese want to rid themselves of this image. Second, the
prevention of insider trading is a world-wide trend. The United States
enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider Trad-
ing and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.61 The latter Act was
under consideration at the time of .the adoption of the Japanese amend-
ment. The United Kingdom enacted the Company Securities (Insider
Dealing) Act of 1985 and the Financial Services Act of 1986. France, Ger-
many, and Switzerland also reinforced their insider trading regulations.2
Japan wanted to follow the trend in order to foster a new "fair trader"
image, thereby further boosting the already fantastic growth of its securi-
ties markets. Third, the Tateho case focused Japan's attention on insider
trading. As a result of this case, the Japanese government accelerated the
reform of insider trading provisions. 3
60. Akio Takeuchi, Insaida Torihiki Kisei No Kyoka [The Reinforcement of Insider
Trading Regulation], 1142 SHoJI HoMU [COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL] 3 (1988).
61. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2). Although the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 had not yet been adopted, the Japa-
nese translated the bill and published it in their law journals. The Japanese found the
American insider trading provisions to be more strict than their own.
62. Kakuro Kanzaki, Naibusha Torihiki No Kisei Ni Kansuru Kakokuho No Doko
[Foreign Countries' Insider Trading Regulation Trends] 819 JURISUTO [JURIST] 79, 85-86
(1984) (Switzerland). The Germans created insider trading self-regulation in 1971, and
amended it in 1976 and 1988. Sakamoto, Sho Gaikoku Ni Okeru Kisei No Jokyo - Doitsu
[Foreign Regulations, Germany], 806 KINYU SHOJI HANREI [FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL
CASES] 78 (1988).
63. TAKEJI YAMASHITA, JAPAN'S SECURITIES MARKETS 253-54 (1989); Kawamoto,
Hokaisei Ni Itaru Keii [The Texture of the Amendment], 806 KINYU SHoJi HANREI [FINAN-
CIAL AND COMMERCIAL CASES] 98-100 (1988); David I. Sanger, Insider Trading, The Japa-
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Tateho is a listed company and a chemical manufacturer. In August
1988, the company suffered a loss of 24 billion yen (200 million U.S. dol-
lars) against capitalization of only 2.5 million yen (21,000 U.S. dollars)
because of speculation on the future bond market. On August 31, the
management notified its eight banks to come to company headquarters
for a conference, which was scheduled for the afternoon of September 1.
After Tateho's announcement of its loss on September 2, the price of its
stock dropped dramatically. Meanwhile, from August 11 to August 21, six
of Tateho's high-level managers, including three officers, sold shares. One
of these officers was "advised" by the Osaka Stock Exchange to return his
profit from the tainted trade because of his violation of Article 189 (now
Article 164) of the Securities and Exchange Law. Article 189 had been a
copy of Section 16(b) of the American Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The Article requires corporate insiders to disgorge their short-swing prof-
its to their corporations.
One of Tateho's eight banks, Hanshin Sogo Bank, sold all of its
337,000 Tateho shares on September 1. According to the bank's manag-
ers, the sale verdict was made on the morning of the first, but there was
no connection with Tateho's conference that afternoon. Two of the top
ten shareholders also sold their shares during August, but neither of them
owned more than ten percent of the company's total shares. In all, sev-
enty-six stockholders sold over 20,000 shares each in August. According to
the Osaka Stock Exchange's investigation, these transactions had nothing
to do with confidential information. However, there are strong suspicions
to the contrary. 4
How did the bank manage to avoid a loss by selling all of its Tateho
shares? Japanese banks know their customers very well because they can
access their customers' inside information. For example, a bank always
checks its customer's financial and managerial activity through loans and
other financial services, usually holds its important customers' shares in
order to stabilize the relationship between them, and always monitors its
customers' accounts to oversee any unusual activity. Therefore, Hanshin
Sogo Bank may well have known about Tateho's financial crisis.
Why did so many shareholders sell their shares in August? Was there
nese Way, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1988, at 1.
64. The following statement was made by the Osaka Stock Exchange:
The Osaka Stock Exchange has made every effort to investigate the true facts
related to the possibility of insider trading of Tateho stock. According to our
investigation, there is no evidence of insider trading. But we found trading
which might cause misunderstanding. We feel very sorry about this incident,
since it came right after our notification to all listed companies to monitor
insider trading. We strongly point out that insider trading is unfair and dam-
ages investors' confidence in securities markets. Triggered by this incident, we
want to make every effort to prevent the misuse of confidential information by
insider trading, and to protect the trustworthiness of trading markets. We also
hope listed companies, securities firms, and related persons will prevent insider
trading. Kawamoto, supra note 63, at 98-100 (Author's translation).
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any sign or rumor that made these shareholders act? These questions are
left unanswered. However, because the case was widely reported by the
Japanese press,65 the Japanese public became sensitized to the reality of
insider trading.
§ 3.02 The New Regimen
[1] Article 157
Article 157 prohibits any person in a securities, future, option, or in-
dex transaction, including future securities transactions on a foreign mar-
ket, from (1) employing any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (2)
making any untrue statement of a material fact or omitting to state a
material fact; or (3) using a false quotation to induce another person[s] to
buy or sell securities. Violations of this Article carry a penalty of up to
three years in prison or a fine of up to 3 million yen (25,000 U.S. dollars),
or both.61
Article 157 is similar to Rule 10b-5 adopted under the U.S. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.67 Rule 10b-5 is a catch-all fraud provision in fed-
eral securities regulation, and it has been widely used in the United
States.6 In contrast to Rule 10b-5, Article 157 has seldom been used in
Japan. Like Rule 10b-5, Article 157 prohibits "any" person from doing
"any" fraudulent act in "any" kind of securities transaction. The 1988
amendment extends the Article's scope to trading in futures, options, and
indexes. The scope of this Article is very broad, and it can be applied to
any kind of security, whether listed, traded on the over-the-counter mar-
ket, held privately, or issued by governments or foreigners.
The reason this Article has not been used much is that its wording is
too vague and its scope too broad. The Article was substantially copied
from the United States and is very difficult to apply in a Japanese court.
Under the Japanese legal system, there is no jury at a criminal trial. The
judge decides both the facts and the law. To protect defendants, very
strict conditions are imposed upon the prosecution. A prosecutor must
65. Id.
66. S.E.L., supra note 3, arts. 197, 202. Article 197 provides a penalty of no more than
three years in prison, or no more than three million yen in fines, for the breach of Article
147. Article 202, however, reads, "Any person who has committed a crime as prescribed by
the proceeding five Articles may be confined to imprisonment with hard labour and fined
concurrently in consideration of circumstances." (emphasis added). Id., translated by THE
JAPAN SECURITIES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, JAPANESE SECURITIES LAWS 71 (1987). Nonetheless,
these Articles stand for the proposition that if the crime is serious, the defendant may be
punished by both prison and fines. CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH INSTITUTE, S.E.L. 58 (1989).
67. KATSURO KANZAKI, SHOKEN TORIHIKIHO (Shinpan) [SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE LAW
(New Edition)] 612 (1987); TAKEO SUZUKI & ICHIRO KAWAMOTO, SHOKEN TORIHIKIHO
(Shinpan) [SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE LAW (New Edition)] 555 (1987); Louis Loss ET AL.,
JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION 192 (1983). Article 157 was designated as Article 58 before
the 1992 amendment.
68. ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 309 (1986); Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 726-29 (1988).
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prove the defendant's "intention" to commit the crime and "the definite
cause and effect" of the crime. A prosecutor is considered a very "high
authority" in Japan. Once a defendant is prosecuted, a guilty decision is
expected. If a prosecutor accumulates too many "not guilty" judgments,
s/he will be deemed incompetent. Because Article 157 does not specify
what kind of defendant conduct falls under its aegis, prosecutors are re-
luctant to use it for fear that failure will hurt prosecutorial reputations.
The Ministry of Finance itself stated that "the Article is too vague and
too broad. There is a limitation to its use in an insider trading case. ' ' 9
[2] Article 163
Article 163 was copied from Section 16(a) of the American Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.70 It requires a corporate insider (director, audi-
tor,7' or major shareholder who owns more than ten percent of the com-
pany's shares) to file a report with the Minister of Finance after purchas-
ing or selling company securities.
[3] Article 164
Article 164 was copied from Section 16(b) of the American Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.72 It requires a corporate insider to surrender short-
swing profits (made from the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase
69. SECURITIES BUREAU (OF THE M.O.F.), THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COUNCIL RE-
PORT, May 11, Showa 51 (1976). The report states, "In the United States, our Article 58's
[now Article 157] twin, Rule lOb-5, has been widely used and extended to insider trading
cases. However, it is very difficult for us to precisely define the scope of insider trading. If a
tippee should fall under this Article, that would be overreaching. Furthermore, the Article's
purpose is to prevent fraud. There is a limitation on expanding it to insider trading cases."
(Author's translation). See also KANZAKI, supra note 67, at 612; SUZUKI & KAWAMOTO, supra
note 67, at 555; TATSUTA, in Louis Loss ET AL., JAPANESE SECURITIES-REGULATION 192 (1983).
70. Wataru Horiguchi, Shoken Torihikiho Dai 189 Jo No Kenkyu [A Study of the Se-
curities and Exchange Law, Article 189] 39-6, IKYORONSO [HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY RE-
VIEW] 641 (1958); SUZUKI & KAWAMOTO, supra note 67, at 556; TATSUTA, supra note 69, at
107. Article 163 was Article 188 before the 1992 amendment.
71. Commercial Code Article 273 requires that every company must have at least one
auditor to supervise the company's business operation. The auditor has the right to check
the directors' management. The auditor can ask the directors or other employees to submit
business reports and can check the business and property of the company. The auditor can
oversee the company's subsidiaries' business. The auditor can forbid the directors' doing
business if the auditor finds the directors' actions will harm the company. If litigation oc-
curs between the company and one of its directors, the auditor will represent the company.
The auditor cannot be a director of the company or its subsidiaries. If the auditor neglects
his duty, he bears responsibility for the company's harm. An auditor, like a director, is an
employee of a company. The auditor is not an independent, outside CPA. Only a big com-
pany (with capital over 0.5 billion yen ($4 million) or liability over 20 billion yen ($167
million)), or a listed company, is required to have an outside CPA auditor or an accounting
firm. Kabushiki Gaisha No Kansato Ni Kansuru Shoho No Tokurei Ni Kansuru Horitsu
[Commercial Code Special Law on Audit of Stock Companies] Article 2; S.E.L., supra note
3, art. 193-2.
72. See supra note 70. Article 164 was Article 189 before the 1992 amendment.
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within six months) to the company. If the company does not ask the in-
sider to surrender the profit, any shareholder can bring a stockholder de-
rivative suit against the insider to disgorge the profit to the company on
behalf of the company.
[4] Articles 163 & 164 in Tandem
Article 163 is a pure disclosure requirement. Article 164 uses this dis-
closure to make insiders return profits from insider trading. Article 164
contains the following provisions.
(1) If a corporate insider purchases and sells, or sells and purchases,
his company's securities within six months and makes a profit, the com-
pany can request the insider to return the profit to the company.
(2) Any shareholder can demand that the company ask insiders to
return profits to the company. If the company fails to ask insiders within
sixty days after the shareholder's demand, the shareholder can request
that insiders return short-swing profits to the company.
(3) If neither the company nor any shareholder requests the insider
to return the profit, the request right will expire two years after the in-
sider takes his short-swing profit.
(4) If the Minister of Finance, based on the insider's transaction re-
port, finds that any insider received profit from the short-swing transac-
tion, the Minister shall notify the insider. If there is no objection from
the insider, the Minister of Finance shall notify the company with the
insider transaction report. If the Minister of Finance knows that the in-
sider has already returned the short-swing profit to the company, the
Minister does not have to notify the company.
(5) If an insider denies his profit from the short-swing transaction, he
shall file an objection with the Minister of Finance within twenty days
after he receives the notification from the Minister.
(6) If an insider challenges the short-swing trading assertion with le-
gitimate grounds, the Minister of Finance may erase the allegation por-
tion of the statement that will be sent to the company.
(7) If the insider does not deny the short-swing profit, the Minister of
Finance shall make public the insider's transaction report thirty days af-
ter the Minister of Finance's notification to the company, and this dis-
closure shall last two years, until the date upon which the profit request
right expires. If the Minister of Finance knows the insider has returned
the profit to the company, the Minister will not make the report public.
(8) If a major shareholder was not a major shareholder at either the
time of the purchase or the time of the sale, the shareholder shall not fall
under the Article.
(9) The Minister of Finance shall set up a rule that provides a
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method of calculating the short-swing profit of the insider.3
The purpose of these Articles is to prevent corporate insiders from
trading on the basis of confidential information.7 ' These Articles do not
require proof that insiders have possessed and traded on confidential
information.
Article 164 is related to Article 163. After an insider reports to the
Minister of Finance, the Minister can ascertain whether the insider has
breached Article 164. If the Minister finds that an insider profited from a
short-swing transaction, he must notify the insider and his company and
make public the name of the insider. This notification should give the
company a chance to recover its loss. If the company does not ask the
insider to return the profit from the insider trading, the company's share-
holders can sue the insider and make him relinquish the profit to the
company. Although the Japanese copied both Articles from the Ameri-
cans after -the Second World War, the Japanese deleted Article 163 in
1953. The reason for this elimination was that the Article was not deemed
"effective." Perhaps it was too burdensome for the Ministry of Finance to
check the reports. 75 As a result, without Article 163's reporting duty, Arti-
cle 164 became worthless, thus the 1988 reform.
There was only one case brought under Article 164 before the 1988
73. The method is provided by Showa 63 (1988), No. 40 M.O.F. Ordinance, art. 6. First,
the profits are calculated by finding the difference between the two transaction prices, and
multiplying by the matching number of the shares. Any securities exchange tax and com-
missions are then subtracted. The matching number of the shares is the number of the
shares that are purchased and sold, or sold and purchased, within six months. For example,
Insider A sold 1,000 shares at a price of 5,000 yen per share and bought 1,200 shares at a
price of 3,000 yen per share within six months. The matching number is 1,000, so the profits
are 2,000 x 1,000 = 2,000,000 yen, minus tax and commissions.
Second, if there is more than one transaction, the first purchase should match the first
sale, or reverse. The rest of the transactions should be matched by the transaction order.
For example, insider B bought 1,000 shares at a price of 3,000 yen per share on July 10;
1,300 shares at a price of 3,200 yen per share on July 20; 900 shares at a price of 3,500 yen
per share on July 30. Then he sold 800 shares at a price of 6,000 yen on October 1; 1,600
shares at a price of 6,500 yen per share on October 11; 200 shares at a price of 6,300 yen per
share on October 21. The profits from the first set of transactions are 3,000 x 800 =
2,400,000 yen. The profits from the second set of transactions are (3,500 x 200) (3,300 x
1,300) (3,000 x 100) = 5,290,000 yen. The profits form the third set of transactions are
2,800 x 200 = 560,000 yen. The total profits are 8,250,000 yen, minus tax and commissions.
Third, if there is more than one purchase or sale in a day, the lowest purchase price or
the highest sale price should be used to calculate the first transaction. For example, if in-
sider C sold his shares twice in one day, the higher price of the securities should be used to
calculate the first transaction. If he purchased his company's securities twice in one day, the
lower price should be used to calculate the first transaction.
74. CLARK, supra note 68, at 295; Loss, supra note 68, at 542; KANZAKI, supra note 67,
at 618; SUZUKI et. al., supra note 67, at 556; SEIJI TANAKA & WATARU HORIGUCHI, KON-
MENTARU SHOKEN TORIHIKIHO [COMMENTARY ON THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE LAW] 713
(1990).
75. KANZAKI, supra note 67, at 621; SUZUKI et. al., supra note 74, at 557; TANAKA &
HORIGUCHI, supra note 74, at 713.
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amendment. 76 Togo was the founder and president of Shokusan Jutaku
Sogo Company. He bought 560 thousand Shokusan shares at a price of
479 yen per share on July 20, 1972. He sold thirty thousand shares on
September 14 and 530 thousand shares on October 2, 1972. He made a
net profit of over 1.1 billion yen. One of Shokusan's shareholders re-
quested that the company sue Togo to make him disgorge the short-swing
profit under Article 164. The shareholder who asked the company to sue
Togo is known as a "sokaiya. '7 7 A sokaiya is a shareholder who criticizes
the company's management at the annual general meeting, if the com-
pany does not pay to keep him quiet, or one who is paid by the company
to prevent other shareholders from speaking in the general meeting.
Many sokaiya belong to gangs called "yakuza. ' 7 1 In this case, the sokaiya
had attempted to blackmail Togo for a sum of money after Togo's short-
swing transaction, but Togo refused to pay. As a consequence, the sokaiya
requested that the company sue Togo under Article 164. Because the
sokaiya belonged to a very notorious criminal group, the company reluc-
tantly sued Togo. However, the case was settled out-of-court in December
1988. Togo had been found guilty of tax evasion in another case. The
76. TANAKA & HORIGUCHI, supra note 74; SUZUKI et. at., supra 74, at 557; KANZAKI,
supra note 67, at 621. There are three cases related to Shokusan Jutaku, concerning tax
evasion, bribery, and insider trading. Nihon (Japan) v. Togo, Saikosaibansho Saibanshu
(Keiji) 236 Go 179 [236 Supreme Court Reports (Criminal Law) p. 179] (tax evasion); Nihon
(Japan) v. Takata and others, Saikosaibansho Hanreishu Dai 42 Kan Dai 6 Go 861 [Su-
preme Court Reports, Volume 42, No. 6, p. 861] (bribery). Junji Abe, Shokusan Jutaku
Jikan Saikosaibansho Ketei Ni Tsuite [The Supreme Court Decision in Shokusan
Jutaku], 920 JURISUTO [JURIST] 4 (1988).
77. Isaacs writes: "In effect, the general meeting of shareholders merely approves man-
agement proposals ... [Sihareholders are not expected to question management, or express
any opinion . . . [T]he meetings are kept very short . .. [Ilt was the general practice of a
number of public companies to offer money and other benefits to a limited number of 'spe-
cialists' to ensure that they attended general meetings for the purpose of encouraging or-
derly proceedings and to support company management. . . . '[Sipecialists' could often
guarantee that there would be no disruption of the meetings, as they used violence and
other unlawful means of influence.... The 'specialists' who enjoyed the greatest reputations
had come from a yakuza background (organized syndicates of gangsters) or right-wing polit-
ical groups." He continues with an example: "In May, 1979, more than 500 shareholders
attended an annual general meeting of shareholders of a company listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange, 200 of whom were sokaiya taking up all the front row seating.... Not a single
speech or question was presented to management by the ordinary shareholders present, and
the meeting was wound up after 25 minutes." However, under a 1982 Commercial Code
amendment, companies are not allowed to pay sokaiya. Sokaiya have set up many "eco-
nomic study groups" to "study" companies' publicly disclosed documents. Sokaiya publish
"economic study" periodicals at very high prices. For example, a periodical of three or four
pages published once a month will cost a company 500,000 yen (about $3900). If a company
does not subscribe to the periodical, the sokaiya might buy one share of the company's
stock, attend the general meeting, and criticize the management violently. Issacs continues:
"A report in January 1984 that Sony's annual general meeting of shareholders took more
than 13 hours had a tremendously negative impact [on the company's image]." JONATHAN
ISAACS, JAPANESE SECURITIES MARKET 123-128 (1990); ARON VINER, INSIOE THE JAPANESE SE-
CURITIES MARKETS 91-92 (1988).
78. ISAACS, supra note 77.
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Japanese government confiscated Togo's property and he became insol-
vent. After the company found that it was impossible to make Togo dis-
gorge the profits from the tainted transaction, the case was tried in Tokyo
District Court - from 1974 until 1987! There is a question as to how the
shareholder, the sokaiya, could allege that Togo breached Article 164,
even though the Article 163 duty to report had been deleted in 1953. This
question remains unanswered. Nevertheless, Shokusan Jutaku was the
only Article 164 case brought between the. enactment of the Securities
and Exchange Law in 1948 and its 1988 amendment.
Article 163, as revived, requires that a corporate insider must file a
report with the Minister of Finance before the fifteenth day of the next
month, after the insider's purchase or sale of his company's securities. If
the transaction is executed by a securities firm, the report should be sub-
mitted to the securities firm by the insider. The securities firm then sub-
mits the report to the Minister of Finance on behalf of the corporate
insider.
[5] Exceptions to Insider Filing Under Article 163
The important exceptions to the insider filing provisions under Arti-
cle 163 include the following: (1) fractional shares and non-rounded units;
(2) employee securities purchase plans; (3) employee trust funds; (4)
stock-index future transactions; and (5) stabilizations under Article
125(3).79
[a] Fractional Shares and Non-rounded Units
A fractional share is a portion of stock that is less than one full share.
In contrast, a non-rounded unit is a unit of stock that contains several
shares but is not a full unit. Fractional shares and non-rounded units may
be created by a stock dividend, share split, or a reverse share split; but
non-rounded units could also be created in connection with a new issue.
The par value of most Japanese companies' stock is fifty yen (about
0.42 U.S. dollars), if the company was organized prior to 1981. Par values
were so low due to the hyper-inflation that occurred during World War II
and the post-war period. The low par value created a tendency for stocks
to trade at relatively low prices, and it is inconvenient for the stock ex-
changes to trade such small-value stocks. Under the 1981 amendment to
the Commercial Code, an older company's listed stock should be traded
in the form of units that contain several shares since the exchange rules
require that listed companies' stock should have a par value or unit par
value of more than 50,000 yen (about 420 U.S. dollars).80 Unlisted compa-
79. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 163; Law No. 40 of 1988, Ministry of Finance Ordinance,
art. 4.
80. Law No. 74 of 1981, Fusoku [Supplementary Provisions], art. 15. Another reason for
raising the trading price was to block sokaiya because a non-rounded unit shareholder can-
not attend the shareholders general meeting. If a sokaiya wants to attend the meeting he
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nies can choose whether they want to use the unit system. The 1981
amendment also requires new companies to set up their stocks' par value
at 50,000 yen or greater. As a result, many older companies set up before
1981 use 1,000 shares as a unit in order to comply with the amendment
and to be in accord with the new companies' 50,000 yen par value. All
listed companies' stocks are traded in either shares or units. Therefore,
fractional shares and non-rounded units (i.e. with a unit par value of less
than 50,000 yen) are not allowed to be traded on the stock exchange.
Since fractional shares and non-rounded units are not easily liquidated,
there is little fear of insider trading, and insiders are exempted from the
duty to report.
[b] Employee Securities Purchase Plans
If a company has an employee securities purchase plan, a contract
with a securities firm to buy the company's securities on a well-planned
and regular basis, and if the purchase decisions are not based on a case-
by-case investment judgment, company insiders are not required to file
transaction reports. In these situations, there is a limitation of one million
yen for every employee in each purchase. If the purchase is over this
limit, insiders must file transaction reports.
[c] Employee Trust Funds
Conditions and limitations upon employee trust funds are the same
as those imposed upon employee securities purchase plans. Both em-
ployee securities purchase plans and employee trust funds are part of em-
ployee welfare programs. Purchases of employee welfare programs are in-
tended to raise pension funds, to improve the relationships between
employers and employees, and to give employees incentives to work hard.
There is little danger of insider trading because (1) the amount of each
employees' purchases is limited; (2) the purchases are executed by a third
party (securities firm or trust company) on a planned and regular basis,
and (3) the purchase decisions do not involve case-by-case investment
judgments. Such transactions are also exempted from a duty to report
because the government seeks to encourage employee stock purchase
programs.
[d] Stock-Index Future Transactions
A stock-index future transaction is based on the average price of
many stocks in the future - the stock-index future - and is considered
a package of all stocks. For instance, the "Stock Future 50" is an average
price of fifty kinds of different stocks' future prices on the Osaka Stock
Exchange. Since a stock-index future involves stock of so many compa-
nies, a price change of the stock of one company will not have a substan-
must buy a round unit (higher price), compared with the lower price of one share of non-
rounded unit. ISSACS, supra note 77, at 127.
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tial impact on the stock-index future. Even an insider who trades stock-
index futures that include his company's stock future price is exempted
from the duty to report.
[e] Stabilizations Under Article 125(3)
Securities stabilization is a policy designed to prevent a new-issue
stock price decline. In a securities stabilization, the issuer must disclose
to the general public that the company is under stabilization. There are
also many restrictions on the company's securities price and on the time
limit for the stabilization."' There is no fear of insider trading and insid-
ers are exempted from the duty to report.
[6] Scope of Articles 163 and 164
The scope of Articles 163 and 164 is limited to public companies,
which include listed companies and companies whose securities are
traded on over-the-counter (OTC) markets.8 2 Before the amendment,
there were different opinions about the scope of Article 164 because there
was no clear definition as to what kinds of securities fell under the Arti-
cle. The amendment ended this disagreement. As a result of the amend-
ment bringing future and option transactions within the Article, the se-
curities covered include stocks, convertible bonds, bonds with warrant,
warrants, options, and future transactions of the securities described
above. If a corporate insider does not file a report required by Article 163,
or files a false report, or if an insider makes a false objection under Arti-
cle 164, there is a fine of up to three hundred thousand yen (2,500 U.S.
dollars)."8
Some argue that an astute major shareholder can evade Article 164
by selling his securities twice. For example, if a shareholder has 10.2 per-
cent of a company's shares, he can sell 0.3 percent of the company's
shares and return the short-swing profit to the company. Then he can sell
the rest of the 9.9 percent of the company's shares without returning the
short-swing profit to the company. It is true that the major shareholder
can evade Article 164, but one must consider its legislative purpose. Since
it is very difficult to prove that an insider traded on confidential informa-
tion, this Article uses a very objective standard - ten percent of the com-
pany's securities - to settle the threshold of proof. Any shareholder who
owns more than ten percent of a company's securities falls under Article
164. As long as s/he is no longer a major shareholder, s/he is outside of
81. TANAKA & HORIGUCHI, supra note 74, at 562-72; SUZUKI et. al., supra note 67, at
535-48; KANZAKI, supra note 67, at 639-56.
82. In the 1988 amendment, only listed companies' insiders were subject to these two
articles. Many commentators argued that the scope was too narrow. In the 1992 amend-
ment, insiders of companies whose securities are traded on OTC markets were included. See
Shen-Shin Lu, Are the 1988 Amendments to Japanese Securities Regulation Law Effective
Deterrents to Insider Trading?, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 179, 224.
83. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 205.
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the restriction of Article 164. However, if any shareholder commits fraud
or makes a false statement, s/he falls under Article 157.
[7] Article 165
Article 165 prohibits any corporate insider from short-selling his
company's securities.8 4 Short-sales are legal in Japan, but short-sales will
accelerate securities price decline in a falling market. The Securities and
Exchange Law does not preclude everyone from short-selling. There are
some Ministry of Finance and stock exchange rules to restrict exchange
members, usually broker/dealers, from short-selling.85 However, corporate
insiders are not allowed to short-sell because they can access confidential
information. For example, suppose a company has a loss, and before the
information is disclosed, the insiders short-sell the company's securities.
They then buy securities for the settlement at a lower price after the dis-
closure of the bad news. The insiders can take advantage of their trading
counterparts by trading on confidential information. Short-sale by insid-
ers is a kind of insider trading.
Before the 1988 Amendment, Article 190 (now Article 165) read: "A
listed company's officers and major shareholders shall not sell their com-
pany's stock, if they do not have their stocks." ' The content of the Arti-
cle was not clear. If a major shareholder did not have shares of a com-
pany, how could s/he be the company's major shareholder? The Article
could also have been interpreted to mean that if an officer or a major
shareholder had only one share of company stock, s/he could short-sell
84. Article 165 was Article 190 before the 1992 Amendment.
85. Yukashoken No Karauri Ni Kansuru Kisoku [Securities Short-Sale Rule], Showa 23
(1948); Shoken Torihiki Iinkai Kisoku 16 [Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation
16]; Tokyo Stock Exchange Gyomukitei [Operational Rules] Article 72; Osaka Stock Ex-
change Gyomukitei [Operational Rules] Article 70. These rules define "short-sale" as a
transaction in which either a stock exchange member or his client does not possess the se-
curities, and the member borrows securities for settlement of the client's account. Securities
future trading, margin trading, and issue-day settlement trading are excluded from the
scope of short-sale. The rules require stock exchange members to state whether a transac-
tion is short-sale or not. The sale price cannot be lower than the last sale price. An exchange
member must state that a transaction is a short-sale unless the following apply: (1) he
knows that he or his client has the securities and there is no inconvenience or expense in
delivering the securities promptly; (2) he has the securities in the client's account or will
receive the securities in a pending transaction; or (3) he bought the securities in the same
exchange but the settlement has not been completed. These rules are copied from Rules 3b-
3, 10a-1, and 10a-2 of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However, there are small
differences. For example, U.S. Rule 10a-1 requires that the short-sale price cannot be lower
than the two last sale prices, while the Japanese rules only require that the price cannot be
lower than the last sale price.
86. The Japan Securities Research Institute translated Article 190 (now Article 165),
before the 1992 Amendment, as follows: "No officer nor major shareholder of a corporation,
the shares of which are listed for trading on a securities exchange, shall sell such portion of
the same shares as he does not actually have." JAPANESE SECURITIEs LAWS 64 (1987). "[Sluch
portion of the same shares" should read "such stock." The ambiguity of the Article is
manifest.
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any amount of the company's stock.
In order to clarify the content of the Article, the amended Article
reads "[a] listed company's officer/major shareholder shall not (a) sell his
company's securities, when he has less 'value' of the same class of the
securities than the securities he wants to sell; or (b) put or call an option
of sale of his company's securities, when he has less 'value' 7 of the same
class of the securities than the securities he wants to sell." Since future
and option transactions are now within the Article, the "securities" in-
clude stocks, convertible bonds, bonds with warrant, and warrants. As
some of the securities do not have prices, the Article uses "value" to eval-
uate prices of securities.
To illustrate, although a class of stock has a price on the daily stock
exchange, a conversion right of a convertible bond or a warrant does not
have a price. Even if a stock has a price every day, the price will change
drastically in a fluctuating market. It is very difficult to determine the
value of the right of a convertible bond or warrant because no one can
prejudge whether or not the right will be executed. If not, the right is
worth nothing. Similarly, an option that is not exercised is worth nothing.
The method of calculating the value of such securities is promulgated by
a Ministry of Finance ordinance.
Article 165 does not prohibit insiders from doing future transactions
because insiders can future-trade as a way of risk hedging. As a result, the
Article precludes a public company's insiders from selling or putting/call-
ing a sale option worth more than the value of the securities they hold,
and if they sell or put/call a sale option worth more than the value of the
securities they hold, they fall under this Article because they have sold
short. There is a fine of up to three hundred thousand yen (2,500 U.S.
dollars) for breach of this Article. 8
[8] Article 166
[a] Introduction
Articles 166 and 167 were added by the 1988 amendment.8 9 Article
157, the general anti-fraud provision, is too vague and too broad to be
used in an insider trading case. The Japanese wanted to clarify the con-
cept of insider trading and to make it illegal. These Articles describe who
is an insider and what kind of act shall fall under insider trading provi-
sions. They constitute the first Japanese laws that clearly prohibit insider
trading since the Securities and Exchange Law was created in 1948. Arti-
87. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 165.
88. Id. art. 205.
89. The Japanese created these two articles as Articles 190-2 and 190-3 in 1988. The
numbers were changed to Articles 166 and 167 in 1992. The substance of these Articles has
not been changed by the 1992 Amendment. However, since there was much criticism from
many commentators, the scope of the Articles was enlarged to include public companies,
compared with only listed companies in the 1988 Amendment. See Lu, supra note 82.
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cle 166 prevents "corporate-related parties" and "primary tippees" from
insider trading, while Article 167 regulates them in the case of a tender
offer. These Articles have the same content; the only difference is that
Article 166 covers ordinary securities transactions, while Article 167 cov-
ers tender offers.
[b] Proscriptions
Article 166 prescribes that if "corporate-related parties" know the
"material facts" of an issuer's business, the parties shall not purchase or
sell the issuer's securities until the "material facts" are disclosed. This
Article also prescribes that any person, a "primary tippee," who directly
knows the "material facts" of an issuer from the "corporate-related par-
ties," shall not purchase or sell the issuer's securities until the "material
facts" are disclosed. The securities covered by this Article include a pub-
lic company's stocks, bonds, warrants, and options.
[c] Definitions of Terms
[i] Corporate-Related Parties
"Corporate Related Parties" include:
(a.) an issuer's director, auditor, agent, or employee who knows the
issuer's business' "material facts" through his work;
(b.) an issuer's shareholder who has the right to examine the issuer's
books and records under Commercial Code Article 293-6, and knows the
issuer's business' "material facts" through exercise of the right;90
(c.) a person who has the legal right to oversee, or has authority over
the issuer, and knows the "material facts" of an issuer's business through
exercise of the right or authority;
(d.) a person who has a contract with the issuer and knows the is-
suer's business' "material facts" because of the contract; or
(e.) an officer of any entity employing persons in categories.(a.) and
(b.) above, if such officer has learned of any material fact in connection
with the performance of his duties.
The "corporate-related parties" remain subject to this Article for a
period of one year after they have terminated their duties, employment,
or contracts.
Under this Article, people in categories (a.) and (b.) are "insiders,"
while those in categories (c.) and (d.) are "quasi-insiders." Category (a.)
includes everyone who has connections with the issuer. Even a part-time
worker who cleans the issuer's office may fall under this Article. Category
(b.) includes the shareholder's agents or employees, if they exercise the
90. A shareholder who has over ten percent of his company's stock can ask the com-
pany to let him examine or copy the company's books and records. SHOHO [COMMERCIAL
CODEI, art. 293-6.
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examination right. If the shareholder is a company, and one of its direc-
tors, auditors, agents or employees exercises examination rights, s/he may
fall under this Article. A secondary party who knows the issuer's "mate-
rial facts" from any person who exercises the examination right in such a
company may fall under this Article.
To illustrate, X company is a major shareholder of Y company. X's
employee Z exercises the examination right to learn Y business' "material
facts." Instead of taking advantage of the information himself, Z tells W,
another of X's employees, the "material facts," and W does the insider
trading. W will fall under this Article. In this case, W is also a "primary
tippee." Category (c.) includes all persons who can examine, license, or
have authority over the issuer, for example a government bureaucrat who
receives the issuer's application for producing a very effective anti-AIDS
medicine, or who receives an issuer's application for registering its new
patent, or a Ministry of Finance officer who just examined the issuer's
books or records. Category (d.) includes all persons who have contracts
with the issuer, such as the issuer's attorneys, accountants, bankers, and
underwriters. For example, a printing company that has a printing con-
tract with the issuer, or an interpreting company that sends interpreters
to the issuer would both be controlled by this Article. If the entity that
has a contract with the issuer is a company, the conditions stated in cate-
gory (b.) will apply - the company's directors, auditors, agents, employ-
ees, and their primary tippees will fall under this Article. For example, X
securities firm is the underwriter of issuer Y. Z, one of X's employees,
knows the "material facts" of Y's business through the underwriting con-
tract. Z passes this confidential information to W, and W does the insider
trading. W falls under this Article.
[ii] Primary Tippee
Any person who receives the "material facts" of an issuer's business
directly from the "corporate-related parties" is a "primary tippee." Arti-
cle 166 prohibits any "primary tippee" from trading the issuer's securities
before the "material facts" of the issuer's business are disclosed. This re-
striction is effective within one year after the "corporate-related parties"
have terminated their duties, employment, or contracts. For instance, X
company's former employee Z, out of his job for ten months, knows the
"material facts of Y's business through his former work; Z tells his friend
W the confidential information and W trades Y's securities before Y's
disclosure of the "material facts;" Z falls under this Article. However, if
W received the confidential information within one year of Z's termina-
tion but traded one year after Z's termination, W does not fall under this
Article.
According to the Ministry of Finance's explanation,91 the reason this
91. Akio Takeuchi, Insaida Torihiki Kisei No Kyoha [The Reinforcement of Insider
Trading Regulation], 1144 SHoJI HoMu [COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL] 9, 15 (1988). Professor
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Article prevents only "primary tippees" from insider trading is to make
the scope of the Article clear. If all tippees fell under the restriction, no
manageable limits would exist. For example, in the case above, if W, in-
stead of taking advantage of the confidential information by himself, told
M, then M told N, and N did the insider trading before Y's disclosure, W,
M and N are all tippees. It is impossible to restrict all tippees because
anyone could be called a tippee. To narrow this Article's scope, only "pri-
mary tippees" are prohibited from insider trading.
[iii] Material Facts
"Material Facts" include the following:
(a.) Management decisions relevant to the execution of the following
matters:
(1) issue of stocks, convertible bonds, and bonds with warrants;
(2) capital reduction;
(3) share splits;
(4) dividends;9 2
(5) mergers or acquisitions;
(6) disposing of all or a part of the company's business; as well as
acquiring all or part of another company's business;
(7) dissolution;9
(8) bringing a new product or new technology into the market; or
(9) entering into a joint venture, or other matters similar to (1) - (8)
above which are prescribed by ordinance.
(b.) When any of the following happen:
(1) a disaster, or other damage occurs to the company;
(2) a change of a major shareholder;
(3) an event which will unlist the company; or
(4) any events, like (1) - (3) above, that are prescribed by ordinance.
(c.) A new estimate indicating that the company's sale, ordinary prof-
its, or net profits will be different from the previous estimate, as this new
estimate may have an impact on the investor's judgments.
(d.) In addition to (a.) through (c.), any important facts about the
Takeuchi is the Chairman of the "Unfair Trading Special Department" of the Securities
and Exchange Council. The Securities and Exchange Council is an advisory council in the
Securities Bureau. The Unfair Trading Special Department consists of five scholars, one
bureaucrat of the Justice Department, one Tokyo Stock Exchange assistant director, one
drug company president, one president of a securities research firm, one trustee of an eco-
nomic study fund, and a director of a Japanese economic newspaper.
92. Only if the management decides to change the amount or the method of the preced-
ing dividend does this decision fall under the scope of "material facts."
93. The only exception is dissolution by merger.
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company's operation, business, or property that will have an impact on
investor judgment.
[d] Disclosure of Material Facts
There is a disclosure of material facts if:
(a.) the company complies with an ordinance to make "material
facts" public, or
(b.) the company files a statement or a report under Article 25."'
An order of the M.O.F 5 requires a company to publicize material
facts in at least two forms of mass media. Disclosure is complete twelve
hours after the publication. The mass media include a national daily pa-
per, a national industry or economic newspaper, or a national radio or
television broadcast. The twelve hour requirement commences with the
publication in the second medium.
[e] Exceptions
The following persons, securities, and transactions are beyond the
scope of this Article:
(a.) a person who obtains stock by exercising a warrant;
(b.) a person who obtains stock by exercising his conversion right
under a convertible bond;
(c.) a person who trades securities to complete his mandatory obliga-
tion or requests the issuer to buy his shares under the Commercial
Code;9
6
(d.) a person who follows a decision of the board of directors to buy
securities against a tender offer;
(e.) a person who trades securities under a stabilization that is regu-
lated by an ordinance; 97
(f.) a person who trades bonds or options on bonds, unless these
94. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 165-2. Under Article 25, the Ministry of Finance must
make public the company's disclosure document for a special period of time - for example,
five years for annual and supplemental reports.
95. S.E.L. Operation Order, art. 30, 1 1.
96. Appraisal Right: under the Commercial Code a shareholder can ask the issuer to
buy his shares in the following circumstances: (1), if a shareholder opposes the issuer's im-
portant managerial decision, such as disposing of an important property, he can ask the
issuer to buy his shares (Article 245-2); (2) if the issuer decides to make restrictions on the
qualification of its shareholders, any shareholder who opposes this decision can ask the is-
suer to buy his shares (Article 349). However, this situation should not arise, because once
the issuer makes this decision, its securities will be removed from the list or the OTC mar-
ket and only a public company is within the scope of Article 166; or (3) a shareholder can
ask the issuer to buy his shares if s/he opposes the issuer's merger decision (Article 408-3).
97. A stabilization is a way of preventing a sharp price drop of a newly issued security
under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. TANAKA & HORIGUCHI, supra note 74, at
749; SUZUKI et. al., supra note 67, at 595; KANZAKI supra note 67, at 639.
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bonds or options come with warrants or conversion privileges;
(g.) a transaction among insiders and primary tippees not on an over-
the-counter market or a stock exchange;9 s
(h.) an execution of a securities transaction by the issuer; either the
transaction had been decided/contracted before the "material facts" hap-
pened or other similar transactions that are prescribed by an ordinance.
[9] Article 167
Article 166 prohibits any insider, quasi-insider, or primary tippee
from insider trading in an ordinary securities transaction, while Article
167 prohibits them from insider trading in the case of a tender offer. Arti-
cle 167 has almost the same content as Article 166. The only difference
between these two Articles is that the term "material facts" in Article 166
is replaced by the term "tender offer facts" in Article 167. Under Article
167 no insider, quasi-insider, or primary tippee of the offeror can buy or
sell the target company's securities if he knows the offeror has made a
decision to execute or withdraw a tender offer. The concept of insiders,
quasi-insiders, and primary tippees is the same as that in Article 166. The
exceptions to Article 167 are the same as those to Article 166.
[101 Article 154
Article 154 gives the Minister of Finance the right to order both the
stock exchanges and listed companies to file reports about their business
or properties or to submit documents. The Article permits the Minister to
examine only the stock exchanges' business, properties, books, and
records, not the listed companies'. Before the amendment, the Minister
had the right to order or examine only the stock exchanges. The new law
gives him the additional right to order listed issuers to file reports. 9"
§ 4. THE 1992 AMENDMENT: SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE SURVEILLANCE
COMMISSION
§ 4.01 History of the Law Reform
The Unfair Trading Special Department ' "0 (hereinafter, the Depart-
ment) of the Securities and Exchange Council in M.O.F. was set up in
1987. It began major reform against insider trading in 1988. As a result of
the creation of this agency, the Japanese hoped additional securities
98. There is no danger of abuse of confidential information among insiders and pri-
mary tippees because they all know the confidential information. However, in this case, if
the seller knows the buyer would resell these securities to a third party, the seller should not
sell the securities to the buyer. For instance, A and B are both insiders or primary tippees.
If A knows that B would resell the securities bought from A to C, an outsider, A should not
sell B the securities because B would take advantage of C by using confidential information.
S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 166.
99. Telephone interview with Wataru Horiguchi by the author, February 1, 1993.
100. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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problems could be addressed. One such scandal occurred in July of 1991,
when the "Big Four" (Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko and Yamaichi) securities
houses illegally compensated their large clients. 1 Nomura Securities and
Nikko Securities were also found to have manipulated the stock price at a
railway company on behalf of an organized crime boss.'0 2 Following this
chain of events, the presidents of Nomura Securities and Nikko Securities
resigned.'03 Subsequently, a top aid to Finance Minister Hashimoto re-
signed after admitting he had helped arrange a loan-fraud scandal0"
worth U.S. $93 million. Following this, the Minister of Finance himself
resigned. 0 5
In an attempt to consider the impact on U.S. investors and markets,
the S.E.C. sent queries to Japanese securities firms regarding the stock
scandal. 06 Two large U.S. pension funds also reacted by sending notice to
the Big Four to request reforms of the Japanese brokers."0 ' The extent of
this outside pressure forced the Japanese Prime Minister to commence
with financial reform.' Many scholars criticized the abolition of the U.S.
S.E.C.-style regulator that was imposed after W.W.II.109 The Japanese
business leaders, after all of the aforementioned scandals, strongly urged
their government to set up an American S.E.C.-type of independent se-
curities watchdog." 0 The Prime Minister responded by asking the M.O.F.
to propose establishing a new institution that would oversee the securities
markets as well as the securities industry. The M.O.F. then submitted a
proposal for the "Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission" to
be designed within the M.O.F., despite the fact that an independent insti-
tution outside of the M.O.F. was demanded by the Administration Re-
form Council."' The M.O.F. did not want to give up its power.
The Japanese also adopted the "honest" and "fair" principles recom-
mended by the International Organization of Securities Commissions
101. Christopher J. Chipello & Masayoshi Kanabayashi, Japan's 'Big Four' Firms Try
to Cool Payment Furor, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1991, at A13.
102. Clay Chandler, Tokyo is Scrutinizing Allegation of Nomura Stock Manipulation,
WALL ST. J., June 27, 1991, at All.
103. Trapped in the Rubble, THE EcONOMIST, June 29, 1991, at 65.
104. Top Japanese Aid Quits in Loan Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 1991, at 14.
105. Quentin Hardy, Hashimoto's Exit, New Securities Laws Are Just A Drop in Ja-
pan Reform Bucket, WALL ST. J., Oct.. 4, 1991, at A10.
106. Michael R. Sesit et* al., SEL Sends Queries to Japanese Firms on Stock Scandal,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1991, at Cl.
107. Kathryn Graven, Pension Funds Ask Japanese Brokers To Make Reform, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 5, 1991, at B6a.
108. Chuck Freadhoff, Japan Scandal May Hasten Financial Reform, INVESTOR'S
DAILY, Aug. 7, 1991, at 1; Weisman, Scandals Prompt Kaifu Offer Securities Reform, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1991, at A6.
109. Lu, supra note 82, at 235.
110. Japanese S.E.C. Is Urged, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1991, at Dll.
111. Shaken Torihikiho Kanshi linkai No Hasoku [The Start of the Securities and
Exchange Surveillance Commission], 470 TEGATA KENKYU [BILL STUDY] 70 (1992).
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(I.O.S.C.O.) in 1991.12 The new amendment binds securities firms and
their employees to be honest and fair with their clients at all times. The
securities firms were then prohibited from offering any compensation to
clients, and the penalties for this were raised in the new amendment." 3
§ 4.02 The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission
The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (S.E.S.C.)
consists of three commissioners with one serving as the chair." 4 The com-
missioners are appointed by the Minister of Finance after gaining the ap-
proval of both chambers in the Diet."5 Their term is three years and can
continue by reappointment."' The commissioners cannot be dismissed
against their will." 7 The S.E.S.C., including these commissioners, pres-
ently employs 118 people.
The Minister of Finance's right to ask for reports under Article 154 is
delegated to the S.E.S.C.." s The S.E.S.C., as structured, has the right to
investigate all securities crimes, including insider trading and market ma-
nipulation." 9 The S.E.S.C. can subpoena information of individuals, as
suspects or as witnesses, to assist in its investigations.2 0 The Securities
and Exchange Surveillance Commission also has the power to check items
in the possession of the suspect, when actually questioning him, but can-
not similarly examine items in the possession of a witness.'2 ' The S.E.S.C.
cannot search the suspect's office or home without a court warrant be-
cause Article 35 of the Japanese Constitution requires a warrant in order
to conduct a search. If necessary, the S.E.S.C. can request the courts to
issue warrants for searches and to have access to property to confiscate
relevant evidence.'22 The S.E.S.C. also can request information and coop-
eration from other government departments.2 3 The S.E.S.C., in other
words, investigates all facets of the securities firms and self-regulation
organizations. 2 4
The S.E.S.C. must report to the M.O.F. when the S.E.S.C. discovers
illegal activities.2 5 The S.E.S.C. does not have the power to discipline one
who violates the laws or to initiate a proceeding. The S.E.S.C. can only
112. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 49-2.
113. Id. arts. 50-3, 199, 207.
114. Okurasho Sechiho [Ministry of Finance Establishment Law] art. 10 [hereinafter
MOFEL].
115. Id. art. 11.
116. Id. art. 12.
117. Id. art. 13.
118. S.E.L., supra note 3, art. 154-2.
119. Id. art. 210.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. art. 211.
123. Id.
124. Id. arts. 55, 56, 79-14, 79-15.
125. Id. art. 226.
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advise the Minister of Finance.12 The Minister, then, is expected to give
serious consideration to the S.E.S.C.'s advice. 2 The S.E.S.C. can follow
up with a request for the report on any action taken by the Minister of
Finance after the S.E.S.C. recommendations have been given. ' 28 The
S.E.S.C. then can make further suggestions to the Minister of Finance.1 2 9
Given the Japanese cultural norms, the S.E.S.C. cannot be expected to
act independently or to challenge the M.O.F. in the event the M.O.F.
does not follow the S.E.S.C.'s recommendations. This new watchdog,
which is under the aegis of the M.O.F. and has a position similar to an
inside council, observes, investigates, and reports, but it does not have the
teeth to bite into the securities market.
§ 5. CASES AFTER THE 1988 AMENDMENT.
Since the 1988 Amendment, there have been two major cases related
to Article 164's short-swing profit. In these cases, the insiders either re-
turned the short-swing profit privately or were ordered to do so by the
court. 30 There also have been two Article 166 (insider trading) cases. In
the first Article 166 case, the Tokyo District Court fined a president of a
finance company 200,000 yen (1,667 U.S. dollars) by summary judgment
for breach of Article 166 in September 1990."' The second case, the
Macros Case, 2 2 was decided by Tokyo District Court in 1992. Here the
defendant, who was the director of a listed company, "window-dressed"
the company's sales and sold the company's stock before the scheme was
exposed. He made a profit of 18,000,000 yen (150,000 U.S. dollars), but
was later fined 500,000 yen (4,167 U.S. dollars) with no prison sentence,
despite the fact that the Court found him extremely malicious
(akushitsu). The court fined him without further penalty because he had
donated half of the profit to a pro bono legal service and he had suffered
enough social sanction. 133
These new insider trading laws obviously carry too light of a penalty.
Also of import is the point that in Japan, defendants will not be sen-
tenced to imprisonment unless they have a previous criminal record."3 4
The new law, therefore, is not an effective deterrent to insider trading.
§ 6. PROBLEM AREAS
The 1988 and 1992 amendments reinforce the proscription upon in-
126. MOFEL, supra note 114, art. 19.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. art. 20.
130. Lu, supra note 82, at 206.
131. News, 1229 SHoJI HOMU [COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL] 130 (1990).
132. Makuros No Insaida Torihikijiken Hanketsu [Macros Insider Trading Judg-
ment] 1306 SHoJI HoMu [COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL] 27 (1992).
133. Tokyo District Court Judgment, Sept. 25, 1992.
134. Lu, supra note 82, at 231.
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sider trading, but some important problems have not been solved.
§ 6.01 Bribes to Politicians
In the gift-giving society, important politicians receive scores of invi-
tations to many kinds of ceremonies every day. Their aides send flowers,
money, or other gifts to cover events that they cannot attend. Politicians
need money. Gift-giving is a strong Japanese tradition, especially among
those who help each other. Japanese politicians spend a lot of money giv-
ing gifts - and, like some politicians in every country, a number of them
receive gifts as bribes. Japanese companies bribe politicians in return for
profitable favors. The Recruit Scandal is one such example of a Japanese
company bribing politicians through insider trading. 3 '
Under the Japanese life-employment system, job hunting for a senior
university student is very important because it will have a critical influ-
ence on his whole life. "Recruit" magazine, published by Recruit Com-
pany, is the most popular job-hunting magazine, sponsored by thousands
of private companies. The magazine, widely read by students, gives se-
niors private company job information. The students use the magazine as
a "job hunting Bible," and it makes Recruit large profits every year. Pri-
vate companies and the Japanese government alike want the best univer-
sity graduates to join them. The two entities always compete with each
other, trying to get the best new employees. The government uses a bu-
reaucratic examination system to find the highest level of university grad-
uates, while private companies use an interview system. The government
and many private companies have an agreement that prohibits senior stu-
dents from visiting the companies for interviews before the government
examination results. However, many companies do not follow the
agreement.
In 1984, the government changed the examination schedule to better
compete with private companies, and there was a rumor that the govern-
ment was going to abolish "the agreement." Without the agreement Re-
cruit would have lost significant business.1 36 Recruit proceeded to bribe
the Chief Cabinet Secretary and other congressmen to put pressure on
the administration to follow the agreement. As Recruit was a listed com-
pany and had many shareholders, it was preferable to use the stock of its
subsidiary - Recruit Cosmos Real Estate Co. - to bribe the politicians.
When a company goes public its stock price often trades at a sub-
135. Sanger, supra note 63; Seijika Yonjuyonin Ni Shikin [Money Given to Forty-four
Politicians], ASAHI SHINBUN [NEWS], June 13, 1989, at 15, col. 2; Asano, Kawamoto,
Shibahara, Nishita, & Yasuhara, Rikuruto Jiken No Horitsu Mondai [The Legal Problem of
the Recruit Case], Zadankai [Conference], 947 JURISUTO [JURIST] 16 (1989); ISAACS, supra
note 77, at 138-39.
136. If the agreement had been broken, Recruit's sponsors would have gone out to ad-
vertise themselves as soon as possible because there would have been no time restriction.
Since these companies would not have advertised themselves at the same time, Recruit
would have lost much advertising business.
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stantial premium above the offering price. Recruit Cosmos gave confiden-
tial information to politicians regarding the company going public and
sold company stock to them to complete the bribe. Here is how it worked.
Cosmos registered its stock on the over-the-counter market on Octo-
ber 30, 1986. Before registration it sold 242,000 shares to forty-four Japa-
nese politicians at a price of 3,000 yen (25 U.S. dollars) per share. After
registration, its stock was traded on the over-the-counter market at a
price of 5,270 yen (44 U.S. dollars); then it rose to 7,250 yen (60 U.S.
dollars). The forty-four politicians sold their shares and took a total profit
of 730,000,000 yen (6 million U.S. dollars). In addition to the trading
profit, the Recruit Group also gave these politicians money donations, en-
tertainment, and other benefits such as quantity purchases of tickets for
party fund-raising events. By May of 1988, the total Recruit bribes to the
politicians, including the trade profit, was over 1,330,000,000 yen (11 mil-
lion U.S. dollars).
Prime Minister Takeshita received about 201,000,000 yen (1.7 million
U.S. dollars) during his service as Minister of Finance and later Prime
Minister. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abe, gained 137,000,000
yen (1.2 million U.S. dollars). The Minister of Finance, Miyazawa, re-
ceived 122,000,000 yen (1 million U.S. dollars). Former Prime Minister
Nakasone made a 110,000,000 yen profit (0.9 million U.S. dollars).
After the scandal was exposed, the politicians denied knowledge of
the stock transactions and donations because these transactions and do-
nations were executed in the names of their wives, children, aides or
others. However, all of the politicians were found to have had connection
with the plot. Most of them resigned from office and their political parties
for a period of time but subsequently were re-elected. One of the Prime
Minister's aides, Aoki, committed suicide on April 26, 1989."'
Although over twenty persons who had connections with the scandal
were prosecuted for bribery, most of them were company directors or of-
ficers. Only two congressmen and four aides of politicians were prose-
cuted. Nakasone, Takeshita, Abe, and Miyazawa were not prosecuted.
There were no prosecutions for breach of Article 157.
In another insider trading case, Meitanco Co., an electric appliance
manufacturer, announced that the company had invented a "highly effi-
137. The reason for Aoki's suicide was that this was his only way out. There is no plea-
bargain system in Japan. Even if he had testified in the Diet, no immunity to avoid prosecu-
tion would have been available. As a consequence, he would have gone to jail even if he had
testified. His family would have lost his support. By proving his loyalty to his "master" -
by committing suicide - his master became committed to the care of his family, and of
course would himself be spared the consequences of unfavorable testimony. If the aid had
betrayed his master, society would have criticized him for his disloyalty! In the Lockheed
Scandal, in which the aircraft manufacturer bribed former Prime Minister Tanaka to push
Japanese airlines to buy Lockheed products, Tanaka's driver committed suicide for the
same reasons. Lokido Jiken Nisshi [Lockheed Case Diary], 676 JURISUTO [JURIST] 169, 171
(1978).
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cient device" to save electricity, registered the device, and received a pat-
ent. The president of Meitanco bought a large stake of the company's
stock before the new invention's announcement. He also bribed politi-
cians with the company's stocks and with money. After the announce-
ment, the company's stock price soared, and the president asked "his"
politicians to speak in the Diet to push government departments to buy
the company's new device. Ironically, government test reports proved
that the new device could not save.any energy at all.138
Article 157 should apply to scandals like Recruit and Meitanco.
However, Article 157 is too vague and too broad for the Japanese legal
system. Since it has been a dead letter for over forty years, there is little
anticipation that it will be used in the future. As a result, things have not
yet changed. Although Articles 166 and 167 specifically make insider
trading unlawful, it is unlikely that Japanese courts will impose penalties
of the magnitude necessary to serve as a deterrent."3 9
Politicians (and others) also can still take advantage of public com-
panies in order to engage in insider trading. For instance, a listed com-
pany A's insider B tells C, one of politician D's aides, A company's "mate-
rial facts," and D buys A company's securities and profits. D is not
restricted by Article 166 because D is not a primary tippee. D is a second-
ary tippee. There is no insider or primary tippee penalty for passing "ma-
terial facts." As a result, if a tippee other than a primary tippee does
insider trading, no one in the scheme will be sanctioned.
It is a reasonable conclusion that Japanese politicians do not intend
to ban all insider trading. They have left seams in the net in order to
allow the astute to pass through. The politicians passed a very strict-look-
ing law in order to convince foreigners that Japan would no longer be an
"insider's haven," but at the same time they also allowed room for eva-
sion of the law. The Japanese call this "getting two birds with only one
marble."
§ 6.02 Civil Remedies and Legal Fees
It is very difficult to secure a remedy for losses resulting from insider
trading. The Securities and Exchange Law does not provide for civil lia-
bilities in insider trading. The only way for an insider trader's victim to
get a private remedy is to sue the insider in tort on the basis of Civil
Code Article 709. For example, insider A bought XYZ company's stocks
from B and made a substantial profit. B can sue A; however, B has the
burden of proof. Usually, it is very difficult to prove that A knew the
business' "material facts" through his work or duty. It is also very diffi-
cult to prove how much B lost in a fluctuating market. The Japanese law
does not recognize implied liabilities.
138. Nagaseko Ni Jikei Sannen [Nagaseko Sentenced to Three Years], ASAHI SHINBUN
[NEWS] (Yukan [ev. ed.]), May 9, 1989, at 1.
139. See supra § 4.
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A shareholder who sues an insider under Article 164 has to pay his
own legal fees. Article 164 prescribes that if a company does not ask an
insider to return his profits from insider trading, any shareholder can sue
the insider to disgorge the profits to the company on behalf of the com-
pany. However, even if the plaintiff wins he must pay the legal fees, and
profits will be returned to the company. Thus, shareholders rarely want
to sue insiders on behalf of their companies.
§ 6.03 Bureaucratic Ambivalence
There is no independent public regulator with adequate authority to
oversee the securities market in Japan. The Japanese do not have an
American-style Securities and Exchange Commission. The S.E.S.C. does
not have the bite. It can only advise or make suggestions to the Minister
of Finance. The new law appears to give the S.E.S.C. extensive power, but
actually the S.E.S.C. is still dependent upon the M.O.F. as it cannot initi-
ate any proceeding. The M.O.F. is unwilling to give power to an S.E.C.-
like independent regulator.
Another reason for the bureaucrats' failure to expose insider trading
is that personnel of the Ministry have been involved in scandals. Two
Prime Ministers and two Ministers of Finance were involved in the Re-
cruit Scandal. The fact is that when Nakasone was Prime Minister,
Takeshita was the Minister of Finance; when Takeshita became the next
Prime Minister, Miyazawa became the Minister of Finance. During these
two recent terms of cabinet both the Finance Ministers were involved in
insider trading. Ministry of Finance bureaucrats are not in the habit of
exposing their bosses..
Finally, whether the Japanese government has the mind-set to effec-
tively regulate securities markets is questionable. The Wall Street Jour-
nal, in January of 1993, reported that the Japanese government was using
"vast amounts of money from the postal system and other funds" to
purchase securities in an effort to stem "the relentless slide in the Nikkei
225-stock index."14 The Journal reported that "the objective is appar-
ently to keep stock prices high enough that banks and other corporations
with big stock portfolios won't have to declare major losses on their in-
vestments when the fiscal year ends March 31." Although the government
"officially says its intention isn't to prop up the Nikkei," the Journal cites
convincing evidence of massive purchases by the government through the
banks that largely offset the fact that institutional investors were large
net sellers during the fourth quarter of 1992. "What happens after the
critical March 31 date passes," the Journal continues, "is anyone's
guess."' " Nor is the denial by the government that it is supporting the
market credible, since it publicly announced, in August of 1992, an emer-
140. Quentin Hardy, Japan Fights Uphill Battle to Aid Stocks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25,
1993, at C1.
141. Id.
VOL. 22:1
SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN
gency package of economic measures that included a promise to invest
more public funds in the stock market."' 42 This was all against the con-
tinued decline during 1992 in the Nikkei and an eighty five percent re-
duction during 1992 in net purchases by international investors in securi-
ties traded on the principal Japanese stock exchanges."4
§ 7. CONCLUSION
The Japanese recently amended their Securities and Exchange Law
in order to convince foreigners that their securities market is a fair one.
Article 157 is the general anti-fraud provision, but this Article is a dead
letter because it is too vague, too broad, and has yet to be used in an
insider trading case. There is little hope that the Japanese will use this
Article in the future. Article 163 requires corporate insiders to file reports
with the Minister of Finance after they trade their company's securities.
Article 164 requires corporate insiders to disgorge profits from tainted
transactions to their companies. Article 163 (relating to the filing of in-
sider reports), while inactive for a long time, was revived in the new
amendment. Article 165 prohibits insiders from short-selling. Articles 166
and 167 are new Articles, and they look very strict on paper. Article 166
prohibits insiders, quasi-insiders, and primary tippees from insider trad-
ing in ordinary transactions, while Article 167 regulates them in tender
offers. Article 154 reinforces the right of the Minister of Finance to ex-
amine stock exchanges, and to order issuers to file reports with him. The
S.E.S.C. was created and delegated powers of the M.O.F. under this Arti-
cle to serve as a new watchdog. The S.E.S.C. is not an independent regu-
lator. Therefore, securities regulation in Japan still depends on the old
M.O.F., which has not been an effective enforcer of the laws.
The new amendments seem like a great advance in preventing insider
trading in Japanese securities markets, but they certainly have not yet
changed things to any significant degree. Insider trading has been too in-
herent in the Japanese political scene to expect Japanese politicians to
ban all insider trading. On the one hand, they have created very strict-
looking rules in order to convince foreigners that the Japanese market is
fair. On the other hand, they conveniently preserve ways that permit eva-
sions of the regulatory scheme.
There is no provision for civil liabilities against insider trading in the
Securities and Exchange Law. An insider's trade "victim" has to sue the
insider under Civil Code Article 709. The burden of proof lies with the
plaintiff, and it is very difficult to prove the amount the plaintiff lost, or
that the insider knew the "material facts" through his work or duty. If a
shareholder sues an insider for the return of profits to a company under
Article 164, that shareholder has to pay his own legal fees. As a result,
142. Robert Thompson, Fall in Foreign Purchases in Tokyo, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1993,
at 13.
143. Id.
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few shareholders will sue an insider on behalf of a company. There is no
U.S.-style S.E.C. in Japan. The past involvement of certain high level
personnel of the Ministry of Finance and other politicians in insider trad-
ing, makes it unlikely that lower level bureaucrats will strive to expose
insider trading that may involve the highest levels of government. Even
the recent change of leadership in Japan, from the long-standing Liberal
Democrats to a nascent coalition, dismantles little of the historic fabric
throughout which insider trading penetrates.
Although it seems that the new law has reinforced anti-insider trad-
ing provisions, it leaves many loop-holes. The new amendments to the
Securities and Exchange Law are neither severe nor effective enough to
prevent insider trading in Japan.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
SECTION
Trade in Culture: Consumable Product or
Cherished Articulation of a Nation's Soul?
MICHAEL BRAUN*
LEIGH PARKER*"
I. INTRODUCTION
There are three classic ways to control the culture of another
country: through political coercion, which is less feasible as the Com-
munist collapse demonstrates; through acquisition, which is expensive;
and through flooding.
*.. [FIlood the markets of other countries with your slick, cheap,
heavily advertised product, swamping the local variety until it ceases
to exist.'
Once culture was seen through the artifacts left behind by lost civili-
zations. Later, as man matured, culture was expressed in song and dance
handed down through oral traditions. Today, culture is broadcast across
thousands of miles to the farthest reaches of the globe, disseminated
through radio, television, and film. For the first time since the dawn of
man, the exchange of culture has become a profit making business, forc-
ing nations to create a regime for trade in culture.
In 1948, the nations participating in the first round of the newly es-
tablished General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) could not en-
vision that one day film and television sales would represent a multimil-
lion dollar industry. Accordingly, they neglected to create a regime to
account for trade in culture. Presently, the trading community does not
* J.D., Loyola University, Los Angeles, 1993; B.A., U.C.L.A., 1990. Mr. Braun is cur-
rently working on an LL.M. degree at the London School of Economics.
** J.D., Loyola University, Los Angeles, 1993; M.I.M., American Graduate School of
International Management, 1982; B.A., Indiana University, 1981.
1. Silvia Fraser, Canada and the U.S.: Too Close for Comfort?, WORLDPAPER, Mar.
1992, at 12.
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know whether to classify cultural products as goods, services or a com-
pletely separate entity. With American film and television sales generat-
ing more than $4.5 billion in trade surplus during a time in which the
United States runs a mighty trade deficit, it is evident that "the prosper-
ity of the American economy is increasingly tied to Hollywood's well be-
ing."2 Accordingly, the United States contends that cultural products are
like any other tradeable commodity, subject to the strictures of liberal-
ized trade negotiated under GATT. On the other hand, the European
Community (E.C.),*** struggling against very successful American pro-
gramming, contends that "cultural industries are intrinsically different
from manufacturing and pose unique political problems that defy normal
trade rules."3
In the first confrontation over this issue, the United States was will-
ing to exclude culture from liberalization in the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement. Cognizant of the United States' failure to liber-
alize trade in culture with Canada, the E.C. subsequently passed its "Tel-
evision Without Frontiers" legislation mandating that European televi-
sion consist of at least fifty percent domestically created products.
Although cultural industries in the United States vehemently objected to
the Directive as unwarranted protectionism, the mandatory ratio remains
in full effect and serves as the foundation of other European cultural en-
deavors. Thus far the issue of trade in culture has been enmeshed in the
endless bureaucracy of the Uruguay Round of GATT and will not likely
see a rapid resolution.
This article will trace the evolution of trade in culture, beginning in
Part II with the cultural derogation embodied in the United States-Ca-
nada Free Trade Agreement. This section will identify and analyze the
Canadian rationales for the derogation and the subsequent responses
from the United States. Part III will discuss European cultural initiatives
designed to protect culture, focusing on the 1988 Broadcast Directive.
The rationales and responses will be analyzed and contrasted to those
used in the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Part IV of this
article will look at the viability of treating culture as a tradeable com-
modity under the GATT and alternatively as a service under a General
Agreement for Trade in Services (GATS), ultimately concluding that
neither is adequate. Finally, this article proposes the creation of a Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Culture that acknowledges the unique nature
of culture as both a consumable product as well as the cherished articula-
tion of a nation's soul.
2. Bruce Stokes, Tinseltown Trade War, NAT'L J., Feb. 23, 1991, at 432.
*** The European Community changed its official name to the European Union, effec-
tive January 1, 1994. The name European Community will still be considered correct, how-
ever, and will be used in this article.
3. Id.
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II. UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A. Definition of Culture
The amorphously defined word "culture" suffers from a multiplicity
of meanings. The Canadians have taken a broad view, believing culture to
be inclusive of the "knowledge, beliefs, attitudes and practices of a soci-
ety .... ,"4 In the broadest sense, the Canadians see culture as the embod-
iment of their national identity, an identity which is on the verge of ex-
tinction and becoming more Americanized each day.5
"To Americans, broadly speaking, culture is another service industry,
an outgrowth of their country's economic machine as surely as automo-
biles and apple pie."6 The claim to cultural sovereignty is at best a vague
nationalistic concept and realistically a feeble attempt at protectionism. 7
Under either definition, culture and its collateral industries have signifi-
cant financial worth. Since culture is quantifiable in monetary terms,
shouldn't it fit within the auspices of free trade like all other quantifiable
commodities?8
B. Historical Perspective
The 1988 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was a
landmark achievement in an otherwise long and somewhat jaded trade
history.9 The main objective of the FTA was to promote freer trade be-
tween the two countries and "build on their mutual rights and obligations
under the [GATT]." 10 The FTA created an open market between the
4. CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, OSGOODE HALL LAW
SCHOOL OF YORK UNIVERSITY, TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE 139 (Marc Gold & David Leyton-
Brown eds., 1988) [hereinafter TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE].
5. David Trigueiro, Cultural Cannons Fire Broadside, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 18, 1992,
at A4. See also Mary Lamey, Quebec Artists Enrich Culture of Canada: Film Executive
Shaping the Future, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Feb. 11, 1992, at B1 (quoting Harold Green-
berg, Chairman of Astral Inc., "We believe the country that loses the ability to express itself
is no longer a country.").
6. See Jeffrey Simpson, Living Beside a Cultural and Economic Colossus, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1986, §4 at 3. While such a view is a broad generalization, the official U.S. position
is to treat cultural products as any other quantafiable good, thereby giving credibility to this
assessment.
7. Laurie Watson, Cultural Sovereignty Issue, UPI, June 29, 1986, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI file. One Canadian author, attempting to explain the cause for such
difference of opinions, wrote, "[W]hen you are the dominant force in [selling] copyright...
it's hard to understand how the customer looks at it." Id.
8. See e.g., SERVICES POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (SPAC), REPORT ON: NORTH AMERI-
CAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT at 18-19 (1992); ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR TRADE POLICY AND
NEGOTIATIONS, REPORT ON THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT at 68-69 (1992).
9. See generally Jean Raby, The Investment Provisions of the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 394 (1990) (for a gen-
eral discussion on U.S.-Canadian trading history); see also Ann Carlsen, The Canada
United States Free Trade Agreement: A Bilateral Approach to the Reduction of Trade
Barriers, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 299, 301-2 (1989).
10. The United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 2 B.D.I.E.L. 359
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world's two largest trading partners, phased out most tariffs within a ten
year period," applied national treatment1 2 to many parts of the service
sector, and greatly liberalized investment policies."3
Although "Canadians have recognized the existence of economic in-
terdependence with the United States and have sought the benefits of a
closer relationship," they have simultaneously feared the loss of Canadian
distinctiveness, autonomy, and independence. 4 So while the FTA broadly
embraced the principle of national treatment, several key sectors were
explicitly exempted from liberalization, among them Canadian cultural
industries. 5
C. The Cultural Industries Exemption
Cultural industries have been broadly defined to include all expres-
sions of a nation's culture." This encompasses all aspects of publication,
distribution, sale, exhibition or transmission of printed materials, music,
radio, and television.17 Under Article 2005.1 of the FTA, cultural indus-
[hereinafter FTA]. Article 102 of the FTA sets out five objectives: (a) Eliminate trade barri-
ers to goods and services; (b) Promote fair trade;(c) Liberalize the investment climate; (d)
Establish joint procedures to administer the FTA and to resolve disputes; (e) Promote fur-
ther cooperation on trade and investment issues both bilaterally and multilaterally. See also
RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., 1991 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANS-
ACTIONS 8 (2nd ed. 1991). "Free trade is a theoretical concept that assumes trade between
two or more parties unhampered by government measures such as tariffs or non tariff barri-
ers." Id. Basic to the notion of free trade is the concept of comparative advantage that
suggests "that a country or region should specialize in the production and export of those
goods and services that it can produce relatively more efficiently than other goods and ser-
vices, and import those goods and services in which it has a comparative disadvantage." Id.
at 3.
11. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE NAFTA PARTNERSHIP 2 (Govern-
ment of Canada ed., 1992) (available from the Canadian Consulate) [hereinafter NAFTA
PARTNERSHIP] (U.S. and Canada negotiated two rounds of accelerated tariff reductions in
1990, covering 400 items worth six billion in two way trade, and in July 1991, covering 250
items and two billion in trade).
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (The concept of National Treatment, encom-
passed in Article III, ensures that goods of a foreign sovereign shall be treated no less favor-
ably than domestically produced goods) [hereinafter GATT].
13. See generally FTA, supra note 10; Jeffrey J. Schott, United States-Canada Free
Trade: An Evaluation of the Agreement, INST. FOR INT'L ECON. POL'Y ANALYSES IN INT'L
ECON. 2, 4 (1988).
14. TRADE-OFFS IN FREE TRADE, supra note 4, at ix.
15. See FTA, supra note 10. (See Chapter 12, Articles: 1304, 1401, 1601, 1701, and
respective Annexes. Among sectors remaining protected are communications, transporta-
tion, oil and gas, uranium, agricultural support etc.).
16. See generally A.W. Johnson, Free Trade and Cultural Industries, in TRADE-OFFS
ON FREE TRADE, supra note 4, at 350 [hereinafter Johnson].
17. FTA, supra note 10.
Article 2012. Definitions
Cultural industry means an enterprise engaged in any of the following
activities:
(a) the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, periodicals, or
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tries are exempted from the confines of free trade."s In effect, this deroga-
tion not only allows Canada to grandfather all its prior restrictive and
discriminatory laws but gives it the right to design legislation to protect
those industries in the future. 9
The one limitation to the Cultural Industries Exemption ("Exemp-
tion") is the retaliation provision of Article 2005.2.20 This Article states
that if Canada takes action that discriminates or has a negative impact on
American cultural industries, then the United States will have the right
to take retaliatory measures of equivalent commercial effect.
2 1
The United States was and remains the largest owner and producer
of cultural products in Canada.12 By 1986, American cultural producers
dominated the Canadian market." Considering that seventy-five percent
of all cultural products consumed in all of Canada are imported, the vast
majority of which are from the United States, it should be no surprise
that Canada wanted to protect cultural industries from extinction.
2 4
Given the dominance of the American cultural product on the Cana-
newspapers in print or machine readable form but not including the sole activ-
ity of printing or typesetting any of the foregoing,
(b) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of film or video recordings,
(c) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of audio or video music
recordings,
(d) the publication, distribution, or sale of music in print or machine readable
form, or
(e) radio communication in which the transmissions are intended for direct
reception by the general public, and all radio, television and cable television
broadcasting undertakings and all satellite programming and broadcast net-
work services.
Id.
18. FTA, supra note 10.
Article 2005.1 Cultural Industries
1. Cultural Industries are exempt from the provisions of this Agreement, ex-
cept as specifically provided in Article 401 (Tariff Elimination), paragraph 4 of
Article 1607 (Divestiture of an Indirect Acquisition) and Articles 2006 (Re-
transmission Rights) and 2007(Print-in-Canada Requirement) of this Chapter.
Id.
19. DEBRA P. STEGER, A CONCISE GUIDE TO CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREE-
MENT 49 (Carswell ed., 1988). See also JOHN D. RICHARD ET AL., THE CANADA-U.S. FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT 16 (1987). These rights are unilaterally given to Canada. United States
cultural industries assume no advantages or obligations via the FTA.
20. FTA, supra note 10. "Article 2005.2: Notwithstanding any other provisions of this
agreement, a party may take measures of equal commercial effect in response to actions that
would have been inconsistent with this agreement but for paragraph 1 [2005.1]." Id. See
Pamela Young, Dancing With An Elephant, MACLEANS'S, Sept. 19, 1988, at 37. (Retaliatory
measures need not be limited to the cultural sector. Canadians fear this is a convenient way
of pitting the Canadian cultural industry against other Canadian industries, thereby under-
mining the entire purpose of the exemption).
21. Id.
22. Simpson, supra note 6 (books at 81%; newspapers and periodicals at 91%; movies
90%; records 52%; royalties, licensing, rental fees 90%).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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dian market, the desire of Canadians to protect their "cultural identity,"
and the built in retaliation provision that enables the United States to
take actions of reciprocal commercial effect, the following question natu-
rally arises: Why was the United States' entertainment industry so ada-
mantly opposed to a cultural exemption in the FTA? In part, the consid-
erations were fiscal, but of far greater concern was the precedential value
that such an exemption would set for the international trading commu-
nity.25 Americans feared that other countries, whose markets were not as
saturated as Canada's, would demand similar derogations, the financial
effect of which could be devastating.
While the FTA is four years old and stands on its own record, the
arguments made regarding the cultural exemption are far from moot. The
perceived need to regulate the amount of foreign culture imported into
Canada is based upon the conviction that Canada's very survival as a dis-
tinct nation state is jeopardized by the overwhelming dominance of
American culture.2 6 To fully understand the presence of the Exemption,
we must explore Canada's rationale for withdrawing cultural products
from free trade negotiations. The success or failure of the Canadian argu-
ments is essential in determining if the Canadian exemption is a viable
precedent for other nations who also seek cultural exemptions.
D. Canadian Arguments
The Canadian arguments begin with the assumption that culture and
economics are inextricably intertwined, so changes in one will necessarily
effect changes in the other. As the Canadian and United States' econo-
mies become increasingly intertwined, it will be even more important to
protect Canadian culture, the remaining vestige of national identity. Sec-
ondly, the Canadians suggest that each country has sectors it wishes to
protect and justifies a cultural derogation on the same basis as the U.S.
justifies national security exemptions. Finally, Canada makes its most
compelling argument suggesting that the common language, geographic
proximity, and the parallel history it shares with the United States has
created unique circumstances that necessitate a cultural exemption.
1. Economics and Culture are Inextricably Intertwined, so Changes
in One will Necessarily Effect Changes in the Other 27
It is illogical, inefficient, and impossible for a relatively small trading
nation in an increasingly interdependent global economy to limit con-
sumption to their own products. 8 Assuming trade liberalization is a ne-
25. The FTA was envisioned as the model for all bilateral and multilateral negotiations
designed to set the tone for NAFTA, Enterprise for the Americas, and most importantly,
the ongoing Uruguay Round of GATT.
26. David Elton, Competing Perspectives on Trade, in CANADA-U.S.- FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 94 (Earl H. Fry et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter CANADA-U.S. TRADE AGREEMENT].
27. See generally Johnson, supra note 16.
28. Alan M.Rugman, Multinationals and the Free Trade Agreement, in TRADE-OFFS
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cessity for economic viability in the world order, the question becomes
whether "we can separate the trade and economic aspects [of our lives]
from the social, cultural, and political dimensions which are the touch-
stones of our sovereignty."2"
When the FTA was negotiated, Japan, Europe, and the United States
were the three international centers of economic power.30 Economic sense
compelled Canada to affiliate with a trading power rather than get caught
in the cross-fire of a triad trade war.3 ' The United States was the only
logical choice for Canada, considering the geographic proximity, language
similarity, and long history of trade between the two nations.3 2 Unfortu-
nately, a closer trading relationship is inversely proportional to sovereign
autonomy.33 A broadened U.S. trading regime would undermine Canada's
economic independence, and, correspondingly, its political sovereignty. 4
Reduction of political sovereignty will place a premium on the preserva-
tion of culture, a nation's last link to a unique identity."
Pierre Juneau, president of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
(CBC), stated, "Much of what Canadians and most other nations consider
as culture, as essential to our sovereignty and therefore requiring atten-
tion and support by governments, the United States leaves to a large ex-
tent in the hands of private enterprise."36
"Canada is pre-eminently a political nation; the bonds of our na-
tionhood are primarily in the sphere of government and in activities deci-
sively shaped by government."" Accordingly, it is no surprise that the
"Canadians have built up one of the Western world's most costly subsidy
systems, providing rich grants for everything from automobile manufac-
turing to oil exploration."3 " Compared to Americans, Canadians accept a
stronger role of government in their daily lives and have come to expect it
in terms of services, financial assistance, medical care, and a host of other
ON FREE TRADE, supra note 4, at 4, 10.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see also ROBERT YOUNG, THE CANADA U.S. AGREEMENT & ITS INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXT 20-28 (1986).
33. Brenda Dalglish, Partners in Power, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 14, 1992, at 28.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Presentation to Center for International Affairs at Harvard, April 1986, quoted in
TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, June 22, 1986, at 5.
37. Donald Smiley, Impact on Canadian Policy Autonomy, in TRADE-OFFS ON FREE
TRADE, supra note 4, at 444.
38. John F.Burns, Why Canada Walked Out of Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1987, § 4 at 2. See also Trade Stakes are Getting Higher, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), July 25,
1992, at B4 [hereinafter Trade Stakes] ("Books, magazines, film broadcasts and other cul-
tural products are building blocks of a national identity. They are in many ways just as vital
to sovereignty as are weapons and other items vital to national security, and trade deals
routinely exempt goods related to national security.").
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areas. 39 In light of the pervasive nature of American culture in every as-
pect of Canadian society, it is generally accepted that state intervention is
necessary "to create and support a countervailing cultural force to the
unrelenting flow of Americana across the border."4
2. Sensitive Sectors, Such as National Security in the United States
and Culture in Canada, Require Protection
As an underlying rationale to remove cultural industries from the ne-
gotiating table, the Canadians asserted that trade negotiations should
take place in the context of broader values that each country cherishes:
national security in the United States and cultural sovereignty in Ca-
nada.4 1 Interestingly, the objective of all trade liberalization agreements is
not free trade but "freer" trade. Trade officials generally recognize that
some restrictions on trade always remain in effect, even if those goods
and services are produced at a comparative disadvantage.42 '[S]elected
exclusions are part of virtually all free trade agreements. The size of the
exclusions typically reflect the differential in living standards or a recog-
nition of extreme import sensitivity of certain sectors."43 Accordingly, Ca-
nadian culture must be afforded the same preferential status that the
telecommunications, marine transportation, and energy industries enjoy
in the United States. 44
3. Language, Proximity and Heritage
Canada's most persuasive argument happens to be its most basic:
The endangered status of Canadian culture emerges from the unique cir-
cumstances presented by a shared language, geographic proximity, and
common heritage with the United States.
a. Language Factor
Ironically, as Canada attempts to preserve its culture from the unre-
lenting flow of Americana, it is faced with an internal cultural revolu-
39. See generally Rick Salutin, Culture and the Deal: Another Broken Promise, in
TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE, supra note 4, at 365.
40. Watson, supra note 7. The Canadian subsidy system contains tax breaks for pub-
lishers, movie investment incentives, content regulations, preferential postal rates for
magazines, as well as tariffs on imported records and other cultural products. Id.
41. Id. The cultural industries are the "building blocks of national identity [and] are in
many ways just as vital to sovereignty as are weapons ... to national security." Trade
Stakes, supra note 38, at B4.
42. FTA, supra note 10, at 359. (FTA essentially exempts the following industries
based on their "sensitive" nature in light of national interest: financial services, government
procurement, transportation, and energy).
43. Stewart & Stewart, Consideration of a North American Free Trade Agreement:
Need for Each Government to Examine Possible Exclusions 2 (Position Paper Prepared for
Libby Glass).
44. Jonathan Ferguson, Culture Not Part of Talks, Wilson Says, TORONTO STAR, June
14, 1991, at A3.
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tion . 5 For years French speaking Canadians, primarily domiciled in Que-
bec, have resisted the assimilation policy propagated by the national
government.4 1 In recent years, Quebequois have seriously entertained the
notion of seceding from the rest of Canada and thereby gaining their in-
dependent sovereignty."' Generally, American culture has affected Quebec
less than the rest of Canada.' Given that Quebec shares one of the most
populous borders with the United States and all aspects of its existence
have mirrored the rest of Canada, Quebec's relative disinterest in Ameri-
can cultural products supports the inescapable conclusion that language
has been an effective barrier to cultural assimilation."9
b. Geographic Proximity
Canada is almost twice the area of the United States, with only one-
tenth its population." Most Canadians live within 100 miles of the U.S.
border and have free access to American television and broadcasting sta-
tions." Such proximity gives the majority of Canadians the same access
to American cultural products as if they resided in U.S. territory.
c. Common Heritage
During the long trade history between the United States and Canada,
their economies have become interdependent.2 "All analysts have agreed
that bilateral free trade entails larger adjustments in the smaller econ-
omy."53 Complete integration between the two economies necessarily had
its effect upon Canadian cultural industries.5 Canada remains the fore-
most exporter of television to the United States, exceeding all other for-
eign programming combined, yet it accounts for only one percent of the
profits realized in the U.S. market.5 On the other hand, despite three
45. See generally Charles Falzon, Film, TV Central to Sense of Nationhood, TORONTO
STAR, June 17, 1991, at A21.
46. Id.
47. Mark Clayton, Trying to Save the Soul of Canada, The CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Sept. 21, 1992, at 14.
48. Id.
49. Ian Austen, Hispanic Culture: Will it Make its Presence Felt in Canada?, THE
OTTAWA CITIZEN, Aug 15, 1992, at B1 ("[C]ulture . .. is overwhelmingly determined by lan-
guage. Look at Quebec." (quoting historian Jack Granatstein)).
50. CALIFORNIA WORLD TRADE COMMISSION, CALIFORNIA, CANADA AND FREE TRADE: A
GUIDEBOOK FOR CALIFORNIA BUSINESS, § 3.4, at 19.
51. Id.
52. YOUNG, supra note 32, at 24.
53. Id.
54. Robert Lantos, Hollywood and Canada: Balancing the Scales, Notes for Remarks
at Luncheon Meeting of The California-Canada Chamber of Commerce, Sept. 22, 1992 at 8
(transcript available from Alliance Communications Corporation). In the words of Prime
Minister Trudeau, "Living next to you is in some ways like sleeping next to an elephant. No
matter how friendly and even tempered the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.
Even a friendly nuzzling can sometimes lead to frightening consequences." Id.
55. Fraser, supra note 1, at 12.
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years of cultural protection, the United States maintains an eighty-per-
cent share of Canadian cultural domination." With advances in telecom-
munications technology, the spread of Americana will permeate even the
farthest reaches of Canada.5 Consequently, a cultural exemption is neces-
sary to prevent the otherwise inevitable absorption of Canadian culture
into that of its southern neighbor.
E. United States Responses
Americans have long viewed culturally restrictive policies as contra-
dictory to the philosophy of free trade, freedom of communication, and
the unencumbered flow of ideas." While Canadians argue that these poli-
cies tend to be either defensive or constructive in character rather than
externally aggressive, Americans have long held the view that such poli-
cies are no more than blatant protectionism.5 9 Canadians claim such poli-
cies reflect their desire to preserve and foster their cultural heritage.
While a meritorious goal by international standards, the negative eco-
nomic consequences are unacceptable to the United States.
Ultimately, the statistics are the most prolific defense to the Cana-
dian insistence of retaining the cultural industries exemption." Since the
FTA, Canada has instituted a wide variety of cultural preservation pro-
grams,6" none of which were considered economically harmful to Ameri-
56. Id. (As of 1992, after three and a half years of FTA, U.S. cultural products maintain
an ominous presence in the Canadian market. The following are percentages of foreign own-
ership in Canadian cultural industries, the majority of which is U.S. ownership: 97% of
films, 96% of television drama, 90% records and tapes, 76% of published books purchased
in Canada, 75% of magazines purchased in Canada. The total is 80% American ownership).
57. Id.
58. Denis Stairs, Canada's Trade Relations with the United States: The Non-Eco-
nomic Implications of an Economic Issue, in CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, supra
note 26, at 51 (Examples: (1) Deductibility of Foreign Advertising Expenses, (2) Simul-
casting: removal of U.S. advertising commercials and replacement with Canadian ones, (3)
Telecommunications Programming Services Act: imposes six percent tax on revenue of Ca-
nadian cable corporations that is used to subsidize Canadian programming).
59. Id. (One example was the Canadian decision to remove tax benefits for business
advertising in Time Magazine, a measure designed to prevent further new penetrations by
American interests and to give artificial support to indigenous alternatives).
60. Ottawa Must Look Beyond the Bottom Line to Protect Culture, THE GAZETTE
(Montreal), Aug. 4, 1991, at B3.
61. See Jamie Portman, Book Publishing Industry: Government Boosts Industry Aid
By 260%, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Jan. 29, 1992, at D12 (In April 1992, a new policy was
instituted that was designed to replace the Baie Comeau policy, which infuses $104 million
into Canadian book publishing and distribution industries over five years, representing an
increase of 260% capital infusion over existing levels); Federal and Provincial Governments
Come to Aid of Alberta's Cultural Industries, CANADIAN NEWSWIRE, Apr. 22, 1992 (On April
22, 1992, $7 million was committed to a joint project between the federal government and
Alberta to assist the province's film and video, sound recording, and book and periodical
publishing industries. "The Agreement is designed to strengthen long-term economic viabil-
ity of Alberta companies active in the cultural industries, expand domestic and interna-
tional marketing and distribution opportunities for Alberta's cultural products .... "). See
also Tu Thanh Ha, Culture Policy Calls For $57 Million Investment in the Arts, THE
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can cultural industries.2 Possibly the threat of retaliation under § 2005.2
dissuaded the Mulroney government from pursuing new cultural initia-
tives that might have adversely affected American cultural industries. 3
Alternatively, the absence of a United States complaint may simply be
attributed to the fact that their fears never came to fruition.
F. Summary
The United States believes that culture is a tradeable commodity,
while Canada maintains that it is inextricably intertwined with the sur-
vival of their sovereignty as a nation. 4 In the words of one Canadian au-
thor, "culture is a candy mint and a breath mint. It's simultaneously a
consumable product and a cherished articulation of a nation's soul ... If
it wasn't both a commodity and something more permanent then the re-
lationship between trade and culture would be nonexistent or irrele-
vant." 5 In light of the statistics, and the large number of Canadian cul-
tural industries owned by American interests, many consider the
Canadian cultural derogation a Pyrrhic victory.6 6 Notwithstanding the ex-
emption, figures at end of 1991 indicate the same statistical facts as in
1988 with the United States owning ninety-three percent of Canada's
movie and video revenues, ninety-two percent of book publishing, and re-
ceiving $350 million (U.S) from television and program sales. 7
Despite the rhetoric of then United States Trade Representative
Carla Hills that "there are no sacrifices, there are no tradeoffs,"'68 in refer-
ence to Amercian cultural industries, clearly they were bargained away. 9
Whether the tradeoff was for a minimum content on car parts or subsi-
dies on agriculture, we may never know. Despite the reasons for its exis-
tence, the derogation provides a precedent for exempting cultural indus-
GAZETTE (Montreal), June 20, 1992, at A5.
62. NAFTA Hearing Before the House Ways and Means Committee, Sept. 9, 1992
(Statement of USTR Carla Hills in response to question by Rep. Anthony (D-AR)).
63. Jamie Portman, U.S. Changing Tune on Protectionism; Beleaguered Canadian
Culture May Benefit From U.S. Move, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 27, 1991, at C2.
64. Robert Bragg, American Culture Strictly Business, CALGARY HERALD, July 24, 1991,
at A4.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Jonathan Ferguson, Culture, Jobs Give PM Trade-Talk Willies, THE TORONTO
STAR, July 28, 1991, at B4. See also Jeff Silverstein, Canada Wants to Guard Culture in
North American Pact, THE CHRISTIAN SCl. MONITOR, Nov. 13, 1991, at 8.
68. Intellectual Property and International Issues: Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the Committee on Judiciary
House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1991). (Response of United States
Trade Rep., Carla Hills, to question by Rep. Craig James (R-Fla.)).
69. Karen Tumulty & Joe Havemann, An Uncommon Market for U.S. Entertainment,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1990, at F2 ("One source recalls that when the United States struck a
free trade agreement with Canada a few years ago, Secretary of State James A. Baker III
telephoned [Jack] Valenti at home at midnight and said: 'I'm sorry Jack. We had to throw
you overboard.' ").
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tries that can be, and is, invoked in multilateral trade negotiations.
Pursuant to the derogation adopted in the FTA, the real issue now be-
comes whether other nations can rightfully protect their cultural indus-
tries within the auspices of free trade.
III. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) links the
economies of Canada, Mexico, and the United States. 0 The United States
entered the NAFTA negotiations determined not to grant Canadians the
cultural exemption they received under the FTA.71 It became increasingly
clear, however, that the exemption was an indispensable condition for Ca-
nadian participation in NAFTA. Despite the United States' verbal oppo-
sition, Canada received a cultural exemption in NAFTA that mirrored
the one negotiated in the FTA.
72
Although trade in culture was a contention between the United
States and Canada, Mexico announced that culture would not be an issue
to it and that "[t]he rights and obligations between Canada and Mexico
regarding cultural industries will be identical to those applying between
Canada and the United States. '73
While Hispanic culture is prominent in the United States, as evi-
denced by a multitude of Spanish radio, television, and cable networks
and a large indigenous population of Mexican ancestry, in Canada it is
not.74 Not only are Canadian and Mexican cultures vastly different, but
geographic distance and language differences serve as effective barriers to
significant integration."
In light of Mexico's relatively underdeveloped cultural sector, why
was it necessary for Canada to maintain the exemption as to Mexico?"
One explanation was that out of requisite fairness in multilateral negotia-
tions, derogations in favor of one country should apply to the other coun-
70. The NAFTA took effect on January 1, 1994.
71. But see Peter Morton, Mexico and U.S. Clash Over Energy Contracts: Trade Deal
Hits Last-Minute Snag, THE FIN. POST, Aug. 7, 1992, at 1 ("If one side held firm and the
other side wanted the deal, it was clear which way it had to go; Bush wanted the deal"
(quoting U.S. Trade Consultant Bill Merkin)).
72. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW & DESCRIPTION 19 (Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative ed., 1992).
73. NAFTA PARTNERSHIP, supra note 11, at 2 (In the cultural sector, Canada and Mex-
ico signed a Film and Television Co-Production Agreement in April 1991 in efforts to
"broaden financing and production opportunities for the film and television industries of
both countries.").
74. Austen, supra note 49.
75. Id.
76. Emil Zubryn, Mexican Film Industry Braces for Poor Year, HOLLYWOOD REP., Aug.
25, 1992, at 16 (Association of Mexican Film Producers and Exhibitors estimated no more
than 50 feature films will be produced this year. This might be overly optimistic since the
National Film Industry Chamber (Canacine) decided to no longer support the official Devel-
opment Fund for Quality Films.).
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tries in the same manner. This argument, however, is irreconcilable with
both the United States' and Canadian justifications for the exemption in
the FTA: namely that the exemption was needed to protect ailing Cana-
dian industries from relentless United States imperialism; a creature fed
by their joint history, common language, and geographic proximity.
Another possible explanation is that Canadian cultural industries are
so saturated by foreign interests that any subsequent foreign ownership,
no matter by whom or how minimal, would be devastating."7 Notwith-
standing these possible rationales, by allowing Mexico to accept such a
derogation, the Americans have undermined their own case by implicitly
endorsing the protection of culture within the auspices of free trade
agreements. 8 Accordingly, the United States should not be startled that
other nations, particularly the European Community member states, are
now lobbying for the incorporation of a cultural industries exemption
within the auspices of GATT.
IV. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
"No other market is as important for American exporters or our in-
vestors as is the market of the European Community.""8 With film and
television sales generating more than a $4.5 billion trade surplus, during a
time in which the United States' trade deficit continues to grow, clearly
"the prosperity of the American economy is increasingly tied to
Hollywood's well being."8 As domestic demand for television stagnated,"
American industries began looking to overseas markets as fertile deposi-
tories for their cultural products.82 Having saturated Canadian markets,
77. Heather Hartt, Lantos Blasts Valenti over NAFTA, HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 23,
1992, at 3, 16. "The Cultural exemption is not directed against the U.S. any more than it is
directed against Ireland or Spain or Australia, [ilt's directed toward Canada." Id.
78. See M. Jean Anderson et al., Intellectual Property Protection in the Americas: The
Barriers Are Being Removed, 4 Prentice Hall Law and Business J. Proprietary Rts. 2, 7
(1992). NAFTA is the first step in the goal of an enlarged FTA that encompasses all of the
Americas and has an accessions clause that will enable other countries in Latin America to
join. ABA Meeting Looks at NAFTA and Intellectual Property Rights, INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA), Apr. 22, 1992 (Much of the phrasing of the intellectual property part of NAFTA is
modeled after the Dunkel Text, further indicating the influential value NAFTA will have to
GATT negotiations.).
79. U.S. Welcomes Changes in Europe, But Fears of Trade Barriers Linger, AvIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., 127 (June 12, 1989).
80. Stokes, supra note 2.
81. Id.
Movie theater admissions are no higher now than they were in the 1960s. The
number of commercial TV stations, the single largest consumer of the indus-
try's product, is barely growing. And the average number of hours of broadcast
TV usage per household has plateaued, undermining advertising revenues that
determine what stations will pay for programs.
Id.
82. Id. ("By the year 2000, half of the revenues from American movies and records will
be earned in foreign countries."). See also Carl Bernstein, The Leisure Empire, TxM, Dec.
24, 1990, at 56.
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American attention focused on the European continent. With steadily ris-
ing per capita incomes, a combined population greater than that of the
United States, and a newly deregulated television industry, European
markets have become the newest venue for American cultural products."'
Since its inception in 1958, the European Community has joined with
the United States in pursuing freer trade and open markets. Despite their
common goals, both sides throughout their trading history have employed
a variety of protectionist measures resulting in bilateral conflicts.8 4 In
1992, the E.C. was added to the United States priority watch list that
identifies countries that maintain the most pervasive and egregious anti-
American trading barriers. 5 Not surprisingly, in a manner of diplomatic
quid pro quo, American measures deemed protectionist by the European
Community were the subject of an annual report entitled "Problems with
Doing Business with the United States." 8
While the United States runs a trade deficit with Europe in a num-
ber of economic sectors, the sale of U.S. videos, movies, music, and televi-
sion programs account for a trade surplus of more than $8 billion (U.S.). s"
Overseas revenues of Hollywood studios have doubled in the past five
years. If this trend continues, overseas sales may soon exceed domestic
revenues.8 Coupled with this growth trend is the incontrovertible fact
that American programming dominates European markets, while Euro-
pean Community programming has but a de minimis appeal outside na-
tional boundaries.8 9
83. Id.
84. Trade Relations E.C.- U.S.A and E.C.- Canada, COOPERS & LYBRAND E.C. COMMEN-
TARIES, Oct. 8, 1992 at § 2.2.
85. Among the barriers identified as egregious was the Broadcast Directive promulgated
in 1989. Id.
86. Id.
87. Noreen Janus, Hollywood Meets the NAFTA, AM. CHAMBER OF COM. OF MEX. Bus.
MEX., May 1992. See also Steven Greenhouse, Europe Reaches TV Compromise; U.S. Offi-
cials Fear Protectionism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1989, at Al (some estimates suggest 70% of
entertainment shows are of American origin); Clyde H. Farnsworth, U.S. Fights Europe
TV-Show Quota, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1989, at D1 (television producers collected $630 mil-
lion in programming revenues in European Community representing two-thirds of the for-
eign sales); Jonathan Weber, Turning the Volume Down; Hollywood Nervous Over Possible
European TV Quotas, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 1989, at B1 (sales of movie and television pro-
grams are worth more than $800 million annually); Jacqueline Frank, European Television
Without Borders or Without Americans?, THE REUTERS LIBRARY REPORT, July 26, 1989.
(1989 U.S. film and television industry contributed $2.5 billion trade surplus, with television
sales alone over $600 million).
88. Briefs: Overseas Fortunes, HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb. 18, 1992, at 6. Presently, external
sales account for 42% of Hollywood studio revenues with continued growth projected. Movie
revenues from foreign theaters will grow to $4.95 billion by the year 2000, up from $2.27
billion in 1991. Hollywood's rentals amounted to 15% of movie revenues and will likely grow
to 19% by 2000. Janus, supra note 87. TV programming, to Europe, accounts for $600 mil-
lion annually. Growth in these sectors has been attributed to a number of factors including
great advances in technology and the recent deregulation of many European broadcasting
systems. Id.
89. The Audiovisual Industry, PANORAMA OF E.C. INDUSTRY 26-8.
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A. Television Without Frontiers Directive
On October 3, 1989 the European Community, by a vote of ten to
two, adopted a broadcasting directive, known as Television Without
Frontiers ("Directive"), aimed at regulating trans-European television
broadcasting." The goal of the Directive is to encourage development of
the European television industry, a step considered essential in achieving
continental unification." While the Directive covers a broad array of cul-
tural policies,9" the most controversial section creates a regime in which
50.1% of member state television programming, excluding news, sports,
game shows, and advertising, must be of European origin.8 This objective
may be achieved by, among other things, the use of quotas94 and subsi-
dies.9 5 The goal of the Directive is preservation of a "European cultural
identity" that, the E.C. contends, is being eroded excessively by American
programming.9 Although the United States immediately denounced the
Directive as a violation of free trade principles and warned the European
Community of possible trade repercussions, the Directive remains in force
and is the foundation of European cultural policy.97 The rationale under-
Nearly 72% of programs purchased by Community Members come from the
United States whilst only two percent of the audiovisual product broadcast
across the Atlantic are Community origin . . . Not only is there a lack of com-
munity program exports but also 90% of these programs never cross the fron-
tiers of their country origin.
Id.
90. Timothy M. Lupinacci, Note, The Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities in
the European Community: Cultural Preservation or Economic Protectionism?, 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 113, 115 (1991).
91. Audiovisual Communications, COOPERS & LYBRAND, E.C. COMMENTARIES, March 25,
1993, § 3.1, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD file [hereinafter Audiovisual
Communications].
92. Id.
93. Council Directive of 3 Oct. 1989 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid
Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pur-
suit of Television Broadcasting Activities, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. 23 (1989). Article IV:
Member states shall ensure where practicable and by appropriate means, that
broadcasters reserve for European works, within the meaning of Article VI(a),
a majority proportion of their transmission time, excluding the time appointed
to news, sports events, games, advertising and teletext services. This propor-
tion, having regard to the broadcaster's informational, educational, cultural,
and entertainment responsibilities to its viewing public, should be achieved
progressively, on the basis of suitable criteria.
Id. 28 Am. Soc'Y OF INT'L L., Nov. 1989.
94. See Weber, supra note 87. Quotas have the effect of depressing prices by dividing
the market into local and foreign segments. Accordingly, European shows will increase in
value being able to satisfy the local content requirement while the price of U.S. programs
will drop with an ensuing glut in the market. Id.
95. Lupinacci, supra note 90, at 116.
96. Id. at 120.
97. See generally Paul Presburger et al., Television Without Frontiers: Opportunity
and Debate Created by the New European Community Directive, 13 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 495 (Spring 1990); Brian L. Ross, "I Love Lucy," But the European Commu-
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lying the Directive has been the basis for a series of related directives
aimed at preservation of European culture.98
The European Community cites three broad justifications for its po-
sition: (a) the Directive is a political rather than a legal commitment that
contains no enforcement provision and leaves implementation to individ-
ual member states,99 (b) since United States sales account for only
twenty-eight percent of the rapidly growing E.C. television market, Amer-
ican industries will have ample opportunity to grow,' 0 and (c) culture is
not like all other tradeable commodities. While culture has quantifiable
monetary value, it simultaneously represents the essence of national sov-
ereignty and thereby must be treated differently than common tradeable
goods.
1. The Directive is Merely a Political Commitment
Supporters of the Directive argue that it is a political rather than a
nity D6esn't: Apparent Protectionism in the European Community's Broadcast Market, 16
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 529 (1990). For a broader discussion of European Broadcast Directive see
Suzanne M. Schwarz, Television Without Frontiers?, 16 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 351
(Fall 1991).
98. Transatlantic Television Can You Spare a Reel?, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 19, 1989,
at 56; Adam Dawtrey, EC Crackdown on Subsidies Dropped, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 16,
1990 [hereinafter Dawtrey]. In recognition of Europe's rapidly developing broadcast sector
and the need to remove the physical, technical, and fiscal barriers that exist between states,
the Commission has adopted a broad base media policy consistent with the mandates
promulgated by the Treaty of Rome. While the effect of the Broadcast Directive has not
been immediately devastating, U.S. cultural industries live in fear that the European Com-
munity will continue to impose an array of protectionist measures that will greatly disad-
vantage them. Robert Marich, AFMA Blasts EC 'Rental Rights', THE HOLLYWOOD REP.,
July 2, 1992, at 3, 24 [hereinafter Marich]. The "rental rights" directive received approval
on October 28, 1992 with implementation to begin in July of 1994. In addition to establish-
ing regulations to combat piracy, the directive "seeks to establish across the countries of the
EC an agreed definition of the potential artistic beneficiaries of the video-rental exploitation
of films made within the EC, and at the same time to establish a rule of equitable renumera-
tion for all involved." Audiovisual Sector a Major Political Issue in GATT Talks, INFORMA-
TION SERV. TECH. EUR., No.0076, Nov. 5, 1992. The home video tape directive calls for mem-
ber states to collect a levy on "rental or lease transactions for videocassette, CDs and other
software, the proceeds of which will go to European cultural projects." Susan W. Liebeler et
al., EC 1992 and its Potential Effects on the United States Entertainment Industry, ENT.
L. REP., June 1989, at Legal Affairs Vol. 11 No. 1. In at least three EC member states a tax
is levied on the sale of empty video cassettes, the proceeds of which are used primarily to
compensate European copyright holders as well as promote or subsidize local cultural indus-
tries; Karen Tumulty et al., An Uncommon Market for U.S. Entertainment, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 1990, at F2; Susan W. Liebeler et al. EC 1992 and its Potential Effects on the
United States Entertainment Industry, ENT. L. REP., June 1989 at Legal Affairs Vol. 11
No. 1. In the spirit of EC media policy, a number of states have imposed screen quotas
thereby limiting the number of foreign films shown in domestic theaters. Furthermore,
many countries require a dubbing license be bought before showing a dubbed film or alter-
nately require dubbing to be performed domestically. For a full discussion of the entire EC
Media Policy see generally Audiovisual Communications, supra note 91.
99. Lupinacci, supra note 90, at 123.
100. Id. at 124.
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legal obligation, implicitly suggesting that the European Court of Justice
would not take action if faced with a member state in violation of the
Directive's mandates."' In support of this view, many have suggested
that without the Directive the United States would face an array of dif-
ferent quotas resulting in a regime far more restrictive, more difficult to
administer, and far less predictable.' °0
2. United States' Sales are Minimal in a Growing European Market
A combination of events, including the staggering rate of technologi-
cal advances and the recent deregulation of broadcasting stations across
Western Europe, "has created a number of new generation broadcasters
hungry for ratings and starved for commercial television."' 03 The United
States' television and film industries, being the most lucrative U.S. export
behind aerospace, sold programming worth $844 million to the E.C. in
1988 with profits expected to triple by the end of 1992. ' 04 Despite these
figures, European statistics show American programming sales to be far
below the fifty percent limit.'05 With the European audio-visual market
growing by nearly eleven percent each year, the European Community
suggests that Amercian sales will not stagnate or decline but rather
101. Steven Greenhouse, Europe Reaches TV Compromise U.S. Officials Fear Protec-
tionism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1989, at Al.
102. Tyler Marshall, European Community Sets Quota For Television Imports, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1989, at Cl.
103. See Weber, supra note 87 (advances in telecommunications have enabled Ameri-
can TV to reap profits through sales to European network, cable and satellite services). Fred
Hift, TV Trade War Heats Up, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 2, 1989, at 10 (the
American business has created a new group of European entrepreneur who are dependent
on popular U.S. programming to maintain their ratings). See The Audiovisual Industry,
PANORAMA OF E.C. INDUSTRY 28-1 ("the EC audiovisual industry has experienced significant
growth. Television which only ten years ago was almost exclusively controlled by the public
sector, is now largely privatized."); Bethany Haye et al., Eureka Has Golden Message for
U.S.: No Euro TV Quotas, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 3, 1989 (In past two years Europe has
consumed 15 years worth of American production. With all the new channels projected to be
opened, not even the Americans could fill the void.).
104. Lupinacci, supra note 90, at 126.
105. Marshall, supra note 102. David Kelly, Fritts Says Valenti is Ringing EC Alarm
Too Soon, HOLLYWOOD REP., June 29, 1992, at 4, 16. The U.S. industries are not close to the
50% quota. Penetration is at 25%, suggested the National Association of Broadcasters Pres-
ident Edward Fritts, therefore the quotas are not nearly as detrimental as MPAA suggests.
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increase. °e
Generally, local programming remains the best selling commodity
within an E.C. member state, but as among foreign programming, the
United States' programming is the product of choice. 101 For example, in
Germany domestic programs will typically be preferred to American pro-
grams, but given the choice between American programs and programs
produced in other member states, German viewers will choose the pro-
grams from the United States.01 The fact remains that while American
exports account for the vast majority of foreign films in Europe, only fif-
teen percent of European films are seen outside their national bounda-
ries. 09 United States producers "have gained because of superior distri-
bution across the E.C. region, better marketing, and because they have
been able to win marginal sales in the European Community at low prices
that can be [subsidized] by sound profits already earned" in the domestic
U.S. market."0 Despite American fears and the proliferation of a variety
of new cultural directives,"' U.S. television industries remain a dominant
force in European sales." 2 As one commentator put it, "The Hollywood
lead is so enormous - in TV and movies - that the Europeans will have
How the Definition of European Can Vary, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1989.
European content of TV in Member States
Belgium 71%
Denmark 77
France 67
Greece 78
Ireland 61
Italy 54
Luxemburg 48
Netherlands 70
Portugal 66
Spain 65
UK 69
West Germany 83
Average Total 68%
106. Clyde H. Farnsworth, U.S. Fights Europe TV-Show Quota, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
1989, at D1 (Television is expected to grow to 400,000 hours in 1990s from 250,000 hours in
1987. The U.S. sells 70,000 hours of TV time to Europe (1990) and hopes to have it increase
threefold by 1995 representing 4 billion in sales.); GATT to Examine Broadcasting, THE
FIN. TIMES, June 28, 1990 (The number of channels expected to double by year 2000); Mar-
shall, supra note 102 (By 1995 an estimated 120 major channels will be looking to fill more
than 200,000 additional TV hours by 2000). See also ECONOMIST Aug. 19, 1989; David
Dodwell, U.S. Filmmakers Focus on Uruguay Round: The Audio- Visual Trade Tussle Has
Come to a Head in Geneva, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at 4.
107. John Marcom Jr., Empty Threat?, FORBES, Nov. 13, 1989, at 43.
108. James Ulmer, Euro, U.S. Lawmakers Trade Views in L.A. on TV Quotas,
HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 25, 1989.
109. Joel Kotkin, How the West Was Lost? Why the Sun Won't Set On the Empire
Built By the Anglo-Americans, THE WASH. POST, July 5, 1992.
110. Dodwell, supra note 106.
111. See Dawtrey, supra note 98.
112. Id; see also Dodwell, supra note 106.
VOL. 22:1
TRADE IN CULTURE
to run faster just to keep up.11' 3
3. Culture is Different from Other Tradeable Commodities and its
Unique Nature Requires it to be Protected
The Directive represents merely one of many recent efforts claiming
to be the vanguard of a collective European culture.' 4 While such cul-
tural directives' 9 go beyond the powers conferred by the Treaty of
Rome,"1 which established a purely economic alliance, they fall directly
within the purview of the Maastricht Treaty, which elevates culture to a
level of importance equal to that of other major community policies.1 7
The European Commission's main objective was to preserve the history of
the European people by supporting their cultural endeavors at home and
creating avenues for its dissemination throughout the world."' Critics
suggest that the concept of "a common European heritage" is dubious
coming from a continent that has been ravaged by two World Wars and
has seen the likes of Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler." 9 But recent evi-
dence suggests that European youth are increasingly finding commonali-
ties not merely in fashion, music, and food but in attitudes, values, and
lifestyles. 20 Commonalities among European youth are increasingly anti-
American and distinctly European."'
The preservation of cultural values and national identity as a compo-
nent of sovereignty is a well established goal of international agreements.
For example, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
promulgated by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 rec-
ognizes free expression as a fundamental human right.12 2 Similarly Article
1(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirms
the right of all peoples to "freely determine their political status and
113. Id.
114. Adam Dawtrey, EC Crackdown on Subsidies Dropped, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 16,
1990 (at least 6 of the 12 members are urging the Commission to take an official stance on
protecting European culture).
115. See Marich, supra note 98.
116. Dawtrey, supra note 114.
117. Culture: Single Market Should Favor Cultural Exchanges, EUR. Soc. POL'Y, May
14, 1992. See also EC Scriptwriters, Directors, and Producers of Cinematographic Works
Call for Enquiry into U.S. Trade Practices, REUTER TEXTLINE AGENCY EUROPE, Nov. 18,
1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD file.
118. Id.
119. U.S. 'Outraged' By EC Move To Restrict Foreign TV Programs, Will File GATT
Case, Hills Says, 6 INT'L TRADE REP., BNA, 1292 (Oct. 11, 1989); David Dodwell, U.S. Film
makers focus on Uruguay Round, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at 4 (the EC is a market that is
fragmented for both cultural and lingual purposes).
120. Jeff Kaye, The Rave of Europe, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1993, at El.
121. Id.
122. UN Declaration HR, Article 19: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."
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freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.' 1 23
Both the European cultural directives and the cultural derogations
granted to Canada are based on the right of a sovereign nation to protect
its culture and regulate its own internal broadcast industry.' 24 Then Eu-
ropean Community president Jacques Delors framed the issue as a matter
of cultural survival, stating that "[e]ach country should be able to defend
its own culture . . . . Culture is not a piece of merchandise like other
things . . . we have [a] right to exist, to perpetuate our traditions.' 2 5
The unique nature of cultural products necessitates their regulation
outside the traditional rules of economics that underlie a free trade sys-
tem. Modern international trade is based on a theory first propounded by
David Ricardo in 1817, known as comparative advantage. The theory of
comparative advantage "holds that a country or region should specialize
in the production and export of those goods and services that it can pro-
duce relatively more efficiently than other goods and services, and import
those goods and services in which it has a comparative disadvantage."' 26
Cultural products do not fit well within such a scheme. First, price is
not always the determinative factor in their purchase, and second, ineffi-
cient producers are still motivated to produce despite economic loss. 2 '
Therefore, treating cultural works as a tradeable commodity would force
it to exist under a theory of economic Darwinism, a fate that would lead
to the production of cultural works by a few low cost producers. This
result is not only incongruous with numerous treaties protecting culture
but also threatens national sovereignty by disabling the country's ability
to express itself.
Most countries employ a wide variety of subsidy schemes recognizing
the need to protect cultural endeavors that are not profit generating nor
self sustaining.12  For example, Native American crafts in the United
States may not have survived without significant government subsidiza-
tion. Similarly, the cultural directives promulgated by the European
Community benefit far more than the film and television industries but
have substantial impact upon non-profit cultural works. "
While official United States policy refuses to accept culture as any-
thing more than a tradeable commodity, the European Community sim-
123. JOSEPH SWEENY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, DOCUMENTARY SUPPLE-
MENT 67 (1988) (quoting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 1:1).
124. Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the International "Free Flow" of Infor-
mation, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 372, 382 (1990).
125. Greenhouse, supra note 101.
126. RALPH FOLSOM ET AL., INT'L Bus. TRANSACTIONS, DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT (1991)
at 3.
127. Theater arts have long been associated with a nation's cultural endeavors yet re-
main dwarfed in profitablility compared to revenues from film and television.
128. See generally Trade Relations E.C.-U.S.A. and E.C.-Canada, COOPERS & LYBRAND
E.C. COMMENTARIES, Oct. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD file.
129. Id.
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ply points to the cultural derogation granted to Canada in both the FTA
and NAFTA, as well as American domestic restrictions on the ownership
of entertainment industries, and argues that the mere existence of such is
de facto proof that culture deserves protection.'3 0
B. Reactions of the United States
In direct response to the Broadcast Directive, the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives introduced and unanimously passed Resolution 257 that de-
nounced the Directive as a contravention of GATT and merely "another
episode of protectionism hiding behind the masque of patriotism."' 3 ' The
United States' reaction to the Directive has been the foundation from
which it argues against all culturally protectionist measures. The Con-
gressional rejection of the Directive, as compared to their approval of the
FTA, suggests that there is a distinction between the cultural exemption
granted to Canada and the cultural policies that the E.C. continues to
propagate.
The United States consistently defends the derogation granted in
favor of Canada as one strongly objected to, but necessary for the benefits
of freer trade and supports its position through three severable argu-
ments: (1) the geographic proximity, shared history, and similarity of lan-
guage has inextricably intertwined Canada and the United States thereby
creating a unique relationship deserving of special treatment in certain
areas; (2) Canada's situation is unique because its cultural industries are
so highly saturated by foreign investment; and (3) the United States has
never conceded the validity of a cultural exemption and has explicitly
reserved the right to take retaliatory measures against foreign actions
harmful to American cultural industries. 3 2
1. Proximity, Language, and History
The derogation insisted upon by and granted to Canada was more a
matter of comity and understanding than official United States policy.
While it is clear that due to geographic, economic, social, political, and
linguistic factors, Canada and the United States share a unique co-exis-
tence, it does not necessarily follow that a "cultural derogation" is
uniquely applicable only between them. Rather, the European Commu-
nity suggests that with the onslaught of modern technology capable of
transferring information at the touch of a button, the United States has
been able to expand its markets with ease.'3" Further, with English rap-
130. Roy Denman, Television Without Frontiers, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1989, at A23.
131. House Approves Resolution Urging U.S. Action To Protest Television Program-
ming Directive, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. 1384 (Oct. 25, 1989) (Resolution 257 voted on October
23, 1989 by 342 to 0); Lupinacci, supra note 90, at 128 (the U.S. responded by bringing the
E.C. into arbitral proceedings as proscribed by GATT article XXII/XXIII under the charge
that the Directive violates the Most Favored Nation and National Treatment provisions).
132. See text accompanying note 20.
133. See supra note 88.
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idly becoming the lingua franca of the modern world there is no effective
difference between the road from Hollywood to Vancouver as compared
to the road from Hollywood to Brussels. In time the United States' indus-
tries will overwhelm their European counterparts, and Americana will be-
come the adopted culture of the world.
2. Canada's Cultural Industries are Completely Saturated with For-
eign Investment, Justifying their Unique Treatment
The Canadian situation is not one of economic dominance but one of
mere survival. The official United States position does not expressly ac-
knowledge that the saturation levels of the Canadian cultural industries is
a factor in granting the derogation to Canada. But, in light of American
dominance in their market, the internationally recognized right to express
one's sovereign culture, and the interest in a comprehensive free trade
agreement, American saturation of Canada becomes a legitimate point.
In essence, the European Community witnessed what happened to
Canada, feels similarly susceptible to the American machinery, and would
rather take preemptive measures than find themselves unable to produce
a domestic product in the future.""
The United States is quick to point out the facial inconsistency of
allowing citizens to select parliamentary leaders but not television pro-
grams, yet, does not address the issue of when a country can legitimately
control domestic broadcast content and when that control turns into pro-
tectionism.135 The European Community argues that a quota and subsidy
regime is one of preventative maintenance, justified by the proposition
that by the time the E.C. is as saturated with American cultural products
as Canada, it is already too late."3 6
3. The United States Never Conceded Validity of a Cultural
Derogation
Former U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills has repeatedly stated
that the "cultural derogation [was] taken and I use the word taken be-
cause it was not given it was taken and we also took the right to retaliate
if it is exercised .... "s137 Interestingly, the retaliation provision has never
been invoked.' Whether this is due to want of cause or that the political
134. Leyla Ertugrul, European Parliament Clears "TV Without Frontiers", THE REU-
TER LIBR. REP., May 24, 1989, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 180 and 181. The FCC places limits of all kinds
on programming content from language to nudity that are allowed under European stan-
dards. What FCC labels as appealing to the prurient interest to Europeans is merely part of
their culture. Accordingly, U.S. objections to E.C. content restrictions are hypocritical.
136. Jack Valenti, Television With Manacles, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1989, at A27.
137. News conference with Carla Hills, Former U.S. Trade Rep., on Sept. 18, 1992, at
77.
138. NAFTA Intellectual Property Provisions In North American Trade Pact Called
"Model", INT'L Bus. DAILY, Aug. 20, 1992.
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ramifications of using retaliation are too costly is not entirely clear.189 The
method through which the United States would retaliate is § 301 of the
United States Trade Act of 1974 as amended by the Omnibus Trade Act
of 1988.140
The amended Act instructs the U.S. Trade Representative to create a
"watch list" and a "priority watch list" consisting of those countries
promulgating practices that are otherwise burdensome, restrictive or vio-
lative of American rights and interests. 14 1 Use of § 301 is a drastic mea-
sure, one not entirely consistent with GATT, and for that reason has been
the focus of much international debate. 142 In essence, the threat of a
§ 301 sanction hangs over the heads of all U.S. trading partners as essen-
tially a mechanism of last resort to safeguard American interests. 14 As
with all such considerations, the following question arises: if such a pow-
erful trade weapon is used, will the benefits outweigh the costs?144
Although the European Community has articulately advocated ex-
cluding culture from the GATT, the E.C. certainly does not stand
alone. 48 "Most Third World countries... [feel] that governments should
retain the right to control the import of films and TV or video program-
mes in order to safeguard national cultures."'4 6 Mochtar Lubis, president
of the Press Foundation of Asia, explained the Third World fear of West-
139. Tumulty, supra note 98, at F2.
140. Title III, Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C 2411 (Supp. 1993);
If the United States Trade Representative determines under section 304(a)(1) that -
(A) the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are being denied; or
(B) an act, policy, or practice'of a foreign country (i) violates or is inconsistent with, the
provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement,
or
(ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce;
the Trade Representative shall take action ...
141. M. Jean Anderson et al., Intellectual Property Protection In the Americas: the
Barriers Are Being Removed, PRENTICE HALL L. & Bus. No. 4; J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 7,
Apr. 1992 (in 1992, nine countries were on the priority watch list and 22 countries were on
the regular watch list, one of which was Canada).
142. Free Trade's Fading Champion, ECONOMIST, Apr. 11, 1992, at 65 (Use of section
301 against Japan, India and Brazil in 1989 has put the world on notice of the powerful
weapon contained therein. Its extended use, however, which may indeed be violative of
GATT, would only lead to a number of reciprocal protectionist measures and the ultimate
derogation of the free trading system).
143. Id. See also Bob Davis, Kantor Takes Tough Stance on Trade With Europe, Ja-
pan at Senate Hearing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1993, at A2. (The article suggests that the new
USTR Mickey Kantor would advocate the use of Section 301).
144. Id.
145. Chakravarthi Raghavan, Governments May Lose Right to Control Foreign Films,
TV Shows, THIRD WORLD NETWORK FEATURES 2, 1990. Countries in favor of cultural restric-
tions include Australia, Canada, Nordic Countries, Egypt, India, and most Third World
countries.
146. Id. at 2. See also David Dodwell, U.S. Filmmakers focus on Uruguay Round: The
Audio-Visual Trade Tussle Has Come to a Head in Geneva, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at 4
("[Simaller players such as Australia and India share EC concerns that their own film in-
dustries might be hurt if U.S. companies win unfettered access to their markets.").
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ern cultural domination by pointing out that "[m]odern communications
[are] a powerful instrument to influence the attitudes, habits, tastes, per-
ceptions of many people around the world .... Thus communications
penetrate into the deepest layers of the societal fabric and of culture.'
147
V. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
"Today, culture may be [a] country's most important product, the
real source of both its economic power and its political influence in the
world."' 4 In direct response to the promulgation of the European Broad-
cast Directive, the U.S. House of Representatives unanimously passed
Resolution 257 denouncing the Directive as a "blatantly anti-U.S. action"
in violation of international trade agreements.'4 9 Lobbyists have been
quick to point out that the entertainment industry is America's second
largest exporter and is responsible for the viability of a number of collat-
eral industries, all of which employ thousands of people.' 0 As a result,
the United States has actively opposed further E.C. cultural directives
and demands a withdrawal of those presently in existence. The United
States lodges a variety of complaints all based on the theory that Euro-
pean Community cultural directives violate GATT. Unfortunately, analy-
sis of the GATT regime does not shed light on the subject and tends to
raise more questions than answers.
A. The GATT Regime
The United States claims that culturally restrictive legislation, such
as the Broadcast Directive, violates Articles I W and IIP of GATT by
placing quantitative restrictions on all non-European cultural products.'53
147. Cate, supra note 124, at 381.
148. Bernstein, supra note 82, at 56.
149. H.R. Res. 257, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H6558. The vote was 342 in
favor of the resolution and none opposed, with 90 abstentions. 135 CONG. REC. H7357. Rep.
Frenzels said the cultural exemptions claimed by Europe were no more than "the last refuge
of trade scoundrels." Id. at H7330 (statement of Rep. Frenzels). "The Directive is one of the
first signals of what the United States can expect from Europe in 1992 and comes across
more like a red flag flying over Fortress Europe than as a friendly initiation to be neighbors
in a global telecommunications village." Id. (statement of Rep. Markey).
150. Tumulty, supra note 98. The U.S. entertainment industry generates a vigorous
trade surplus estimated to be US$3.5 to four billion per year. Id. Western Europe sales
account for more than one-half of the industry's total sales outside the U.S. Id.
151. GATT, supra note 12, at 194. Article I MFN treatment requires all contracting
parties to grant each other treatment as favorable as they give to any country in the applica-
tion and administration of import and export duties and charges. No country is to give
special trading advantages to another or to discriminate against another. MFN automati-
cally extends bilateral agreements to all GATT members without the need for multilateral
negotiations. This automatic trade liberalization mechanism is considered the cornerstone of
GATT. There are exceptions to MFN, however, including an exception for Free Trade Areas
in Article XXIV. Id.
152. See GATT, supra note 12.
153. Suzanne Michele Schwarz, Television Without Frontiers?, 16 N.C. J. INT'L & COM.
REG. 351. The U.S. collaterally argues that the Article XXIV exception to MFN for free
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The European Community contends that the Directive regulates cultural
works that are services and therefore GATT does not apply to them.'6 4
Notwithstanding the E.C. position, even if cultural works are construed
as goods properly regulated under GATT, the United States' reliance on
GATT as the vanguard of its interests is misplaced. First, GATT does not
clearly prohibit cultural content restrictions. Second, the United States
provides similar protection for its own domestic entertainment industry,
some of which may violate GATT. Third, harm to U.S. industries is spec-
ulative and accordingly will not support a GATT claim.
1. GATT Does Not Clearly Prohibit Cultural Content Restrictions
European observers are surprised at what they call "the very aggres-
sive stance taken by the United States administration against European
Community cultural rules."' 5 A spokesman for the European Community
emphasized that the Community's rules of origin are completely "compat-
ible with the GATT."'16 Several GATT provisions allow derogations from
GATT obligations.
a. Article XXV: Waiver
GATT Article XXV:5 provides that a country may, when its eco-
nomic or trade circumstances warrant, seek a derogation from particular
GATT obligations.'5 7 A waiver would allow the European Community to
suspend most favored nation status and national treatment obligations to
trade areas does not apply. A free trade area is defined under Article XXIV:8(b):
A free trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of com-
merce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII,
XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the
constituent territories in products originating in such territories."
GATT, supra note 12, at Art. XXIV:8(b).
Although the European Community is a free trade area, the United States contends
Article XXIV does not allow a free trade area to increase any rate or duty in a manner
inconsistent with GATT.
154. See generally GATT, supra note 12, at 194 (at its inception, GATT was designed
to facilitate only the trade in goods, not services.).
155. GATT: U.S. Will Submit Rules of Origin Proposal at Next Meeting of GATT,
USTR Hills Says. 6 INT'L TRADE REP., (BNA), 1152 (Sept. 13, 1989).
156. Id.
157. GATT Article XXV:5 reads:
"In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agree-
ment, the Contracting Parties may waive an obligation imposed upon a con-
tracting party by this Agreement; Provided that any such decision shall be ap-
proved by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority shall
comprise more than half of the contracting parties. The Contracting Parties
may also by such a vote
(i) define certain categories of exceptional circumstances to which other
voting requirements shall apply for the waiver of obligations, and
(ii) prescribe such criteria as may be necessary for the application of this
paragraph.
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non-E.C. nations permitting the operation of the Directive's European
content restrictions.
Although the United States argues that the Directive violates Arti-
cles I and III, the United States has benefited from a similar waiver.
Nonetheless, the United States and Canada concluded an agreement in
1965 that provided for preferential duty free entry of Canadian auto parts
into the United States.1 5 Auto exporting GATT nations such as Great
Britain and the former West Germany objected to the pact as a violation
of Most Favored Nation treatment (MFN). 56 The United States sought
and was granted a waiver of its MFN obligations even though it conceded
that the agreement violated Article ."60
The European Directive presents a strikingly similar situation: a lo-
cal content regulation promulgated within a regional trading area. Argua-
bly, cultural content restrictions are no different than the American auto
part restrictions suggesting that a GATT waiver may likewise apply.
b. Article XIX: Escape Clause
Article XIX, the Escape Clause, is an exception to GATT Article XI
prohibiting quotas.' The Escape Clause allows GATT member states to
impose quotas on products that are being imported in increased quanti-
ties and that cause, or are likely to cause, serious injury to competing
domestic producers.'62 Arguably, the increase of American entertainment
products in European markets has caused serious injury to domestic pro-
ducers. Subsequently, Article XIX:3(a) would permit the European Com-
munity to impose a quota on American entertainment imports to the ex-
tent and for the period of time considered necessary to rectify the injury
158. United States-Canadian Automotive Products Agreement, Jan. 16, 1965, entered
into force Sept. 16, 1966, 17 UST 1372, TIAS No. 6093. See also Stanley D. Metzger, The
United States-Canadian Automotive Products Agreement of 1965, 1 J. WORLD TRADE L.
183 (1967).
159. S. REP. No. 782, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1965). Canada argued that although
the Agreement technically violated GATT Article I, the net effect would be an expansion of
trade, and the Agreement would be applied in a non discriminatory manner in conformance
with GATT goals. Id.
160. See Report of the GATT Working Party, quoted in Harold Hongjuh Koh, The
Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on the Proposed United States-Ca-
nada Free Trade Agreement, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 193 (1987).
161. GATT, supra note 12, at 194.
162. Id. Art. XIX:1(a) provides:
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obliga-
tions incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff
concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that con-
tracting party in such increased quantities and under conditions as to cause or
threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or di-
rectly competitive products, the contracting parties shall be free, in respect of
such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to pre-
vent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to
withdraw or modify the concession.
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to European producers. '
c. Article XXI: Security Exception
An exception to both Articles I and III is Article XXI, which pro-
vides "[niothing in this Agreement shall be construed . . . to prevent any
contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests.' 164
One of the central European arguments in support of the Directive is
that the development and preservation of European cultures remains vi-
tal to the formation of the E.C. as a political entity. 6 The E.C. argues
the Directive expresses "cultural sovereignty," within the political power
of the sovereign. 6 Given the political component of cultural content re-
strictions, some scholars argue that ". . .the film, broadcast and sound
recording industries of many countries outside the U.S. are considered to
be purveyors of national culture and deserving of the treatment accorded
to national security.' 67
163. Id. Art. XIX:3(a) provides:
If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the
action is not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue
the action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or
continued, the affected contracting parties shall then be free, not later than
ninety days after such action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of
thirty days from the day on which written notice of such suspension is received
by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the application to the trade of the con-
tracting party taking such action, or in the case envisaged in paragraph 1(b) of
the Article, to the trade of the contracting party requesting such action, of
such substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under this
Agreement the suspension of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not
disapprove.
See Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Non-Discriminatory Application of Article XIX GATT:
Fact or Fiction, Legal Issues of European Integration 1981/2 at 39-41. It has been suggested
that the Escape Clause cannot justify cultural content restrictions because many commenta-
tors believe such a quota under Article XIX must be applied nondiscriminately. However,
Article XIX:3(a) indicates that a quota may be directed specifically at the "contracting
party that is taking such action" to cause harm to domestic producers; Mark Koulen, The
Non-Discriminatory Application of GATT Article XIX(1): A Reply, Legal Issues of Euro-
pean Integration 1983, at 89-95, 110-11.
164. GATT, supra note 12, at 194.
165. 135 CONG. REC. H7326 at 7328 (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino), "These [EC] am-
bassadors claimed they were integrating their markets and solidifying Europe economically
and politically." Id.
166. Id.
167. GATT Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Geneva, 1955, 44, quoted in
Keith Acheson and Christopher Maule, Trade Policy Responses to New Technology in the
Film and Television Industry, 23 J. WORLD TRADE L. 35, 47-48 (1989); see also Kelly L.
Wilkins, Television Without Frontiers: An EEC Broadcasting Premier, 14 B.C. INT'L. &
COMp. L. REV. 195 n. 81 (1991).
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d. Article XVIII: Governmental Assistance to Economic
Development
Article XVIII allows nations to impose trade restrictions in order to
foster economic development. While Article XVIII generally applies to
less developed countries (LDCs), Article XVIII:4(b) indicates that devel-
oped nations may also use quotas to establish a particular industry."0 8
GATT practice shows Article XVIII can be successfully invoked by non-
LDC countries to justify trade restrictions, provided they apply to an in-
fant industry critical for the nation's further economic development. 6
Canada has argued that it is in some ways a "third world nation cul-
turally;" until a few years ago it "published fewer children's books than
Uganda."' 0 Similarly, the European Community seeks to promote its au-
dio-visual industry as an engine of economic growth.' 7 1 Both the EC and
Canada recognize the multiplier effect that the entertainment industry
has upon collateral industries. Accordingly, development of the motion
picture and television production industry will spur expansion in related
businesses and create jobs. 1 2
e. Article IV: Motion Pictures
Article IV permits nations to set screen quotas mandating that a cer-
tain percentage of all films shown in a country are of domestic origin.1
7 3
168. GATT, supra note 12, at 194.
Article XVIII:4(a) provides that nations that "can only support a low standard of living
and are in the early stages of development shall be free to deviate temporarily from the
provisions of the other Articles in this Agreement...". In contrast, Article XVIII:4(b)
states that a nation "the economy of which is in the process of development, but which does
not come within the scope of sub-paragraph (a) above, may submit applications to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES under Section D of this Article.". Section D and Section C,
paragraph 13, allow a member nation that qualifies under Article XVIII:4(b) and that finds
"governmental assistance is required to promote the establishment of a particular industry
with a view to raising the general standard of living of its people," may impose trade restric-
tions that would otherwise violate GATT. There is a caveat: there must be no other action
permitted by GATT that would achieve the particular development objective. See Article
XVIII Section C, paragraph 13.
169. See, e.g., Agreement with Romania on Trade Relations, Apr. 2, 1975, T.I.A.S. No.
8159, at Art. 1(3) (effective 3 August 1975), cited in Howard Liebman, Comment, GATT
and Counter-trade Requirements, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 252, 260.
170. Don Mitchell, A Publisher Who Isn't Waiting for a Miracle, 19 B.C. BUSINESS,
Dec. 1991, No. 12, § 1 at 27.
171. Arthur Dimopoulos, The Television Without Frontiers Directive: Preserving Cul-
tural Integrity or Protectionism?, 13 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 293 (1993) [hereinafter
Dimopoulos].
172. Bernstein, supra note 82, at 56.
173. Article IV provides the following, in relevant part:
If any contracting party establishes or maintains internal quantitative restrictions relat-
ing to exposed cinematographic films, such regulations shall conform to the following
requirements:
(a) Screen quotas may require the exhibition of cinematographic films of national origin
during a specified minimum proportion of the total screen time actually utilized, over a
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Its provisions are similar to those of the Directive, the major difference
being that Article IV applies only to films while the Directive covers a
wider range of cultural works.
Article IV is the clearest indication that cultural industries were in-
tended to be exempt from GATT. Article IV was negotiated in the early
GATT rounds immediately following World War II. At the time, motion
pictures were well established, as was American domination of the indus-
try. Motion picture production in many countries outside the United
States was slow to recover from the wartime manpower and material
shortages, yet people were eager to see new movies. 174 Germany's film in-
dustry had flourished during the Reich as an artistic as well as a propa-
ganda power. Not only did it suffer from the devastation of the war, par-
tition, and postwar recession, but it was the special target of American
occupying forces who sought to eradicate the Nazi propaganda film ma-
chine. Motion pictures, having substantial influence on society, played an
important propaganda role during the war for both the Allies and the
Axis.
Negotiators in 1947 could not have predicted the current explosion of
films, cable television, satellite transmissions, videocassette, and audio
works. Cultural content restrictions clearly follow the logic and spirit of
Article IV differing only in scope by encompassing works that the original
GATT negotiators could not possibly have foreseen. 17 5
2. The United States' Opposition to Cultural Restrictions is Incon-
sistent with Its Practices that Protect the Domestic Entertain-
ment Industry
The United States has long resisted efforts by other nations to limit
the impact of American cultural exports. 7  The American opposition,
specific period of not less than one year, in the commercial exhibition of all films of
whatever origin, and shall be computed on the basis of screen time per theater per year or
the equivalent thereof; .... See GATT, supra note 12.
174. American motion picture exports soared in the late 1940's.
175. See Cate, supra note 124, at 410. The counter-argument forwarded by the U.S. not
only ignores the postwar explosion of cultural industries but also lacks logical consistency:
Article IV is portrayed as a partial exemption for motion pictures and spells out the only
allowable regulations nations may impose on any cultural works, all other cultural works
being under the purview of GATT. See also Schwarz, supra note 153.
176. See Schwarz, supra note 153. The debate began with Third World resistance to
post-World War II American control of the international broadcast industry. In the 1950's
and 60's, U.S. domination of the international media was justified by First Amendment and
free market values supporting an unregulated flow of communications. By 1970, UNESCO
was urging a balanced, regulated flow of information to preserve national cultures. U.S. per-
ceived Third World calls for media regulation as censorship; concerned that regulations
would hamstring its domination of the international communications industry, the U.S.
withdrew from UNESCO in 1984. The Directive and other cultural preservation efforts
shifted the focus of the cultural debate to the entertainment sector. Because the entertain-
ment industry is critical to the balance of trade, the U.S. shifted its response to trade terms,
basing its objections in GATT language despite its own well-established protection of its
1993
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however, is hypocritical in light of a number of United States domestic
practices that mandate similar cultural safeguards. This inconsistency in-
validates the American argument that cultural restrictions violate GATT.
a. First Amendment restrictions are justified on cultural grounds
The United States has applied the First Amendment to oppose cul-
tural restrictions abroad and to impose them at home. Freedom of speech
is not completely free in America; the First Amendment has been used to
regulate speech to conform with social norms. For example, restrictions
on fighting words, defamation, and obscenity are based on majoritarian
American cultural values.'77
The Directive regulates the content of advertising by restricting com-
mercials for tobacco, alcohol, prescription drugs, and by establishing an
entire regime for advertisements aimed at children, among others. 79 Sim-
ilarly, restrictions on commercial speech have been imposed to limit the
freedom of speech that United States advertisers have when discourse
concerns an activity regulated by social norms.7 9
b. Many FCC regulations are cultural restrictions
Many FCC regulations restrict freedom of speech on the grounds
that it is necessary to promote the health, safety, and well being of view-
ers in conformity with majoritarian cultural norms. These regulations are
often similar to the cultural restrictions imposed by the Directive.' The
similarities suggest that the United States, like the European Commu-
nity, recognizes the importance of regulating the media in order to pre-
serve cultural values.
c. U.S. concern for American viewers is not exported
In an illustrative contrast to American attitudes toward Europe and
domestic industry. Id.
177. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1983) (the definition of obscenity as being based in "community
standards").
178. Dimopoulos, supra note 171.
179. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding
restrictions on commercial speech regarding gambling).
180. AUDIOVISUAL COMMUNICATIONS, COOPERS & LYBRAND, E.C. COMMENTARIES, Oct. 15,
1992 [hereinafter COOPERS & LYBRAND]. For example, the FCC regulates programming and
advertising aimed at children. Similarly, the Directive provides restrictions on "broadcasts
which may be potentially harmful to the physical, mental and moral development of chil-
dren and young people, particularly those containing pornography or gratuitous violence or
inciting hatred for a particular race, sex, religion or nationality, should be identified as such
by broadcasters in programme announcements and must not be shown during hours in
which minors are commonly in front of the television." Right of Reply, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920,
1930 (1989). This Directive provides for the right of reply to personal attacks and political
messages. The FCC has similar guarantees of the right of reply and equal time for political
rebuttals.
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the Third World, in upholding the FCC personal attack rule, the United
States Supreme Court said "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters that is paramount .... It is the right of
the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetics, moral
and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here."' 8' The U.S. oppo-
sition to the efforts of other nations to protect cultural industries is
clearly hypocritical in light of its own reactions when its domestic indus-
try is subject to foreign control. The United States has shown it places
more emphasis on the preservation of its own culture than on the rights
of other sovereigns to protect their cultures.'82
d. Harm to United States entertainment industry is speculative
Given the explosion of the international broadcast and film industry,
"with more broadcasting hours on more channels, the Directive should
not hurt American sales." ' It is considered unlikely that the United
States' share of the European market will reach the 49.9% limit set by
the Directive. 84 If the United States is unable to show actual harm to the
American entertainment industry, then a claim under GATT will not be
successful.18 5
3. United States Protectionism of Domestic Cultural Industries
May Violate GATT
While the United States contends cultural regulations such as the
Directive violate GATT, several United States practices could be consid-
ered equally violative. Even if those practices do not present clear GATT
violations, they do indicate the U.S. not only recognizes the need to pro-
tect its cultural identity but will also take action to do so. Any challenge
to cultural restrictions under GATT would not likely succeed if the
United States was practicing the same type of restrictions in order to pre-
serve its own domestic cultural industries.
For example, the public service aspect of broadcasting has been in-
voked to justify FCC regulations on the nationality of broadcast station
owners.'8 6 This FCC regulation could be considered violative of GATT
Article III because foreign citizens are not accorded the same treatment
181. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the personal
attack rule regulating broadcast media).
182. Id.
183. Leyla Ertgul, European Parliament Clears "TV Without Frontiers," REUTERS LIB.
REP., May 24, 1989.
184. John M. Broder, Hollywood Opposes Trade Pact, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993.
185. See GATT, supra note 12, at Art. XXIII.
186. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b). Federal law prohibits foreign citizens from more than 25%
ownership of broadcast stations; foreign citizens cannot be officers of a corporation that
holds a broadcast license. The most publicized example of the FCC ownership regulations
involves Rupert Murdoch, a native of Australian who became a U.S. citizen in order to
purchase the Fox TV network. Id.
1993
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
as United States citizens.
Americans object to European and Third World efforts to preserve
their cultures yet reacted vehemently when several landmark Hollywood
movie studios were purchased by foreign corporations.187 Former U.S.
Representative Leon Panetta of California introduced a bill in 1991
aimed at limiting foreign ownership of Hollywood studios and other
American cultural industries.'88 "We ought not to allow our motion pic-
ture industry and related firms to be run from abroad. The United States
stands to lose both its artistic license and its integrity as a truly American
institution through the intangible but sure process of foreign owners' dis-
creet discretion, implicit censorship, or pervasive corporate
philosophy. '"18 9
4. Conclusion
Reliance on GATT rules as the basis for United States opposition to
European cultural directives is misplaced. Even if the GATT regime was
applicable to trade in culture, the outcome would not be certain. Inspired
by this confusion, the European Community has advocated the treatment
of cultural products as services under a proposed General Agreement of
Trade in Services (GATS).
VI. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES
A. Introduction
"In 1987, the United States introduced to members of the GATT a
comprehensive proposal for liberalizing trade in services. The proposal
called for the GATT to recognize "the sovereign right of every country to
regulate its services in industries subject only to an external control over
measures which had [the] purpose or effect of restricting market access
by foreigners.' 190
Pursuant to this declaration, formal talks on a GATS were begun.
The European Community envisioned that cultural products, being ser-
vices, would be addressed under a GATS. In contrast, the United States
maintained that cultural products like all other tradeable goods must be
reconciled within GATT.
187. Jamie Portman, U.S. Changing Tune on Protectionism; Beleaguered Canadian
Culture may Benefit from U.S. Moves, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 27, 1991, at C2. The foreign
purchases included the following: Matsushita Electronics Industrial Company of Japan
bought MCA for $6.16 billion; Sony bought CBS Records. Sony also bought Columbia Pic-
tures for $3.4 billion. Id.
188. The Bill died in subcommittee (telephone conversation between author and former
Congressman Paneta's staff, October 1992).
189. Id.
190. Lupinacci, supra note 90, at 138.
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B. Definition of Services
Among the obstacles plaguing GATS negotiations is the lack of a
generally accepted definition of services. One author defined services as
"[t]hings which can be bought and sold but which you cannot drop on
your foot."' 91 While negotiations have progressed beyond this impotent
definition, they have not gone far enough to placate all interested parties.
Generally, services are processes that require "personal contact between
the provider and the consumer."' 9' They "involve the dissemination of
skill and knowledge. . . and entail the movement of either the provider or
the receiver to the other."'9 3 While cultural products clearly involve the
dissemination of "skill," they do not require personal contact. Some cul-
tural products also have a tangible quality because they exist in physical
form, such as film reels, that makes their classification as a "service" par-
tially inaccurate. This sentiment was echoed in the European Audiovisual
Charter that stated "audiovisual works are an essential element of cul-
ture, and therefore cannot be considered services."' 94
The European Court of Justice, in the few cases that tangentially
address this issue, has been unable to resolve this dichotomy. In State v.
Sacchi,96 the court distinguished between the transmission of television
signals and the product being transmitted, holding the former to be a
service and the latter a good. The court ultimately concluded that "a tele-
vision broadcast must, because of its nature, be regarded as a supply of
services."' 9 6 Pursuant to Sacchi, the physical product can be regulated
under GATT yet its transmission is necessarily excluded. While such an
analysis is a plausible attempt to grapple with the unique nature of cul-
tural products, alone it is insufficient as the linchpin reasoning for why
culture must be treated as a service. Nonetheless, the European Commu-
nity and a number of other nations remain wholeheartedly in favor of
treating culture as a service. The EC has made crystal clear that they
were not willing to envision a GATS in the audiovisual sector if their
191. A GATT for Services, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1985, at 20.
192. Lupinacci, supra note 90, at 135.
193. Id. at 136.
194. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 180, at § 7.2. The Audiovisual charter also known
as the Delphi Declaration was promulgated in September 1988 by the European federation
of Audio-visual producers representing industry professionals from the 12 E.C. member
states, Austria, Cyprus, Hungary, Iceland, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and For-
mer Yugoslavia. Its other main provisions included the following statement: "The cultural
and linguistic identity of every nation must be safeguarded through financial support and a
system of broadcasting quotas.". Id. "The concentration of production and broadcasting in
the hands of a few individuals or multinationals is a threat to democratic rights. The inde-
pendence of artistic expression must be protected from political and commercial pressures".
Id.
195. Case 155/73, State v. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. 409, 427, 14 COMM. MKT. L.R. 177, 201
(1974). Aff'd in Procureur du Roi v. Marc J.V.C. Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. 833, 31 COMM. MKT.
L. R. 362 (1981).
196. Id.
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cultural concerns were not met,"7 meaning a complete exemption of cul-
tural industries from any agreement on services on the ground that "un-
fettered imports would dilute European culture."' 9 s Since cultural prod-
ucts do not fit well within the definition of services, the E.C. and its
cultural allies do not want cultural products included in a potential
GATS, it would be nonsensical for culture to be railroaded into a services
agreement when major disagreements still exist on important sectors,
such as maritime transport, air transport, financial, and telecommunica-
tions services that account for more than 75% of potential trade in
services.'9 9
In reality, culture is no more a good than a service. Accordingly, the
threshold question becomes not as much how to classify culture but how
should it be treated under international trading rules? All multilateral
trading endeavors begin with the realization of mutual objectives. The
difficulties lie in the reconciliation of the various formulations espoused
to accomplish those objectives. The United States wants to exploit the
economic advantages that come with exporting its culture while remain-
ing committed to respecting the identities and valued traditions of other
sovereigns. Similarly, the European Community wants to preserve its cul-
ture while reaping the economic benefits from its dissemination. 20 0 Cul-
ture, like services, is an area of first impression under GATT, therefore it
deserves similar treatment but not a similar definition. Such treatment
consists of identifying products to be liberalized, obtaining multilateral
concessions that create the parameters of its trade, and incorporating the
agreement within the underlying principles of GATT.
VII. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN CULTURE
Although cultural works cannot properly be classified as goods or ser-
vices, it must be recognized that they are cultural expressions that have
quantifiable economic value. In recognition of this duality - the multi-
billion dollar international trade in culture and the basic principle of
GATT to include rather than exclude economic issues - it is the conclu-
sion of this article that cultural works are hybrids: an inextricable mix-
ture of culture and commerce and that in recognition of their unique
characteristics must be considered separately from a GATT or GATS
regime.
Freer trade might benefit a nation's overall economy but usually at
197. Intellectual Property, Copyright Group Assails EC's stance in GATT talks, See
Prospects as Bleak, DAILY RPT. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Nov. 1, 1990, at A-16.
198. Id.
199. E.C. Negotiators Attack U.S. GATT Offer Exempting Key Sectors in Service
Talks, 58 BANK RPT. (BNA), Mar. 30 1992, No. 13, at 570.
200. Bruce Stokes, Tinseltown Trade War, NAT'L J., Feb., 23, 1991, No. 8 at 432. "The
Community has a strong cultural heritage and we wish to preserve these national and re-
gional identities." The best way to accomplish this goal is to "ensure a minimum amount of
TV programming in local languages, produced by local film-makers." Id.
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the expense of its lesser developed industries.2 0 ' "The law of comparative
advantage says that a country should specialize in what it does best [b]ut
it turns out that a lot of what makes up a country's comparative advan-
tage is created by government policies on everything from education to
government procurement."' ' On the other hand, under a system of man-
aged trade, the government uses trade and other policies to implement an
industrial strategy and encourage the development of key industries. As
these industries mature, they will gain strength, ultimately being able to
compete in a free market. In the United States, managed trade is seen in
the automobile, maritime transport, financial services, telecommunica-
tions, textiles, agriculture, and a host of other industries. 03 Managed
trade "is the only viable alternative in the real world to protectionism"
2 4
and must be employed to ensure "commitments by nations to accept cer-
tain proportions of imports in their domestic markets." ' 5
GATT in many senses is the ultimate free trade agreement uniting
108 countries in the goal of removing all trade restrictions.0 ' Since its
inception in 1948, GATT has been very successful in reducing the number
of managed goods and progressively removing barriers to their free trade.
Notwithstanding its successes, the GATT implicitly realizes that trade
liberalization is a slow and deliberate process. "Highly sensitive industries
can be seriously harmed through. . . liberalization efforts, with long term
consequences to shareholders, workers, communities and regions of a
country."' 7 The concepts of freer and managed trade are not antithetical
but rather adjacent steps in the process transcending isolationism to-
wards free trade.
Under an envisioned General Agreement on Trade in Culture
(GATC), cultural products would be traded under managed circum-
stances with the understanding that as industries matured, trade would
be liberalized. This scheme would recognize the vital social need to pre-
serve a nation's culture as well as the fiscal aspects attached to the sale of
cultural products. The removal of culture into a separate agreement
would alleviate the pressures of manipulating GATT articles to accommo-
date the elusive concept of culture, facilitate a GATS by allowing parties
to concentrate on a comprehensive list of negotiable services and ensure
the survival of a diversity of cultural expressions no matter how small or
unprofitable they may be.
201. Dalglish, supra note 33.
202. Id. quoting Andrew Jackson, senior economist with the Canadian Labor Congress.
203. Id.
204. Leonard Silk, Head Off a Trade War, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 4, 1993, at A23, quoting
Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.
205. Id.
206. Dalglish, supra note 33.
207. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 43.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
"In many ways, language is the essence of culture." Presently, the
people of the world speak approximately 6000 languages, "[b]ut some-
where between 20% and 50% of those languages are no longer being spo-
ken by children. That doesn't mean they're endangered, [iut means
they're doomed."2 '
Currently 660 languages are safe from extinction because they are
either spoken by more than 100,000 people or because "they are protected
by the government. [A]t the rate things are going, the coming century will
see the extinction. . . of 90% of the world's linguistic diversity. It is
doubtful whether a culture can survive without a language. . . forcing us
to consider what the cost would be of losing 90% of the world's
cultures." 0 9
Globalization of the world's cultures is due to a number of homogen-
izing forces, such as multinational corporations, immigration, and global
media.21 0 Threats of cultural genocide exist not only directly from bullets
and bulldozers but indirectly from television, films and radio. The state
of cultural arrest in Canada is a sad example of that fact. Although una-
ble to reclaim significant portions of their market, the cultural derogation
granted to Canada has been the impetus for a number of cultural endeav-
ors used to preserve their struggling cultural regime. The world, a witness
to the Canadian situation, remains fearful of a cultural imperialism the
sole goal of which is not enrichment but economic profit. As a result, the
E.C. has embarked upon a bold program of cultural imperatives designed
to foster the continued growth of cultural industries. "Americans don't
understand the serious nature of cultural politics in Europe. [T]he cur-
rent political environment, Europe-wide TV deregulation and the subse-
quent mushrooming of the European market would have been politically
impossible without a cultural safety net of some kind." '
The Broadcast Directive and subsequent culturally based directives
are the price paid for such liberalization. While protectionism is contrary
to free trade in goods, it has long been considered the rule and not the
exception when it comes to trade in services. Trade in culture, being a
hybrid combination of both a good and service, is furthermore inextrica-
bly combined with national sovereignty and cannot justly be treated as
one or the other. If the United States continues to treat culture as a
tradeable good, the European Community and its allies will refuse to ad-
dress culture in any multilateral trading arrangement, leaving U.S. cul-
208. Mitchell Stephens, Brave New World; Pop Goes the World; MTV in Prague, Pad
Tai in Topeka - As the World Shrinks, Cultures Blend and Diversity Disappears, L.A.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 17, 1993 at 23, quoting Michael Krauss professor of linguistics at
University of Alaska.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Stokes, supra note 2, at 432.
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tural products as victims of unrestricted national policies. While respec-
tive negotiating positions have been defined, the unique nature of trade
in cultural products makes a victory under ill-suited GATT or GATS re-
gimes impossible for either side.
By accepting that culture is unique and addressing it in its own fo-
rum, the fears of cultural imperialism on the one side and blatant protec-
tionism on the other will be eradicated. The European Community will be
forced to make market access commitments and possibly bifurcate its in-
dustry to protect unprofitable cultural works and simultaneously begin
liberalization for films, television, and other profitable cultural endeavors.
A comprehensive negotiation would enable concerned countries to limit
market access in order to foster cultural industries as well as to bind
countries to timetables, liberalization levels, and prevent the pure domes-
tic regulation of trade in culture.
One author has analogized our state of cultural globalization to mix-
ing paint. "When you first begin stirring many different-colored paints in
a can, you get some colors that clash, but you also get some beautiful
rainbow patterns. Maybe that is the period we are in now .... The Ques-
tion is: What will human culture look like after the paint can has been
stirred a century or two longer?" '
212. Stephens, supra note 208, at 22.
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STUDENT COMMENT
The Basel Convention on Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes: An
Opportunity for Industrialized Nations to
Clean Up Their Acts?
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing environmental activism and awareness is forcing industri-
alized and developing countries to recognize the treacherous conse-
quences of ignorance and complacency towards our rapidly deteriorating
global environment. Widely publicized problems and incidents have
spurred public concern over health, safety, and the future vitality of our
fragile world ecosystem. Some commentators see the right to environment
as an emerging human right under international law.' However, while the
area of environmental law has progressed rapidly since it first became an
item of global concern in the 1970's, even existing conventions and trea-
ties may not be enough to protect the world environment for future gen-
erations. More drastic measures may be necessary.
Transboundary movement of hazardous waste, especially uncon-
trolled incidents of third world toxic dumping, is an issue of global con-
cern that has stirred a great deal of activism. This paper explores the
historical progression of the law of transboundary movements of hazard-
ous wastes to the recent implementation of the Basel Convention. It then
offers recommendations for how the United States and the world commu-
nity should strengthen the Basel Convention, especially by creating more
stringent requirements for liability and an international agency to super-
vise and enforce the convention to make it binding on all parties, and
therefore more effective. The issue of the environment as a human right
will also be discussed in this context, emphasizing the author's resolve
that the strictest standards must be adhered to where materials that
1. See Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Envi-
ronment, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103 (1991); Melissa Thorme, Establishing Environment As a
Human Right, 19 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 301 (1991). See also Dana J. Jacob, Comment,
Hazardous Exports from a Human Rights Perspective, 14 SW. U. L. REV. 81 (1983).
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threaten human life are concerned.
II. HISTORY OF THE TRAGEDY
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment2 was
the first indication of environmental consciousness among the nations of
the world.' While showing some signs of promise, Principle 21 of the Dec-
laration laid a weak, conflicting foundation for international actions:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and
the responsibility to ensure that the activities within their jurisdiction
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.4
In order to compensate for the inadequacies of Principle 21, the more
forward-looking and expansive Principle 22 urged states to "co-operate to
develop further the international law regarding liability and compensa-
tion for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused
by the activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas
beyond their jurisdiction."5
The need for control of hazardous wastes became an item of global
concern following several major tragic incidents during the 1970's and
80's. In 1976, an explosion occurred at a chemical plant near Seveso, It-
aly, causing a vapor cloud of toxins to be released into the atmosphere.'
Although the chemicals released were highly lethal, it took the plant
managers seven days to inform local authorities about their toxicity, and
another five days for the officials to act.7 Certain highly affected areas
were evacuated, and an intensive clean-up plan was instigated. Although
there were no immediate deaths caused by the chemical release, over 500
cases of skin irritation were reported, and numerous animals and acres of
food were destroyed as a result of contamination.8
Following the Seveso incident, the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) in 1984 showed its concern through
adoption of a Decision/Recommendation that requires countries to ensure
2. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, adopted by the UN Conference
on the Human Environment at Stockholm, June 16, 1972, Section I of Report of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr.1
(1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
3. Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 259, 266 (1992).
4. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 2, Principle 21.
5. Id., Principle 22.
6. Ved Nanda & Bruce Bailey, Export of Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Technol-
ogy: Challenge for International Environmental Law, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 155, 161
(1988). Prior to the explosion, plant workers complained of inadequate safety measures. Id.
7. Id. at 162.
8. Id. at 162-63.
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that hazardous waste situated within their borders is managed respon-
sibly, in order to protect both human health and the environment.9 Al-
though this was one of many "first steps" taken by international organi-
zations toward managing the problem of toxic wastes, it was hardly the
solution.
As if the Seveso incident had not been adequate warning, in 1984
toxic gas escaped overnight from a storage tank at a Union Carbide chem-
ical manufacturing plant in Bhopal, India, covering a 25 square-mile area.
The toxic gas immediately caused the death of over 1,600 people and in-
jured over 200,000 people.1" Several hundred more people died during the
next several months due to lingering effects of the gas," and even as late
as 1987 victims continued to die daily.'2
Following the Bhopal incident, and after many other disastrous inci-
dents, 13 a second OECD Recommendation 4 was produced that enlarged
the first, and in 1986 the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) helped establish an international environment bureau. The pri-
mary focus of these and other efforts was information generation, rather
than regulation.' 5
Of primary concern was the effect of hazardous wastes on the envi-
ronment in developing countries. The World Bank addressed this prob-
lem by creating a program to help developing countries effectuate policies
concerning toxic wastes.' 6 The effectiveness of such programs has been
questioned by some commentators who believe the World Bank lacks the
ability to effectively address environmental concerns in its lending poli-
cies because of internal and external constraints.' 7
9. OECD, DECISION AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL ON TRANSFRONTIER MOVE-
MENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, OECD Doc. C(83) 180, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 214 (1984).
10. Nanda & Bailey, supra note 6, at 165-66.
11. ld. at 166. The Indian government reported that 30,000 to 40,000 people had suf-
fered serious injuries from the incident, and that it had received 500,000 other claims re-
lated to the leak. Id. citing Matt Miller, Two Years After Bhopal's Gas Disaster, Lingering
Effects Still Plague Its People, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1986, at 30.
12. Jeffrey D. Williams, Comment, Trashing Developing Nations: The Global Hazard-
ous Waste Trade, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 275 n.5 (1991), citing WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 1987, at A15.
The Indian government estimated the death toll at 3,329 by early 1987. Id.
13. The Chernobyl nuclear reactor meltdown in 1986 killed 31 people, injured several
hundred more, and caused concern over abnormally high radiation levels in food and water
worldwide. Chernobyl caused the international community to take a hard look at the lack of
regulations and systems of liability and compensation available. Similarly, a chemical fire
and major toxic chemical spill in Basel, Switzerland in 1986 threatened the countries along
Rhine River (France, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany) and raised concern over
the lack of an international regulatory scheme. See Nanda & Bailey, supra note 6, at 161-
179 for a detailed analysis of these and the previously discussed incidents.
14. OECD, COUNCIL DECISION ON EXPORTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES FROM THE OECD
AREA. OECD Doc. C(86) 64, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1010 (1986).
15. Nanda & Bailey, supra note 6, at 189.
16. Ved Nanda, International Environmental Protection and Developing Countries'
Interests: The Role of International Law, 26 TEX. INT'L L. J. 497, 505 (1991).
17. See id. at 506; Ved P. Nanda, International Development Agencies (IDAs), Human
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During 1986, public awareness of hazardous waste issues grew. The
Khian Sea, a Philadelphia ship, arrived in the Bahamas with 13,000 tons
of incinerator ash, only to be turned away. 8 After two years of searching
for a disposal site, the crew of the Khian Sea attempted to unload her
cargo in Haiti. ' 9 After three thousand tons of the cargo, listed as "fertil-
izer ash," were dumped, the Haitian government ordered the ship to
leave.20 The ship departed, changed its name, and travelled through the
Middle East and Far East in search of a disposal site. When next seen in
Singapore, it was empty.2 ' This is one of many similar incidents2 2 in
which developed countries have persistently abused developing countries
in an effort to dispose of waste that is harder or more expensive to dis-
pose of in developed countries.23
The issue of toxic waste dumping in developing countries is contro-
versial. In considering whether the World Bank should "encourage more
migration of the dirty industries to the third world," Lawrence Summers,
the chief economist of World Bank, stated that "the economic logic of
dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impecca-
ble." 2 4 Summers' major contentions were:
First, the costs of pollution depend on earnings foregone through
death or injury; these costs are lowest in the poorest countries. Sec-
ond, costs rise disproportionately as pollution increases; so shifting
pollution from dirty places to clean ones reduces costs. Third, people
value a clean environment more as their incomes rise; if other things
are equal, costs fall if pollution moves from rich places to poor ones.2
The basic problem with this economic model is obvious: can such a price
tag be placed on human lives? The problem is complicated by the fact
Rights, and Environmental Considerations, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 29, 34 (1988).
18. Robert M. Rosenthal, Ratification of the Basel Convention: Why the United States
Should Adopt the No Less Environmentally Sound Standard, 11 TEMP. ENVTL. & TECH. J.
61, 62 (1992).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 63.
22. In 1988, another shipment from Philadelphia was marketed and sold to Kassa
(Guinea) as "raw materials for bricks" and dumped in an abandoned quarry. After the is-
land's vegetation started dying and investigators found the substance to be toxic, Guinea
protested. Since then the company has sent a ship to remove the ash. Williams, supra note
12, at 178-79.
23. The estimated cost of disposing a ton of hazardous waste in the United States dur-
ing 1988 was $2,500. Nanda, supra note 16, at 506 n.71.
Therefore, even though, as in 1988, when a Detroit attorney offered the government of
Guinea-Bissau (Northwest Africa) $600 million (two times the foreign debt and thirty-five
times the value of all annual exports of Guinea-Bissau), he could have stood to make $400
million off the deal. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 63 n.30.
24. Pollution and the Poor: Why "Clean Development" at Any Price is a Curse on the
Third World, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 1992, at 18 [hereinafter Pollution and the Poor].
25. Id. This purely economic view, which the author sees as a balance of costs and
benefits, ignores humanitarian issues, which will be discussed later in this paper. See infra
notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
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that some developing countries feel they need the capital created by haz-
ardous waste dumping so desperately that for the industrialized nations
to ban all dumping would be to deprive these countries of their right to
have fair access to the means of industrialization.2 8
Developing countries often see environmental regulation, as one com-
mentator aptly remarked, "as a wolf in sheep's clothing designed to per-
petuate the existing cycle of impoverishment. 2 7 Many see the situation
as coercive; one in which the developing countries, with enormous
amounts of money being waved in their faces, have no option but to
choose the short term gain and long term disaster of hazardous waste
dumping.2 8 Furthermore, because of high environmental standards in in-
dustrialized countries, many see waste dumping in developing countries
as a "double standard" in which industrialized countries allow chemicals
that have been banned for domestic disposal due to hazardous health and
environmental effects to be exported to developing countries that do not
have such stringent environmental standards.2
The problem is not merely one of acceptance of the waste. The fact
that developing countries lack the infrastructure to control hazardous
waste in a manner which would be acceptable to industrialized nations
greatly increases the likelihood of accidents or improper disposal.30 Fur-
thermore, once environmental havoc is created by toxic waste, the costs of
reversing the process are exorbitant, it is nearly impossible to entirely
26. Williams, supra note 12, at 292. Although developing countries usually accept waste
as a tool for industrialization (either through disposal for quick cash or recycling as industry
in itself), environmentalist groups such as Greenpeace view waste as unnecessary for sus-
tainable development and intolerable because of the unnecessary hazards it exposes people
of developing countries to. A commentator makes the statement that
If clean growth means slower growth, as it sometimes will, its human cost will
be lives blighted by a poverty that would otherwise have been mitigated. That
is why it would be wrong for the World Bank or anybody else to insist upon
rich-country standards of environmental protection in developing countries.
Pollution and the Poor, supra note 24.
27. Williams, supra note 12, at 292.
28. The inequity between industrialized and developing countries has been likened to a
sport where the participants are not playing on a level field, where "industrialized countries
may take unfair advantage of their impoverished neighbors, who may be willing to trade an
increased public health and environmental risk for a short term infusion of capital." Ste-
phen Johnson, The Basel Convention: The Shape of Things to Come for United States
Waste Exports?, 21 ENVTL. L. 299, 300-01 (1991).
29. See Williams, supra note 12, at 288-289.
30. In Koko, Nigeria, hazardous waste packed in steel drums was stored in the midst of
a residential area for over seven months between 1987 and 1988 for only $100 per month.
See Nanda & Bailey, supra note 6, at 156.
The situation is further exascerbated by the fact that developing countries have some of
the worst pollution problems and most lax disposal regulations in the world. For example, in
the southeastern suburbs of Algiers lies one of the world's largest municipal waste dumps.
The refuse of the entire city, an average of 1,400 tonnes a day, is efficiently
collected from the city and trucked to an area hundreds of metres square. In-
dustrial waste is added indiscriminately. Spontaneous fires fuelled by gases
emitted from the fermenting heap produce clouds of foul smoke sometimes
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remove, 31 and the human misery created is irreversible.32
III. THE BASEL CONVENTION - THE SOLUTION?
In 1987 UNEP sponsored the "Cairo Guidelines" as a resolution to
address concern about exports of waste to other countries and to assist
developing countries in implementing safe hazardous waste disposal sys-
tems.13 However, since resolutions are not legally binding, and because of
growing public concern, ' the UNEP sponsored a working group of tech-
nical and legal experts to prepare a global convention on the control of
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes. 5
The resulting document, referred to as the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
creating a fog in the neighbouring areas. On occasions, the choking smoke is so
thick that motorists on the highway running through the dump become disori-
ented and crash.
In Cairo, an open canal of raw effluent runs through residential areas to a
large lake that has been converted into a reeking open cesspit. From there, the
effluent drains through a further canal into the Mediterranean, contaminating
the sea and beaches and killing fish and wildlife.
Middle East: Earth Summit-Environment Debate Gathers Momentum, Middle East Eco-
nomic Digest, Reuter Textline, May 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
After witnessing the Bhopal incident and its aftermath, the devastation to be inflicted
on developing countries by improper management of hazardous wastes should be
convincing.
31. The problem is not limited to "Third World" countries. Eastern European coun-
tries have more than their share of environmenta problems. Since reunification, Germany
has had to deal with a wide spectrum of environmental problems, the least of which are
abandoned coal mines that were frequently used for illegal dumping of hazardous waste.
The Environment Ministry has determined that pumps will be needed for the next 50 to 100
years to prevent water from seeping into the mines, potentially causing extensive ground-
water contamination. See Government Reaches Accord on Financing Cleanup of Contami-
nated Sites in East, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 706, Nov. 4, 1992.
The Europe Commission had to take emergency action recently when a dam in Yugosla-
via, holding back millions of tons of toxic waste from such abandoned mines, was found to
be crumbling into disrepair. The Commission is planning on emergency repair of the dam,
which could collapse at any time; if this happens, it has been estimated that up to 7 million
tons of toxic waste would flow into the Tara, Drijna, and Sava rivers, and onwards into the
Danube and the Black Sea. See Yugoslavia: Crumbling Dam's Toxic Waste "Threatens
Millions", Reuter Textline, Guardian, Nov. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
32. Improper solid waste management can cause groundwater contamination, crop con-
tamination, increased incidence of cancer and birth defects, and, in the case of serious con-
tamination, severely shortened lifespan. See Johnson, supra note 28, at 306. Because in de-
veloping countries ill-health and shortage of food are already problems, the toxic waste
legacy merely incurs increased misery. Id.
33. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 72. See also id. at n.117.
34. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
35. Michelle M. Vilcheck, Comment, The Controls on the Transfrontier Movement of
Hazardous Waste From Developed to Developing Nations: The Goal of a "Level Playing
Field," 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 643, 656 (1991); U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.14/30, (1987).
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Disposal 6 (Basel Convention), was signed by thirty-five countries of 116
countries participating in the negotiations in Basel, Switzerland that en-
ded on March 22, 1989." The Convention was designed to become effec-
tive upon actual ratification by twenty countries. 8 On May 6, 1992, over
three years after its creation, the Basel Convention finally came into ef-
fect. " Yet how effective it has actually been, or has the potential to be,
will depend on whether the world community can come to a consensus as
to its terms and achieve full implementation of the Convention.
A. The Ends and Means of the Basel Convention
Dr. Mostafa Tolba, former Executive Director of UNEP, stated that
the aim of the Basel Convention is "a major reduction in the generation
of hazardous wastes." ° The first objective of the Convention is "to pro-
tect countries against the uncontrolled dumping of toxic wastes.""' The
Basel Convention broadly defines waste to include "substances or objects
which are disposed of or are intended to be disposed of or are required to
be disposed of by the provisions of national law." ' Hazardous wastes are
36. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, UNEP Doc. I.G.80/3, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657(1989) [herein-
after Basel Convention].
37. Vilcheck, supra note 35.
Signatories to the Convention include Afghanistan, Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada,
Columbia, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary,
Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands,
Norway, Panama, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Arab Emirates, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Basel Convention, supra note 36.
38. Id.
39. United Nations Officials See Basel Treaty As "Limping" Into Effect With Limited
Support. 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 275, May 6, 1992 [hereinafter Treaty "Limping" Into
Effect].
40. Vilcheck, supra note 35, at 658.
The Preamble to the Convention also recognizes that the protection of human health
and the environment should be maintained by states in their control of movement and dis-
posal of wastes, that "any state has the sovereign right to ban the entry or disposal of for-
eign hazardous wastes and other wastes in its territory," that
hazardous wastes and other wastes should, as far is compatible with environ-
mentally sound and efficient management, be disposed of in the State where
they were generated, that transboundary movements of such wastes from the
State of their generation to any other state should be permitted only when
conducted under conditions which do not endanger human health and the en-
vironment, and under conditions in conformity with the provisions of this
Convention,
that information exchange is condoned, and, of special controversy, that there is a "need to
continue the development and implementation of environmentally sound low-waste technol-
ogies, recycling options, good house-keeping and management systems with a view to reduc-
ing to a minimum the generation of hazardous wastes and other wastes." Finally, the Pre-
amble takes into account "the limited capabilities of the developing countries to manage
hazardous wastes and other wastes." Basel Convention, supra note 36, at Preamble, 657-59.
41. Alexandre Kiss, The International Control of Transboundary Movement of Haz-
ardous Waste, 26 TEx. INT'L L. J. 521, 535 (1991).
42. Basel Convention, supra note 36, art. 2(1).
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identified by their origin or component parts4 and are specifically listed
in the convention.44 Industrialized countries such as the United States
lobbied hard for the national definitions of waste clause to be included."
Annex II of the Convention requires wastes collected from house-
holds and residues arising from the incineration of household wastes to be
considered separately.4' This broadens the definition of wastes more than
most countries have had to previously deal with, and some have inter-
preted this to go as far as to include nonhazardous recyclables. 4
7
The Convention requires States to reduce the generation of hazard-
ous wastes, 48 and when this is unavoidable, to dispose of the waste as
close as possible to the source of production. 9 The crux of the Conven-
tion is that an exporting state must guarantee "environmentally sound
management" of the waste5" and may only export waste where it does not
have the technical capacity and facilities to dispose of the wastes in an
environmentally sound manner.51
The Basel Convention prohibits the export of hazardous wastes to a
developing country (Party) that has prohibited all imports by its legisla-
tion, or if the exporting country has reason to believe that the wastes in
question will not be managed in an environmentally sound manner. 52 The
Convention also creates an affirmative duty in a contracting state to pro-
hibit the import of hazardous wastes into its territory if it has reason to
believe the waste would not be managed in an environmentally sound
manner.
53
The Basel Convention does not allow parties to the Convention to
permit hazardous or other wastes to be exported to or imported from a
nonparty state. 4 There is one important exception to this standard that
may hinder the effectiveness of the Convention. Article 11 allows parties
to enter into bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements or arrange-
ments with nonparties,
provided that such agreements or arrangements do not derogate from
the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes and
other wastes as required by this convention. These agreements or
43. Id. art. 1 (a), (b).
44. Id. annex I, III.
45. See Kiss, supra note 41, at 536.
46. Basel Convention, supra note 36, at annex II.
47. See Grant L. Kratz, Implementing the Basel Convention Into U.S. Law: Will it
Help or Hinder Recycling Efforts?, 6 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 323, 334 (1992).
48. Basel Convention, supra note 36, art. 4(2)(a).
49. Id. art. 4(8).
50. Id. art. 4(2)(d).
51. Id. art. 4(9)(a).
52. Id. art. 4(2)(e).
53. Id. art. 4(2)(g).
54. Id. art. 4(5).
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arrangements shall stipulate provisions which are not less environ-
mentally sound than those provided for by this Convention in particu-
lar taking into account the interests of developing countries. 5
The Basel Convention requires a permit to be issued by party states
for each transboundary movement of waste that occurs." It also requires
an authority to be established57 to ensure compliance with the require-
ment of notice8 to and consent from (via a written response) the receiv-
ing state.5 9 An exporting state may not allow commencement of trans-
boundary movement of waste until it has received such written consent,
which also confirms that there will be adequate, "environmentally sound
management" of the wastes.8 0
Since the Convention did not establish an international police force
to monitor the international hazardous waste shipments, the Basel Con-
vention requires much international cooperation and control, placing-a
great deal of responsibility on each individual member state. Enforce-
ment, therefore, must take place at the national level through the estab-
lishment of strict domestic regulations in compliance with the Conven-
tion.8 ' While a Secretariat provided by the convention is responsible for
oversight of its implementation, the Secretariat's principle responsibility
will be facilitating the flow of information, not enforcing compliance with
Convention regulations.8 2
B. Do the Means Adequately Fulfill the Ends?
Although the Basel Convention is undoubtedly the most comprehen-
sive and stringent effort to date to attempt some form of control over
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes,6 3 it is not without its crit-
ics. African nations have been opposed to the Convention from the begin-
ning.6 ' They feel the convention does not do enough to protect developing
nations against dumping by industrialized countries.8 In response to this
dissatisfaction with the convention, in 1991 the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) drafted the Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import
into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Manage-
ment of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa.6 6 The Bamako Convention is
55. Id. art. 11(1).
56. Id. art. 4(7)(a).
57. Id. art. 5(1).
58. Id. art. 6(1).
59. Id. art. 6(2).
60. Id. art. 6(3)(a),(b).
61. Christina L. Douglas, Hazardous Waste Export: Recommendations for United
States Legislation to Ratify the Basel Convention, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 289, 308 (1991).
62. Id. at 310.
63. See Vilcheck, supra note 35.
64. Myra McDonald, Africans Challenge International Accord on Toxic Waste, Reuter
Libr. Rep., Jan. 28, 1989, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD file.
65. Kiss, supra note 41, at 537.
66. Organization of African Unity: Bamako Convention on the Ban bn the Import into
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very similar to the Basel Convention, except it is obviously more strict in
that it bans all waste imports into Africa.
. The executive director of the Kenya Energy and Environment Or-
ganization (KENGO), Achoka Awori, says the Basel Convention contains
"slippery" language and limited provisions for monitoring disposal sites.
"There are loopholes which can be exploited. '6 7 One of the most contro-
versial loopholes presently is the recycling exception, which allows waste
that would normally be banned under the convention to be transported
and disposed of in countries for "recycling. "8
Are the fears of the African Nations"9 and other developing coun-
tries70 well-founded? Although there is great support among academics
for the Basel Convention, at least one commentator sees the Convention
Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes
Within Africa, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 773 (1991).
67. Treaty "Limping" Into Effect, supra note 39.
68. Kevin Stairs, Greenpeace's adviser on treaties and conventioris, says that most haz-
ardous waste trade is executed as recycling trade. For instance, in March the German gov-
ernment was forced to pay for two trains to go to Romania to recover more than 400 tons of
toxic German pesticides it had sent there earlier. Greenpeace says that Romanian farmers
were told by Germany that the pesticides could be re-used, but when Greenpeace investi-
gated, they found damaged and rusting barrels with the pesticides leaking into the environ-
ment. Greenpeace claims the pesticides were illegal under Romanian and German law.
Alecia McKenzie, Environment: EC Hazardous Waste Proposal Opposed by Germany, In-
ter Press Service, March 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
During 1992 Britain exported 165 tons of lead wastes to the Philippines, and 280 tons
to Indonesia for recycling. These are only two of 60 countries where Britain sent toxic waste
last year. When Greenpeace visited lead recovery plans in Indonesia, they found workers
stirring "huge vats of molten lead by hand with inadequate cloths over their faces to protect
them from highly toxic lead fumes." Id.
In 1990, 40 million tons of waste, with a price tag of $19 billion, were exported from
OECD countries for recycling in other parts of the world. The high cost of pollution control
in industrialized countries is expected to cause plant closures, thus further driving recycling
processes into countries with less stringent controls. World: Europe's Green Channel for
Toxic Waste, Reuter Textline, April 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File [hereinafter Green Channel for Toxic Waste].
69. Many developing countries are grappling with cleaning up past environmental dam-
age, and because money allocated to the environment may be subtracted from that going
towards feeding hungry mouths, there is a great deal of concern with stopping such environ-
mental problems from occurring in the first place. Other nations who are not themselves as
concerned - and are more concerned with the profitability of hazardous waste trade - are
being pressured by neighboring developing countries, who feel threatened by the possibility
of having to share waste dilemmas due to their proximity. This may be the driving force
behind the OAU's insistence on a unified ban to developing countries, even though the Basel
Convention clearly allows individual nations to ban imports of waste. See supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
70. Belize has passed legislation explicitly prohibiting the importation or transit of haz-
ardous wastes, Panama has established criminal penalties to prevent all traffic and imports
of hazardous waste, the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran National Assemblies are considering
bills dealing with hazardous waste trafficking, while Guatemala and Costa Rica have been
criticized by Greenpeace for the loopholes in their laws that prohibit dumping toxic wastes.
See Central American Nations Considering Laws to Restrict or Prohibit Toxic Waste Im-
ports, 14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 551, Oct. 9, 1991.
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as "add[ing] nothing new to the existing rules, and there is little reason to
expect the Convention to impact seriously upon the burgeoning interna-
tional hazardous waste trade.""' A great deal depends upon who partici-
pates in the convention and how they implement its values into their na-
tional legislation, since enforcement of the Convention depends entirely
upon national legislation and each country's enforcement thereof.
A liability mechanism is still not in place for the convention, even
after the first meeting of the contracting parties to the Convention in De-
cember of 1992 in Uruguay to discuss implementation of the convention.
The parties put off important decisions such as liability and compensa-
tion for damages and the creation of mechanisms for full treaty imple-
mentation, giving key countries such as the U.S., Japan, and the Euro-
pean Community more time to implement the Convention.7 2 The former
executive director of the UNEP, which founded the Convention, Mostafa
Tolba, said of these countries' failures to ratify the convention,
"[w]ithout their ratifications and active participation in implementing the
treaty, obviously the Basel Convention will get nowhere." 3 The only de-
veloped nations that have thus far ratified the convention are France, Ca-
nada, Australia, and only six days after the meeting of the parties to the
Convention, Japan also passed a bill to amend domestic laws to enforce
the Basel Convention.
74
The most controversial issue to be addressed at the meeting of the
parties was whether the Convention would implement a ban on exports of
hazardous waste to developing countries. While no hard-line agreement
was reached, to the disappointment of environmental groups, the Uru-
guay meeting ended with a plea for such a ban, while maintaining that
recycling of waste will be permitted. 5 A technical group is also being
formed to create guidelines, give advice on, and have expertise in identi-
fying, evaluating, and safely handling hazardous waste that is labeled
recyclable. 0
Other important issues which were decided at the meeting of the par-
ties were the budget;7 the establishment of a working group to draft a
protocol on liability and accidents involving hazardous waste;"8 the
planned preparation of a manual on how to manage hazardous waste in
an environmentally sound manner; an agreement to create technical
71. Williams, supra note 12, at 301.
72. UNEP Conference Ends Without Calling for Toxic Trade Ban, Int'l Env't Daily
(BNA), Dec. 8, 1992. The European Community is currently in the process of implementa-
tion. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
73. Id.
74. Basel Convention: Bill Approved to Implement Treaty on Trade in Hazardous
Substances, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA), Dec. 11, 1992. This Bill provides for immediate imple-
mentation of the Convention. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. The two-year budget for the Convention will be $4.9 million. Id.
78. A compensation fund was also arranged. Id.
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guidelines on how to dispose of hazardous waste in an "environmentally
acceptable" way; and the consideration of an emergency fund for hazard-
ous waste accidents.79 Thus, as in the past, the key mechanism of the
convention seems to be transfer of information, leaving regulation to the
states.
C. Europe - The European Community
The European Community has felt increased pressure to ratify the
Basel Convention since a second meeting of the parties was set to occur
between February and May of 1994.80 Disagreements between Member
States concerning when to ratify caused initial conflicts.8 ' Denmark, the
Community's current president country, has been a driving force in call-
ing for a ban of all exports of hazardous wastes to developing countries."2
The pronouncement is controversial, and has created greater struggle
within the Community, since the United Kingdom and Germany vehe-
mently oppose the ban.8 Nevertheless, the initial steps towards ratifica-
tion have been taken after a recent Council of Ministers and Parliament
decision to ratify the convention.8 4 It is estimated that it will take as long
as a year to apply the Community Regulation, before which time the Con-
vention cannot be ratified. 5
D. The United States
The United States Congress failed in both the 102nd and 103rd Con-
gresses to accept legislation which would implement the Basel Conven-
tion. The Bush administration's efforts were rejected by Democrats who
didn't feel the language was protective enough.88 Democratic efforts to
draft implementing legislation have gone farther, and compromise legisla-
79. Id.
80. European Report, Dec. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD
File.
81. Id.
82. Denmark itself is not a party to the Convention. Environment: EC Hazardous
Waste Proposal Opposed by Germany, Inter Press Service, March 22, 1993, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. The European Community adopted legislation in
February of 1993 that allows hazardous waste to be labelled as non-hazardous, thus falling
outside the Basel Convention. Green Channel for Toxic Waste, supra note 68.
83. Greenpeace Accuses Germany, Britain of "Toxic Colonialism," Agence France
Presse, March 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. Germany and
the United Kingdom are two of the largest exporters of toxic waste in Europe who have
shipped waste to developing countries. EC: The EC Decides to Sign the Basel Agreement
on the Export of Dangerous Wastes, Reuter Textline, April 24, 1993, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File.
84. See Council Formally Adopts Waste Shipments Regulation, Europe Information
Service, February 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Waste:
Court Refuses to Annul Framework Directive, Europe Information Service, March 30, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
85. Id.
86. INSIDE E.P.A., July 23, 1993, at 15.
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tion has also been attempted.8 7 Progress during the 102nd Congress was
halted by attempts to tie the implementing legislation into the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, which is up for reauthorization. 8 This
proved to be too great a feat for Congress to accomplish in one session.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency has recently been
drafted to aid in this effort.89
Several bills have been proposed that would either require a "no less
strict" standard 0 to fulfill the vague "environmentally sound manage-
ment" language of the Convention, a complete ban on the international
trade of hazardous wastes,"' or require that waste is managed in a manner
"no less strict" than U.S. standards.92 It will take a two-thirds vote from
the Senate to create the necessary changes for ratification of the Basel
Convention. Although the United States would like to participate in the
Convention, most of its trade in hazardous waste is legislated through
bilateral agreements with Canada and Mexico, so there is less pressure for
the United States to ratify at this point. Even so, industry and govern-
ment officials remain concerned that the United States is at a competitive
disadvantage to its trading partners who have ratified the Convention.9 3
Pressure is mounting to meet the March 1994 deadline for the next
meeting.94
The text of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
was released in September of 1992."' Fears that NAFTA would relax U.S.
and Canadian standards and create problems with Mexican border indus-
tries stirred heated debate during the NAFTA negotiations.9 However,
NAFTA itself does not create any hazardous waste regulations and will
not eliminate the current requirement for U.S. industries in Mexico to
export their waste back to the United States.97 NAFTA also prohibits
parties from relaxing environmental regulations to promote investment
and encourages increasingly stringent environmental standards.9 Most
importantly in terms of transboundary hazardous waste trade, NAFTA
will be subject to the Basel Convention, and to the extent it is inconsis-
tent with it, the latter will prevail.9
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. H.R. RES. 2358, The Waste Export Control Act. Kratz, supra note 47, at 329.
91. H.R. RES. 2580, The Waste Export and Import Prohibition Act. This Act is primar-
ily sponsored by environmental groups. Id.
92. S. 1082, The Bush Administration's Proposal. This seems to be most highly favored,
since it is the most middle-of-the-road. Id.
93. INSIDE E.P.A., supra note 86.
94. Id.
95. Environmental Compromise: Striking the Balance Between Trade and Ecology,
Int'l Env't Daily (BNA), Nov. 20, 1992.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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E. Alternatives/Additions to the Current Basel Convention
One commentator has described UNEP as having no "teeth" because
it lacks executive authority, 0 0 and therefore it will not be able to coerce
states into compliance with the Basel Convention. An international envi-
ronmental agency within the United Nations is suggested0 1 that would
have the powers, such as those suggested by the Hague Declaration on
the Environment,0 2 to force countries into compliance, even without
unanimous agreements. Such an innovative, radical solution may be re-
quired to combat the illegal hazardous waste trade or other trade ex-
cluded from the Basel Convention, if we are to take the goals of the con-
vention seriously.
Furthermore, developing countries may have more than a mere right
to environment stake in transboundary dumping of wastes in their terri-
tories because of the potential harmful effects to people and endanger-
ment of their lives such dumping engenders. 0 3 These rights extend into
the arena of human rights, which should be guaranteed to all human be-
ings.0 These rights have been specifically recognized in cases where indi-
viduals have brought petitions to international human rights tribunals al-
leging violations of guaranteed rights as a result of environmental damage
due to hazardous wastes.10 5 Even though the Basel Convention is an at-
tempt to restrict trade in hazardous waste, and does allow countries to
instigate their own bans, it still allows trade under the auspices of re-
cycling, and does not altogether ban exporting hazardous wastes to devel-
oping countries. There remains, therefore, the possibility that industrial-
ized countries may invade the province of these human rights."'
100. Palmer, supra note 3, at 261.
101. Id. at 262.
102. Hague Declaration on the Environment, Mar. 11, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1308
(1989).
103. The Stockholm Declaration implies that the exercise of human rights - other than
the right to environment - requires basic environmental health. Human rights threatened by
environmental deterioration may include the right to life, health, suitable working condi-
tions, an adequate standard of living, and rights to political participation and information.
See Shelton, supra note 1, at 112.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 113.
106. This raises issues of great concern, especially when illegal trade, which may occur
because of lax liability and enforcement standards, results in unthinkable human rights vio-
lations. For instance, attempts have recently been made to dump shipments of hazardous
waste (500,000 tons) in Somalia, after an illegal agreement was made between a Swiss firm
and a Somali official. Somalia is currently in a state of war and famine. The former UNEP
Executive Director, Mostafa Talba, said "[tihe Somali affair should remind us that wherever
there is human suffering, there is someone ready to make a profit." UNEP Official Urges
African Nations to Approve Basel Accord on Waste Shipments, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
654, Oct. 7, 1992.
Such outrageous actions by multi-national corporations are precisely why stronger ac-
tion must be taken to halt the problem of transboundary dumping of hazardous wastes in
developing countries.
VOL. 22:1
BASEL CONVENTION
The concept of an international environmental institution with real
"teeth," combined with the possibility that the deleterious effects on the
environment and humans by hazardous waste might be recognized as a
human right protected under international law, could be the necessary
solution to the inequities of hazardous waste trade.
IV. CONCLUSION
The UNEP and signatory states to the Basel Convention should be
applauded for their attempts and accomplishments toward creating a
workable system of regulation for the transboundary movements of haz-
ardous wastes. However, they should be wary of allowing the economic
goals underlying some of the vagaries of the Convention's provisions to
override the basic human rights entailed in charging developing countries
with handling hazardous wastes. The developed countries of the world
have learned their lesson of the dangers involved in hazardous substances
through instances such as the Bhopal, Seveso, and Basel chemical leaks,
and the lessons learned were hard and tragic, and cost many human lives.
Now industrialized nations are largely unwilling to deal with the many
wastes they create and would prefer to export them to developing coun-
tries who lack the infrastructure to adequately understand or manage the
wastes with which they are entrusted.
The Basel Convention, while a good step forward, is not a universal
panacea. As industrialized nations, we have a responsibility to protect the
human rights of the many citizens of developing countries whose govern-
ments may choose to accept hazardous waste for money or to build indus-
try through recycling. While the Basel Convention has shown clear intent
to control such situations, after the first meeting of the parties has con-
vened there still is no ban on hazardous wastes exported into developing
countries, and the vague language that allows room for varying national
interpretations and other bilateral agreements could provide a loophole
for abuse of developing countries by multi-national corporations.
Furthermore, as the discussion of liability under the convention has
been put off another year, and since the UNEP lacks actual enforcement
capabilities, developing countries or other states may be left without a
remedy if a state refuses to accept responsibility for the actions of its
multi-national corporations or, as we have seen elsewhere in international
law, hides under the principle of sovereign immunity. In these situations
the international community may be left virtually powerless to force a
remedy. The world community should therefore establish an Interna-
tional Environmental Agency to enforce the regulations through actual
police power, and strict guidelines for liability should be outlined. Finally,
even if these measures are instigated, the Basel Convention will be virtu-
ally meaningless to the international community without implementation
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by the United States and the European Community and willingness by
the industrialized nations to allow humanitarian concerns to override na-
tionalistic economic motives for maintaining loopholes and lax standards.
Diana L. Godwin*
* J.D. Candidate, University of Denver College of Law, 1994; B.A., Anthropology and
Communication, University of Colorado at Denver, 1991.
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DRAETTA, UGO, RALPH B. LAKE AND VED P. NANDA, BREACH
AND ADAPTATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, But-
terworth Legal Publishers, St. Paul (1992); ($100.00); ISBN 0-88063-750-
1; 214 pp. (hardcover).
Breach and Adaptation of International Contracts analyzes various
legal principles that are applied to international contracts to deal with
situations in which a contract's performance does not develop as ex-
pected. It attempts to discuss whether these principles, which are com-
mon within national legal systems, are adapted in unique ways in the in-
ternational arena by drafters of international contracts or by those who
deal with international contractual problems after they arise.
In searching for these unique international adaptations, the authors
first compare the same principles in civil and common law systems. They
then attempt to determine the extent to which these principles have been
"delocalized" in the international setting, i.e. delocalized by embodying
modifications to the national rules in a way that transforms the principles
into ones that are to some extent autonomous and not reliant on a na-
tional system for enforcement. The authors attempt to determine
whether and to what extent a separate body of "delocalized" or interna-
tional contract principles has developed in the international law context,
calling it the Lex Mercatoria, or new merchant law.
The authors lay the groundwork for their analysis by identifying the
special aspects of international contracts that distinguish them from
wholly domestic contracts. This brief, but cogent discussion sets the stage
for the author's repeated observations that established domestic legal
* Principal and Chair of International Department: Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Ben-
nett, P.A.; Vice Chair of Committee X: International Bar Association; J.D. and M.B.A. Uni-
versity of Wisconsin; B.A. Northwestern University.
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principles in any national system do not adequately address the circum-
stances that are unique in trans-national situations.
The first chapter also introduces the concept of the Lex Mercatoria,
the notion that business practices can evolve independently of national
legal systems to eventually comprise a system of rules that are autono-
mous in their existence, and in their enforcement, from the legal systems
of the contracting parties. The authors note that elements of such a law
merchant can be found in the development of uniform international laws
(e.g. the Vienna Convention on International Sales), standard form inter-
national contracts or clauses (e.g., INCOTERMS of the International
Chamber of Commerce), special standard trade practices within indus-
tries (e.g., I.C.C. Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Cred-
its), and arbitral decisions that are not necessarily based on national laws
(e.g., arbitrators exercising their power as amiable compositeurs).
The book identifies many standard legal concepts that relate to con-
tract situations in which performance is not complete. For example, the
authors discuss the elements of breach, the remedies for breach, the
quantification of damages, the limitations of liability due to force majeure
or other reasons, and the contractual self-protections against breach. For
each concept, definitions and treatment of the principle within the com-
mon law and civil law systems of the Lex Mercatoria are provided to de-
termine to what extent extra-national definition and treatment (usage)
patterns can be discerned.
For example, Chapter Three examines principles used in different le-
gal systems to quantify the measure of damages once entitlement to dam-
ages due to breach has been established. The authors discuss common law
principles/approaches. Within that discussion, the authors distinguish the
similar approaches under English and United States law. Civil law princi-
ples for damage assessment are then discussed and contrasted with ap-
proaches under English law.
Having laid this groundwork, the authors then attempt to determine
special international trade practices that have evolved to quantify dam-
ages once entitlement has been established.
The authors discuss the use of terms such as "consequential dam-
ages" and "indirect" damages. Several interesting observations are made
regarding confusions in meaning that can result from the use of one of
these terms outside of the national legal system in which the term's
meaning has been developed, e.g. use of "consequential damages" outside
the context of the United States legal system. The authors draw some
conclusions in this chapter as to basic rules that may be derived by exam-
ining international arbitration decisions.
In other chapters, the authors analyze numerous other principles that
relate to incomplete fulfillment of contract requirements. For each chap-
ter, the same approach is taken as in Chapter Three: definition of the
principle, discussion of its special importance in international situations,
treatment of the principle under common law and civil law, and analysis
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of the principle to discover if it has been modified in definition or appli-
cation in the international context, thus supporting the notion that there
is indeed an evolving Lex Mercatoria that is independent, to some extent,
of any national legal system.
Although the book is largely academic and perhaps theoretical in its
style, it does have practical value to an international law practitioner. It
identifies approaches that have been taken in contract drafting to cope
with the special qualities of an international contract setting. It illustrates
the difficulty of achieving a true meeting of the minds when contracting
parties come from different legal systems, systems which do not use the
same approaches or definitions when addressing a given issue.
The authors' suggestion that there are unique common threads of in-
ternational contract practices and principles is perhaps more a matter of
style than a matter of practical substance. Each reader of this book can
evaluate the evidence presented and draw his or her own conclusions. The
benefit of the authors' presentation lies more in their analysis than in
their conclusions. The authors' tendency to draw conclusions from rela-
tively scant evidence of published arbitral decisions detracts somewhat
from the credibility of their insightful observations.
The book distills many difficult concepts and distinctions into rela-
tively brief and abstract discussion. Expanding the explanations of the
principles addressed would enhance readability. Presenting more case il-
lustrations of the principles addressed would also greatly assist the reader
in grasping the ideas presented. As written, the book requires more ana-
lytical energy from the reader than many would care to expend.
The book should be of particular interest to academicians who have
an interest in international trade or contract issues and particularly those
who follow the debate over the existence of a Lex Mercatoria. However, it
should also be of interest to the practitioner who has more than a superfi-
cial interest in international contract issues. Some ideas presented in the
book are obviously those of writers with real and extensive practical in-
ternational trade law experience. The authors' presentation will challenge
reading practitioners to re-evaluate some of their approaches in dealing
with day-to-day international contract issues.
All in all, the book contains an interesting blend of academic, theo-
retical and practical concepts. It succeeds in offering new insights for its
readers, regardless of the varied perspectives those readers possess.
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BENVENISTI, EYAL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPA-
TION; Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (1993); ($29.95); ISBN
0-691-05666-8; 241 pp. (hardcover) Index.
Eyal Benvenisti charts the history of the law of occupation, examines
contemporary responses to it, and prescribes guidelines for the lawful
management of occupation in this thorough introduction to the topic.
One chapter is devoted exclusively to the Israeli occupation of the Golan
Heights, West Bank, Gaza, and the Sinai. Another chapter examines a
plethora of occupations that have occurred in the past twenty-three years,
including those in Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Bangladesh. Mr. Benvenisti,
a lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, offers a historical view
of enforcing international occupation law before concluding with his own
response to lawfully monitoring an occupied territory in view of the diffi-
culties of enforcing customary international law.
A framework of applicable international law provides the background
for the author's discussion. Two documents have generally been recog-
nized as the customary law on the law of occupation: Article 43 of the
1907 Hague Regulations and its successor, Article 64 of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention. Article 43 imposes a general responsibility on the occu-
pying power to maintain public order and unless prevented, respect the
laws of the occupied country. Early attitudes toward Article 43 viewed
occupation as a transient situation, eventually leading to territorial con-
cessions by the defeated party. However, as time passed, the economic
and political rifts between occupier and occupant lead to profound eco-
nomic stagnation, among other problems. Article 64 attempted to enforce
Article 43, and the author argues, introduce new elements into the law of
occupation, such as further delineation of an occupier's duties.
Benvenisti's examination of the occupied Israeli territories is suc-
cinct, without sacrificing the relevant historical facts. He discusses both
the judicial and economic response to the occupations, briefly mentioning
the import, export, taxation, and employment ramifications. He is obvi-
ously comfortable with his history here, describing all facets of the occu-
pation, from the Jewish settlements to the applicable international law.
The chapter on "Occupations Since the 1970s and Recent Interna-
tional Prescriptions" is no less interesting or informative. From the Iraqi
occupation of Kuwait to the Indian occupation of Bangladesh, Benvenisti
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peruses the globe in his assessment of the legality and policies of various
invasions. Because he covers so many occupations, he limits his discussion
of each country to a page, tying up the loose ends in his analysis at the
end of the chapter.
In his final two chapters, the author discusses the success of existing
institutions in enforcing international occupation law and offers his own
recommendations on enforcement policies. He suggests the main problem
of supranational tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice, is
the obvious lack of states' consent to have occupation issues adjudicated.
In addition to international covenants and agreements, Benvenisti advises
that the "most promising concerted and hence powerful reaction to un-
lawful occupation measures is the collective power behind international
global and regional organizations." In his concluding remarks Benvenisti
outlines the duties and powers of the occupying force, leaving the reader
with his hope that deficiencies in current occupation law "will pave the
way for the creation of international institutions [designated to monitor
and enforce international occupation law]."
Lisa B. Berkowitz
CLAPES, ANTHONY LAWRENCE, SOFTWARS: THE LEGAL BAT-
TLES FOR CONTROL OF THE GLOBAL SOFTWARE INDUSTRY;
Quorum Books, Westport, CT (1993); ISBN 0-89930-597-0; 325 pp.
(hardcover) Index.
The title of Mr. Clapes' latest effort, Softwars, refers to the debate
over how much proprietary protection should be granted to the creators
of computer programs. The literal elements of software, source and object
code, are widely established as proper subjects for copyright protection.
But the debate rages fierce-in courtrooms, legislatures, and professional
symposia throughout the industrialized world-over the extent copyrights
protect the nonliteral elements; i.e. "look and feel," "structure sequence
and organization," and user interface.
To what extent does the copyright protect the screen displays,
menus, audio input and response, assignment of function keys, command
language, use of color, and iconography of a software package? When are
these elements capable of such limited expression that they merge into
the unprotected idea of the program? Is software predominantly utilita-
rian, with a limited number of efficient methods of operation for a given
use? Or is software more artistic and creative, with endless possibility for
expressive variation?
These legal issues cannot be separated from the public policy ques-
tion. Will the broad protection of software maximize innovation by sup-
plying the impetus to create, or will it unnecessarily stifle the free flow of
information and thereby curtail innovation? "One side in the softwars
vigorously avers that without strong legal protection for computer pro-
grams, the industry will stagnate. The other side swears that unless legal
protection for computer programs is weakened, a few large monopolists
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will inherit the entire business." Depending on the context, the large
American software producers, who dominate the worldwide industry, tend
to be strong protectionists. Large Japanese and European producers, as
well as smaller American companies, whose success largely depends on
product compatibility with standards developed by the industry giants,
tend to be weak protectionists.
Mr. Clapes' "tour of the battlefield" begins with a detailed look at
the landmark "look and .feel" cases, including Lotus Development Corpo-
ration v. Paperback Software International, which helped establish that
copyright protection extends to nonliteral elements of a program. In addi-
tion to the legal analysis, the author provides the industry context in
which these cases are argued, including licensing strategies and the place
of litigation in the overall business plan. By supplying a healthy dose of
context and background throughout the book, Mr. Clapes enables his di-
verse audience of lawyers, business people, and programmers to appreci-
ate one another's perspective.
Softwars is global, and the battles rage beyond American courts.
Microsoft Corporation v. Shuuwa System Trading K.K., heard in the To-
kyo District Court, relates to the reverse engineering controversy; i.e. to
what extent does a copyright prevent competitors from dissecting a
software package in order to produce a competitive product? Another
case receiving international attention from the software industry, argued
before the Federal Court of Appeal in Melbourne, Australia, involved the
piracy of an Autodesk, Inc. program.
The attempt to develop uniform copyright laws throughout the
emerging European Community represents another battleground for
Softwars. In the early 1990s, as an EC directive on reverse engineering of
software was being formulated, lobbyists from around the world de-
scended on Brussels. The weak protectionists, lead by Fujitsu and some
large European companies, formed the European Committee for Inter-
operable Systems (ECIS). ECIS was opposed by the Software Action
Group for Europe (SAGE), which predominantly consists of large Ameri-
can corporations and the Software Protection Agency.
The "reports from the front" that comprise this book are interesting
and enlightening but one-sided. As Assistant General Counsel at IBM,
Mr. Clapes does not hide his viewpoint. He states, somewhat facetiously,
"that he is not likely to write anything that will get him fired." The very
words he uses to describe the battle lines-"innovators" versus "copy-
ists," "clones," and "imitators"-lead readers to wonder, at times,
whether the author is a "war correspondent reporting from the front"
(author's words) or a propagandist writing from central headquarters.
However, Mr. Clapes offers strong arguments for his side and usually
presents the counterarguments.
At this juncture in the softwars, legal protection for software is
slightly stronger in America than in Europe and Japan. It is Mr. Clapes'
well argued opinion that the continuing predominance of American com-
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panies in the global software industry is inextricably bound to the contin-
ued strength of American intellectual property rights in software.
Greg S. Weber
CORTEN, OLIVIER AND KLEIN, PIERRE, DROIT D'INGERENCE
OU OBLIGATION DE REACTION (RIGHT OF INTERFERENCE OR
OBLIGATION TO REACT?); Bruylant Publishing, University of Brus-
sels, Brussels, Belgium (1992); FB 1.868 ($55.00); ISBN 2-8027-0599-7;
283 pp. (softcover).
The thesis of this book lies in the notion that the right of interfer-
ence stems from the classic international law's inability to effectively in-
sure the respect of human rights inside nations. This treatise by Olivier
Corten and Pierre Klein presents a comprehensive view of the law of the
right of interference for human rights violations as it exists today and
provides a look at the direction the law seems to be taking in the future.
As Professor Jean Salmon of the University of Brussels remarks in
his introduction, the right of interference is an integral part of the new
world order of which so much is made. Yet, in spite of countless debates
over its place in international law, the right remains a rather vague no-
tion. Not only do Corten and Klein wonderfully define the right of inter-
ference in a clear and concise manner, they also illustrate each doctrine or
definition with concrete and often recent events.
One of this book's appealing features is the ingenuity of its authors,
who do not hesitate to confront the fact that political reasons often lie
behind publicly claimed humanitarian concerns.
They also do not hesitate to present a wide range of worldwide think-
ers and their ideas, offering contradicting theories of various issues. They
analyze the legality of interventions under the U.N. Charter as well as
regional agreements such as the E.E.C. or the O.A.S. charters.
The book presents a wide array of reactions to the violations of
human rights that are actually permissible under international law. These
reactions vary from economic sanctions to armed intervention through
the U.N. Security Council. The authors argue for the use of these alterna-
tives over the unilateral right of interference that has proven bloody in
the past (for example during the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in
1979).
In the second chapter of the book's second part, examples of the vio-
lations of human rights occurring during the civil war that raged in
Somalia starting in 1991 are discussed. Because this book was written in
1992, the authors could not have included (or foreseen) the U.N.-led in-
tervention in that conflict. Instead, they stated that Security Council Res-
olution 688 (in which the Council asked all member states, among other
things, to help provide humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi population)
was an isolated incident and not the emergence of a "new right of inter-
ference", because no one seemed interested in invoking the Resolution
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again in order to help the population of Somalia. History has proven
them wrong in the intervention that ensued. Should we then infer the
emergence of a "new right of interference" in the form of armed humani-
tarian interventions led by the U.N. Security Council? Perhaps the au-
thors will soon address this question in a follow-up volume.
Geraldine J. Cummins
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL AP-
PRAISAL; Edited by Philip Alston; Oxford University Press, New York
(1992); ISBN 0-19-825450-4; 675 pp. (hardcover).
In this book, Alston has compiled sixteen essays, each analyzing and
assessing a different aspect or subdivision of the United Nations' human
rights regime. This medium provides the impetus for an insightful and
thought-provoking treatment of the growth and status of human rights in
the United Nations. Additionally, a multitude of instruments, institu-
tions, and bodies are treated, leaving the reader with a solid working
knowledge of current issues and access to many avenues for further
exploration.
The book is divided into three sections: "UN Charter-Based Organs,"
"Organs Monitoring Treaty Compliance," and "Other Issues." The first
section contains eight essays, each analyzing a separate body relative to
the global pursuit of human rights. Essays by Antonio Cassese and John
Quinn each discuss the role assumed by the General Assembly in the
human rights arena. Cassese presents a historic evaluation of the General
Assembly, taking into account political and structural factors that have
played significant roles during the first forty years of General Assembly
existence. Quinn discusses General Assembly action in the 1990's and
evaluates the current situation of this organ. Other commissions dis-
cussed in this section include the Security Council, the Economic and So-
cial Council, and several other relevant commissions.
The second section of the book is devoted to an analysis of five sepa-
rate committees established to oversee the implementation of their re-
spective human rights instruments. Karl Partsch assesses the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, presenting both a view as to
the formation and evolution of the Committee and suggestions as to how
the Committee could become more effective. The essay by Philip Alston
charts the history of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, identifies obstacles and weaknesses facing the Committee, and
proposes specific solutions to many of the problems he assesses. Addi-
tional essays examine the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, and the Committee
Against Torture. The strength of this section of the book lies in its sys-
tematic evaluation of the various representative committees and identifi-
cation of areas for improvement in light of their given purposes.
The final section of the book contains three separate essays: "The
Role of the United Nations Secretariat" by Theo Van Boven, "Lessons
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from the Experience of the International Labour Organisation" by Vir-
ginia Leary, and "Human Rights Co-ordination within the UN System"
by Klaus Samson. Van Boven's piece identifies the various obligations as-
sumed by the Secretariat with respect to the promotion of human rights
and examines the roles of the International Civil Service, the Center for
Human Rights, and the Executive Head for Human Rights Secretariat.
This piece is particularly useful in light of the preceding treatment of the
other main organs of the United Nations.
The United Nations and Human Rights is an invaluable source of
information on the development and current posture of the United Na-
tions' human rights regime. This value is two-fold. On the one hand the
book, read as a whole, paints a detailed picture of the pursuit of human
rights within the United Nations system. On the other hand the essays,
when considered as independent pieces, provide keen descriptions, assess-
ments, and evaluations of their subjects.
In sum, Alston's insightful compilation on the workings of the cur-
rent United Nations' human rights regime should not go unread by seri-
ous students of international human rights.
William G. Klain
VOL. 22:1
